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Introduction
In the United States and many other countries, the convicted
criminal is subject to both direct and indirect sanctions that greatly
restrict his civil and proprietary rights. In addition to a possible prison
sentence, he may experience numerous civil disabilities during and after
release from prison. In many states, for example, the convicted criminal
may lose such rights and privileges as voting, holding offices of public
and private trust, and serving as a juror. The criminal offender also may
lose his family by divorce or adoption proceedings resulting from his
conviction. He may have difficulty managing his property, entering
contracts and obtaining insurance, bonding, and pensions. Ex-convicts
also may be barred from a broad range of government regulated and
private employment.
Many of the statutes imposing civil disabilities are the remnants of
a feudal past and appear to serve little useful function in modern times.'
Unfortunately, scant research has been devoted to the extent and effect
of civil disability laws. This lack of research is alarming since each in-
dividual in the United States is directly or indirectly affected by the
millions of persons restricted by these statutes. It has been estimated
that more than two million new offenders are received in prisons and
juvenile training Schools or placed on probation each year,2 and the
national crime index continues to rise at an alarming rate. A significant
number of convicted criminals return to crime upon release from prison.'
According to a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation study of 94,467
persons arrested for serious crimes in the years 1967 and 1968, some 70
percent had prior convictions and nearly one-half had served prison
terms. These figures illustrate dramatically the inadequacy of current
I. This Project includes a review of the historical origin of civil disabilities. Frequently,
historical analysis shows that the philosophy and environment that engendered certain laws are no
longer present, yet the laws remain. Describing this phenomenon, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. observed: "A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this.
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of
centuries the customs, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The reason which gave
rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be
accounted for." 0. HOLMES, JR.,THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at v (1967).
3. Estimates of recidivism rates among first offenders range from 1/3 to 2/3.See D. GLASER,
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964). More recent studies indicate
that roughly 1/3 of all offenders released from prison return within 5 years. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 2 at 45.
4. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS 36 (1968).
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correctional and rehabilitation methods. It is clear that the war on
crime will fail unless post-release failures are greatly reduced.
Numerous studies have sought to determine the causes of high
recidivism rates. A leading authority has concluded that the post-release
conditions invariably associated with a prisoner's return to crime are
economic deprivation and failure to integrate into non-criminal social
groups.5 The federal government and a number of states recently have
taken steps to alleviate these conditions by instituting various programs
directed at rehabilitation of convicted criminals.6 It is clear that these
efforts must be accompanied by a comprehensive evaluation of the role
civil disability laws play in rehabilitating convicted criminals. The
following Project undertakes this crucial task.
5. D. GLASER, supra note 3 at402.
6. See S. REP. No. 613, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965), discussed in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG, &
AD. NEws 3076.
Part One: Survey of the Law
This survey is an attempt to portray in graphic detail the entire
body of statutory and decisional law that gives rise to the civil
consequences of a criminal conviction. The survey begins with a review
of the historical development of civil disabilities. Next, the more
common definitional and interpretional problems that have
characterized this area of the law are detailed. With this background, the
survey proceeds to examine the numerous rights and privileges that'are
either suspended or forfeited upon conviction. Among the activities
surveyed are the right to vote, hold public office, and obtain public
employment and professional licenses. The survey also considers the
property, judicial, and domestic rights lost by the convicted person as
well as the effect of a criminal conviction on the offender's ability to
participate in insurance, pension, and workmen's compensation
programs. The survey concludes with an examination of the existing
procedures by which civil disabilities may be removed. In most
instances, both federal laws and the laws of every state have been
researched and recorded. In a few situations, representative samplings
were believed sufficiently illustrative. The survey does not purport to be
exhaustive. It is doubtful whether a complete exposition of the pervasive
scheme of disabilities is possible. It is believed, nevertheless, that this
survey is an accurate and reasonably comprehensive view of the
collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. More importantly, it
provides the basis for what is believed to be a realistic evaluation of the
scope and operation of laws that deprive convicted criminals of civil
rights and privileges long after they have paid their debt to society.
I. HISTORY AND THEORY OF CIVIL DISABILITIES
A. Ancient Greece and Rome, Medieval Europe
Civil disabilities as a consequence of crime can be traced to ancient
Greece. The Greeks called the disability "infamy." Criminals
pronounced infamous were prohibited from appearing in court, voting,
making speeches, attending assemblies, and serving in the army.1 In light
of the nature of Greek society, which applauded one's loyalty and service
to his city-state and placed great emphasis on the right of citizenship,
there is little doubt that "infamy" was employed as a retributive
measure to punish the criminal for his crime against society. In addition,
1. See Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 351 (1968).
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since "infamy" entailed the loss of the rights most valued by society,2 it
is likely that this punishment was employed not only for its penal effect,
but also for its deterrent value. The Romans of a later age adopted the
Greek practice of "infamy" and refined it into laws imposing specific
disabilities that were quite similar to those of modern America.3 In the
Roman Empire, as in Greek society, citizenship and its related rights
were highly valued.4 By employing the loss of civil rights as a penal
measure, the penologists of that day certainly realized the deterrent value
of the social degradation that accompanied civil disabilities.-
Roman legal concepts accompanied the expansion of the Roman
Empire. By the time the Empire was finally dissolved, the Germanic
tribes of Europe and England had incorporated civil disabilities into
their primitive penal systems. Civil disabilities were imposed through a
method known as "outlawry." Although the practice of this penal
method varied throughout Europe, the form that developed in Anglo-
Saxon England was generally typical. "Outlawry" was a form of
community retaliation against the criminal. The criminal had declared
war on the community by violating the laws that regulated society. The
community, therefore, had the right to retaliate by whatever means it
deemed appropriate. In this early age the retaliation was so severe that
the criminal rarely escaped death.6 Not only did the criminal risk his life,
but he also lost all his civil and proprietary rights.' Thus, on the eve of
the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, civil disabilities resulting
from criminal conviction were an integral part of a penal system that
was retributive in theory and excessively punitive in practice.
B. English Criminal Jurisprudence: 1066-1870
1. Nature of Civil Disabilities.-As a direct result of this heritage,
civil disabilities in England between 1066 and 1870 were imposed
through a procedure that was similar to the ancient practice of
"outlawry," but which developed into a penal sanction with distinct
characteristics of its own. The procedure was denoted "attainder," and
the criminal who was convicted of treason or a felony was declared
2. See W. FOWLER, THE CITY-STATE OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS 163-70 (192 1).
3. See Damaska, supra note 1, at 351.
4. See J. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 255-56, 259 (1967); J. GRANRUD, ROMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 86-87 (1901); R. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 75 (1942).
5. Damaska, supra note 1, at 351.
6. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 447 (1895). For a
description of outlawry in England see Richards, Is Outlawry Obsolete? 18 L.Q. REV. 297 (1902);
Cf PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1321 (1964).
7. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at447.
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"attainted." The immediate consequences of attainder were forfeiture,
corruption of blood, and loss of all civil rights.' This forfeiture of
civil and proprietary rights was commonly referred to as "civil
death," which, in practice, became synonymous With attainder. In
theory, forfeiture entailed the loss of one's real and personal pro-
perty through escheatage to the King of England or to the criminal's
mesne lord.? According to the doctrine of corruption of blood,
based on the fiction that the criminal's act was evidence that he and his
entire family were corrupt and therefore unworthy of being feudal
tenants, the criminal theoretically could not transfer his property by
either grant or devise. 0 In actual practice, however, the application of
both forfeiture and corruption of blood deviated substantially from the
prescribed procedure. The attainted criminal was not immediately
divested of his property; he retained possession of it until "office
found,"" which was the procedure by which the king claimed ownership.
Until the king's assertion of ownership, the criminal could transfer his
property by devise or contract, subject to the king's superior right, and
receive property by grant or devise. 2 Therefore, although attainder did
not extinguish all of the criminal's rights, it was not a mere legal fiction
since the criminal was divested of many civil rights, such as the right to
sue, appear in court as a witness or juror, and hold public office. 3
Contemporaneous with the development of attainder as a form of
civil death was the development of another form of civil death which was
not, as most frequently applied, related to criminal conduct. This form
of civil death was applicable in only three situations: the monk
professed, adjuration, and banishment." The most frequently applied
was the monk professed, which arose when a person made vows to serve
the church and entered a monastery. The professing individual was
immediately divested of all his real and personal property as if he had
physically died.' 5 Although this person was stripped of his proprietary
8. 4 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *389.
9. Id.
10. See Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317,324, 18 N.E. 148, 150 (1888).
I. Nichols v. Nichols, 75 Eng. Rep. 711, 717 (K.B. 1575).
12. SeeAvery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 324-26, 18 N.E. 148, 150-51 (1888).
13. Id.
14. The disability accompanying the monk professed is the most important because it was a
more frequent occurrence than either adjuration or banishment. Adjuration was the procedure by
which a criminal escaped punishment if he swore to leave the country forever. Banishment was a
legislative act of Parliament which denounced the person "attainted" and banished him from the
country. This method was seldom employed. Id. at 328, 18 N.E. at 152.
15. The monk professed was divested of all his property on the theory that since he had
rejected the secular world, with all its privileges and obligations, and pledged his allegiance to the
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rights, he was not considered civilly dead in the eyes of the law, for he
could carry on many activities as the agent of his superior abbot. The
monk, for example, often represented the abbot in court and at the trade
fairs and markets. 6 Thus, while civil death of the monk professed did
impose civil disabilities, it, like attainder, was more severe in theory than
in practice.
2. Factors Promoting Civil Disabilities.-Civil disabilities in
England were the product of a criminal jurisprudence based on
retribution and deterrence, economic changes brought by the growth of
capitalism,' 7 and the humanitarian influence of the Age of
Enlightenment.
(a) Retribution and deterrence.-The primary goals of English
criminal jurisprudence were retribution and deterrence. 8 The retributive
element was derived from the Anglo-Saxon belief that the criminal,
having injured society, was an outcast who deserved nothing less than the
full punitive sanction. During this period there was little attempt to
understand the nature of the criminal personality. 9 Civil disabilities
were in harmony with this ancient emphasis on retribution since the
criminal's loss -of civil and proprietary rights resulted in social isolation
that, in itself, was punishment. Attainder and its collateral conse-
quences, therefore, achieved the retributive aims of punishment and
isolation of the criminal from society.20
The deterrent value of a penal sanction was important to the early
English penologists because of the rapid increase in the crime rate on
several occasions during this period.21 To curb these increases in criminal
activity and the consequent threat to the public order and security, the
authorities utilized two methods that they believed had the greatest
deterrent effect. The principal penal-sanction was the death penalty that
spiritual world, he should be denied the rights and privileges that belong to the members of secular
society. Id. at 327, 18 N.E. at 152.
16. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 419. Some of the shrewdest businessmen
at the fairs were monks. Id.
17. The phrase "growth of capitalism" as used in this section means the transition of the
English economy from a feudal, agriculturally-oriented economy to an urban, industrial nation.
This transition began in the fourteenth century and reached its conclusion in the Industrial
Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. B. SUVIRANTA, THE THEORY OF THE
BALANCE OF TRADE IN ENGLAND 1 (1967).
18. A. BABINGTON, THE POWER TO SILENCE 5 (1968); A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 83-86 (1966).
19. Cf. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1945).
20. See A. BABINGTON, supra note 18, at 44.
21. The crime rate increased significantly during the 2 periods in which England experienced
the rise of a large, impoverished urban population. G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER. PUNISHMENT
AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 11-18,84-95 (1939). See notes 30-34 infra and accompanying text.
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was imposed for the most trifling offenses. Not only was the death
penalty frequently imposed, but the methods of execution became
inhumanly brutal.2 The second penal method employed for its deterrent
effect was the public degradation of the criminal that had long been
recognized as an effective penal sanction of deterrent value.?
Accordingly, early English lawmakers used various means to degrade
the criminal in the public's eye. The authorities, for example, publicized
executions by encouraging large, enthusiastic crowds to watch the
spectacle. 21 The use of stigmatic mutilations,31 furthermore, made the
criminal easily identifiable in society with the result that it was difficult
for him to find honest employment. The belief in social degradation as
a deterrent also can be seen in the frequent use of less severe
punishments, such as stocks, pillory, whipping, and the so-called "poetic
punishments." 2 Similarly, the practice of attainder served as a deterrent
because the deprivation of the criminal's civil and propreitary rights
brought public degradation and a resulting loss of status for both the
criminal and his family.29
(b) Changes in economic conditions.-The rise of capitalism,
beginning in England with the fall of feudalism and continuing into the
Industrial Revolution, brought three economic changes that had a
substantial impact on the development of the English penal system.
(i) Creation of a large, impoverished urban mass.-The creation
of a large, impoverished urban mass bred criminal activity and
significantly affected the English penal system.? The transition from a
22. W. MIDDENDORFF, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNISHMENT 22 (1968); 1 L. RADZINOWICZ,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 720 (1948). It is recorded that 72,000 criminals were
hanged during the reign of Henry VIII in the sixteenth century. During the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, vagabonds were hanged in groups of 300 and 400. G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER. supra
note 21, at 19. In 1819 it was reported that 180 offenses were punishable by death. A. BABINGTON,
supra note 18, at 39.
23. The death penalty was executed by hanging, beheading, burning at the stake, boiling
alive, and mutilation of the criminal's body. G. IVES, A HISTORY OF PENAL METHODS 14-15 (1914);
2 J. REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 352 (2d ed. 1787).
24. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 319 (7th ed. 1966);
Damaska, supra note 1, at 351.
25. A. BABINGTON, supra note 18, at40; G. RUSCHE & O. KIRCHHEIMER. supra note 21, at 21.
26. These mutilations, often quite brutal, included: the branding of the criminal's cheek, E.
SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, supra note 24, at 319; and the mutilation of hands, ears, tongue, and
other body parts, G. IVES, supra note 23, at 15.
27. G. RuscRE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER. supra note 21, at 19-20.
28. See G. IVES, supra note 23, at 54-57; Damaska, supra note 1, at 351. Poetic punishments
were not really punishment in the true sense of the word, but rather were methods used to expose the
criminal to public ridicule and loss of status. Making a seller of rotten fish wear a rotten fish around
his neck is an example of a poetic punishment.
29. 4 W. BLACKSTONE. supra note 8, at *531.
30. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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feudal society to an urban, commercially oriented society created this
downtrodden urban mass. This transition began in the fourteenth
century and gained momentum in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as
industry and commerce expanded. 31 Many persons, who heretofore had
been bound by feudal obligations, migrated to the urban centers that
offered bright but illusory hopes of success and prosperity. As the
population of the cities swelled, the masses sank deeper into poverty
32
because they were overcome by unemployment and economic barriers
erected by the established businessmen.3 The hardship of the urban
masses was heightened by the development of the Industrial Revolution
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This phenomenon brought
unemployment to many people as manufacturers replaced men with
machines. As the unemployment rate soared, the economic position of
the urban working class declined correspondingly.u
(ii) Scarcity of labor.-By the late sixteenth century, industry and
commerce in England were flourishing, and the English economy was
developing by expanding both internal and external markets.3 This
expansion of the economy opened up new employment positions, and
thereby created a demand for labor that could not be met by the existing
labor supply.3 It did not take the imaginative new bourgeoisie long to
realize that there existed within its midst an untapped labor source-the
mass of criminals and vagabonds who were confined in prison until they
paid their fines.3 7 The exploitation of this labor source began
immediately. The vehicle of exploitation was the house of correction.3
Criminals 39 sent to the houses of correction often received vocational
31. See 1 E. LIPSON, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND 402-05, 413 (1926); B. SUVIRANTA,
supra note 17, at 1.
32. 2 W. CUNNINGHAM, THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE 45 (1925); 3
E. LIPSON, supra note 31, at410.
33. See G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 21, at 11,26.
34. Id. at 86-88.
35. See 2 W. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 32, at 25-27; J. HORROCKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
MERCANTILISM 46-47 (1942); 1 E. LIPSON, supra note 3 1, at 502-06.
36. Two factors created a shortage of labor in England. First, several foreign wars and
internal conflicts had diminished the population. Secondly, the existing poor laws forced paupers,
who comprised the majority of tile large urban mass, back into their native towns where there was
no opportunity for employment. G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 21, at 25-26.
37. During this period of history prisons were used to confine the criminal before his trial and
to detain him until he paid his fine. Prisons did not exist as a means ofpunishment. This practice is
expressed in the Latin phrase carcer enim ad continendos homines non ad puniendos haberi debet
(prisons exist only in order to keep men, not to punish them). Id. at 62.
38. The first house of correction was the Bridewell, which was established in London in 1555.
Id. at 41.
39. At first only vagabonds and petty criminals were sent to the houses of correction. Later,
however, more serious offenders were givin long prison sentences. Id. at 42.
[Vol. 23
CIVIL DISABILITIES
training and then were either forced to work in the shops of the
correctional institution or hired out to private businessmen. Some
historians have suggested that these houses of correction performed a
rehabilitative function. By providing training and jobs for men who had
never worked before, imprisonment would enable the criminal to lead a
law-abiding, productive life upon release.40 Yet, this rehabilitative
function undoubtedly was not the primary objective of the houses of
correction. The correctional institutions existed principally for the
purpose of exploiting an available labor supply. 41 If the criminal was
rehabilitated in the process, this was a fortunate by-product, for he
would then join the free labor force and thereby aid the development of
the economy.
(iii) Critical need for revenue.-The transition of English society
from a feudal to an urban society was characterized by the rising
importance of money. In feudal society money was relatively
insignificant because the necessities of life were provided to the lord and
peasant by both the local agricultural production and the feudal
incidents and obligations. With the breakdown of feudalism and the
development of industry and commerce, however, money assumed a new
importance. Not only was money required to provide the necessities and
pleasures-of life, but it was essential to the achievement of position and
power.4 2 As the rising bourgeoisie demonstrated the economic power of
money, the English aristocracy realized that it had to increase its
monetary reserves if it was to retain control over the bourgeoisie. The
aristocracy's desire to obtain money affected the penal system in two
ways. First, the aristocracy assumed control over the compensatory part
of the penal system that permitted most criminals to enter a monetary
settlement with the victim's family in lieu of further punishment.4 By
assuming control of the administration of this system, the aristocracy
was able to channel the monetary settlement to itself rather than to the
victim's family. The collections obtained in this manner provided the
aristocracy with a fruitful source of revenue. 4 Secondly, the aristocracy
40. A. HARDING, supra note 18, at 85.
41. G. RUSCHE & O. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 21, at 42, 65.
42. See B. SUVIRANTA, supra note 17, at 1-2.
43. The compensatory element of the penal system originated in the early Anglo-Saxon penal
practices. Under this system the criminal could negotiate a settlement with the victim's family
instead of being punished. Practically every crime was "'emendable," except for the most serious
crimes. Outlawry was employed for the unemendable crimes and for those who refused or were
unable to pay the fine. It is interesting to note that "much of the jurisprudence of the time must have
consisted of a knowledge of these pre-appointed prices." This system was the forerunner of the
present day fine system. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 451-60. For examples of the
prices placed on different crimes see I J. REEVES, supra note 23, at 15-16.
44. G. IvES, supra note 23, at 9.
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attributed great importance to the forfeitures of land and personal
property that were the consequences of attainder for treason or felony.
The forfeited properties that escheated to the aristocracy were a valuable
source of revenue for them, since the kings and lords, either by personal
management or assignment to political cronies in return for favors, were
able to turn the forfeited property (even relatively worthless land or
personal property) into cash for the royal coffers. 5 An interesting
example of the importance placed on the forfeiture of property is found
in the struggle between the kings and the lords over the definition of
treason and felony. Under the law of forfeiture, if the crime was declared
a treason, the property was forfeited to the king; if the crime was
declared a felony, the lands escheated to the lords. This distinction
brought pressure on the judiciary by the kings to declare ordinary
felonies to be treason,4" and by the lords to have more crimes declared
feloniesY Thus, civil disabilities, in addition to the penal function, served
an important economic function that the aristocracy fully utilized.
(c) Influence of the Age of Enlightenment.-The Age of
Enlightenment blossomed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. Although its leading proponents often were not English, their
teachings affected the English penal system. The humanitarians of this
movement, who included such notable men as Cesare Becarria, Charles
Louis Montesquieu, Sir Samuel Romilly, and Jeremy Bentham, argued
that punishment should be less severe and aimed at the prevention of
crime and the reformation of the criminal." Another dominant theme of
the humanitarians was the reformation of both procedure and
punishment to achieve certainty in the administration of sanctions. 9 The
principal results of the movement in England were the gradual
substitution of imprisonment for capital punishment" and the
introduction of a reformative theory of corrections based on
humanitarian principles.5'
The impact of these changes, however, was not significant in
England. Capital punishments were still commonplace" and prison
45. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 453 .
46. Id. at 500-08.
47. G. Ivas, supra note 23, at 9 n.3; 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 465-66.
48. A. BABINGTON, supra note 18, at 164-68.
49. See G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER. supra note 2 1, at 74-78.
50. Id. at 85.
51. A. BABINGTON. supra note 18, at 166-68.
52. A statement by a member of the House of Commons in 1830 illustrates that the impact of
the humanitarians was minimal on English penal practice: "It is impossible to conceal from
ourselves that capital punishments are more frequent and the criminal law more severe on the whole
in this country than in any country in the world." Id. at 39.40.
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conditions had decayed to the extent that prisoners experienced a living
hell.0 The humanitarian movement had little if any effect during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on the reformation of the law
of civil disabilities.5 The reformative principle of corrections that the
Age of Enlightenment introduced into England, however, was one of the
elements sparking the reforms that abolished corruption of blood and
forfeiture.
C. Early American Criminal Jurisprudence
America's English heritage is clearly reflected in the development of
early American penal thought and practice. Like the English system, the
penal practices of the American colonies were based on the principles of
retribution and deterrence and consequently utilized severe and socially
degrading punishments.s6 The only departure during the colonial period
from these practices was the Quaker Criminal Code of 1682-1718,
introduced by William Penn in Pennsylvania, 57 which reduced the
severity of punishment and substituted imprisonment for death. The
short life of this code and its replacement by an extremely severe
Anglican-Puritan code are indicative of both the tenor of the times and
the English background. Consequently, in the United States, civil
disabilities were imposed by the English procedure of attainder, resulting
in the forfeiture of all property and rights as the immediate consequence
of conviction.s
After the colonies had gained their independence, an enlightened
penal practice developed slowly. The theories of the European
humanitarians of the Age of Enlightenment influenced the early
American penologists.5 9 Gradually, the severity of the penal sanctions
was reduced and imprisonment was instituted as a method of
punishment. In the late eighteenth century, the leaders of this reform
movement introduced a novel penal institution, the penitentiary, which
was based on reformative principles. 0 The early 1800's, however,
witnessed a return, in the name of reformation, to the punitive concept in
the administration of prisons.6' The United States Constitution
53. See G. RUSCHE & 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 21, at 102-12.
54. See Damaska, supra note 1, at 352.
55. Corruption of Blood Act of 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; Act to Abolish Forfeitures for
Treason and Felony, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23 (1870).
56. S. RUBIN. THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 24 (1963).
57. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 19, at 468-69.
58. S. RUBIN, supra note 56, at 24.
59. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 19, at 473.
60. E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY. supra note 24, at 503-07.
61. H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 19, at 506, 516-17,547.
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specifically prohibits forfeiture and corruption of blood except during
the life of a person convicted of treason.6 2 In. addition, civil death was
declared not to exist in the absence of an express statute.6 Yet, in the
United States civil disabilities continued to play a significant role in the
treatment of criminals. New York passed a civil death statute in 1799."
Other states passed civil death statutes" and imposed specific disabilities
in their constitutions and statutes." Unfortunately, there is no legislative
history to explain the enactment of these disabilities. Public security and
facilitation of prison administration have-been offered as plausible
explanations for the civil death statutes . 7 It is likely, however, that civil
disabilities in America were actually the result of the unquestioning
adoption of the English penal system by our colonial forefathers and the
succeeding generations who continued existing practices without
evaluation. Later in this Project," civil disabilities will be evaluated
according to current correctional theory, based on rehabilitation rather
than retribution, which is a descendant of the nineteenth century
movement toward a truly reformative prison system."
D. Civil Disabilities in Modern America
The legislatures of every state have enacted civil disability laws.
These laws can be divided into two broad catagories: civil death statutes
and specific disability statutes. Civil death statutes are blanket
provisions that deprive the criminal of rights while he is serving a prison
sentence for life or less than life. 70 Thirteen states have civil death statutes
that are applicable to offenders sentenced to prison for terms of either
life or less than life.71 The following statutes are typical: "A person
62. U.S. CONST. art. IIf, § 3.
63. Owens v. Owens, 100 N.C. 240,6 S.E. 794 (1888); Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19 S.W.
846 (1892).
64. 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 172-73 & n.26.
65. See note 71 infra.
66. E.g., CONN. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (right to vote); DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (right to hold
public office).
67. Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, in 1952 NATIONAL
PROBATION & PAROLE ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 86, 91; Note, The Effect of State Statutes on the
CivilRights of Convicts,47 MINN. L. REV. 835,837 (1963).
68. See notes 316-94 on pages 1218-33 infra and accompanying text.
69. See H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 19, at 547-68.
70. It is generally agreed that the statutes which pertain to sentences of life imprisonment and
less than life are to be construed in pari materia. 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 174;
Note, supra note 67, at 839.
71. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.05.070, .080 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1653(A), (B)
(1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-210 to -311
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sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life is thereafter
deemed civilly dead; ' 72 and "[a] sentence of imprisonment in a state
prison for any term less than life suspends all the civil rights of the
person so sentenced, and forfeits all public offices and all private trusts,
authority, or power during such imprisonment. . . ."7 The courts have
not adequately answered the question of what rights fall within the
purview of the statutes. Some courts hold that civil death entails the loss
of the right to contract 7 inherit property, 75 and bring a civil suit.76 In
addition, several courts hold that upon imprisonment, the marriage of
the convict declared civilly dead is dissolved77 and his property descends
as if he were naturally dead. 78 On the other hand, several courts hold
to the contrary. 79 Later in this survey the consequences of civil death
in each specific area will be discussed.
Specific disability statutes designate particular disabilities that take
effect upon conviction and remain operative during the term of
imprisonment and throughout the convict's life, unless the right is
restored by state procedure. Typical specific disability statutes read:
"The following persons are not entitled to vote .. .(d) Persons
convicted of any felony by any court of record and whose civil rights
have not been restored;"80 and "[a]n applicant for a license [as an
optician] .. .shall . . . (4) Not have been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude."'" Specific disability statutes cover many
areas, ranging from the denial of traditional civil rights, such as the right
(1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 222.010 (1959); MANT Rzv CODES AN. §§ 4-47A tn -4791 (IA7)
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 79, 79(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.D. CNT. -Cnne-&2 06 2-7-
(1960).- St,. 8- 13 24p7-, hR.I. GEN.
LAWs ANN. §§ 13-6-1 to -2 (1956); S.D. 1511E LAWS ANN. § -2-48-35-(4967),-U-eCr-ODE
•,. 97 - - 37 ( 3) The Kansas civil death statute has recently been repealed. Ch.
180, § 21-4071, [1969] Kan. Laws, repealing, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118 (Supp. 1969).
72. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653(B) (1956).
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1956).
74. Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520,79 S.W. 505 (1904) (dictum).
75. In re Donnelly, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61 (1899) (overruled by statute; see note 150 infra).
76. New v. Smith, 73 Kan. 174, 84 P. 1030 (1906); Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463,253 N.W.
437 (1934).
77. E.g., In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347,39 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
78. See, e.g., In re Deming, 10 Johns. 232 (N.Y. 1813).
79. See Graham v. Graham, 251 Ala. 124, 36 So. 2d 316 (1948) (civil death does not dissolve
the felon's marriage); Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888) (offender's property does
not descend on sentence to life imprisonment); Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 182 Misc.
678, 45 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (civilly dead offender may sue for cause of action that arose
before imprisonment); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87,219 P. 700 (1923) (right to inherit); Byers v.
Sun Say. Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914) (capacity to contract).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041(5)(d) (Supp. 1969).
81. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1683(4) (1956).
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to vote, hold public office, and serve as a juror, to the denial of
professional and occupational licenses.
II. INTERPRETATIONAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CIVIL
DISABILITY STATUTES
In applying both civil death and specific disability statutes, the
courts have most frequently been troubled with such problems as the
definition of "conviction," "infamous crime," and "crime involving
moral turpitude," and the statutory authority of one state to impose its
disabilities on a person convicted in another state.
A. Meaning of Conviction
In most states, an offender incurs numerous civil disabilities upon
"conviction" of a crime . 2 The term "conviction" has posed
interpretational problems that the courts have not yet adequately
resolved. This definitional confusion stems from several sources. First,
the definition of conviction hinges on the legislature's intent,8' but the
sparse legislative history gives the courts little guidance in defining this
intent. Consequently, courts often reach different conclusions
concerning true legislative purpose. Secondly, the use of "conviction" in
civil disability provisions as well as criminal penalty and procedure
statutes causes confusion since the meaning of "conviction" varies
according to the type of statute involved.'4
1. Statutory Definition. -Fourteen states have enacted a general
definition of the term "conviction" that is applicable to both civil
disability statutes and criminal penalty and procedure statutes. Twelve
of these fourteen states define "conviction" as a plea of guilty, a verdict
of guilty by a jury, or a finding of guilt by the court when ajury trial has
been waived.85 Kansas defines "conviction" merely as a plea of guilty.8
82. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 114.01(7) (1960) (forfeiture of public office upon conviction of
a felony); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964) (person convicted of an infamous
crime is incapable of holding public office, voting, or serving as juror). "Conviction" refers to a
decision only in a criminal court, not in a civil court. Lovely v. Cockrell, 237 Ky. 547, 35 S.W.2d
891 (1931).
83. E.g., Richetti v. Board of Parole, 300 N.Y. 357,90 N.E.2d 893 (1950).
84. E.g., People v. Weinberger, 21 App. Div. 2d 353,251 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1964); L. ORFIELD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 488 (1947).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 689 (West 1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 26401(d) (Revision 1969);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-109 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-5 (Smith-Hurd 1964); LA. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 934(3) (West 1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 263, § 6 (1968); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.02(5) (1964); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4809 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
1-11 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7002 (1958); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 959.01(i) (1958); ARIZ. R.
CRIM. P. 306.
86. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3110(4) (Supp. 1969).
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Oregon requires either a jury verdict of guilty or a finding of guilt by the
court when a jury trial has been waived.87 Sixteen states have enacted a
definition of "conviction" that applies only to a specific area of state
law.8
2. Judicial Definition.-In the states having no statutory definition
and in the fourteen states that have enacted a general definition, the
courts define "conviction" in two ways. The first view equates a
conviction with the determination of guilt, either by plea of guilty or by
the 'court's or jury's verdict of guilty. Most courts accept this definition
when the statute in question involves either the imposition of a punitive
sanction or a criminal procedure. 89 A smMl minority of courts adopt this
view for civil disability statutes," especially when the provision pertains
to the right to hold public office."
The second definition of conviction is more specific than the first.
According to this view, a conviction has occurred only after both a
determination of guilt and a pronouncement of judgment and sentence.
There is no conviction unless judgment and sentence are rendered. When
87. ORE. REV. STAT. § 137230 (1969).
88. Fifteen states have enacted a definition of "conviction" which applies only to the state
law regulating the use and operation of motor vehicles. Nine of these 15 states define "conviction"
as the final conviction of an offense. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-444(c) (1956); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-253(c) (1964); MICH.STAT. ANN. § 9.1808(1) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.01(13)
(1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.010(4) (1959); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-30 (Supp. 1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-204(c) (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-714 (1968); TEX. REv. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6687b (1969). Three of these 15 states define "conviction" as a plea of guilty, a verdict of
guilty by a jury, or a finding of guilt by the court when ajury trial has been waived. CAL. VEHICLE
CODE § 13103 (West 1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-195 (1962); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 343.01(2)(a)
(1958). Three states define "conviction" as a conviction of any offense related to the use or opera-
tion of a motor vehicle. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 632(1) (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 482.820
(1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4621.010 (1970). In California, Massachusetts, and Oklahoma
"conviction," as defined and applied to the laws regulating the licensing of schoolteachers,
firearms, and liquor dealers, respectively, means a plea of guilty, a verdict of guilty by a jury, or a
finding of guilt by the court when a jury trial has been waived. CAL. EDuC. CODE § 12911 (West
1969); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 121 (1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 506(7) (Supp.
1969-70).
89. See, e.g., Exparte Morehead, 107 Cal. App. 2d 346, 237 P.2d 335 (1951) (sentencing a
sexual psychopath for hearing and examination); In re Anderson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 48, 92 P.2d 1020
(1939) (pardon procedure); Exparte Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 8 P. 829 (1885) (time for submission of
application for bail); Sparkman v. State Prison Custodian, 154 Fla. 688, 18 So. 2d 772 (1944)
(habitual criminal statute); State v. Brady, 156 Kan. 831, 137 P.2d 206 (1943) (procedure in
sentencing for the death penalty); Goss v. State, 107 Tex. Crim. 659, 298 S.W. 585 (1927) (pardon
procedure).
90. People v. Dail, 22 Cal. 2d 642, 140 P.2d 828 (1943) (right to serve as a witness); Tucker v.
Tucker, 101 N.J. Eq. 72, 137 A. 404 (1927) (divorce grounded on criminal conviction).
91. E.g., State v. Redman, 183 Ind. 332, 109 N.E. 184 (1915); Bell v. Treasurer of
Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484,38 N.E.2d 660 (1941).
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
the statute in question imposes civil disabilities, most courts adopt this
second definition.' 2 These courts reason that the legislature did not
intend for valuable rights and privileges to be lost without a final
judgment and sentence. 93 In actuality, perhaps this interpretation was
inspired by the judiciary's desire to aid the rehabilitation of those
offenders whom it thought possessed a reformative potential. 4
Under either definition of conviction, therefore, civil disabilities
attach when a judge renders a judgment and sentence, and imposes the
penal sanction. Similarly, under either view a conviction has occurred
when the court imposes both judgment and sentence, but suspends
execution of the sentence and places the offender on probation. 5 The
offender receives no conviction under the second view, however, when the
judge suspends imposition of judgment and sentence, and places the
offender on probation." Consequently, most offenders receiving a
suspension of imposition of sentence incur no civil disabilities. 7
Courts also are faced with the definition of conviction when an
92. E.g., People v. Loomis, 231 Cal. App. 2d 594, 42 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965) (unlawful
possession of concealed weapon); People v. Burch, 196 Cal. App. 2d 754, 17 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1961)
(impeachment of testimony); Summerour v. Cartett, 220 Ga. 31, 136 S.E.2d 724 (1964) (public
office); Prewitt v. Wilson, 242 Ky. 231, 46 S.W.2d 90 (1932) (voting); Donnell v. Board of
Registration of Medicine, 128 Me. 523, 149 A. 153 (1930) (occupational license); Hunter v. State,
193 Md. 596, 606-07, 69 A.2d 505, 509-10 (1949) (witness); People v. Funk, 321 Mich. 617, 33
N.W.2d 95 (1948) (habitual offender); Keogh v. Wagner, 15 N.Y.2d 569, 203 N.E.2d 298, 254
N.Y.S.2d 833 (1964) (public office); Commonwealth v. Palarino, 168 Pa. Super. 152, 77 A.2d 665
(1951) (witness); see Holland, "Conviction" Defined, 40 CAL. S.B.J. 36 (1965). A minority of
courts accept the second definition of conviction for statutes concerning punitive sanctions or
criminal procedure. See, e.g., People v. Shaw, I N.Y.2d 30, 133 N.E.2d 681, 150 N.Y.S.2d 161
(1956) (habitual offender); Richetti v. Board of Parole, 300 N.Y. 357, 90 N.E.2d 893 (1950);
Commonwealth v. Minnich, 250 Pa. 363,95 A. 565 (1915); Cromeans v. State, 160 Tex. Crim. 135,
268 S.W.2d 133 (1954) (habitual offender).
93. See, e.g.. Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736,741,254 P.2d 638,643 (1953).
94. See People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370,387,348 P.2d 102, 113, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669,680 (1959).
Note, The Effect of Expungement on a CriminalRecord, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 127, 131 (1967).
95. See, e.g., Stephens v. Toomey, 51 Cal. 2d 864, 338 P.2d 182 (1959); People ex rel.
Bierbaum v. Jennings, 135 Misc. 809,240 N.Y.S. 91 (Cayuga County Ct. 1930).
96. E.g., Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (1953); State v.
Rappaport, 211 Md. 523, 128 A.2d 270 (1957).
97. E.g., Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523,319 P.2d 624 (1957) (pension); In
re Hickman, 18 Cal. 2d 71, 113 P.2d 1 (1941) (professional license) (holding subsequently nullified
by CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE i 6102 (West 1962)); Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254
P.2d 638 (1953) (voting); Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 357 Pa. 378, 54 A.2d 705 (1947) (witness);
Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash. 2d 232, 443 P.2d 843 (1968) (public office); State v. Spurr, 100 W.Va.
121, 130 S.E. 81 (1925) (witness). Contra, Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 113, 52 Cal. Rptr. 303
(1966) (insurance agent's license); Rosner v. Benedict Heights, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 2d 1, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1963) (witness); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 73 P.2d 888 (1937) (disbarment of
attorney); Huff v. Anderson, 212 Ga. 32,90 S.E.2d 329 (1955) (public office).
California has amended its Business and Professional Code to provide that occupational and
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offender appeals from an adverse decision. A few states have resolved
this dilemma by statute. 8 In the absence of a statutory guideline, the few
cases in point indicate that most civil disabilities, except the loss of the
right to hold public office, will not be imposed until the appellate courts
have rendered their decisions." The right to hold public office is
generally suspended immediately upon conviction, irrespective of a
pending appeal,100 because a person convicted of a crime does not
command the respect that is necessary for the proper functioning of
government. 101 If the conviction is subsequently reversed, this rule may
yield a harsh result.' Consequently, some courts do not deprive the
offender of the right to hold public office pending an appeal. 03
B. Breadth of the Disabling Crimes
Civil disabilities are imposed when the offender has been convicted
of a crime enumerated in the disabling statute or constitutional
provision. Often the provisions describe these crimes in terms that
designate a general class of crimes rather than specific crimes. Common
examples of these general terms include "felony,"'0 "infamous crime,"
professional licenses may be denied or revoked because of criminal conviction, irrespective of a
probation order suspending sentence. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1679 (West 1962) (dentists);
id. § 2383 (physicians); id. § 2555.1 (dispensing opticians); id. § 2963 (psychologists);
id. § 6102 (attorneys); id. § 10177(b) (West 1964) (real estate brokers); id. § 10562(b) (mineral,
oil and gas brokers). In the absence of a statutory prohibition, a suspended sentence will probably
not preclude the attainment of a license. Holland, supra note 92, at 44.
The federal courts generally have not followed the view that a suspended sentence does not
constitute a conviction. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943); Gutierrez v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 323 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1963); United States v. Rivera, 224 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1955).
98. See statutes cited note 97 supra; N.Y. EDOC. LAW § 6613(12) (McKinney 1953)
(dentists); id. § 6514(!) (physicians, osteopaths, and physi6tberapists).
99. In re Riccardi, 182 Cal. 675, 189 P. 694 (1920) (professional license) (holding codified in
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102 (West 1962)); Vinsant v. Vinsant, 49 Iowa 639 (1878) (divorce on
grounds of criminal conviction); Donnell v. Board of Registration of Medicine, 128 Me. 523, 149 A.
153 (1930) (professional license); Woodmen of the World v. Dodd, 134 S.W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911) (revocation of insurance policy upon conviction of felony).
100. E.g., People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 I11. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168 (1958); State v.
Redman, 183 Ind. 332, 109 N.E. 184 (1915); Bell v. Treasurer of Cambridge, 310 Mass. 484, 38
N.E.2d 660 (1941).
101. State ex rel. Blake v. Levi, 109 W.Va. 277, 153 S.E. 587 (1930).
102. In re Simmons, 65 Wash. 2d 88,395 P.2d 1013 (1964).
103. City of Pineville v. Collett, 294 Ky. 853, 172 S.W.2d 640 (1943); State e rel. Heartsill v.
County Election Bd., 326 P.2d 782 (Okla. 1958); 1960 Op. FLA. ATr'y GEN. 060-45, cited in FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 112.01 (Supp. 1969).
104. Four states have substituted the statutory definition of a felony for the word "felony."
These statutes state that the disabling crime is one that is punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary. Thus, although the disabling crime does not appear on the record as a felony, in actual
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and "crime involving moral turpitude." The following statutes are
illustrative: "Subject to the constitution of the state, every person
convicted of felony shall from thenceforth be disqualified from holding
any office of honor, trust, or profit under the laws of this state, or
practicing as an attorney in any of the courts of this state;" ' 5 "[N]o
person convicted of any infamous crime . . . shall ever exercise the
privileges of an elector in this [s]tate;" 10 "An applicant for a license
under this chapter [collection agencies] shall . . . (3) Not have been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude."'10 Although statutory
definitions of the disabling classifications have somewhat facilitated the
interpretational process, often the judiciary must resort to the common
law to particularize the general statutory classification.
1. Felony.-The judicial interpretation of "felony" has presented
few problems in the application of civil disability statutes, since both the
common law and the modem statutory definitions have developed a
simple, objective standard of determining what crimes are felonies. This
standard is based on the degree of punishment authorized by statute.
Therefore, a particular crime is characterized as a felony if the
punishment it carries is as severe as that required by statute to consti-
tute a felony. Forty-five states have enacted a statutory definition of
felony. Thirty-six states define a felony as an offense that may be pun-
ished by death, or imprisonment' 8 in the penitentiary"' or state pri-
son."0 It has been consistently held that "state prison" and "peniten-
practice it is a felony. LA. CONST. art. 8, § 6; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (Supp. 1969); ORE.
CONST. art. 2, § 3; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
105. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1963).
106. CAL. CONST. art.2, § 1.
107. ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 32-1023 (Supp. 1969).
108. Louisiana's statute provides for "imprisonment at hard labor." LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:2 (Supp. 1970).
109. ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 7 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-103 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 2-7 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA CODE ANN. § 687.2 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62.10Y
(1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.060 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 677 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-01-07 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE § 1.06 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.030(2) (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-103 (Supp. 1969); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 47 (1952); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-6 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-1 (1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2 (1957).
110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-103 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 17 (West Supp. 1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.08 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-Ill (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-
101 (1956); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 451 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 274, § 1 (1968);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.197 (1962); Mo. Rev. STAT. § 556.020 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-114 (1969); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-102 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.120(2) (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:1 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-1
(1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 5 (1958); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-14 (1967):
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-13 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1 (1959); WASH, REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.01.020 (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.60 (1958).
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tiary" are synonymous. Neither term includes a municipal or county
jail."' Eight states having a statutory definition of felony provide that
the imprisonment must be for more than one year. 12 This require-
ment, however, does not differ from the more general "imprisonment
in a penitentiary" because a convict is seldom sent to a penitentiary for
a sentence of less than a year."3 South Carolina is the only state that
defines felony in terms of specific crimes rather than in terms of
punishment." 4
In the absence of a statutory definition,"5 the courts have held that a
felony is a crime "punishable" by death or imprisonment in the
penitentiary,"' regardless of the punishment actually imposed." 7 Under
such a broad definition, a felony encompasses a wide variety of offenses.
Not only are crimes mala in se, such as murder and rape, classified as
felonies, but also included are crimes mala prohibita, such as the
conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor," 8 the acceptance of a bribe by a
person participating in a sports event," 9 and the willful or negligent
creation of an undue quantity of steam in a steam boiler or engine." °
2. Infamous Crime.--Conviction of an "infamous crime" results
in the imposition of civil disabilities in some states. The courts have
encountered considerable difficulty in defining "infamous crime" as
used in civil disability statutes. The difficulty stems from a lack of
definitive statutory explanation and many judicial interpretations that
are contrary to both the historical and rational meaning of the term.
Although six states have enacted a definition of an infamous crime,' 2'
these statutory definitions are rarely helpful. The definitions enacted by
11. See State v. Delmonto, 110 Conn. 298, 147 A. 825 (1929); State v. Neckar, 2 Ohio St. 2d
221, 208 N.E.2d 134 (1965).
112. ALASKA STAT. § 11.75.030 (1962); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1 (1958); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-401(e) (1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-2 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02(2)
(1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-6 (1953); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(5) (McKinney 1967); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-1-3 (1956).
113. Comment, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403,407 (1967).
114. S.C.CODEANN. § 16-11 (Supp. 1969).
115. Five states do not have a statute that defines a felony: Colorado, Delaware, Maryland,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.,
116. See, e.g., Lacey v. People, 442 P.2d 402,406 (Colo. 1968).
117. See. e.g., United States v. Davis, 71 F. Supp. 749, 751 (D.D.C. 1947); State ex rel.
Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 85, 256 N.W. 377, 384 (1934).
118. CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(5) (West 1955).
119. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180A5 (McKinney 1967).
120. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1013 (1956).
121. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-18 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-127 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. § 680 (1942); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 556.030 (1949); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.01.080 (1965).
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Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Washington provide, in essence; that
an infamous crime is a felony. In Colorado and Illinois, the statutes
enumerate specific infamous crimes. Although the Colorado statute is
held to be an exclusive listing of infamous crimes,'2 the courts of Illinois
have adopted the opposite view. Consequently, the Illinois courts may
declare any crime to be infamous if the circumstances of the case.
warrant this classification.'2
In the absence of a statutory definition, the judiciary is divided on
the meaning of "infamous." This conflict is the product of history. In
the early English common law, a crime was characterized as infamous if
it involved any form of fraudulent or untrustworthy conduct. Although
this category originally included only crimes designated crimen falsi,
involving some type of falsification, it was later expanded to include
felonies and treason.I2 A crime, therefore, was denoted "infamous"
according to the nature of the crime itself, rather than the punishment
inflicted.125 This interpretation was accepted by several American courts
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 26 During the late
nineteenth century, however, the United States Supreme Court rendered
two decisions that rejected the English common law definition of
infamous crime. In Ex Parte Wilson'27 and Mackin v. United States'2
the Court declared that an infamous crime, as described in the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution,'" involved an infamous
punishment, irrespective of the nature of the offense. An infamous
punishment was defined to be either death or imprisonment in a
penitentiary. The focus of the interpretational approach, therefore, was
shifted from the nature of the crime itself to the nature of the
punishment. These two cases had a tremendous impact on the
subsequent interpretation of infamous crime. The Wilson-Mackin
approach was followed not only in cases that involved state indictment
statutes similar to the fifth amendment,' 3° but also in cases concerning
122. People v. Enlow, 135 Colo. 249,310 P.2d 539 (1957).
123. People exrel. Ward v.Tomek, 54 III. App. 2d 197,203 N.E.2d744 (1964).
124. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 14-16 (2d ed. 1969).
125. Note, Criminal Law-"Infamous Crimes" In Illinois Today, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 138,
139 (1964).
126. Hartwig v. Hartwig, 160 Mo. App. 284, 142 S.W. 797 (1912); Wick v. Baldwin, 51 Ohio
St. 51, 36 N.E. 671 (1894).
127. 114 U.S.417,422-29 (1885).
128. 117 U.S. 348,351-52 (1886).
129. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .. "U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St. 386, 154 N.E.2d 917 (1958); State v.
Rezendes, 253 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1969).
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the application of civil disability statutes. 3 1 According to this
interpretation, all felonies are infamous crimes. 32 This interpretation has
become the prevailing view in the application of civil disability statutes
33
despite the fact that the Court in each case was concerned with criminal
procedure rather than civil disabilities.3 4
Several courts have recognized that the Wilson-Mackin
interpretation is applicable only for a statute involving criminal
procedure. They have adhered to the common law standard that a crime
is declared infamous according to its nature, rather than to its
punishment. 3 The common law definition of infamous, however, has
been broadened. Under this view, a crime is now infamous if its
commission involves the breach of the moral principles of the
community.' Fraudulent conduct is no longer necessary. In applying
this standard, an infamous crime has been held to include both felonies
and misdemeanors.'3 These courts, therefore, have recognized that the
definition of infamous crime requires a connection between the disability
and the nature of the crime, but they have not required that the
connection be narrowed to relate specific disabilities to specific crimes.
Only one court has held that the disability must be reasonably
related to the nature of the crime. In Otsuka v. Hite'3 the California
Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to be an elector
because his crime, a violation of the Selective Service Act, did not
indicate that he constituted a threat to the integrity of the voting process.
There is no indication that the Otsuka case has had a significant impact
on other courts.
3. Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-Some states impose civil
131. E.g., Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923) (public office); Attorney
Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504,267 N.W. 550 (1936) (public office); Wagers v.
State, 370 P.2d 567 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (juror); lsaacs v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs, 122 W.
Va. 703, 12 S.E.2d 510 (1940) (voter).
132. See, e.g., Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736,254 P.2d 638 (1953).
133. See R. PERKINS, supra note 124, at 18; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3 (1961).
134. A careful analysis of the Wilson and Mackin cases reveals that their interpretation of
infamous crime was influenced solely by the Court's view of the purpose underlying the fifth
amendment's indictment clause. That purpose, the Court found, is to establish procedural
safeguards for persons accused of serious crimes. The Court reasoned, therefore, that justice would
be best served by a broad interpretation so that few crimes would fall outside.the purview of the
procedural safeguards.
135. E.g., Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 111 A. 861 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 334 Pa. 321,5 A.2d 804 (1939).
136. See Johnson v. State,4 Md. App. 648,244 A.2d 632 (1968).
137. State ec rel. Stinger v. Krueger, 280 Mo. 293,305-06,217 S.W. 310,313 (1919); State v.
O'Shields, 163 S.C. 408, 161 S.E. 692 (1931).
138. 64 Cal. 2d 596,414 P.2d 412,51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
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disabilities upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
interpretation of crime involving moral turpitude is founded on a moral
judgment of the nature of the offense. The definition that has been
established is quite broad, involving an offense that is contrary to justice,
honesty, principle, and good morals. 39 This broad definition
encompasses both felonies and misdemeanors if their commission is
contrary to the public's moral standards."0 Since the concept of moral
turpitude depends on a subjective evaluation of the public's morals, its
meaning varies in degree from state to state and from year to year.",
C. Extraterritorial Applicability of Civil Disability Statutes
An issue often raised in litigation involving a civil disability statute
is whether the forum jurisdiction's disability statute applies to a foreign
conviction. 4 2 This question arises when an offender who has been
convicted of a crime in a foreign jurisdiction travels to the forum state,
where he encounters the forum state's specific disability statute. It also
arises when an offender who is imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction that
does not have a civil death statute asserts a civil right in litigation before
a forum court where a civil death statute is in effect. In both situations,
the forum court must decide whether its statute applies to an offender
convicted in a foreign jurisdiction.4 3 Although statutory provisions
occasionally are dispositive of these issues, " ' the courts frequently must
139. E.g., In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 150, 73 P.2d 885, 886 (1937); Huffy. Anderson, 212
Ga. 32, 34, 90 S.E.2d 329, 331 (1955).
140. See Raphalides v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 80 N.J. Super. 407, 194 A.2d I
(App. Div. 1963).
141. E.g., In re Bartos, 13 F.2d 138 (D. Neb. 1926).
142. A foreign conviction is one rendered by a court of another jurisdiction. Thus, if the
forum is a New York state court, a conviction rendered in Alabama is a foreign conviction.
Similarly, if the forum is a New York state court, a conviction by a federal court in New York is
also a foreign conviction. Accordingly, a conviction in a military court is a foreign conviction to a
nonmilitary court. Also, a conviction in a foreign country is considered a foreign conviction.
143. In one other factual situation the application of civil death statutes raises problems. A
prisoner convicted to serve a life term by a state that has a civil death statute attempts to file suit or
assert a civil right in a foreign state that does not have a civil death statute. The forum court must
decide whether the civilly dead status of the prisoner prohibits him from initiating a suit or asserting
a right in the forum state. This issue has not been raised often. Two early cases held that the civilly
dead status of the prisoner did not preclude him from initiating a suit or asserting a civil right in
another state. Wilson v. King, 59 Ark. 32, 26 S.W. 18 (1894) (right to sue); Presbury v. Hull, 34
Mo. 29 (1863) (right to contract). Since the courts of one state will not execute the penal laws of
another, the courts of the forum state will not give effect to a foreign state's civil death statute
if it is considered penal in nature. See Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. 2d 848, 271 P.2d 18 (1954); J.
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAW § 620, at 767 (7th ed. 1872).
144. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-741(A)(1) (Supp. 1969-70) (revocation of
accountant's license on "conviction of felony under the laws of any state or of the United States");
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interpret civil disability statutes that make no reference to foreign
convictions. On its face, this issue resembles a conflict of laws problem.
The real problem confronting the forum court, however, is an
interpretational one, requiring a determination of whether the state
legislature intended for the disability statute to have extraterritorial
applicability. Since courts frequently reach different conclusions about
unexpressed legislative intent, the case law on this issue has been
conflicting and inconsistent. From the existing confusion, however,
several distinct positions are apparent.
1. The Majority View.-A majority of state courts hold that
specific disability statutes are applicable to foreign convictions. In at
least 21 states, the controlling case law clearly supports this view.' In
California, Florida, New York, and Ohio, the authorities are in conflict,
but the case law indicates that these states will follow the majority
view.' Although the majority's interpretation has been applied to a
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 85-9(5) (1965) (revocation of auctioneer's license on "conviction of any crime
involving moral turpitude either in this State or any other state"); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2961.02 (Baldwin 1964) (persons "imprisoned in the penitentiary of any other state of the United
States, under sentence for the commission of a crime punishable under the laws of this state by
imprisonment in the penitentiary" denied the right to vote).
145. Alabama-Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604 (1936);
State ex rel. Sanford v. Riddle, 213 Ala. 430, 105 So. 259 (1925). Arizona-DuVall v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329, 66 P.2d 1026 (1937). Idaho-In re Mills, 71 Idaho 128,227 P.2d
81 (1951); In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928). Illinois-People ex rel. Keenan v.
McGuane, 13 I11. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168 (1958); People v. Trent, 85 Ill. App. 2d 157,228 N.E.2d
535 (1967). Indiana-Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923); State v. Redman,
183 Ind. 332, 109 N.E. 184 (1915). Kansas-In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473 (1931).
Louisiana-Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Rayl, 208 La. 531, 23 So. 2d 206 (1945).
Michigan-Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936).
Minnesota-State ex rel. Arpagaus v. Todd, 255 Minn. 91, 29 N.W.2d 810 (1947); In re Karatz,
202 Minn. 306, 278 N.W. 41 (1938). Missouri-State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237,
175 S.W.2d 787 (1943); Bruno v. Murdock, 406 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. App. 1966). Montana-State ex
rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P.2d 791 (1932); In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284, 235 P. 772
(1925). Nevada-State v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64 (1880). New Hampshire-Chase v. Blodgett, 10 N.H.
22 (1838). New Jersey-Application of Smith, 8 N.J. Super. 573, 73 A.2d 761 (Essex County Ct.,
L. Div. 1950); Application of Marino, 23 NJ. Misc. 159, 42 A2d 469 (C.P. Essex County 1945).
North Carolina-State v. Candler, 10 N.C. 393 (1824). North Dakota-State cc rel. Olson v.
Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934). Ohio-Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165 N.E.
566 (1929); In re Jacoby, 74 Ohio App. 147, 57 N.E. 2d 932 (1943). Oregon-In re Ankelis, 164
Ore. 676, 103 P.2d 715 (1940). Pennsylvania-In re Griffin, 371 Pa. 646, 92 A.2d 889 (1952),
Texas-Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 S.W.2d 619 (rex. Civ. App. 1941).
Washington-In re Burns, 13 Wash. 2d 199, 124 P.2d 550 (1942).
146. California-In re Craig, 12 Cal. 2d 93, 82 P.2d 442 (1938); Caminetti v. Imperial Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P.2d 681 (1943) (following majority view). Contra, People v.
Craig, 9 Cal. 2d 615, 61 P.2d 934 (1936). Florida-In re Weathers, 159 Fla. 390, 31 So. 2d 543
(1947); Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21 (Fla. App. 1962) (following majority view). Contra,
Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1957). New York-E.g., In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26
N.E.2d 260 (1940); Tonis v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 286, 67 N.E.2d 245 (1946); Erdman v.
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broad spectrum of specific disability statutes, 4 ' a common rationale
appears in the opinions. These courts have found that specific disability
statutes are designed to protect the public's interests rather than to
punish the offender. 48 Since the public's interests could not be
adequately safeguarded if the statutes applied only to convictions by the
courts of the forum state, the courts conclude that the legislature
intended for the statutes to apply to foreign convictions.,
The majority position also has been followed by one state When the
issue before the court was whether the forum state's civil death statute
was applicable to a foreign conviction. Both state and federal courts in
New York hold that when rights that arise under New York law are
involved, as a matter of public policy the New York civil death statute
applies to foreign convictions imposing life imprisonment.Is
Although the jurisdictions that follow the majority position agree
that both specific civil disability and civil death statutes are applicable to
foreign convictions, they disagree over which body of law should
Board of Regents, 24 App. Div.'479, 261 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1965) (following majority view). Contra,
Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (1878); In re Cohen's Will, 164 Misc. 98, 298 N.Y.S. 368 (Sur. Ct.
1937). Oklahoma-Hughes v. State Election Bd., 413 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1966); Elder v. County
Election Bd., 326 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1958); Briggs v. Board of County Comm'rs, 202 Okla, 684,
217 P.2d 827 (1950) (following majority view). Contra, Wagers v. State, 370 P.2d 576 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1962); Weber v. State, 18 Okla.421, 195 P.510 (192"1).
Several of the cases mentioned above, which refused to follow the majority position, are weak
authority for the position that civil disability statutes are not applicable to foreign convictions. The
Lefcourt, Sims, and Weber cases involved the disqualification of an offepder as a witness. Since
today's convicts are generally not denied the right to testify, these cases have little relevance. Also, it
has been noted that in these and similar cases "the most important reason for allowing such a
witness to testify was not so much the unwillingness to extend the effect of a penal judgment to the
disadvantage of the witness, but rather that the exclusion of his testimony might throw the burden
on the innocent party." 29 ILL. L. REV. 945,946 (1935).
147. E.g., Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604 (1936)
(witness); In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195,267 P. 452 (1928) (professional license-attorney); State ex
rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943) (voter); State ex rel. Anderson v.
Fousek, 91 Mont. 448, 8 P.2d 791 (1932) (public office); Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165
N.E. 566 (1929) (juror); Franciscb v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941) (professional license-dentist); In re Canter's Will, 146 Misc. 123, 261 N.Y.S. 872 (Sur. Ct.
1933) (executor).
148. See, e.g., State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).
149. See In re Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473 (1931); Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v.
Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936).
The majority's rationale has been challenged on the ground that it is contrary to the established
principle that no state will execute the penal laws of another state. In answer to this criticism, the
majority has stated that the application of civil disability statutes to foreign convictions is not an
imposition of an additional penalty, but only a protective measure which must be taken to safeguard
the public's interest. See, e.g., State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 90, 256 N.W. 377, 387
(1934).
150. Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 232 F. Supp. 237, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd on
other grounds, 358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Lindewall's Will, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 NoE.2d 907
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determine whether a foreign conviction is sufficient to invoke the
forum's disability statute. The dispute focuses on whether the forum
should use its own law or that of the convicting jurisdiction to
characterize the offender's criminal act. Assume, for example, that an
offender is convicted by a federal court of a crime that the federal
government denotes as a felony. Under the law of the forum state,
however, the same crime is only a misdemeanor. Since a certain
disability statute in the forum state is applicable to an offender convicted
of a felony, the forum court must decide whether the offender's crime is a
felony, as that term is used in the disability statute. If the forum decides
that the law of the convicting jurisdiction characterizes the crime, the
offender has committed a felony and the disability must be imposed. If,
however, the forum characterizes the crime by using its own law, the
offense is only a misdemeanor and the disability will not be imposed.
The problem of characterization, like that of applicability, is a question
of statutory interpretation. The courts are divided on the question of
characterization. In at least nine states it is clear that the disabling crime
is characterized by the law of the disqualifying (forum) state. 51 The
weight of authority in New York supports this view, 52 even though a
lower New York court recently rejected it.'m The courts of Ohio have
reached no consensus on this issue.'5' The courts following the view that
the forum's law is to be used have reasoned that the legislature
undoubtedly intended for the beliefs of the citizens of the forum state.to
(1942); Pallas v. Misericordia Hosp., 264 App. Div. 1, 34 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1942), aff'd, 291 N.Y.
692,52 N.E.2d 590 (1943); Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470,292 N.Y.S. 705, aff'd, 274 N.Yq574,
10 N.E.2d 558 (1937). Contra, Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938)
(the court reached its conclusion "but not without some hesitation"). Even though Urbana.
Lindewall, and Pallas effectively overrule Panko, some authorities doubt whether New York's
civil death statute was intended to apply to foreign convictions. See Urbano v. News Syndicate
Co., 358 F.2d 145, 148 n.3 (2d Cir. 1966) (dissent).
151. Arizona-DuVall v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329, 66 P.2d 1026 (1937).
Florida-In re Weathers, 159 Fla. 390, 31 So. 2d 543 (1947); Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21
(Fla. App. 1962). Idaho-In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928). Illinois-People v.
Trent, 85 Ill. App. 2d 157, 228 N.E.2d 535 (1967). Louisiana-Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So. 2d 582 (1942). Minnesota-State ex rel. Arpagaus v. Todd, 225 Minn.
91, 29 N.W.2d 810 (1947). New Jersey-Application of Smith, 8 N.J. Super. 573, 73 A.2d 761
(Essex County Ct., L. Dir. 1950). Oklahoma-In re Dunham's Estate, 181 Okla. 407, 74 P2d 117
(1937); Elder v. County Election Bd., 326 P.2d 776 (Okla. 1958). Oregon-In re Ankelis, 164 Ore.
676, 103 P.2d 715 (1940); In re Biggs, 52 Ore. 433, 97 P. 713 (1908).
152. E.g., In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 26 N.E.2d 260 (1940); People v. Gutteison, 244
N.Y. 243, 155 N.E. 113 (1926).
153. See Erdman v. Board of Regents, 24 App. Div. 479,261 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1965).
154. See Browning v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165 N.E. 566 (1929); In re Burch, 73 Ohio App.
97, 54 N.E.2d 803 (1943) (by law of the disqualifying state). Contra, State ic rel. Beckman v.
Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N.E. 891 (1930) (by law of the convicting state or jurisdiction).
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determine the standards by which the disabilities are imposed, since the
forum state's disability statutes protect its citizens.'5 If this were not the
rule, these courts note, a state's disability statutes would be imposed-
according to the views of the foreign jurisdiction's citizens, which
frequently differ from those existing in the forum state.1' Accordingly,
both the Model Penal Code and the Uniform Act on the Status of
Convicted Persons 57 state that the forum should use its own laws to
characterize crimes so that civil disability statutes of the forum state are
applicable to foreign convictions only if the offense in question is a
disabling crime under the laws of the forum state. 1
-In at least seven states the courts hold that the offender's crime is
characterized by the law of the foreign, convicting jurisdiction."9 Under
the rationale of these decisions, the criminal act proves that the offender
lacks an acceptable moral character.1w This view assumes that since the
offender knew the laws of the state in which he committed a crime, he
also knew that he was committing an illegal act. Therefore, to these
courts, such callous disrespect for the laws of society, manifesting a
morally deficient character, is a valid ground for the imposition of civil
disabilities.'
2. The Minority View.-The controlling cases in at least eight
jurisdictions reject the majority view and hold that specific disability
statutes are applicable only to convictions by the courts of the forum
state.12 Although several cases in Florida, Oklahoma, and New
155. See, e.g., In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 203, 267 P. 452, 454 (1928); State ev rel.
Arpagaus v. Todd, 225 Minn. 91,98-103,29 N.W.2d 810,813-14 (1947).
156. See, e.g., DuVall v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329, 339-40, 66 P.2d 1026,
1031 (1937); In re Canter's Will, 146 Misc. 123, 132,261 N.Y.S. 872,882 (Sur. Ct. 1933). The case
of Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21 (Fla. App. 1962), is illustrative. The offender was
convicted in New York of second degree assault. Florida, however, does not recognize a crime of
second degree assault. Thus, the offender was not disqualified from holding public office in Florida.
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.2(1) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962); UNIFORM ACT ON STATUS
OF CONVICTED PERSONS § I in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 295-97 (1964).
158. See notes 151-52 supra and accompanying text.
159. California-Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 476, 139 P.2d
681 (1943). Indiana-Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923). Kansas-In re
Minner, 133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473 (1931). Michigan -Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v.
Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936). Missouri--State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious,
351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943). Montana-State ex rel. Anderson v. Fousek, 91 Mont. 448,
8 P.2d 791 (1932). North Dakota-State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934).
160. See. e.g., State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68,256 N.W. 377 (1934).
161. See. e.g.. State e rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943);
Erdman v. Board of Regents, 24 App. Div. 479,261 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1965).
162. Georgia-Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S.E.2d 849 (1945). Maryland-Garitee v.
Bond, 102 Md. 379, 62 A. 631 (1905). Massachusetts-Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515
(1822). Mississippi-State ex rel. Mitchell v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508 (1933).
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York13 have held that a foreign conviction did not render an offender
incompetent as a witness or a juror, the general rule in these states still
supports the majority position since these cases have been confined to
particular disabilities. The courts of both Colorado and Kentucky have
rendered conflicting opinions on this issue, although the most recent
decisions support the minority position.'" Most courts following the
minority position focus on accepted principles of the common law rather
than on the unexpressed legislative intent. In the leading case of
Commonwealth v. Green,65 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that the forum's'use of a foreign conviction to impose a civil
disability constitutes a penalty imposed for the commission of a crime
committed in a foreign state. The imposition of such a penalty by the
courts of a state other than the convicting state would effectively execute
the penal laws of another state, a practice that contravenes the common
law.'66 This reasoning, adopted by several New York courts, 6 7 formed
the basis for the United States Supreme Court's decision in Logan v.
United States,19 where the Court stated:
At common law and on general principles of jurisprudence, when not controlled by
express statute giving effect within the State which enacts it to a conviction and
sentence in another State, such conviction and sentence can have no effect by way of
penalty or of disability or disqualification, beyond the limits of the State in which
the judgment is rendered.
Although the Logan doctrine has generally been limited to an offender's
competence to serve as a witness, it has occasionally been cited as
controlling authority in cases involving other specific disability
statutes.' Several courts that adhere to the minority position have not
relied on the rationale of Green and Logan. These courts, ignoring the
common law approach, reason that the legislatures did not intend that
the specific disability statutes be applied to convictions rendered in the
courts of foreign jurisdictions. 70
Tennessee-Vines v. State, 190 Tenn. 644, 231 S.W.2d 332 (1950); Burdine v. Kennon, 186 Tenn.
200, 209 S.W.2d 9 (1948). Contra, Kimbro v. Kimbro, 191 Tenn. 316, 232 S.W.2d 354 (1950).
Utah-State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190,407 P.2d 571 (1965). Virginia-Kain v. Angle, Ill Va. 415,
69 S.E. 355 (1910). West Virginia-Isaacs v. Board of'Ballot Comm'rs, 122 W. Va. 703, 12 S.E.2d
510 (1940).
163. See cases cited note 146 supra.
164. See People v. Enlow, 135 Colo. 249, 310 P.2d 539 (1957); Wood v. Wood, 264 S.W.2d
260 (Ky. 1954).
165. 17 Mass. 515 (1822).
166. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825).
167. National Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N.Y. 400 (1879); Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466 (1878).
168. 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892).
169. E.g., People v. Enlow, 135 Colo. 249, 258, 310 P.2d 539, 544 (1957) (public office);
Wagers v. State, 370 P.2d 567, 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (juror).
170. See State ey rel. Mitchell v. McDonald, 164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508 (1933); Isaacs v.
Board of Ballot Comm'rs, 122 W. Va. 703, 12 S.E.2d 510 (1940).
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The courts in California and Missouri have held that the legislature
intended for the civil death statutes to apply only to convictions by the
courts of the forum state and imprisonment in the prisons of the forum
state.1
7'
III. Loss OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
The fourteenth amendment confers citizenship upon all persons
born or naturalized in the United States. 72 The Constitution does not
provide that criminal offenders shall lose their United States citizenship
as a result of a criminal conviction, and it does not give Congress the
power to impose this disability. As a general rule, therefore, United
States citizens convicted of criminal offenses retain their citizenship and
many of the rights and privileges accompanying it,'17 including the right
to obtain a passport.
Although a criminal offender retains his citizenship, his position in
many respects is similar to that of an alien. The courts have recognized
that there is a fundamental distinction between the status of citizenship
and the privileges of citizenship. 74 Consequently, a citizen convicted of a
criminal offense may be prevented from exercising such rights and
privileges as voting, holding public office, and serving on juries.
Moreover, many of the privileges of citizenship retained by convicted
criminals also are available to non-citizens, making the status of
171. See Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960); Beck v. Downey, 191 F.2d 150 (9th Cir.
1951); Vedin v. McConnell, 22 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1927); Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. 2d 848, 271
P.2d 18 (1954); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Boundy,236 Mo. App. 656, 158 S.W.2d 243 (1942); Jones
v. Jones, 188 Mo. App. 220, 175 S.W. 227 (1915).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. The fourteenth amendment also provides that persons
born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the state in which they reside. The courts
have recognized that there is a difference between United States citizenship and state citizenship.
See. e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1876); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Crosse v. Board of
Supervisors of Elections, 243 Md. 555, 221 A.2d 431 (1966), held that it is not necessary for a
person to be a United States citizen in order for him to be a citizen of the state in which he resides.
The court interpreted a state constitutional requirement that a candidate for public office must have
been a citizen of the state for 5 years to mean that he must have been domiciled in the state for 5
years. The court said citizenship of a state depends on the constitutional or statutory context in
which the term is used. For some purposes, the court found that the term citizenship in a state
statute may be equated with residency. Id. at434. In Factor v. Pennington Press, Inc., 230 F. Supp.
906 (N.D. Ill. 1963), however, a federal district courtheld that the language of the fourteenth
amendment indicates that an individual must be a United States citizen before he can be a citizen of
a state.
173. See. e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646,651
(1871) (dictum); Shaffer v. Tepper, 127 F. Supp. 892,895 (E.D. Ky. 1955).
174. See, e.g., White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646,651 (1871) (dictum); Shaffer v. Tepper,
127 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ky. 1955).
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citizenship less meaningful. 175 Nevertheless, aliens who participate in
criminal activity may be subjected to a number of disabilities not
imposed on citizens.171 Unlike convicted citizens, for example, aliens are
subject to deportation.'77 In addition, if an alien has been convicted of a
criminal offense, he may be prevented from obtaining citizenship in the
United States since Congress has provided that an alien cannot be
naturalized unless he possesses good moral character.
178
This section will discuss the effect of a criminal conviction on
citizenship and the constitutional problems involved in the efforts by
Congress to denationalize citizens convicted of certain offenses. In
addition, this section will review the effect of a criminal conviction on
aliens.
A. Effect of Criminal Conviction on Citizenship and Passport Rights
1. Denationalization of Convicted Citizens.-There has been
considerable controversy in recent years over the power of Congress to
provide for the involuntary denationalization of citizens. During this
period, the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional several attempts
by Congress to denationalize citizens 179 and has recognized that a
criminal conviction does not result in the denationalization of the
offender, 1 0 even if he has lost his civil rights under a state statute.'' The
175. Aliens as well as citizens are entitled to protection under the fifth amendment. Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (dictum). In addition,-aliens are protected by the
due process and equal protection clauses. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915). Moreover, all
persons in the United States, irrespective of citizenship, may exercise such rights as freedom of
speech and religion because the Constitution prohibits the government from interfering with these
rights, U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See Hurst, Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?, 29 RoCKY MT.
L. REV. 62,63 (1956).
176. The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment protects "citizens,"
as distinguished from the due process and equal protection clauses, which protect "any person."
U.S. Co sT. amend. XIV, § I. See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953) (power to exclude aliens includes power to detain stateless aliens indefinitely); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (discretionary refusal of Attorney General to grant bail not reviewable
unless arbitrary).
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1964).
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1964).
179. See, e.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (invalidating statute providing that
citizen loses his citizenship for voting in a political election in a foreign state); Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163 (1964) (declaring statute unconstitutional which provided for denationalization of
naturalized citizen after his continuous residence for 3 years in the country of his birth); Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (invalidating statute which expatriated citizens who leave
the United States to avoid the draft); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (invalidating statute which
denationalized citizens convicted of desertion in time of war).
180. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
181. Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950).
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courts have had little difficulty in establishing this rule since the
Constitution does not provide that convicted citizens should forfeit their
citizenship, and Congress, with two limited exceptions," 2 has not
attempted to denationalize convicted citizens.
In 1958, the Supreme Court-in Trop v. Dulles' invalidated a
statute providing for the denationalization of citizens dishonorably
discharged from the armed forces after a court martial conviction for
desertion in time of war."u Finding that the statute was designed to
punish the convicted deserter, the Court held that the use of
denationalization as a punishment violates the eighth amendment's
proscription against "cruel and unusual punishment." The Court
explained that the Constitution does not give Congress the power to use
denationalization as a weapon to express its displeasure with a citizen's
conduct however reprehensible that conduct may be."s
In addition to its effort to denationalize convicted deserters,
Congress has provided that a United States citizen shall lose his
citizenship upon conviction of treason, of advocating the overthrow of
the United States government by force or violence, or of other specified
crimes relating to the forceful opposition to the government."8 In
passing this statute, Congress was attempting to equip the government
with sanctions to combat internal communism.' Although the statute
has not been declared unconstitutional, the Supreme Court's decisions in
Trop and in Afroyim v. Ruskls place its validity in doubt. The Court in
Afroyim ruled that a statute denationlizing a citizen for voting in a
political election in a foreign state was unconstitutional because
Congress has no power, express or implied, to denationalize a citizen
without his consent. The Court stated that the fourteenth amendment
"can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship which a citizen
keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once acquired, this
[f]ourteenth [a]mendment citizenship was not to be shifted, canceled, or
182. 8U.S.C. §§ 1481(a)(8)-(9)(1964).
183. 356 U.S.86 (1958).
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1964).
185. The Court stated that citizenship "is not a license that expires upon misbehavior." Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1964). The statute provides for the expatriation of citizens
convicted of violating the following statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1964) (rebellion or insurrection
against authority or laws of United States); 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (1964) (advocating overthrow of
United States government by force or violence); and 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964) (conspiracy to
overthrow or destroy the government by force, or to prevent or delay execution of any law of the
United States by force, or to take, seize, or possess any property of the United States by force).
187. See Comment, The Expatriation Act of 1954.64 YALE L.J. 1164 (1955).
188. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
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diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the [s]tates, or any other
governmental unit."' 9 As a result of this broad language, the Afroyim
decision may mean that a citizen convicted of treason or of attempting
by force to overthrow the government will retain his citizenship, despite
the statute passed by Congress. 1 0 This result will depend on whether a
citizen may voluntarily abandon his citizenship through his actions.'9'
Although the broad language of Afroyim indicates that positive and
affirmative consent is necessary before a citizen can lose his
citizenship,1 2 the Court could interpret an act of treason or an attempt
to overthrow the government as a voluntary abandonment of citizenship.
2. Right of Convicted Citizens to Obtain Passports.-A criminal
conviction generally does not affect the right of the offender to obtain a
passport . 93 Congress has granted to the Secretary of State the power to
issue passports under rules designated by the President. 94 By executive
order, the President has empowered the Secretary of State to prescribe
the rules for the issuance of passports without the approval or
ratification of the President. 9 5 The present rules do not deny passports to
citizens on the basis of a criminal conviction.'"
In the 1950's passports were regularly denied to habitual criminals,
but since that time the Secretary of State has sharply narrowed the
reasons for which passports are denied. 97 Under existing rules, a
passport will not be issued if the applicant is the subject of an
outstanding federal warrant of arrest, or if he is subject to a court order,
conditions of parole, or conditions of probation that forbid his departure
from the United States.9 8 If a convicted citizen has completely paid his
debt to society, he will not be prevented from obtaining a passport on the
189. Id. at 262.
190. See 20 VAND. L. REV. 1341, 1345 (1967).
191. See, e.g., Marsh, The Supreme Court and the Power of Congress to Expatriate-From
the Objective to the Subjective Test of Voluntariness: A Shift in Predominance, 22 Sw. L.J. 466,
477-78 (1968); 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 925,935 (1967-68).
192. See Marsh, supra note 191, at477-80.
193. A passport is a document identifying a citizen. In effect, a passport requests foreign
powers to allow the bearer to enter and to pass freely and safely, recognizing the right of the bearer
to protection by American diplomatic and consular officers. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475,
481 (1967).
194. 22 U.S.C. § 211(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
195. 22 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (Supp. IV, 1969); Exec. Order No. 11, 295,3 C.F.R. 220 (1970).
196. The current rules do provide, however, that a passport may be refused if the Secretary of
State determines that the applicant's activities abroad are likely to cause serious damage to the
national security or the foreign policy of the United States. 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1970). In
addition, the rules provide that a passport may be revoked or restricted if a citizen's activities
abroad are in violation of the laws of the United States. Id. § 51.71 (c).
197. Ehrlich, Passports, 19 STAN. L. REV. 129, 137 (1966).
198. 22C.F.R. § 51.70(a) (1970).
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basis of his conviction. Passport authorities do not initiate investigations
to determine if applicants have criminal records.' Nevertheless, the
applicant must swear on his passport application that he has never
"been convicted by a court or court martial of competent jurisdiction of
committing any act of treason against, or attempting by force to
overthrow, or bearing arms against, the United States, or conspiring to
overthrow, put down or to destroy by force, the Government of the
United States." If an applicant has been convicted ,of such an act, an
explanation must be attached to his passport application. Passport
officials explain that this inquiry is made because citizens convicted of
these offenses lose their nationality and therefore are ineligible for a
passport.20'
B. Effect of Criminal Conviction on Aliens
Although a born or naturalized citizen of the United States
generally does not lose his citizenship or his capacity to acquire a
passport when convicted of a crime, a criminal conviction may have
serious consequences for persons who are not already citizens. Congress
has provided, for example, that aliens who have been convicted of certain
crimes may be excluded from admission into the United States. In
addition, an alien who has a criminal record may be ineligible to be
naturalized as a United States citizen and may even be subject to
deportation.
1. Entrance into the United States. -Federal law prohibits aliens
convicted of certain offenses from entering the United States. First, an
alien is ineligible for admission into this country if he has been convicted
of a nonpolitical crime involving moral turpitude.22 This restriction does
not apply to an alien convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
while he was under the age of eighteen if the crime was committed or if
the alien was released from confinement more than five years prior to the
date of his application for admission into the United States. Secondly,
Congress has provided that aliens shall be excluded from admission into
the United States if they have been convicted of two or more offenses for
which the aggregate sentences actually imposed were five or more years
199. Letter from Robert D. Johnson, Deputy Director, Passport Office, to the Vanderbilt
Law Review, July i, 1970.
200. U.S. Dep't of State, Passport Application 2 (Feb. 1969).
201. Letter from Robert D. Johnson, Deputy Director, Passport Office, to the Vanderbilt
Law Review, July 1, 1970.
202. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (1§64). For a discussion of what constitutes a crime involving
moral turpitude see notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
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of incarceration.? This statute, by its terms, applies even though the
offenses did not involve moral turpitude and arose from a single course
of conduct. Thirdly, the federal statute prohibits the admission of any
alien who has been convicted of violating any law relating to illicit traffic
in narcotics. 214 When an alien is convicted of a crime in a foreign
jurisdiction, the law of the United States is applicable in determining
whether he has been convicted of an offense that will preclude his entry
into this country.m
2. Naturalization.-If an alien is admitted into the United States
and later desires to become a citizen, his criminal record may prevent
him from meeting the statutory qualifications. The United States
Constitution grants to Congress the power to establish uniform rules of
naturalization.2 Accordingly, Congress has provided that no person
shall be naturalized as a citizen unless he has been a person of "good
moral character" for at least five years preceding the date when he filed
his petition for naturalization. 7 Statutory guidelines provide that an
alien shall not be regarded as a person of good moral character if he has
been convicted during the five-year period of any offense that could have
excluded him from admission into the United States s8 Nor does an
alien possess good moral character if he: (1) has been convicted of two or
more gambling offenses during the five-year period;29 (2) has been
confined in a penal institution, as a result of a criminal conviction, for a
total of 180 days or more during the five-year period, regardless of
whether the offenses for which he was confined were committed within
the period;2 10 or (3) has been convicted of murder at any time.21'
Moreover, an alien who has never been convicted of a crime may lack
good moral character. The statute specifies, for example, that habitual
drunkards21 2 and persons who have committed adultery213 do not possess
203. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10) (1964).
204. Id. § 1182(a)(23).
205. Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1962).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1964). The statute provides that a finding by the Attorney General
that an alien is not deportable is not conclusive evidence that the alien possesses good moral
character. Id. § 1427(d) (1964).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(3) (1964). The courts have held that naturalization is a privilege
which must be given or withheld in accordance with the terms imposed by Congress. See United
States v. Manzi, 276 US. 463, 467 (1928); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926);
Jubran v. United States, 255 F.2d 81,84 (5th Cir. 1958). Consequently, the courts first examine the
statutory guidelines in determining whether an alien seeking naturalization is a person of good
moral character. In re Mayall's Naturalization, 154 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
209. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0(5) (1964).
210. Id. § 1101(0(7).
211. Id. § 1101(0(8).
212. Id. § 1101(f)(1).
213. Id. § 1101(f)(2).
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good moral character. Similarly, Congress permits the courts, in their
discretion, to find that an alien does not possess good moral character
even if his conduct does not fall within the statutory definition.2 1,
According to the courts, the test of good moral character should be the
ethical standards current at the time in the community, not the personal
moral principles of the individual judge or court.21 5 The court may
consider a number of factors, including arrests216 and traffic violations.2 17
Although a denial of naturalization cannot be based on an offense
committed before the five-year period, the courts may consider crimes
committed prior to the five-year period along with other evidence to
determine if the alien has shown good moral character within the
period.21 8 A criminal conviction within the five-year period, however,
does not conclusively establish bad moral character unless Congress has
so provided.
219
3. Deportation.-In addition to making aliens convicted of
certain offenses ineligible for United States citizenship, Congress has
provided that convicted aliens may be deported. A federal statute directs
the Attorney General to order the deportation of any alien who has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude220 within five years after
his entry into the United States and who has been sentenced to or
confined in a prison for a year or more.221 An alien also is subject to
deportation if he has been convicted of two crimes involving moral
turpitude at any time after his entry into the United States, regardless of
whether he was confined in prison as a result of his convictions.m In
addition, Congress has authorized the deportation of aliens convicted of
laws relating to illicit possession of or traffic in narcotics or
marijuana.m
214. Id. § 1101(f. See, e.g., Brukiewicz v. Savoretti, 211 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1954); cf In re
Naturalization of Denessy, 200 F. Supp. 354 (D. Del. 1961). For a discussion of cases applying the
requirement of good moral character see Note, Naturalization-Good Moral Character as a
Prerequisite, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 375 (1959).
215. See, e.g., Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961); In reSchmidt, 56 Misc.
456,289 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
216. United States v. Chandler, 152 F. Supp. 169, 178 (D. Md. 1957).
217. In re Naturalization of Odeh, 185 F. Supp. 953 (D. Mich. 1960).
218. See, e.g., Marcantonio v. United States, 185 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1950); In re Siacco's
Petition, 184 F. Supp. 803 (D. Md. 1960); In re Orphanidis' Petition, 178 F. Supp. 872 (N.D.
W.Va. 1959).
219. United States v. Cunha, 209 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1954).
220. For a discussion of what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude see notes 139-41
supra and accompanying text.
221. 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(4) (1964).
222. Id.
223. Id. § 1251(a)(11).
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To ease the harshness of the deportation provisions, Congress gives
the Attorney General discretion to suspend a deportation order under
certain circumstances2 4 In addition, a convicted alien generally cannot
be deported on the basis of his conviction if he has been granted a full
and unconditional pardon or if the court imposing his sentence makes a
recommendation to the Attorney General that he not be deported.2 A
pardon or judicial recommendation, however, will not prevent the
deportation of an alien convicted of violating narcotics laws. 221
Moreover, the courts have held that an alien whose conviction has been
expunged under state law still is subject to deportation.M
In Mahler v. Eby' 2 8 the United States Supreme Court upheld
statutes authorizing the deportation of convicted aliens as an exercise of
the sovereign's power to determine the conditions upon which an alien
may reside in this country. The Court found that the statute in question
was not designed to punish aliens, but to rid the country of persons who
have shown that their continued presence might be detrimental to the
safety and welfare of society.2 Although deportation provisions have
been upheld, the courts have ruled that they should be strictly construed
since they may inflict the equivalent of banishment or exile on the
convicted alien. 30 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has ruled that a
criminal offender cannot be deported unless he was an alien at the time
of his conviction.231 Consequently, a citizen who has been convicted of
offenses involving moral turpitude cannot be deported if he is
subsequently denaturalized . 32 In determining whether an alien has been
224. Id. § 1254(a)(2). To obtain a suspension of a deportation order, an alien must have
been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 10 years following the
commission of the act constituting a ground for deportation. He must prove that during that period
he has been a person of good moral character. He also must satisfy the Attorney General that his
deportation would result in unusual hardship "to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." Id.
225. Id. § 1251(b).
226. Id. The Ninth Circuit recently held that Congress has not unconstitutionally abridged
the power of executive clemency by nullifying the effect of a state pardon of a narcotics conviction.
Kwai Chiu Yuen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 406 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 908 (1969).
227. See, e.g., Tsimbidy-Rochu v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 414 F.2d 797 (9th
Cir. 1969); Brownrigg v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 356 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1966). See
Comment, The Futile Forgiveness: Basing Deportation on an Expunged Narcotics Conviction, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 372 (1966).
228. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
229. Id. at 39.
230. See, e.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637,642-43 (1954); Tutronev. Shaughnessy, 160
F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Banishment has never been allowed as a punishment in this country.
231. Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120 (1964).
232. Id.
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convicted of a crime that makes him subject to deportation, the courts
apply the law of the United States, not the law of a state or foreign
country.233
IV. Loss OF VOTING RIGHTS
The United States Constitution provides that the voting
qualifications established by the states for state elections also apply to
elections for the United States House of Representatives z' and Senate.2
State law also governs the qualifications for voting in presidential
elections.236 As a result of these provisions, both national and state
elective officials are selected under a medley of voting qualifications that
vary considerably from state to state.2 13  Historically, voting was
considered a privilege rather than a right.3 Consequently, the states
were able to enact strict voting requirements that discriminated against
citizens on such grounds as sex, economic status, race, and education.
Throughout the years, however, the right to vote has been the subject of
continuous expansion through constitutional amendments,
congressional action, and judicial decisions. 39 Today, therefore, voting
is considered a fundamental right.30 Nevertheless, since the states still
have considerable power to set voting qualifications, the requirements
for voting are different in each state.241
Although most of the restrictive and discriminatory voting
requirements have been eliminated, all citizens who have reached their
233. See, e.g., Mercer v. Lence, 96 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 611
(1938); Wyngaard v. Rogers, 187 F. Supp. 527 (D.D.C. 1960), affd sub noI. Wyngaard v.
Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961).
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
235. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
236. When the voters go to the polls at a presidential election, they do not vote directly for the
President and Vice President, but rather for presidential electors. Although the electors are chosen
by the people in each state, this is due solely to state law and not to any requirement contained in the
United States Constitution. The Constitution simply requires that the states "appoint" presidential
electors in a manner prescribed by the state legislature. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I. For a collection of
state laws requiring the popular election of presidential electors see R. HUPMAN & R. TIENKEN ,
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 157-251
(U.S. Government Printing Office Pub. No. 3671, 1968).
237. D. McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 2-3 (1949).
238. 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1360-61 (8th ed. 1927).
239. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV (suffrage not denied because of race, color, or
servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (suffrage rights granted to women); Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. IV, 1969); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 7 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2097 (July 20, 1970) (granting suffrage rights to 18-year-olds); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring equal legislative representation for all citizens of state).
240. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
241. D. McGOVNEY, supra note 237:
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state's voting age and met the residency requirements still do not have
free access to the polls. In almost all states, for example, persons who
have been convicted of certain crimes are not allowed to vote unless their
civil rights have been restored. To date, there have been few substantial
efforts to eliminate or weaken provisions denying the franchise to
convicted citizens.
A. Disfranchisement Upon Criminal Conviction
The state constitutional and statutory provisions disfranchising
persons convicted of criminal offenses are so diverse that they are
difficult to categorize. Despite this diversity, the result in the
overwhelming majority of states is that citizens convicted of serious
crimes, usually felonies, lose their right to vote until their civil rights are
restored in accordance with the appropriate state law.
A number of states provide that no person who has been convicted
of a felony2 ' or an infamous crime2 3 shall be allowed to register and
vote. Some states use these classifications, but also disqualify citizens
convicted of specified offenses.um Generally, the offenses listed separately
are election offenses and treason. 45 Other jurisdictions deny voting
242. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (limited to felony "involving moral turpitude"); ALASKA
STAT. § 15.05.030 (1962) (defining felonies involving moral turpitude but providing that list is not
all-inclusive); CONN. CONST. art. 6, § 3; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9.46 (1964) (excludes persons
convicted of crime of nonsupport); DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2; HAWAII CONST. art. II, § 2; KAN.
CONST. art. 5, § 2; LA. CONST. art. 8, § 6; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.1 (Supp. 1970); MONT.
CONST. art. IX, § 2; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-302 (1967); OKLA. CONST. art. III, § 1;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 93.1 (Supp. 1969-70).
243. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 7; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IOWA
CONST. art. 2, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. 6, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.59.060 (1965). The
Indiana constitution gives the state legislature power to deny the right of suffrage to persons
convicted of an infamous crime. IND. CONST. art. 2, § 8. The legislature, however, has provided
that the right to vote is lost only during the period of confinement in jail or prison for persons
convicted of a felony or misdemeanor. IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4804 (1969). For a general discussion
of what constitutes an infamous crime see notes 121-38 supra and accompanying text.
244. Ten states provide that voting rights are lost upon conviction of a felony or specified
offenses: ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-101(c) (1956); Ky. CONST. § 145;
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.605 (1969); MO. CONST. art. 8, § 2; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 111.060
(1966); NEaB. CONST. art. 6, § 2; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-112 to -113 (1964); NEV. CONST. art. 2,
§ I; N.D. CONST. § 127; N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-01-04 (1960); S.D. CONST. art. 7, § 8; TEX.
CONST. art. 16, § 2; TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 5.01 (1967); VA. CONST. § 23; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-18 (1969); WIS. CONST. art. 3, § 2; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.03 (1967).
At least 3 states deny voting rights to citizens convicted of an infamous crime or specified
offenses: CAL. CONST. art. 2, § I; R.I. CONST. amend. XXIV; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 5; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-205 (1955); id. § 40-2712.
245. E.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2; ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-101(c) (1956); Ky. CONST.
§ 145; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.605 (1969). But see VA. CONST. § 23 (specified offenses include
petit larceny, obtaining property under false pretenses, embezzlement, forgery, and perjury); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 2-205 (1955); id. § 40-2712 (specified offenses include bribery and larceny).
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rights to persons convicted of either an infamous crime, a felony, or
specified crimes 3" In addition, a few states disqualify voters convicted of
crimes punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary.A7
Rather than classifying offenses, a number of states specify the
crimes that result in disfranchisementY8 Some of these states disqualify
only a few offenders, such as those convicted of election offenses or
treasonY.2 9 On the other hand, the constitutional and statutory provisions
in other states list numerous offenses causing a loss of voting rights. °
Alabama has one of the most far-reaching disfranchisement provisions
of any state. The state constitution disqualifies a person from voting for
his conviction of any one of about 25 specified offenses, covering almost
everything from murder to vagrancy. In addition, the constitution
provides disfranchisement for conviction of "any crime punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary, or any infamous crime or crime of
moral turpitude."'' sl
In some cases, the state constitution says one thing and the statutes
say another. The New York, Ohio, and Wyoming constitutions, for
example, exclude from the right of suffrage all people convicted of
infamous crimes2z2 The legislatures in those states have provided that
convicted felons are not entitled to vote.2 53 In Illinois, both the
constitution and an implementing statute provide for disfranchisement
of citizens convicted of infamous crimes,2' but another Illinois statute
excludes from voting all persons who have been legally convicted and
246. FLA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 4-5; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (Supp. 1969); id. § 112.01
(1960); IDAHO CONST. art. 6, § 3; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-402 (1963); MD. CONST. art. I, § 2;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 186 (1967); MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 15; id. art. 7, § 2; N.M. CONST.
art. 7, § I; N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 3; N.Y. ELECTION LAWS §§ 152(2)-(5) (McKinney 1964); OHIO
CONST. art. 5, § 4; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2961.01-.02 (Baldwin 1964); Wyo. CONST. art. 6,
§ 6; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4 (1957).
247. N.C. CONST. art. 6, § 2; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (Supp. 1969); ORE. CONST. art. 2,
§ 3. Generally, only persons convicted of felonies are imprisoned in the penitentiary; persons
convicted of misdemeanors usually serve theif sentences in local jails.
248. CoLO. CoNsT. art. 7, § 10; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-18 (1963); MISS. CONST.
art. 12, § 241; N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 11; N.J. CONST. art. 2, 7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1
(1964); PA. CONST. art. 7, § 7; S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 6; S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(5)(c) (Supp.
1969); UTAH CONST. art. 4, § 6.
249. E.g., N.H. CoNsT. pt. l, art. I1; PA. CONsT. art. 7, § 7; UTAH CoNsT. art. 4, § 6.
250. E.g., S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 6; S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(5)(c) (Supp. 1969).
251. ALA. CONST. art. 8, § 182. Georgia's constitution lists a few specific crimes, and then
adds "or of any crime involving moral turpitude." GA. CONST. § 2-801.
252. N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. 5, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
253. N.Y. ELECTION LAWS §§ 152(2)-(5) (McKinney 1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2961.01-.02 (Baldwin 1964); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4 (1957). The legislatures, in effect, seem to
interpret "infamous crime" to mean "felony."
254. ILL. CONST. art. 7, § 7; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
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sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary.2s Due to this inconsistency,
it is unclear whether a defendant who is sentenced to the penitentiary
loses his right to vote if he has not committed a crime labeled
"infamous" by the legislature.256
At least one state, Arkansas, apparently has repealed its
disfranchisement provision. The Arkansas constitution delegates to the
legislature the pbwer to deprive convicted felons of the right to vote. 2 7
Until recently, the Arkansas Election Code contained a
disfranchisement provision,2 but the state legislature repealed the entire
Code, replacing it with a new law that apparently does not exclude felons
from voting.?"
B. Disfranchisement During Confinement in Jail or Prison
In most states, all citizens, including those not otherwise
disqualified, can be deprived of their right to vote during confinement in
jail or prison. A few states have specific provisions to this effect. In other
states, prisoners cannot vote because they do not have access to the polls
and do not qualify for absentee ballots."O
1. Provisions Expressly Excluding Prisoners from Vot-
ing.-Several states have express provisions excluding persons confined
in public prisons from voting. An Indiana statute, for example, provides:
"Every person undergoing a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of
any felony or misdemeanor shall be disfranchised during the period of
such imprisonment.1 26t Other states have clauses depriving all prisoners
of voting rights in their statutes disfranchising persons convicted of
serious crimes whose civil rights have not been restored. 62
New Hampshire is the only state that has adopted the Uniform Act
on the Status of Convicted Persons.263 This Act provides that a person
255. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
256. Id. ch. 38, § 124-1 (1964) (designates the offenses that are considered "infamous").
257. ARK. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
258. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-101 (1956) (repealed 1969).
259. Id. § 3-707 (Supp. 1969).
260. Since voting rights are lost or suspended during confinement in jail or prison, several
states have provided that inmates do not lose their residence for voting purposes while imprisoned.
E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 54:10 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-6 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. CONST.
art. 2, § 4.
261. IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4804 (1969). The Indiana legislature has the power under the
state constitution to deny the right of suffrage to persons convicted of infamous crimes. IND.
CONST. art. 2, § 8.
262. See, e.g., COLO. CoNsT. art. 7, § 10; Ky. CONST. § 145; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:42
(1969); Mo. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
263. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A (Supp. 1969).
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convicted of a felony cannot vote from the time of his sentence until his
final discharge. The Act, however, allows the offender to vote if
execution of his sentence is suspended or if he is placed on probation or
parole after being committed to prison. Under its provisions, a convicted
felon retains the right to vote and may exercise his right at any time other
than during his period of confinement, regardless of the offense
committed. Like the Uniform Act, the Model Penal Code also proposes
that convicted persons be disqualified from voting only during the period
of their confinement in prison.2 4 A: serious obstacle to widespread
adoption of either the Uniform Act or the Model Penal Code is that the
constitutions of most states provide for disfranchisement. Consequently,
most state constitutions would have to be repealed or amended before
the provisions could be effective32
Although West Virginia has not adopted the language of either the
Uniform Act or the Model Penal Code, the State has taken a lenient
attitude toward voting by ex-convicts. The state constitution provides
that no person "under conviction" of treason, felony, or bribery in an
election shall be permitted to vote. The convicted citizen regains his right
to vote as soon as he has served his full term of imprisonment or has been
pardoned.21
• 2. Unavailability of Election Machinery to Prisoners.-In the
majority of states, there are no statutes expressly disfranchising pre-trial
detainees or prisoners who were not disqualified by their conviction.
Voting rights are suspended during confinement in these states simply
because there are no provisions permitting voting booths at penal
institutions or authorizing the temporary release of prisoners on election
day. Moreover, prisoners are not allowed to vote by absentee ballot.
Most states, for example, permit voting by absentee ballot only in
limited circumstances, which do not include confinement in jail or
prison.w At least four states have statutes specifically excluding persons
confined in penal institutions from the right to receive absentee ballots.68
264. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.3 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
265. In New Hampshire, the Uniform Act is limited by the state constitution, which
disfranchises persons convicted of treason, bribery, or any willful violation of the election laws.
N.H. CONsT. pt. I, art. 11.
266. W. VA. CONST. art.4, § I; W. VA. CODEANN. § 3-1-3 (1966).
267. See. e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT.,ch. 46, § 19-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 253.010(l)(a) (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.85 (Supp. 1969). Alaska permits voters to obtain
absentee ballots "because of physical inaccessability of the polling place," but there are no
indications that prisoners have been permitted to vote under this provision. ALASKA STAT.
§ 1520.010(3) (1962).
268. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, § 86 (Supp. J969);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 6.1758 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2602(w) (Supp. 1969).
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These provisions have been upheld in the few cases that have tested their
validity.2 9 In Ray v. Pennsylvania,27' for example, a federal district court
refused to strike down Pennsylvania's statute providing that prisoners
cannot receive absentee ballots. In addition, the court found that even
when a prisoner's voting rights are not affected by his conviction,
election officials are not required to establish procedures and provide
equipment in order that he might vote.
The issues raised in the Ray decision were discussed by the United
States Supreme Court in McDonald v. Board of Election
Commissioners,2" which involved a class action on behalf of inmates
awaiting trial. The inmates were qualified electors, but could not appear
at the polls because they were either charged with nonbailable offenses or
were unable to post bail. Under the Illinois, statute, they did not fall
within the class of persons permitted to vote by absentee ballot .2 2 The
Court, in a unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Warren, held
that the Illinois absentee voting statute did not deny the untried inmates
equal protection of the law. Noting that the state could furnish the jails
with special polling booths, provide transportation to the polls for
inmates, or permit temporary reductions in bail to allow inmates to get
to the polls on their own,m3 the Court found that the statute did not in
and of itself prevent the prisoners from voting.
The McDonald decision is significant because the Court implied
that a state would violate the constitutional rights of pre-trial detainees
by completely precluding them from voting.274 This situation also
appears to be present in a case pending before the Illinois Supreme
Court. In People ex rel. St. George v. Woods,275 the plaintiff was
temporarily detained in jail due to his inability to post bail. Although he
touched all the procedural bases suggested by the Court in McDonald,
the plaintiff was denied the right to vote. In his brief, the plaintiff
269. See, e.g.. Wyers v. Bannan, 249 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1957); Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F.
Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1967). Courts have held that the privilege of absentee voting is one within the
legislative power to grant or withhold. Hallahan v. Mittlebeeller, 373 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. 1963);
Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn. 588, 370 S.W.2d 829 (1963).
270. 263 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
271. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
272. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 19-I (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) makes absentee balloting
available to 4 classes of persons: (1) those who are absent from the county of their residence for any
reason whatever; (2) those who are "physically incapacitated," so long as they present an affidavit
to that effect from a licensed physician; (3) those whose observance of a religious holiday precludes
attendance at the polls; and (4) those who are serving as poll watchers in precincts other than their
own on election day.
273. 394 U.S. at 808 n.6.
274. See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 84 (1969).
275. No. 43017 (I11. Sup. Ct., filed April 30, 1970).
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contends that denial of the right to vote because of pre-trial
incarceration violates the due process and equal protection clauses.2Y6
In deciding these cases, courts may attempt to distinguish between
untried inmates, as in McDonald and St. George, and convicted inmates
who did not lose their voting rights by their conviction, as in Ray. State
constitutional and statutory provisions establishing qualifications for
voting, however, do not make such a distinction.
C. Voting By Disfranchised Persons
Although most states disqualify persons convicted of certain
offenses from voting, it is uncertain, as a practical matter, how many
technically disfranchised persons actually continue to vote. In many
states, there appear to be no statutory provisions for removing the names
of convicted persons from the voting lists. In these states, unless a special
investigation is made into voting frauds, the police and court files are not
ordinarily consulted to determine whether all voter registrants are
qualified.m Several states have attempted to rectify this situation by
,providing a statutory procedure for the removal of the names of
disfranchised persons from the voting lists. The typical statute places the
responsibility on the court clerk~8 or prosecutor~9 to supply the board of
elections or other appropriate body with the names of persons who have
been convicted of crimes that disqualify them from voting under the
state law. California requires the county clerks to examine the court
records to obtain the necessary information. °0 In Connecticut, the
statute requires the registrar of voters to notify convicted persons by
certified mail before their names are removed.21
In addition to providing for the removal of disqualified citizens
from the voting lists, many states have criminal sanctions to discourage
Ivoting by disfranchised persons.=2 In most of these states, the individual
276* The plaintiff contends that due process was violated because he was denied the right to
vote without a prior hearing. He claims the equal protection clause was violated because he was
prevented from voting solely because of his financial inability to post bail. Brief for Appellant at 11,
14, People ex rel. St. George v. Woods, No. 43017 (Il. Sup. Ct., filed April 30, 1970).
277. Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, 293 ANNALS 99, 104 (1954).
278. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 15(2) (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-45 (1964); GA.
CODE ANN. § 34-121 (1962); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.815 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3215
(1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-94 (Supp. 1969).
279. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:31-17 (1964).
280. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 389 (1961).
281. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-45 (1964).
282. See, e.g.. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9907 (1962); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 24-14 (Supp.
1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-4 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE §12-11-04 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN.




who votes illegally after being convicted of a disqualifying crime is guilty
of a misdemeanor.? Other statutes, however, provide that the illegal
voter is guilty of a felony.8 Some provisions specifically provide that the
ex-convict is guilty of illegal voting only if he votes knowing he is not
legally qualified321 The courts are divided on the question of whether
intent or knowledge is necessary to the statutory offense of illegal voting
in the absence of a statutory requirement. Some authorities contend that
a conviction for illegal voting can occur if the voter knew a state of facts
that would disqualify him from voting.2 Other authorities, however,
hold that the voter cannot be convicted unless his vote is knowingly cast
without right, although he had full knowledge of the facts that
disqualfied him from voting. 27 If an ex-convict reasonably believes that
he has been restored to his citizenship rights, the courts generally will not
find him guilty of making a false registration statement to vote.
288
D. Judicial Developments
The courts have recognized, especially in recent years, that the right
to vote is one of the most precious and fundamental rights enjoyed by
citizens in a democratic society.289 The Supreme Court has suggested
that the right of free suffrage is the most basic of all rights.
290
Consequently, the Court has demanded that any infringement on free
suffrage be "carefully and meticulously scrutinized."2' Before the right
to vote can be restricted, the Constitution demands a compelling state
interest and legislation that is non-discriminatory.8 2 The Court has held
that restrictions on the right to vote must be "germane to one's ability to
participate intelligently in the electoral process. 12 3 Moreover, states
cannot "casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of
some remote administrative benefit to the State."
2 4
Despite their desire to protect and expand the right to vote, the
courts have not been willing to declare state provisions unconstitutional
283. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9907 (1962).
284. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.85.240 (1965).
285. Id.
286. In re Sugar Creek Local School Dist., 21 Ohio Op.2d 16, 22, 185 N.E.2d 809, 816
(1962), quoting 29 C.J.S. Elections § 325, at 810 (1965).
287. Id.
288. E.g., State v. White, 237 Mo. 208, 140 S.W. 896 (1911).
289. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
290. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
291. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
292. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
293. Id. at 668.
294. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
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that deny the franchise to persons convicted of certain crimes. Although
the precise issue has never been before the Supreme Court, laws
excluding felons from the electorate have been cited by the Court in
several cases as examples of voting restrictions that serve a legitimate
state purpose.295 Even the more liberal members of the Court have said in
dicta that states may properly exclude felons from the franchise. 2 6 The
lower courts have relied heavily on Supreme Court dicta in cases testing
the constitutionality of disfranchisement provisions.'"
The courts have used several grounds to justify provisions
disqualifying criminals from voting. The most common explanation for
the laws is that the states have a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity and purity of the ballot b ox.298 In Washington v. State,2 9' one of
the most frequently cited cases, the Alabama Supreme Court said:
The manifest purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only
sure foundation of republican liberty, and which needs protection against the
invasion of corruption, just as much as against that of ignorance, incapacity, or
tyranny. . . The presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of a
felony, or other base offense indicative of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise
the privilege of suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of equality with freemen who
are clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship. It is proper, therefore,
that this class should be denied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes
hazard the welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least in close
political contests. /
In Green v. Board of Elections,301 a federal court of appeals advanced
two additional explanations to justify the disfranchisement provisions.
First, the court suggested that the states, in passing the laws, may have
relied on Locke's theory that every man who enters society authorizes
the society, or its legislative body, to make laws fdr the public good and
295. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673, 675 nA (1966)
(dissenting opinion); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,96-97 (1958); Estep v.
United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 n.13 (1946); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,346-47 (1890).
296. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,675 nA (1966) (Black, J., dissenting);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963) (Douglas, J., for the majority); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (Warren, C.J., for the majority); see Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of
Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (Douglas, J., for the Court).
297. See, e.g., Green v.. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1048 (1968); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), affdmem., 396
U.S. 12 (1969); People v. DeStefano, 64 Ill. App. 2d 389,397,212 N.E.2d 357,362 (1965).
298. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884); State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious,
351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943); Application of Marino, 23 N.J. Misc. 159, 42 A.2d 469
(1945); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68,256 N.W. 377 (1934).
299. 75 Ala. 582 (1884).
300. Id. at 585.
301. 380 F.2d 445 (2dCir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
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pledges that he will assist in the execution of those laws. 2 In applying
this theory the court said, "A man who breaks the laws he has
authorized his agent to make for his own governance could fairly have
been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further
administering the compact." On a less theoretical plane, the Green
court found that it is not unreasonable to deny criminals the right to
elect "the legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce
these, the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the
judges who consider their cases. This is especially so when account is
taken of the heavy incidence of recidivism and the prevalence of
organized crime." 304 The Missouri Supreme Court has justified the
disfranchisement provisions by holding that they are designed to permit
"only those who have lived up to certain minimum moral and legal
standards . . . to exercise the high privilege of participating in
government by voting. ' 35 An interpretative comment to the Texas
constitutional provision that disqualfies criminals from voting says the
state has an important interest in guarding the polls against "unsafe
elements."
Since the courts have found reasons to justify the practice of
denying criminals the right to vote, the disfranchisement provisions have
withstood a number of constitutional objections.3 First, it is recognized
that the due process clause is not violated as long as state laws are
enacted pursuant to a legitimate state purpose.m Secondly, the equal
protection clause cannot be used to set aside a statutory discrimination,
such as the disfranchisement provisions, if facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.m Thirdly, some courts have found support for
disfranchisement laws in the express wording of the fourteenth
amendment. This section reduces the basis of representation of a state in
the House of Representatives "when the right to vote at any election
...is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-
302. Id. at 451, quoting J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 89 (1698).
303. 380 F.2d 445,451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
304. Id.
305. State ex rel. Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 1241-42, 175 S.W.2d 787,788 (1943).
306. TEX. CONST. ANN. art. 6, § I (interpretative comment).
307. For a discussion of constitutional objections to civil disability laws see notes 137-315
on pages 1184-1218 infra and accompanying text.
308. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,444 (1963). Courts have found that the state has a
legitimate purpose in excluding some convicted citizens from voting. E.g., Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal.
2d 596, 603, 414 P.2d 412,417, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289 (1966).
309. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968).
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one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime ... "310
In Green, the state argued that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
could not have intended the general language of section one to outlaw a
discrimination that section two expressly allows without penalty of
reduced representation. The court found the state's argument
"convincing." It could find no support for the argument that "other
crime" refers only to crimes connected with rebellions. 31' Fourthly, the
fifteenth amendment requirement that the right to vote must not be
denied on account of "previous condition of servitude"312 does not
prevent the disfranchisement laws, according to the Illinois Court of
Appeals. In People v. DeStefano3 1 3 the defendant claimed that
"previous condition of servitude" includes penal confinement. Since the
fifteenth amendment was designed to guarantee slaves the right to vote,
the court found that imprisonment is not a "previous condition of
servitude" for purposes of the amendment.314 Fifthly, the Constitution's
prohibition against bills of attainder 315 does not invalidate the
disfranchisement provisions since the courts have found that such laws
are not designed to punish but to accomplish a legitimate governmental
purpose.316 The disfranchisement laws represent a "nonpenal exercise of
the power to regulate the franchise. ' 31 7 Lastly, courts have held that the
eighth amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment is not
applicable to these provisions because depriving convicted felons of the
franchise is not a punishment.31 1 In Green the court found that even if the
laws were designed to punish, the framers of the Bill of Rights would not
have regarded them as "cruel and unusual."31'
310. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
311. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,452 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968). The argument that the fourteenth amendment expressly authorizes the
disfranchisement provisions alsowas made by the dissent in Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 616,
414 P.2d 412,426,51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 298 (1966).
312. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV.
313. 64 Ill. App. 2d 389,212 N.E.2d 357 (1965).
314. Id. at 397, 212 N.E.2d at 362.
315. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1,§ 10.
316. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1048 (1968).
317. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97 (1958) (dictum) (plurality opinion); e.g., State ex rel.
Barrett v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 1239, 175 S.W.2d 787,788 (1943); Application of Marino, 23
NJ. Misc. 159, 160,42 A.2d 469,470-71 (1945); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 86,256
N.W. 377, 385 (1934). But see Elkin v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 6,8, 106 S.W.2d 83,84 (1937).





Constitutional objections also have been raised against the
procedures by which convicted citizens may regain their right to vote by
having their civil rights restored.3 2 In Beacham v. Braterman,3 2 1 the
plaintiff was not permitted to vote because he had been convicted of two
marijuana violations and his application for a pardon had been denied.
The plaintiff not only complained that the Florida disfranchisement
provisions are unconstitutional because they do not support a
compelling state interest, but he also argued that his fundamental
citizenship rights cannot arbitrarily be brought under the pardon
umbrella and dispensed with at the discretion of the executive branch. A
three-judge federal court rejected both arguments, 32 and the Supreme
Court affirmed in a per curiam decision.32 The district court relied on
previous Supreme Court dicta in holding that states may
constitutionally exclude felons from the franchise. The court also found
that the restoration of civil rights is a part of the pardon power and, as
such, is an act of executive clemency not subject to judicial control. The
court explained that the discretionary power to pardon is recognized as a
peculiar right of the executive branch of government.
A Connecticut statute requiring that petitions for restoration of
voting rights be accompanied by a five dollar fee 4 was challenged in
Bynum v. Connecticut Commission on Forfeited Rights.325 The plaintiff
contended that the statute discriminates against the indigent by
depriving them of equal protection of the laws.36 A federal district judge
denied plaintiff's motion for a three-judge court to hear the case,3 7 but
the court of appeals reversed.32 In holding that a three-judge court
should be convened, the appellate court relied on the Supreme Court's
finding in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections3"* that "[w]ealth, like
race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process."
The leading case restricting the scope of the disfranchisement
320. For a discussion of restoration procedures see notes 181-277 infra and accompanying
text.
321. 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), affdmem., 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
322. Id.
323. 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
324. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-48 (1964).
325. 410 F.2d 173 (2dCir. 1969).
326. The plaintiff conceded that Connecticut had the right to bar him and other ex-felons
from the ballot box.
327. Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on Forfeited Rights, 296 F. Supp. 495 (D. Conn. 1968).
328. Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on Fortfeited Rights, 410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969).
329. 383 U.S.663 (1966).
330. Id. at 668.
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provisions is Otsuka v. Hite,331 which interprets California's
constitutional provision disfranchising persons convicted of infamous
crimes. In Otsuka, the California Supreme Court held that the
disfranchisement provision, standing alone, does not violate the equal
protection clause because the state has a compelling interest in
maintaining the "purity of the ballot box. ' ' z2 The court found, however,
that the equal protection clause is violated unless "infamous crime" is
interpreted to include only "crimes involving moral corruption and
dishonesty, thereby branding their perpetrator as a threat to the integrity
of the elective process." The decision is significant because the court
recognized that there are equal protection limitations on the
disfranchisement of voters.3u In reaching its decision, the court said:
[T]he only tenable purpose yet proposed of the voting disqualification ... is to
protect 'the purity of the ballot box' against abuses by morally corrupt and
dishonest voters operating to the detriment of the electorate as a whole. But such
abuses are not consistently predictable by simply considering 'the nature of the
punishment,' in this day of indeterminate sentences and proliferation of technical,
malum prohibitum offenses. Rather, the inquiry must focus more precisely on the
nature of the crime itself, and determine whether the elements of the crime are such
that he who has committed it may reasonably be deemed to constitute a threat to the
integrity of the elective process.3
The dissent in Otsuka complained that the majority opinion
furnishes no guidelines for registrars of voters to follow in determining
whether certain crimes involve moral corruption and dishonesty of such
a nature that their perpetrator can be deemed a threat to the integrity of
the elective process .33 The dissent also pointed out that under the
majority's reasoning there may be misdemeanors which would qualify as
infamous crimes.3
At least one court has restricted the disfranchisement laws by
holding that they only disqualify offenders from voting at public
elections. In Galloway v. Council of Clark,m the Superior Court of New
Jersey held that a city councilman was entitled to exercise the rights and
duties of his office, including voting on ordinances, even though he had
been convicted of an offense that disfranchised him from voting. The
councilman was convicted of conspiring to unlawfully demand and
331. 64 Cal. 2d 596,414 P.2d 412,51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
332. Id. at 602,414 P.2d at 416,51 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
333. Id. at599,414 P.2d at414,51 Cal. Rptr. at286.
334. The New Jersey disfranchisement statute was recently declared unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds. See note 404 on page 1241 infra.
335. 64 Cal. 2d at 611,414 P.2d at 422,5! Cal. Rptr. at 294.
336. Id. at615,414 P.2d at425,51 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
337. Id.,414 P.2dat426,51 Cal. Rptr. at298.
338. 92 N.J. Super. 409,223 A2d 644 (1966).
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receive compensation for favorable consideration of a local variance
application. Although he was later removed from office because of his
conviction, 339 the court upheld the legality of his vote on the very
ordinance that he was paid to support. The court found that the New
Jersey disfranchisement law only operated to prevent the councilman
from voting at public elections and did not apply to votes he might cast
as a member of the city council.
V. Loss OF RIGHT TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE
Although the voting requirements within each state are identical for
federal, state, and local elections,310 the qualifications for holding all
public offices are not the same. Most states have constitutional and
statutory provisions disqualifying persons convicted of certain crimes
from holding public office, but these provisions do not apply to federal
offices, even though the person holding the office is appointed or elected
to represent the people of the state. The courts have ruled that the
qualifications for federal elected officials are determined by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and cannot be altered by the
states. 41 As a result of this distinction, an individual may be qualified to
seek election to the United States Senate, but not to the local school
board. This section will survey both federal and state provisions designed
to prevent convicted citizens from holding public office.
A. Definition of Public Office
A number of state constitutional and statutory provisions
disqualify persons who have been convicted of certain crimes from
"holding any office of trust, honor, or profit under this [sltate.
' ' 2
Provisions in other states, on the other hand, simply disqualify convicted
persons from holding any "office." 3 The difference appears to be one
of form rather than substance. Regardless of the language used, the
provisions generally apply to local as well as state public offices, and to
appointive as well as elective positions. Most of the provisions do not
apply to public employment consisting of merely clerical functions.4
339. The councilman lost his office after a hearing that resulted in the finding that he had
committed a crime involving moral turpitude.
340. See notes 234-36 supra and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 232 Minn. 149, 44 N.W.2d 484 (1950); In re
O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1940); State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 65 Wyo. 189,
197 P.2d 864 (1948) (excellent review of authorities).
342. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 21.
343. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 150; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-2 (1966).
344. See S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 625-26, 628-29 (1963).
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Since all states have various qualifications that their public officials
must meet, there have been a number of cases in which the central issue
has been whether a specific position is a "public office" or an "office of
trust, honor, or profit." One court has held that five elements are
indispensable in order to have a public office.
(1) It must be created by the Constitution or the Legislature, or by a municipality
or other body with authority conferred by the Legislature. (2) There must be a
delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of government to be exercised for the
benefit of the public. (3) The powers conferred and the duties to be discharged must
be defined either directly or indirectly by the Legislature or through the legislative
authority. (4) The duties must be performed independently and without control of a
superior power other than the law. (5) The office must have some permanency and
continuity and the officer must take an official oath. 5
The Supreme Court of Arizona has ruled that a public office must
impose on the incumbent certain definite duties and involve the exercise
of some portion of sovereign power. 6 The court also held that an office,
as distinguished from an employment, may be created only by the
constitution or the legislature, either indirectly or by necessary
implication.
Applying the various tests, courts have ruled that terms such as
"public office" or "office of trust, honor, or profit" include the
following positions among others: city manager,147 postmaster,1' s school
board member,"' county treasurer, ° school director,3 1 justice of the
peace,' 2 commissioner of conservation,3 and a member of the board of
public works.1 4 Courts have held that deputy sheriffsm and deputy
clerks of courtsm are mere agents or employees, not public officers.
Other positions that the courts have found not to constitute public
offices include: chairman of the executive committee of a political
party,3 7 secretary of a state dental board,m assistant city attomey,39
and delegate to a constitutional convention.360
345. Popev. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1943).
346. Stapleton v. Frohmiller, 53 Ariz. 11, 85 P.2d49 (1938).
347. State v. Sheldon, 29 Wyo. 233,213 P. 92 (1923).
348. State ex rel. Wimberly v. Barham, 173 La. 488,494, 137 So. 862, 864 (1931).
349. Id. at 495, 137 So. at864.
350. Stateex rel. Good v. Marsh, 125 Neb. 125, 132,249 N.W. 295, 298 (1933).
351. State ex rel. Milligan v. Jones, 143 Tenn. 575, 578,224 S.W. 1041, 1042 (1920).
352. Whitehead v. Clark, 146 Tenn. 660, 673,244 S.W. 479,482 (1922).
353. State ex rel. Payne v. lrion, 163 La. 1019, 1021, 113 So. 360, 361 (1927).
354. Doll v. State, 45 Ohio St. 445,447, 15 N.E. 293,295 (1887).
355. Kemp v. Wilson, 17 Ala. App. 224,226, 84 So. 636, 637-38 (1919).
356. Jeffries v. Harrington, 11 Colo. 191, 193, 17 P. 505,506 (1888).
357. Walker v. Mobley, 105 S.W. 61, 62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
358. Saint v. Irion, 165 La. 1035, 1059, 116 So. 549,557 (1928).
359. State ex rel. Glenn v. Wilkinson, 220 Ala. 172, 174, 124 So. 211,212 (1929).
360. State v. Doyle, 138 La. 350,352, 70 So. 322, 323 (1915).
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B. Disabilities Imposed on Holding Public Office
By a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions, persons
convicted of certain crimes may be disqualified from holding public
office or from keeping an office already held. Many states have express
provisions denying a convicted citizen the right to hold public office
unless his civil rights have been restored .3 1 Congress also has passed
statutes disqualifying persons convicted of specified offenses from
holding federal offices. In addition, a number of states indirectly
disqualify convicted persons from public office by providing that only
qualified electors are eligible to hold public office. In almost all states,
persons convicted of certain crimes cannot be qualified electors unless
their civil rights have been restored362 Moreover, the federal government
and most states provide for forfeiture of public office upon conviction of
a crime.
1. Laws Expressly Disqualifying Convicted Citizens from Public
Office.-Most states expressly provide that persons convicted of serious
crimes, usually felonies, are not qualified to hold public office unless
their civil rights have been restored. These provisions apply only to state
and local offices. Congress, however, has provided that persons
convicted of certain offenses cannot hold federal offices.
(a) Federal offices.-As a general rule, an individual with a
criminal record stands a better chance of qualifying for a federal office
than he does for a state or local office. The United States Constitution,
which establishes the qualifications for the President, Vice President,
and members of both Houses of Congress, does not exclude convicted
persons from the right to hold these offices .3 3 Several attempts have been
made to add state requirements for public officials to the requirements
contained in the Constitution for federal officials, but the courts have
uniformly rejected these efforts.3
361. For a discussion of how civil rights can be restored see notes 570-659 on pages 1143-
54 infra.
362. See notes 243-59 supra and accompanying text.
363. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § I (establishing the qualifications for President); id. art. I, § 3
(establishing the qualifications for Senator); id. art. I, § 2 (establishing the qualifications for
Representatives). The fourteenth amendment, however, provides: "No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature,
or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability."
Id. amend. XIV, § 3.
364. See note 341 supra and accompanying text.
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Although the Constitution does not disqualify felons from holding
federal offices, Congress has passed several statutes that exclude persons
convicted of specified offenses from holding any federal office. A
member of Congress who practices before the Court of Claims, for
example, is disqualified from holding any "office of honor, trust, or
profit under the United States. ' 365 Similar provisions disqualify
members of the Armed Forces convicted of interfering with voting,66
collecting or disbursing officers convicted of trading in public
property,3 7 any person convicted of falsifying, destroying, or removing
public records or ducuments," or any government official convicted of
receiving compensation in matters affecting the government.3 9 Persons
convicted of rebellion 70 or treason3 1 also are disqualified. Only in one
instance, conviction of bribery, is disqualification discretionary with the
sentencing court.3
2
Several provisions disqualify individuals convicted of certain crimes
from all public employment. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, for example, provides that any person convicted of
inciting, organizing, encouraging, or participating in a riot or civil
disorder shall "be ineligible to accept or hold any position in the
government of the United States" for five years following the date of his
conviction. 3 Under this statute and similar provisions 7 covering all
federal employment, the offender is barred from public office only for
the period specified in the statute. In this respect, these statutes are
similar to the proposed new Federal Criminal Code, which provides that
a person convicted of a disqualifying crime shall not be disqualified for
longer than five years following completion of his sentence.3 The matter
of disqualification under the proposed code, however, is not automatic
but is left entirely to the court's discretion. The court could provide that
365. 18 U.S.C. § 204(1964).
366. Id. § 593.
367. Id. § 1901.
368. Id. § 2071.
369. Id. § 203.
370. Id. § 2383.
371. Id. § 2381.
372. Id. § 201.
373. 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (Supp. IV, 1969).
374. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964) (knowingly or willfully advocating the overthrow of
the government); Id. § 2387 (advising, urging, or causing disloyalty, insubordination, mutiny, or
refusal of duty by any member of the military service).
375. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT
OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3501 (1970). Although the draft largely carries forward
existing policies, it broadens the category of fiduciaries subject to disqualifications.
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an individual would be disqualified from office for any period less than
five years.
Since most of the present disqualifying provisions apply only in rare
situations, there have been few cases interpreting the statutes. It seems
clear, nevertheless, that Congress cannot add to the qualifications
created by the Constitution for constitutional officesY Otherwise, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress has the constitutional power to
enact such provisions "[i]n order to promote the efficiency of the public
service and enforce integrity in the conduct of. . .public affairs.
'377
(b) State and local offices.-The state constitutional and
statutory provisions that expressly disqualify persons convicted of
criminal offenses from holding public office vary considerably. Despite
the variations, the net effect of the provisions in the majority of states is
that persons convicted of serious crimes cannot qualify to hold public
office.
Several states disqualify citizens who have been convicted of a
felony,37 an infamous crime,3 79 or a crime punishable by imprisonment
from public office. Other states use either the felony or infamous crime
classification, but also disqualify persons convicted of specified
offenses.381 The specified crimes generally include such offenses as
embezzlement of public money, bribery, and perjury. 2 Moreover, some
jurisdictions provide that individuals convicted of either a felony, an
376. See Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 369 (1906) (holding that disqualification
provision does not apply to appointments made by states under the Constitution).
377. Id. at 367.
378. KAN. CONST. art. 5, § 2; KY. CONST. § 150 (also gives legislature power to disqualify
persons convicted of high misdemeanors); LA. CONST. art. 8, § 6; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:572.1(A) (Supp. 1970); NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 2; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-112 (1964);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-7 (1959). In Nebraska, a separate statute disqualifies persons imprisoned
in another state for a crime punishable by imprisonment in Nebraska. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-113
(1964).
379. WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 3.
380. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
381. Some states provide that any person convicted of a felony or a specified offense is
ineligible to hold public office. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 11; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 1021,
1029 (West 1966); COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 2; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-17 (1963); GA.
CONST. § 2-801; GA. CODE ANN. § 89-101 (1963) (requiring that the felony involve moral
turpitude); TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 2; TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 1.05 (Supp. 1969-70).
In at least 7 states, the right to hold public office is lost upon conviction of an infamous crime
or certain specified crimes. ARK. CoNsT. art. 5, § 9; DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 21; FLA. CONS.T. art. 6,
§ 5; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01 (1960); ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 4; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 124-2
(Smith-Hurd 1964); Miss. CoNsT. art. 4, § 43; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 7; S.D. CONST. art. II1, §§ 4,
28.
382. E.g., ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 9.
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infamous crime, or specified crimes are disqualified from public office.M
In some of these states, the terminology varies from statute to statute.
Tennessee, for example, has one statute disqualifying every person
convicted of any felony except manslaughter,m and another statute that
disqualifies persons convicted of infamous crimes.m
In a number of states, only persons convicted of specified crimes are
ineligible to hold public office. At least one state has several statutes
that, taken together, result in the disqualification of almost every
offender convicted of a major crime.3 Other states, on the other hand,
disqualify persons convicted of only a few limited offenses.", In
addition, a number of states still provide that no person is eligible to
hold public office who has engaged in a duel. m
A few states have provisions that disqualify offenders only from
serving in the legislature.3 s These states generally have separate statutes
383. See. e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. 6, § 3; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-402 (1963); OHIO CONST.
art. II, § 5; id, art. V, § 4; OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. §§ 2961.01, .02 (Baldwin 1964); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801,40-2714 (1955).
A variety of other combinations are used by the states to disqualify criminal offenders from
public office. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 5 (1958) (disqualifying persons convicted of treason,
embezzlement of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, or any other crime
punishable by imprisonment in the state or federal penitentiary); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-1-2 to -3
(1966) (disqualifying any person convicted of a "'felonious or infamous crime"); N.C. CONST. art.
VI, § 8 (disqualifying persons convicted of treason, felony, corruption or malpractice in office, or
any other crime for which the punishment is imprisonment in the penitentiary).
384. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2714 (1955).
385. Id. § 8-1801. In Ohio, the constitution gives the General Assembly power to exclude
from public office people convicted of bribery, perjury, or other infamous crimes. OHIO CONST. art.
V, § 4. Instead of using the prescribed terminology, however, the General Assembly passed a
statute excluding citizens convicted of felonies. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (Baldwin 1964).
386. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.610 (Supp. 1969-70) (disqualifying persons convicted of arson,
burglary, robbery, grand larceny, or other crimes against property); id. § 561.340 (1953) (offenses
against property involving fraud, such as forgery); id. § 557.490 (perjury); Id. § 559.470 (offenses
against persons, such as murder and manslaughter).
387. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 601 (1964) (bribery); MD. CONST. art. I, § 3
(buying and selling votes); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 69, § I (1957) (failure to account for public
money); MASS. CONST. § 93 (bribery or corruption in obtaining election or appointment); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 264, § 11 (1968) (anarchy); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.313 (1962) (public official
accepting bribe); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:93-5 (1969) (bribery); id. § 2A:104-3 (officer who
voluntarily permits escape of prisoner); id. § 2A:67-6 (1952) (illegally sending prisoner out of state
for crime committed in state); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 3(l) (McKinney Supp. 1970) (violation
of draft laws); UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6 (treason or election offenses); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.92.120 (1961) (public officers convicted of any felony or malfeasance in office).
388. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 2, § 7; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 5; MD. CONST. art. Ill, § 4 1;
NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.420 (1967); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 663
(1958); S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 11; S.D. CODE § 22-154 (1967); TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 3; TEX.
CONST. art. 16, § 4; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-7 (1966); WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 2.
389. See, e.g.. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 18 (disqualified for conviction of felony); S.D. CONST.
art. III, § 4 (disqualified for conviction of bribery, perjury, or infamous crime); W. VA. CONST.
art. 6, § 14 (disqualified for conviction of infamous crime).
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that refer to all public offices. 39 In Oklahoma, for example, convicted
felons are ineligible to serve in the legislature,391 while persons convicted
of bribery are disqualified from holding all public offices..
392
New Hampshire is the only state that has adopted the Uniform Act
on the Status of Convicted Persons. The Act provides that any person
convicted of a felony is ineligible to become a candidate for public office
from the time of his sentence until his final discharge. 93 At discharge, the
convicted felon regains the right to hold public office.3 94 The Act,
however, is subject to the provisions of the New Hampshire constitution
that disqualify from public office any person convicted of treason,
bribery, or any willful violation of the election laws.
3 5
Even though a state constitution does not expressly disqualify
convicted criminals from public office, the legislature may have this
power. The Indiana Supreme Court, for example, has held that a
constitutional provision giving the legislature the power to deprive
citizens convicted of infamous crimes from voting39 also gives the
legislature power to prohibit such persons from holding public office.
397
2. Laws Indirectly Disqualifying Convicted Citizens from Public
Office.-Since the laws of many states provide that only qualified
electors are eligible for public office, criminal offenders, who are denied
voting rights in most states, may thereby be indirectly disqualified from
state or local public office even though there are no express provisions
for disqualification. Courts have had little difficulty in upholding
provisions requiring that all public officers be qualified electors. 98 In
these states, if a disqualified voter is elected to public office, his election
is a nullity.3 99
390. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 445 (1955) (bribery); S.D. CONST. art. III, § 28 (bribery
or corrupt solicitation); W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 45; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-5-3 to -4 (1966)
(bribery or perjury). Another West Virginia statute disqualifies from office persons convicted of
treason, felony, or bribery in an election, "while such conviction remains unreversed." Id. § 6-5-5.
The courts have held that this statute does not apply after the offender has completed his
punishment. Webb v. County Court, 113 W. Va. 474, 168 S.E. 760 (1933).
391. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 18.
392. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 445 (1955).
393. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2 (Supp. 1969).
394. Id. § 607-A:3.
395. N.H. CONST. Pt. I, art. 11; id. pt. 2, art. 96.
396. IND. CONST. art. 2, § 8.
397. Lucas v. McAfee, 217 Ind. 534, 29 N.E.2d 403,petition for rehearing denied, 217 Lnd.
541, 29 N.E.2d 588 (1940). Acting under this authority, the Indiana legislature has provided that
no citizen convicted of specified offenses can hold public office. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-303
(1964).
398. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kinney, 242 Ala. 196, 5 So. 2d 788 (1942); State ex rel. Olson v.
Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 78,256 N.W. 377, 384 (1934).
399. State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 248 Iowa 978,981,83 N.W.2d 451,453 (1957).
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(a) Federal offices.-There appear to be no provisions
disqualifying convicted citizens from holding federal offices because of
an inability to vote. The United States Constitution does not require that
members of Congress be qualified voters of the districts they represent.
Rather, it only specifies that they be "inhabitants" of the states from
which they are chosen.100 Moreover, the Constitution does not require
that the President or Vice President be a qualified voter of any state."'
(b) State and local offices.-At least half of the states have
constitutional or statutory provisions limiting the right to hold public
office to qualified electors.40 2 A number of states having this requirement
also have provisions expressly disqualifying criminal offenders from
public office. In the remainder of the states, the convicted person cannot
qualify for public office unless his right to vote has been restored.0 "
Although several states do not have a blanket provision disqualifying
nonelectors from holding public office, they accomplish the same result
for most offices through separate provisions. Hawaii, for example, has
separate constitutional provisions requiring that the governor,40 4
lieutenant governor, 05 and all legislators 40 ' be qualified voters. In
addition, a statute provides that all county officers must have been
qualified electors of the state and the county in which they were elected
for at least one year prior to their election.4 0 Other states also have
separate provisions for such offices as governor, 411 attorney general,409
and legislators. 4
10
400. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (Representatives); id. § 3 (Senators).
401. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
402. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 5 (1959); ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 15; COLO. CONST. art.
VII, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. VI, § 10; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.021 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 59-101 (1948); IND. CONST. art. 6, § 4 (applies to county officers); LA. CONST. art. 8, § 13;
MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. 12, § 250; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 11; NV,
CONST. art. 15, § 3; NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.040 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:1-1 (1960); N.M.
CONST. art. VII, § 2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-01-01 (1960); OHiO CONST. art XV, § 4; R.I.
CONST. art. 9, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 2; id. art. 17, § 1; VT. CONST. Ch. 1, art. 8; VA. CONST,
art. II, § 32; WASH. CONST. art. 3, § 25; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.04.020 (1961); W. VA.
CONST. art. 4, § 4.
403. For a general discussion of restoration procedures see notes 570-659 on pages 1143-54
infra and accompanying text.
404. HAWAIICONST. art. IV, § 1.
405. Id. § 2.
406. Id. art. IIf, § 7.
407. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 62-3 (1968).
408. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 5; MD. CONST. art. II, § 5; UTAH CONST. art. VII,
§ 3.
409. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. V, § 4.
410. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 2, § 2; CONN. CONST. art. II1, § 3; S.C. CoNST. art. 3,
§ 7; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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3. Forfeiture of Public Office Upon Conviction of a Crime.-In
addition to provisions either directly or indirectly disqualifying
convicted citizens from holding public office, the federal government and
most states provide for forfeiture of public office upon conviction of a
crime. Moreover, state officials and certain federal officers convicted of
crimes may be subject to impeachment.
(a) Federal offices.-The United States Constitution provides:
"The President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 114 The
United States Attorney General has ruled that a member of Congress is
not a civil officer within the meaning of this section. 412 Although the
impeachment provision has rarely been applied, the phrase "other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors" has caused difficulty. Some interpretations
of the phrase permit impeachment of an officer for bad behavior, even
when there are no grounds for an indictable offense.41 3
The Constitution does not provide for the automatic removal of
most federal officers convicted of crimes. Congress, however, has
enacted a number of provisions requiring forfeiture of public office by
individuals convicted of specified crimes. A conviction of disclosing
confidential information, for example, results in removal from office.
41 4
Similarly, farm credit examiners1 5 and National Agricultural Credit
Corporation Examiners416 who make unauthorized disclosures are
subject to removal. Bank examiners convicted of theft are disqualified
from office417 and any officer found guilty of lobbying with appropriated
moneys forfeits his position. 41 In addition, federal officers might be
removed if convicted of an offense that would disqualify them from
office.4
19
(b) State and local offices.-The overwhelming majority of states
have constitutional or statutory provisions requiring the removal of
public officers convicted of certain crimes. Like the provisions making
convicted citizens ineligible to hold public office, the forfeiture
411. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 4.
412. 17 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 419 (1882).
413. See UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED 556-58 (E. Corwin ed. 1964).
414. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964).
415. Id. § 1907.
416. Id. § 1908.
417. Id. § 655.
418. Id. § 1913.
419. For a discussion of statutes that exclude persons convicted of specified offenses from
holding federal offices see notes 365-74 supra and accompanying text.
19701
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
provisions vary considerably from state to state. A number of states, for
example, provide that a public officer forfeits his position if he is
convicted of a felony,40 an infamous crime,421 or a crime involving moral
turpitude.4 2 Several jurisdictions remove public officers convicted of
felonies or other crimes, such as violation of the official oath of office,
4 -
malfeasance in office,44 or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude.412
Other states require the removal of public officers convicted of any one
of a number of assorted offenses. 426 The statutes in several of these states
are similar, but no two are identical. A number of jurisdictions have
statutes providing that a sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary
forfeits all public offices and all private trusts, authority, or power
during the term or duration of the imprisonment.41 Many of these
provisions are contained in civil death statutes.4 8 In a few states, statutes
420. GA. CODE ANN. § 89-101 (1963) (Georgia limits its provisions by requiring that the
felony be one involving "moral turpitude"); IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-834 (1964); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 66.1 (1949); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(a) (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-36 (1950).
421. DEL. CONST. art. 15, § 6 (directing governor to remove from office any public officer
convicted of either misbehavior in office or any infamous crime); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 25-2
(Smith-Hurd 1965) (applies only to elective offices); MIcHi. STAT. ANN. § 6.693 (1956); PA. CONST.
art. 6, § 7. For a discussion of what constitutes an infamous crime see notes 121-38 supra and
accompanying text.
422. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-2701, -2801 (1955); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 22-118.187 (Supp.
1969). The Woming statute also removes officers convicted of offenses involving violations of the
official oath of office. For a discussion of crimes involving moral turpitude see notes 139-41 supra
and accompanying text.
423. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 114.01 (1960); N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS LAW § 30 (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
424. E.g., NEV. REv. STAT. § 197.230 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.120 (1961).
425. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-3-4 (1966).
426. Two states remove any officer convicted of treason or felony, but statues in both states
add specific crimes also resulting in forfeiture. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6-5-5, -6-9 (1966); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 17.03(5) (1957). Several states require removal of officers convicted of an offense
involving misconduct in office. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:135-9 (1969); OKLA, STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 312 (1958); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 24-13 (1967); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5968
(1962); TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 60 (1952); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-17, -28-35 (1953).
Generally, these states also have other forfeiture provisions covering offenses that do not necessarily
relate to the officer's official conduct. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 65 (1958) (sentence of
imprisonment); id. tit. 51, § 8 (1962) (infamous crime or offense involving violation of official
oath); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-48-35 (1967) (sentence of imprisonment); id. § 34-1
(infamous crime or offense in violation of official oath); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-36 (1953)
(sentence of imprisonment). Arkansas has an extremely broad provision, removing any officer
convicted of a felony or any offense involving corruption, gross immorality, or malfeasance in
office. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2102 (1968).
427. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. tit. 41, § 162 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.070 (1962); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-310 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94.4720 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27
(1960).
428. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
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indicate that an officer can be removed from his position if convicted of
any crime.42
Most states supplement their provisions requiring the removal of
public officers convicted of certain crimes with a constitutional or
statutory impeachment procedure. In many states, the grounds and
procedure for impeachment are modeled after the United States
Constitution.413 Most states provide that all state officers are subject to
impeachment; 31 provisions in other states specifically coverjudges 432 and
prosecutors.4 3 The impeachment procedure is rarely used to remove an
officer convicted of a serious crime, since in most states his removal is
automatic upon conviction.
When the forfeiture provisions have been applied, the courts have
often disagreed as to whether a public officer loses his position from the
time of his initial conviction in a lower court 4m or only after all appeals
have been exhausted.435 The few state statutes dealing with this problem
likewise reach no consensus. Some statutes, for example, command
removal of public officers at the time of their initial conviction, but
authorize restoration to office if the conviction is reversed on appeal .4
Other statutes provide that, for removal purposes, a conviction is not
complete when an appeal is pending.4 37 In at least one state, the
legislature has authorized the governor to suspend any officer after his
indictment for a crime.4m
C. Judicial Developments
As a general rule, the courts have given the states considerable
power and discretion in setting qualifications for public officers.439 It has
429. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-109 (1948); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.020 (1967); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 50-10 (1962). Oregon has specific provisions removing officers convicted of a felony
or infamous crime. ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1967); id. § 236.010 (1968).
430. See note 411 supra and accompanying text.
431. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-311 (1956); FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 29; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 49-801 (1964); IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 20.
432. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-311 (1956); FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 29; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 49-801 (1964).
433. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-801 (1964).
434. See, e.g., People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 111. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied,
358 U.S. 828 (1958); Attorney Gen. ex rel. O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 513,267 N.W.
550,553 (1936).
435. See, e.g., Pineville v. Collett, 249 Ky. 853, 172 S.W.2d 640 (1943). For a'general
discussion of what constitutes a conviction see notes 82-103 supra and accompanying text.
436. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2(11) (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:135-9
(1969). The New Hampshire provision is part of the Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted
Persons.
437. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 8 (1962).
438. S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-10 (1962).
439. See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
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been consistently held that there is no constitutional or inherent right to
hold public office.440 The opportunity to be elected or appointed to a
public position is not an absolute right44' but a political privilege subject
to reasonable regulation by the states.442 Consequently, almost all states
have constitutional provisions establishing the qualifications for public
officers. Most courts have held that where a constitution creates an
office and prescribes the qualifications for it, the legislature has no
power to add to those qualifications by statute.4 43 The result is different,
of course, if the constitution either expressly or by implication gives the
legislature such power.u4 Subject to constitutional requirements, the
legislature does have the power to set the qualifications for statutory, as
opposed to constitutional, offices. 445 In the absence of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition, the courts have held that there is no restriction on
the power of the people to elect any citizen to office. 441
Although the states have the power to establish the qualifications
for their public officials, their discretion is limited by the United States
Constitution, which invalidates qualifications found to be arbitrary and
without a reasonable basis. 447 There have been numerous cases dealing
440. See, e.g., Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 555, 139 N.E. 360, 362 (1923), error
dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925); State ex rel. Workman v. Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N.E. 133
(1909); Oliver v. Shreveport, 169 So. 2d 1,3 (La. 1964); State ec rel. Platz v. Mucci, 10 Ohio St. 2d
60, 61,225 N.E.2d 238, 240 (1967).
441. Levitt v. Attorney Gen., 104 N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286, rehearing denied, 104 N.H.
108, 180 A.2d 827 (1962).
442. See, e.g., Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923), error dismissed, 267
U.S. 575 (1925); State ex rel. Workman v. Goldthait, 172 Ind. 210, 87 N.E. 133 (1909); Oliver v.
Shreveport, 169 So. 2d 1, 3 (La. 1964).
443. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 245 A.2d 172 (Del. 1968); Crampton v. O'Mara, 193
Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923), error dismissed, 267 U.S. 575 (1925); State v. Carrigan, 82 N.J.L.
225, 82 A. 524 (1912).
444. Whitney v. Bolin, 85 Ariz.44,330 P.2d 1003 (1958).
445. H. BERNARD, PUBLIC OFFICIALS: ELECTED AND APPOINTED 46 (1968). Constitutional
offices are those set up and defined in the state constitutions. Statutory offices are those established
by a legislative body. Id.
446. Speed v. Common Council, 98 Mich. 360,364,57 N.W. 406,407-08 (1894).
447. See. e.g., Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900); Landes v. Town of North
Hempstead, 20 N.Y.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1967). In Landes the New York
court held that if a classification is employed in prescribing qualifications, it must be
nondiscriminatory and based on a substantial difference having reasonable relation to the object
sought to be accomplished by the legislation. Accordingly, the court found that property
qualifications for public officeholders are invalid. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, recently
upheld a city charter provision requiring local public officials to be property owners. The court
observed that the United States Supreme Court has never applied the equal protection clause to
qualifications for holding public office. Schweitzer v. Clerk for City of Plymouth, 381 Mich. 485,
164 N.W.2d 35 (1969), noted in 118 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (1969). At least one writer has suggested
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with state provisions that disqualify persons convicted of certain crimes
from holding public office. In most cases, however, the reasonableness
and validity of the provisions have been assumed; the courts have been
primarily concerned with such questions as whether there has been a
conviction448 or whether a conviction in one state disqualifies the
offender from holding public office in another state.449 The cases
indicate, nevertheless, that the courts consider the provisions
disqualifying convicted citizens from public office or other employment
to be reasonable and appropriate.4' The Supreme Court has observed,
for example, that "barring convicted felons from certain employments is
a familiar legislative device to insure against corruption in specified,
vital areas." 45' A federal district court recently found in dicta that
"[t]he state has a legitimate interest in excluding from office those who
would impair efficiency and honesty in government operations."' 2 The
cases, therefore, indicate that.the underlying consideration in excluding
convicted persons from public office is to protect society from a
corrupting influence.45 3 The courts have applied the same reasoning to
justify state provisions removing public officers convicted of certain
crimes. In examining the constitutionality of a removal statute, the
Washington Supreme Court, for example, has ruled that two possible
harms must be balanced: "the possible unfairness of an individual's loss
of public office during the remainder of his term against the inherent
danger to the body politic that a criminal may exercise the powers of
government. ' ' 4- The same court earlier observed that the public interest
that the legislative history during the period when the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were
proposed indicates that neither were intended to cover the right to hold public office in the states.
Avins, The Right to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments: The
Original Understanding, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 287, 304 (1967). In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961), nevertheless, the Supreme Court indicated that certain kinds of discrimination in the
selection of public officers may be forbidden by the fourteenth amendment.
448. For a general discussion of what constitutes a conviction see notes 82-103 supra and
accompanying text.
449. For a discussion of the effect of a conviction in one state on the offender's civil rights in
another state see notes 142-71 supra and accompanying text.
450. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (upholding provision excluding
felons from practicing medicine).
451. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1960) (upholding statute forbidding felons to
hold office in waterfront unions).
452. United States v. Warden of Walkill Prison, 246 F. Supp. 72,94 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd,
355 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966) (upholding constitutionality of statute providing that public contractors
waive immunity before investigative bodies on sanction of possible disqualification from receiving
contracts).
453. Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403, 406 (1967). See State ex rel.
Moore v. Blake, 225 Ala. 124, 126, 142 So. 418,419 (1932).
454. Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash. 2d 231,235-36,443 P.2d 843,845 (1968).
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demands that public affairs be administered by officers bearing no
stigma of a conviction.
4-
Although the courts seem to agree that provisions excluding
convicted citizens from public office are reasonable, some courts have
been more restrictive than others in applying the provisions to specific
problem areas. One area in which the states are in conflict involves the
question of whether a convicted person can seek public office after his
rehabilitation or after receiving a pardon.4 '- In the absence of a pardon,
the offender, even though rehabilitated, will be unable to hold public
offices in most states.4 1 The courts have reached conflicting decisions
when considering the effect of a pardon on public office
disqualifications. 4 8 There also is judicial disagreement on the question of
whether a conviction in one state prevents an offender from holding
public office in another state.45 ' Some courts have held that only a
conviction in the state where the person is a candidate for office renders
him ineligible .40 Others, however, hold that criminal offenders are
disqualified from office, regardless of where they were convicted.",
Although the courts have upheld laws disqualifying convicted
persons from public office, these laws have been criticized by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Justice. The Commission has suggested that the states should rely on
the judgment of the voters for elective officials and on the appraisal of
the persons with appointive power for appointive positions.42 The
Swedish already follow the policy suggested by the President's
455. State ex rel. Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327,329-34,60 P.2d 245,246.47 (1936).
456. For a general discussion of the possible ways to remove civil disabilities see notes 570-
659 on pages 1143-54 infra and accompanying text.
457. People ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano, 97 II1. App. 2d 248, 240 N.E.2d 467 (1968)
(candidate disqualified even though the court recognized that he had been rehabilitated since his
conviction more than a quarter of a century earlier). Contra, Webb v. County Court, 113 W. Va.
474,476-78, 168 S.E. 760,761 (1933). The case involves an interpretation of a West Virginia statute
excluding persons convicted of certain crimes from public office "while such conviction remains
unreversed." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-5 (1966).
458. People ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano, 260 N.E2d 284 (111. App. Ct. 1970) (governor's
certificate of restoration removes disqualification); State ex rel. Cloud v. Election Bd., 169 Okla.
363, 366, 36 P.2d 20,23 (1934) (pardon removes disqualification). Contra, Ridgeway v. Catlett, 238
Ark. 323, 379 S.W.2d 277 (1964) (disqualification irrespective of pardon), noted in 78 HARV, L.
REv. 1676 (1965).
459. For a detailed discussion see notes 142-71 supra and accompanying text.
460. See, e.g., Hildreth v. Heath, I I11. App. 82 (1878); State ex rel. Mitchell v. McDonald,
164 Miss. 405, 145 So. 508 (1933). See also Gutterman v. State, 141 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1962).
461. E.g., Crampton v. O'Mara, 193 Ind. 551, 139 N.E. 360 (1923), error dismissed, 267
U.S. 575 (1925).
462. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 90 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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Commission, reasoning that if an ex-convict becomes a candidate, his
former conviction probably will become an issue during the campaign. If
the voters are informed about the candidate and nevertheless choose to
elect him, the Swedes believe that the legislature should not interfere with
their choice."8
VI. Loss OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
The right to work has been acclaimed "the most precious liberty
that man possesses."4"' For the ex-convict, however, the right to work in
an occupation of his choice is at best a qualified right and in many
instances is'nonexistent. A job applicant with a criminal record may face
substantial prejudice on the part of many prospective employers. In
addition, the ex-convict is confronted with a vast array of federal, state,
and local regulations labeling him unsuitable for public employment and
a host of licensed occupations.
A. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals by Private Employers
Conviction of a crime can have lasting social and economic
consequences for the offender .4e Depending upon the nature and gravity
of his offense,"' employment opportunities in the private sector may be
severely limited. Numerous studies have surveyed the extent and effect of
private employers' discrimination against former convicts." 7 Although
findings have not been consistent, it is generally concluded that
substantial discrimination is practiced.48 Many employers, for example,
flatly reject applicants with criminal records. Most employers avoid
hiring released convicts if other personnel are available.46 9 Moreover,
463. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences Of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347, 358 (1968).
464. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 89 (1890).
465. See Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593-94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See
generally D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 311-401 (1964).
466. An ex-convict's reliability is often related to the gravity of the offense for which he was
convicted. Statistics indicate, however, that perpetrators of more serious crimes, such as murder and
rape, are less likely to return to crime. See generily D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 54-85.
467. See, e.g., D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 328; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 462, at
31-33 (1967); Melichercik, Employment Problems of Former Offenders, 2 NAT'L PROBATION &
PAROLE ASS'N J. 43 (1956).
468. See note 467 supra; S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 639 (1963). But see
D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 361 (suggesting that a former convict's primary barrier to
employment is not his criminal record, but rather his lack of extensive or skilled work experience).
469. See S. RUBIN, supra note 468, at 638-40; Note, Employment of Former Criminals. 55
CORNELL L. REV. 306,307 (1970).
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since most fidelity insurance companies refuse to bond ex-convicts, the
released offender is often ineligible for employment in positions that
require bonding.4 70 Past criminality is usually overlooked only in
employing persons for low-skilled jobs. 47  Consequently, many ex-
convicts who are successful in obtaining meaningful employment
probably did not disclose their criminal records.4 72
Discrimination by private employers based on age, sex, or race is
unlawful. 73 Moreover, in a recent federal court decision a private
employer's refusal to hire a job applicant because of his arrest record
was held to be violative of the Civil Rights Act.47 4 Convicted criminals,
however, may be refused private employment with impunity.
Elimination of private prejudice and discriminatory practices against
former convicts was long thought to be the task of educators and social
scientists.475 There is increasing awareness, however, that equal
employment opportunity for released convicts, like other minority
groups, requires government action.4 76 At present, nevertheless, an ex-
convict probably stands a better chance of gaining entrance to private
employment than to either public employment or licensed occupations.4 77
B. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Licensed Occupations
No member of society is more likely to forfeit his right to engage in
a licensed occupation than a convicted criminal. Laws of the fed-
eral government,47  every state, 49  and countless municipali-
470. Lykke, Attitude of Bonding Companies Toward Probationers and Parolees, 21 FED,
PROBATION 36 (Dec. 1957).
471. See, e.g., Harris, Changing Public Attitudes Toward Crime and Corrections, 32 FED.
PROBATION 12 (Dec. 1968).
472. See D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 350-55.
473. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. IV, 1969) (age); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-a (1964) (race, sex,
and religion).
474. Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 39 U.S.L.W. 2049 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 1970) (en-
joining employer from denying job to applicant because of his arrest record on the ground that
the practice discriminates against Negroes since they are arrested more frequently than whites).
475. See S. RUBIN, supra note 468, at 639.
476. See note 34 on page 1160 infra and accompanying text..
477. See, e.g., D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 414; S. RUBIN, supra note 468, at 640.
478. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 12a(2)(B) (Supp. IV. 1969) (Secretary of Agriculture may refuse to
register felons as futures commission merchants and floor brokers); 46 C.F.R. § 10.02-1 (1969)
(persons convicted of narcotics violations ineligible for licensing as deck or engineering officers for
10 years after conviction).
479. ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 1-345 (1958 & Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.01.010-.99.100
(1968); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-101 to -2391 (1956 & Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN.!§§ 71-
101 to -2423, 72-121 to -1717 (1947 & Supp. 1969); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1-300047 (1962 &
West Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§,20-1 to -395 (1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit, 24, §§
101-3536 (1953 & Supp. 1968); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2301 to -2350 (Supp. 111, 1970); FLA. STAT.
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ties4" single out the ex-convict for possible exclusion from the major-
ity of regulated occupations. In general, if a trade, profession, business,
or even an ordinary job requires licensing, conviction of any serious
crime may disqualify the offender from obtaining or holding a license.
4 81
1. Scope of Occupational Licensing.-Under licensing laws, an
individual's right to engage in an occupation becomes a privilege granted
by the state.482 Entrance to and continued participation in a licensed
occupation is conditioned upon the applicant's ability to meet
qualifications prescribed by the legislature. 483 Unlicensed participation
in a regulated activity may lead to criminal prosecution. 484 Until the end
ANN. §§ 454.01-493.56 (1965,& Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-101 to -9980 (1970); HAWAII
REV. LAWS §§ 25-436 to -471 (1968 & Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 54-101 to -2705 (1947 &
Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-101 to -3617 (1961 & Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE §§ 147.1-
158.11 (1949 & Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-1001 to -3101 (1964 & Supp. 1968); Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 311.250-333.990 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-:2368 (1964 & Supp. 1970); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 1-4803 (1964 & Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ I B-754
(1957 & Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, §§ 1-107 (1965) & Supp. 1970); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18.1-.1259 (1957 & Supp. 1970); MINN. 9TAT. ANN. §§ 147.01-157.15 (1947 & Supp. 1970); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 8632-01 to 8923-51 (1956 & Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 326.001-343.250 (1960
& Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CbDES ANN. §§ 66-101 to -3114 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-10"1 to
-3715 (1966); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 623.010-654.210 (1969); N.H. STAT. ANN. §§ 309:1-332:17
(1955 & Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-:25 (1963 & Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1-
I to -36-18 (1953 & Supp. 1969); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6501-7713 (McKinney 1953 & Supp. 1969-
70); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 83-1 to 93D-16 (1965 & Supp. 1969); N.C. CENT. CODE §§ 43-01-01 to
-34-14 (1960 & Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4701.01-4749.99 (1964 & Supp. 1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1-1408 (1963 & Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 9.1-1015 (1963 &
Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-1-1 to -44-25 (1956 & Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-
1 to -1617.(1962 & Supp. 1969); S.D. CODE §§ 36-1-I to -25-30 (1967 &-Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 62-101 to 63-1521 (1955 & Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-I io -34-9 (1953 &
Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-2598 (1967 & Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-1 to
-915 (1954 & Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 18.04.020-.92.900 (1961 & Supp. 1969); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-1 to -21-15 (1966 & Supp. 1970); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1 to -385 (1957 &
Supp. 1969). Licensing provisions appear throughout the codified statutes of Colorado; Illinois,
Texas, and Wisconsin.
480. Municipal ordinances excluding former criminals from occupations are generally upheld
when the regulation bears reasonable relation to public health, safety, and welfare. See, e.g.,
Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 (1965)
(taxicab operator); Moyant v. Borough of Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A.2d 9 (1959) (solicitors); cf.
Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936) (regulation of paper hangers held unresonable).
See generally E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2634 (3d rev. ed. 1964).
481. A license may be refused if an applicant has committed any act for which a licensee
would be subject to disciplinary action. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4511 (West Supp.
1970) (psychiatric technicians).
482. See, e.g., In re Morris, 74 N.W. 679, 681, 397 P.2d 475,476 (1964) (license to practice
law confers no vested right, but is a conditional privilege, revocable for cause).
483. Statutory qualifications often embrace the applicant's character, criminal record, age,
education, skill, experience, and entrance examination scores. See generally Barron, Business and
Professional Licensing-California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640 (1966).
484. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:25-13 (Supp. 1969-70) (misdemeanor to seek
employment as x-ray technician without license).
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of the nineteenth century, few occupations other than medicine and law
were subject to license requirements.8 5 Since that time, however,
occupational licensing has proceeded at a feverish pace."" In addition to
licensed professional callings, 48 7 modern statutes regulate semi-skilled
and unskilled workers ranging from ambulance attendants4 to billiard-
room employees.489 Regulations for many of these licenses are imposed
by local ordinances. 90 Although no definite figures are available, it is
clear that a substantial portion of the working population is subject to
licensing.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the local regulation of
essential occupations as a valid exercise of police power necessary to the
safety, health, good order, and morals of the community. ' The Court,
however, has consistently emphasized that a state cannot, under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily deny access to lawful
occupations by imposing unreasonable restrictions.4 91 Consequently,
patently unreasonable regulations have been stricken by a number of
courts. 93 As a general rule, however, courts are reluctant to substitute
their judgment for that of the legislature. 94
Access to licensed employment is most often a matter of
485. See W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 126 (1956).
486. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES 7-8 (1952) (indicating that approximately 80 occupatiolis were licensed by state laws).
487. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, §§ 258-94 (Supp. 1967) (physicians); ARIZ.-REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32-2016 to -2755 (Supp. 1969-70) (attorneys); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1600-1808 (West
Supp. 1970) (dentists); FLA: STAT. ANN. §§ 461.01 to .19 (Supp. 1969) (podiatrists); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 79A-501 to -521 (Supp. 1969) (pharmacists); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 322.010-,380
(Baldwin 1969) (engineers); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.1 -.28 (Supp. 1970) (accountants); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 83-1 to -15 (Supp. 1969) (architects).
488. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(59) (1970).
489. E.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 460-72 (McKinney 1968). See also ALA. CODE tit. 46.
§§ 64(38)-(70) (Supp. 1967) (cosmetologists); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 9540-45 (West Supp.
1970) (dry cleaners); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-2301 to -2320 (1961) (watch makers); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 72-31 to -45 (1965) (tourist camp operators); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:4-27 to -56 (Supp.
1969-70) (barbers).
490. States often delegate broad regulatory power to municipal corporations. In some states,
the power of municipalities extends to the licensing of exhibitions, trade, business, vocations,
occupations, and professions conducted within the municipality. See generally E. MCQUILLIN §§
26.22-.3 1, supra note 480.
491. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
492. E.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,513 (1924).
493. E.g., State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 SE.2d 731 (1949) (licensing of photographers
held an unreasonable restriction of a lawful and harmless occupation, bearing no relation to public
health, morals and safety); Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of Examiners, 204 Tenn. 500,322 S.W,2d 209
(1959) (licensing of watch repairmen held unnecessary).
494. E.g., Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949) (upholding state
statute regulating insurance agents). I
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administrative determination.49 5 Federal4" and state497 statutes, as well as
municipal ordinances,498 confer licensing authority on administrative
agencies such as licensing boards and boards of examiners. In some
instances, authority is vested in a single official. 9 9 Most agencies are
composed of appointed members of the regulated occupation and
exercise broad discretion in processing applications and supervising
licensed personnel.m
It is well settled that licensing authorities may not refuse, revoke, or
suspend a license without informing the applicant or licensee of the
reason for the proposed action and giving him an opportunity to be
heard. 1 ' In the absence of a hearing satisfying due process standards,
mandamus or similar relief is available in most state courts.0 2
Moreover, it has been held that arbitrary action by licensing authorities
is a violation of civil rights cognizable in federal courts. 3 When an
agency determination is contested on the merits, however, the scope of
judicial review varies considerably between jurisdictions.01 A number of
courts, for example, have held that licensing authority actions are
exclusively administrative and have refused to accord review on the
merits.5 5 In other jurisdictions, however, expanded judicial review is
either authorized by statutes or assumed by the reviewing court.5
495. See generally W. GELLHORN, supra note 485, at 105-51 (1956).
496. E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 318 (1964) (FCC licenses radio operators); 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-22 (1964) (FAA establishes eligibility requirements for civil airman).
497. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 102 (Supp. 1969).
498. See generally E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 26.62-.67 (3d rev. ed. 1964).
499. E.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3905.01 (Baldwin 1964) (insurance).
500. See W. GELLHORN, supra note 485, at 105-18. See also Affeldt & Seney, Group
Sanctions and Personal Rights-Professions, Occupations and Labor Law, I I ST. Louis U.L.J.
382, 399-414 (1969); Barron, supra note 483, at 649-57.
501. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (refusal of Bar
admission without hearing is denial of procedural due process).
502. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 176 (1965).
503. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605,612 (5th Cir. 1964) (arbitrary refusal of liquor
license held to be in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964)).
504. See L. JAFFE, supra note 502, at 107-09; Note, DeNovo Judicial Review of State
Administrative Findings, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1217 (1965).
505. See, e.g., DeMond v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 129 Conn. 642, 30 A.2d 547 (1943);
State Bd. v. Scherer, 221 Ind. 92,46 N.E.2d 602 (1943); Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41,351 P.2d
449 (1960); State v. Huber, 129 W. Va. 198,40 S-E.2d 11 (1946).
506. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 689 (1963) (appeal from refusal or revocation of
veterinarian's license); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-31-11 (1956) (appeal from revocation of dentist's
license); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. art. 4506 (1966) (appeal from revocation of license to practice
medicine).
507. State v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 229 Ore. 543, 368 P.2d 386 (1962);
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469,9 A.2d 408 (1939); McAnerney v. State, 9 Utah 2d 191, 341
P.2d 212 (1959).
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Some courts have found that pursuit of an occupation is a property
right, the deprivation of which requires a trial de novo on review.58
2. Effect of Criminal Conviction under Licensing Statutes.-The
United States Supreme Court, in Hawker v. New York,w" recognized the
power of local governments to bar individuals from occupations on the
basis of past criminality. In upholding a provision prohibiting convicted
felons from the practice of medicine, the Court noted that a legislature
might reasonably require that members of a profession be of good
character and provide that conviction of crime demonstrates a lack of
this requisite character. 510 More recently, in Barsky v. Board of
Regents,511 the Court upheld suspension of a practicing physician's
license because of his conviction for refusing to produce records
subpoenaed by a congressional committee. In Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners,5 1 2 however, the Court indicated a readiness to examine more
closely character standards that bar citizens from professional life. In
reversing on due process grounds the refusal of an application for Bar
admission, the Court noted that any standard by which an applicant is
measured must have a rational connecti on with his fitness for the
profession. 1 3 In its most recent decision in this area, DeVeauv.
Braisted,51 1 the Court upheld a provision of the New York Waterfront
Commission Act of 1953 prohibiting convicted felons from holding
office in waterfront unions. Although this latest decision cites Hawker
with approval, it is clear that the Court attached special significance to
the circumstances that prompted the challenged legislation. In light of
the conditions then existing on the waterfront, the Court found the
legislature's judgment entirely reasonable.515 Read together, Schware
508. See, e.g., Laisne v. California State Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal. 2d 831, 123 P.2d 457
(1942) (license to practice optometry is a vested property right). See also Milligan v. Board of
Registration in Pharmacy, 348 Mass. 783, 204 N.E.2d 504 (1965): "There is growing recognition
• . . that administrative decisions on applications for licenses and permits to engage in a lawful
occupation. . . directly affect the personal rights, property, or economic interests of the applicant,
and . . . that fundamental considerations of fairness require such decisions . . . to be made
objectively, under reasonable procedures and with appropriate opportunity for judicial review
. . . . The problem is important because of the increasingly large numbers of occupations now
being subjected to administrative regulations." Id. at 788,204 N.E.2d at 508.
509. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
510. "It is not open to doubt that the commission of crime . . . has some relation to the
question of character . . . . When the legislature declares that whoever has violated the criminal
laws of the State shall be deemed lacking in good moral character it is not laying down an arbitrary
or fanciful rule .. ." Id. at 196.
511. 347 U.S. 442 (1953).
512. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
513. Id. at 239.
514. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
515. Id. at 158.
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and DeVeau indicate that in the future the United States Supreme Court
will subject legislative restrictions on occupational choices to greater
scrutiny than is suggested by the Hawker decision. Even so, recent
legislation516 and judicial decisions517 make it clear that a criminal
conviction remains a serious obstacle to the pursuit of a licensed
occupation.
For a significant number of former convicts, the barriers to
employment created by licensing laws may be insurmountable. 51 8
Entrance to a licensed occupation may be especially difficult for an
individual with a criminal record because he has the burden of
establishing good character.519 The person already holding a license is in
a more favorable position, since he has the benefit of prior performance
in the occupation as evidence of his fitness. Moreover, the burden of
demonstrating unfitness rests with the licensing authority. 52 On the
other hand, the licensee convicted of crime may be faced with a
presumption that he has betrayed the trust conferred by the license,
thereby forfeiting his privilege to continue in the occupation. 521 Once
expelled, reinstatement is unlikely. 52
As a general rule, acquittal of criminal charges does not preclude
refusal or revocation of a license.52 Moreover, it is usually held that
neither suspension of sentence nor pardon will prevent exclusion from
licensed employment. 524 Even in states that provide for expungement 525 of
516. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.590 (Supp. 1969) (conviction of felony or crime
involving moral turpitude bars licensing as physical therapist); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 89A-7
(Supp. 1969) (convicted felons may be excluded from practice of landscape architecture). See also
Model Professional and Occupational Licensing Act, 5 HARV. J. LEGIs. 67, 77 (1967)
(conviction of felony or crime involving moral turpitude suggested as basis for possible exclusion
from all licensed professions and occupations).
517. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 849 (1965) (taxicab license refused because of applicant's prior convictions of
participating in student civil disorders); In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679,397 P.2d 475 (1964) (attorney's
conviction of involuntary manslaughter justifies suspension from the Bar).
518. It is likely that many former convicts barred from licensed employment do not seek
judicial relief due to the prohibitive expense of litigation.
519. See, e.g., Application of Patterson, 213 Ore. 398,410,318 P.2d 907,912 (1957) (casting
on petitioner "the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he is of good moral
character," but failing to define "good moral character").
520. See, e.g., Sica v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 200 Cal. App. 2d 137, 19 Cal. Rptr. 277
(1962) (public dance hall permit).
521. See, e.g., In re Morris, 74 N.M. 679, 681-82,397 P.2d 475,476 (1964).
522. In re Flynn, 52 Wash. 2d 589, 596, 328 P.2d 150, 154 (1958).
523. Cases cited note 549 infra.
524. See, e.g., Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938) (physicians); Stone v.
Oklahoma Real Estate Comm'n, 369 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1962); State Bd. of Dental Examiners v.
Breeland, 208 S.C. 469, 38 S.E.2d 644 (1946).
525. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1970).
1970] 1007
1008 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
penalties and disabilities incident to conviction, it is generally held that
this relief does not extend to licensed employment. 52'
The extent that occupational freedom is diminished by licensing
laws is uncertain. Conviction of an abominable crime will probably
make an individual unsuitable for most licensed employment. Petty
offenses, on the other hand, seldom bar the offender.,"' Between these
extremes there is a broad range of criminal conduct that invariably
casts a shadow on an individual's employment future. Disqualification
depends largely on the nature of both the occupation pursued and the
crime committed. To determine the exact effect of his conviction, a
former convict must look to the applicable licensing provisions of the
jurisdiction in which he seeks employment. In some instances, federal
law is pertinentses but more often state or municipal regulations control.
Licensing laws vary considerably among the states and even among
regulated occupations within a state. Municipal regulations contribute
further to the lack of consistency. Thus, a conviction that bars a person
from an occupation in one state may not preclude licensing in another5 2'
Similarly, within the same state an ex-convict may be excluded from
some occupations and qualified for others."' Exclusion may be
mandatory for certain occupations and for others discretionary.6 11 In
some instances, the conviction's proximity in time may be
526. Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 452 (1966) (beer license denied on basis of lack of good character evidenced by expunged
conviction).
527. Misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, however, may disqualify the offender. See,
e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 3094 (West 1962) (optometrists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 93A-4
(1965) (real estate brokers).
528. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (h)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969) (unlawful for any person
under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship, transport, or receive firearms or ammunition in
interstate or foreign commerce).
529. Alabama requires mandatory license revocation when an engineer is convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 128(20) (Supp. 1967). California provides for
discretionary revocation for a felony in connection with engineering or any crime involving moral
turpitude. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6775 (West 1964). Michigan bases revocation on an
engineer's professional negligence. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.84(21) (1957).
530. Arizona, for example, no longer lists felony convictions as a ground for refusing a
barber's license (ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-353 (1956)), but still prohibits issuance of a license to
practice cosmetology if the applicant has been convicted of a felony. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-
552 (Supp. 1969-70).
531. The reason for the distinction is often not clear. North Carolina, for example, requires
mandatory refusal or revocation of a physical therapist's license for any act derogatory to the
standing or morals of the profession. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-265 (Cum. Supp. 1969). In the same
state, however, revocation of a physician's license is discretionary. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14
(1965).
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determinative.5 A few jurisdictions have enacted provisions mitigating
the effect of a criminal record on employment opportunity. M Although
these statutory variations and inconsistencies make it difficult to gauge
accurately the effect of a criminal conviction on future employment, it is
possible to determine the extent of probable exclusion from licensed
employment by examining typical statutory provisions.
(a) Commbn grounds for excluding convicted criminals.-Prior
criminal conduct may disqualify an individual in several ways. Most
licensing laws exclude persons convicted of relatively serious crimes or
crimes indicating lack of moral character. Moreover, general character
requirements often preclude licensing of ex-convicts. Professionals
convicted of a crime may be disqualified on the basis of unprofessional
conduct.
(i) Lack of good moral character.-Statutes and ordinances
frequently establish character standards that must be met for admission
to an occupation.em Some statutes also authorize revocation of licenses
for immoral acts.535 Most, if not all, professional callings require
applicants to prove good character. m In addition, a surprising number
of non-professional occupations impose character requirements. Thus,
failure to demonstrate good moral character may prevent an individual
from operating a dry-cleaning plant,537 selling hearing aids, 538 or
becoming a forester.-39 Although character standards bearing little or no
relationship to a regulated activity may be stricken, courts have found
good character to be a reasonable prerequisite in a wide variety of
vocations and activities.540 Even when character is not a statutory
532. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.803 (Supp. 1970) (authority to deny or revoke a
real estate broker's license because of a felony conviction is limited to cases in which an applicant
has been convicted within the past 5 years).
533. See notes 568-71 infra and accompanying text.
534. Character standards are now so firmly embedded in admission requirements that little
thought is given to their relevance. See, e.g.. A Model Professional and Occupational Licensing A ct,
5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 67, 81 (1967) (good moral character should be an entrance requirement for all
licensed professions and occupations).
535. Teachers' certificates may be revoked on the basis of immoral conduct. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 52, § 337 (1960); N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 3020 (McKinney 1953). In Arizona a dental
hygienigt's license may be revoked for acts of gross immorality. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1290
(1956).
536. See generally Affeldt & Seney, supra note 500, at 399-410.
537. E.g.,CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9551.5 (West Supp. 1970).
538. E.g., MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 18.276(6) (Supp. 1970).
539. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1212 (Supp. 1969-70). See also ALA. CODE tit. 46,
§ 120(35) (Supp. 1967) (dental hygienists); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 20-80 (1968) (midwives);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 329.050 (1966) (cosmetologists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 87-74 (1965) (water well
contractors); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 642 (1968) (poultry technicians).
540. See, e.g., Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 154 A.2d 9 (1959) (ordinance imposing
character requirements on solicitors and canvassers).
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requirement, some courts find that the licensing authority has the
implied power to bar persons who are found morally unfit for participa-
tion in the licensed activity."'
Conviction of a crime is quite generally held to be evidence that the
offender lacks the requisite character for either a professional calling 4'
or the most ordinary pursuit.s 3 Some reviewing courts look beyond the
conviction in determining whether an individual's exclusion on character
grounds is justified.5 4 A court may conclude, for example, that denial of
a license is unreasonable in light of the applicant's rehabilitation. 4 5
More often, however, a record of conviction will be conclusive evidence
of bad character. Exclusion on character grounds may be upheld even on
the basis of an applicant's association with criminals.5u
(ii) Conviction of crime.-Most statutes expressly make
conviction of certain types of crimes a ground for exclusion.r' 7 The
record of conviction is normally a sufficient basis for the licensing
authority to act., 8 In a few cases, licenses have been revoked even though
the holder was acquitted of the criminal charge.141
541. E.g., Dorfv. Fielding, 20 Misc. 2d 18, 197 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (denial of
license to sell secondhand goods because of convictions for running house of prostitution).
542. E.g., Application of Brooks, 57 Wash. 2d 66,355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
813 (1961) (denial of application to practice law because of conviction for failure to report to work
camps for conscientious objectors during World War II).
543. See, e.g., Hirsch v. City and County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313, 300 P.2d
177 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (merchant); Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521
(1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 849 (1965) (taxicab operator).
544. A few states expressly provide for the exercise of similar discretion by licensing
authorities. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 117 (West 1962) (record of conviction only
conclusive of the fact of conviction and authorities may inquire into the circumstances to determine
if the offense involved moral turpitude). But cf CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9540.3(d) (West 1964)
(conviction of felony or crimes involving moral turpitude constitutes evidence that applicant for
license to operate dry cleaning establishment lacks moral character).
545. See. e.g., Tanner v. DeSapio, 2 Misc. 2d 130, 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1956)
(reversing a refusal to license former convict to operate beauty parlor).
546. Hora v. City and County of San Francisco, 233 Cal. App. 2d 375, 43 Cal. Rptr. 527
(Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (denial of application to operate massage parlor because applicant's wife,
running same establishment, had been convicted of morals violations). Contra, Roosevelt Taxi, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 27 App. Div. 2d 753,279 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (reversal
of denial of taxicab license because applicant's brother, a known criminal, was applicant's business
associate).
547. A few statutes provide for license revocation upon the commission of a crime. See. e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1263 (1969-70) (mandatory revocation of dentist's license upon
commission of a felony).
548. See, e.g., Otash v. Bureau of Private Investigators & Adjusters, 230 Cal. App. 2d 568,41
Cal. Rptr. 263 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (private investigator).
549. See, e.g., Freeman v. Board of Alcohol Control, 264 N.C. 320, 141 S.E.2d 499 (1965);
accord, Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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Conviction of a felony °0 is often a ground for denial or revocation
of a license. Felons are barred from occupations ranging from practical
nursing 5 1 to selling horsemeat.55 2 Crimes, irrespective of where
committed, are generally classified as a felony or misdemeanor
according to the law of the licensing jurisdiction.- When a license is
refused or revoked on the basis of a felony conviction, courts are
reluctant to disturb the licensing authority's determination.5 ' There
have been instances, however, when reviewing courts have found the
exclusion of felons unreasonable.-
Crimes involving moral turpitude are frequently grounds for
disqualification from a licensed occupation. A few statutes exclude
persons convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude,-ss but the usual
provision embraces any crime involving moral turpitude.5 5 7 Thus,
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude may exclude the offender under
most statutes. 5 8 Irrespective of statutory language, both licensing
authorities and courts have experienced considerable difficulty in
applying the moral turpitude standard.59
A few statutes bar persons convicted of enumerated crimes. These
provisions may limit exclusion to crimes that indicate unfitness for a
550. For a discussion of the definition of felony, see notes 108-20 supra and accompanying
text.
551. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-171.5 (Supp. 1967).
552. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561 , § 242.2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1967). See also CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17769 (West 1964) (trading stamp dealers); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONTROL
LAW § 102 (McKinney 1970) (night club employees).
553. E.g., Erdman v. Board of Regents, 24 App. Div. 2d 698, 261 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1965)
(conviction of felony in federal court was a misdemeanor under state law). See notes 151-61 supra
and accompanying text.
554. E.g., Barton Trucking Corp. v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 299, 165 N.E.2d 163, 197 N.Y.S.
2d 138 (1959) (denial of public cart license because of felony conviction 20 years earlier). The court
stressed that the petitioner's conviction had been for criminal activities linked to the business
in which he sought to be licensed. Id. at 313, 165 N.E.2d at 170.
555. See, e.g., Brown v. Murphy, 3 Misc. 2d 151, 224 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Sup. Ct. 1962). A
license to drive a tow truck was refused by the New York City Police Commission based on the
applicant's court-martial conviction of carrying a concealed, loaded weapon and subsequent bad
conduct discharge from the Navy 15 years earlier. The New York Supreme Court reversed because
of the Commissioner's failure to accord a proper hearing, but noted in dictum that deprivation
based solely upon the stated grounds would be capricious in light of the applicant's co.mmendable
record since discharge from the service. Id. at 157-59,224 N.Y.S.2d at 429-31.
556. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-289 (Supp. 1969-70) (insurance agent's license).
557. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1613 (Supp. 1969) (inhalation therapist's license refused
or revoked for conviction of moral turpitude crime).
558. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 16 (Supp. 1967) (revocation of architect's license authorized
for misdemeanor involving moral turpitude).
559. For a discussion of what constitutes moral turpitude see notes 139-41 supra and
accompanying text.
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particular occupation. The offense of receiving stolen property, for
example, may prevent licensing as a junk dealer.m" Revocation may also
be confined to offenses involving use of a license."' As a general rule,
however, specificity is lacking in licensing legislation.
Statutes also may provide that persons separated from the Armed
Forces under less than honorable conditions are barred from licensed
employment. New York, for example, refuses to issue a peddler's license
to a former serviceman who failed to obtain an honorable discharge."'
Court-martial conviction of a wide variety of military offenses may
subject the offender to dishonorable discharge.V3 Moreover, Armed
Forces personnel may be separated administratively as undesirables
under less than honorable conditions."
4
(iii) Unprofessional conduct.-Professionals such as doctors,
lawyers, and accountants may have their licenses revoked or suspended
for unprofessional conduct. s0 Courts have upheld- this vague criterion
despite attacks on the failure to prescribe specific standards of
conduct."' Conviction of a crime is generally regarded as unprofessional
conduct, and revocations frequently are sustained even though criminal
proceedings are dismissed." 7
(b) Mitigating provisions.-A few states have enacted legislation
mitigating the effect of criminal conviction under licensing laws. Several
statutes, for example, provide for reinstatement of revoked licenses
following specified periods of time, normally one to five years."8 A
similar remedy is available in New-York where a certificate of good
conduct may be issued to former criminals after five years of satisfactory
conduct. 69 Although this statute expressly states that issuance of a
560. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 61 (McKinney 1968). See also Ms. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 575 (Supp. 1970) (embezzlers barred from becoming collections agents); N.Y. GEN, Bus.
LAW § 74 (McKinney 1968) (conviction of illegal possession of weapons disqualifies for guard
duty).
561. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2322 (Supp. 1969-70) (structural pest control).
562. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 32 (McKinney 1968).
563. E.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL. UNITED STATES 127c (rev. ed. 1969) (absence
without leave, violation of a lawful general order, feigning illness).
564. See generally Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Changes Needed? 22 ME. L. REV.
141 (1970).
565. See. e.g.. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.533 (Supp. 1970) (physicians).
566. E.g., Irwin v. Board of Regents, 304 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1969)
(upholding statute revoking license of accountant for unprofessional conduct, defined as acts
evidencing moral unfitness).
567. See, e.g., Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949)
(physicians).
568. See, e.g.. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 409 (McKinney 1968) (reinstatement of
cosmetologist's license possible after one year).
569. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 242 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
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certificate shall not proscribe licensing authority discretion, a few New
York licensing statutes require recognition of the certificate.
570
California recently enacted legislation requiring licensing authorities to
recognize prison training when passing upon a former criminal's
application .571Under this provision, an inmate who has received training
for an occupation in the course of a prison rehabilitation program can-
not be denied the right to take the examination required to obtain a
license for that occupation. In effect, if the applicant is otherwise
qualified, his conviction will not bar licensing.
Most licensing statutes, however, make no provision for mitigating
the effect of a criminal conviction. In these jurisdictions, an applicant
excluded from licensed status on the basis of his criminal record must
depend upon the courts for relief. In many instances, judicial review of
the agency determination may be of limited scope.572 In the absence of a
showing of arbitrary or capricious action, it is unlikely that a licensing
authority's exclusion of a convicted criminal will be disturbed by the
reviewing court.5 73
C. Exclusion of Convicted Criminals from Public Employment
The difficulties experienced by the ex-convict in securing public
employment are no less formidable than those he encounters in seeking
entrance to licensed occupations. The restrictions excluding convicted
criminals from public employment affect a large number of job
opportunities. Federal, state, and local governments employ more than
twelve million people.574 One out of six civilian workers is a public
employee.5 7 5 Moreover, three and one-half million men and women
currently serve in the Armed Forces.575
A number of government employees are elected or appointed to
positions of public trust. Individuals occupying these positions are
generally thought of as public officers. The many restrictions on the
convicted criminal's privilege of holding public office, as well as the
distinction between officers and employees, are fully discussed
elsewhere.5 77 The present inquiry embraces the many public occupations
570. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 74 (McKinney 1968) (private investigators).
571. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23.8 (West Supp. 1970).
572. See note 505 supra and accompanying text.
573. See, e.g.. Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp. 589, 595 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (revocation of
pharmacist's license). See generally W. GELLHORN, supra note 485, at 118-25.
574. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1969, at
430-31 (90th ed. 1969).
575. Id. at 211.
576. Id. at 255.
577. See notes 342-60, 363-77 supra and accompanying text.
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that are not appreciably different from jobs in the private sector.
Although a number of these positions appear particularly suited to ex-
convicts, both federal and local governments have been slow to recognize
this fact.78 Thus, it is not unusual to find constitutional and statutory
provisions barring convicted criminals from a wide variety of routine
public occupations. Additionally, regulations requiring that public
employees be of good moral character may disqualify many offenders.
The decision whether to employ an applicant with a criminal record
is often discretionary with governmental agencies. Available
information indicates, however, that examining and certifying agencies
actually hire few ex-convicts.579 It is likely that those offenders who do
succeed in obtaining employment are most often placed as unskilled
laborers.m Even an acquittal of a criminal charge will generally not
prevent the offender from being denied employment if the public agency
regards him as unfit.5 1 Similarly, neither pardon nor expungement
preclude exclusionsz There may even be instances in which members of
a convicted criminal's family will be barred from public employment. m
For some offenders, the passage of time may lower the barriers to
employment . 4 Others may be employable by reason of positive
rehabilitation measures initiated by the federal government and certain
states.58 - Under a few court decisions, pardoned offenders may have
increased employment opportunities.5 It is apparent, however, that
under current practices many ex-convicts are barred from public
employment. It is equally clear that reviewing courts are not likely to
578. See, e.g., C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW § 8-2 (1957) (typical public employees include
architects, medical inspectors, engineers, matrons, janitors, park attendants, superintendents of
nurses, switchboard operators, and watchmen).
579. See Wise, Public Employment of Persons with a Criminal Record, 6 NAT'L PROBATION
& PAROLE ASS'N J. 197 (1960).
580. See D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 359-61.
581. See, e.g., Berman v. Gillroy, 198 Misc. 369,97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd. 305
N.Y. 688, 112 N.E.2d 771 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954).
582. Taylor v. Macy, 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (upholding dismissal from United
States Civil Service even though state conviction of vagrancy had been expunged).
583. E.g., Sheridan v. Gardner, 347 Mass. 8, 196 N.E.2d 303 (1964) (upholding provision
that convicted person's immediate family cannot serve on crime commission).
584. E.g., MASS. ANN.. LAWS ch. 31, § 17 (1966) (convict eligible for public employment
one year following conviction).
585. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 64-A, § 19 (1968) (expressly declaring ex-convicts
eligible for civil service appointment).
586. See, e.g., Slater v. Olson, 230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W. 879 (1941) (application for civil
service position as assistant smoke inspector); Commissioner of Metro. Dist. Comm'n v. Director




intervene unless exclusion is found to be arbitrary or patently
unreasonable.8
1. Federal Employment.-The United States Constitution does
not require exclusion of convicted criminals from federal employment
Congress, however, has enacted legislation barring certain types of
offenders from many federal positions. A number of disqualifying
provisions under the Federal Criminal Code have already been discussed
in connection with the prohibitions against convicted criminals holding
public office m  Many of these provisions apply equally well to public
employees.58 9 Other federal statutes, however, make it clear that
individuals convicted of certain crimes are barred from all federal
employment. Conviction of either advocating the overthrow of the
government'" or promoting insubordination in the Armed Forces, 11 for
example, disqualifies the offender from employment by the United
States government or any department or agency thereof for a period of
five years following the conviction. Moreover, under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,592 a person convicted of inciting a
riot or civil disorder and sentenced to imprisonment for one year will be
ineligible for federal employment for five years subsequent to conviction.
Under the Study Draft of the New Federal Criminal Code,
59 3
disqualification from federal office or employment because of criminal
conviction is discretionary with the sentencing court. 94 Moreover, the
Draft provides for automatic removal of the disqualification five years
after the defendant has completed his sentence.05
Conviction of a serious crime often disqualifies the offender from
military service. Only in exceptional cases, for example, are convicted
felons permitted to enlist in the Armed Forces.sK In addition, a wide
587. City of Aurora v. Schoberlein, 230 Ill. 496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907) (removal from civil
service is administrative and not to be judicially tried de novo on the merits); accord, Appeal of
Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262,280 N.W. 464 (1938); City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 24 So.
2d 319 (1946).
588. See notes 365-74 supra and accompanying text.
589. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964) (disclosure of confidential information); id. § 1913
(lobbying with appropriated moneys).
590. Id. § 2385.
591. Id. § 2387.
592. 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (Supp. IV, 1969) (inciting, organizing, promoting, encouraging,
aiding, or abetting a riot or civil disorder or any offense determined by the head of an employment
agency to have been committed in furtherance of civil disorder).
593. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970).
594. Id. § 3501.
595. Id. § 3503.
596. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV, 1969) (Service Secretaries may authorize exceptions in
meritorious cases).
10151970]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
variety of civil and military offenses may result in a serviceman's
separation from the Armed Forces under less than honorable
conditions.597 Servicemen who fail to receive an honorable discharge are
ineligible for preferential Civil Service appointments available to other
veterans. 598
In certain instances, convicted criminals may be barred from
employment in activities regulated by the federal government. Under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,111 for
example, felons are ineligible to serve as officers or directors of any labor
organization. Similarly, an individual convicted of an offense involving
dishonesty or breach of trust normally is not employable by a bank
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."' Convicted
criminals also may be denied employment with either the federal
government or defense-related industries because their criminal records
preclude issuance of the requisite security clearance. 601
Even in the absence of direct prohibitions against hiring convicted
criminals, federal agencies exercise broad discretion in deciding whether
to employ applicants with criminal records. United States Civil Service
regulations, for example, provide that "criminal, infamous, dishonest,
immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct" may be the basis for
disqualifying individuals from the federal serviceY. 2 Formerly, before an
applicant could be considered for a responsible position, the Civil
Service Commission required two years to elapse following discharge
from a felony sentence, and one year following discharge from a
misdemeanor sentence.0 Since employment of rehabilitated offenders
has recently received special emphasis in the federal service,", however,
the Commission now accepts applications from ex-convicts at any time.
Determination of the applicant's suitability embraces the nature,
seriousness, and circumstances of the crime, the offender's age, social
and economic environment, and rehabilitation. The Commission,
however, neither requires applicants to disclose information concerning
convictions by juvenile authorities that occurred prior to age 21, nor
considers arrests that were not followed by conviction. Moreover,
597. See note 563 supra.
598. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108(1), (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
599. 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1964).
600. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (1964).
601. 32 C.F.R. §§ 155.5, 156 (1970).
602. 5 C.F.R. § 731.201(b) (1969).
603. D. GLASER, supra note 465, at 414.
604. See Employment of the Rehabilitated Offender in the Federal Service, in Civil Service
Form 941 (Feb. 1968), reprinted in 32 FED. PROBATION 50 (Sept. 1968).
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current Civil Service regulationss authorize employment of federal
prisoners participating in work-release programs pursuant to-he Federal
Prisoner's Rehabilitation Act of 1965.0
2. State and Municipal Employment.-Many states and
municipalities bar convicted criminals from public employment. W7 The
disability may be imposed by constitutional provision," statute,0 or
ordinance. 10 In some instances, former criminals are permanently
barred,6"' while in others employment is permitted at a specified time
after conviction. 612 In most states, ex-convicts are barred from holding
police or correctional employment.
613
Many constitutional and statutory provisions disqualifying
convicted criminals appear to limit the disability to public office.614 It is
clear, however, that a wide variety of routine government jobs may fall
within these proscriptions. Recently, for example, the dismissal of a
school bus driver upon disclosure of a felony conviction 24 years earlier
was upheld under a constitutional provision barring convicted felons
from holding "office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit." 615
State and municipal civil service provisions usually authorize
exclusion of convicted criminals. Typical regulations provide that both
state and municipal commissions may refuse to examine or certify an
applicant guilty of either a crime, or infamous or notoriously disgraceful
conduct. 16 Thus depending on a commission's policy, a criminal
conviction can be a serious obstacle to civil service appointment. In
addition, immoral or criminal conduct may disqualify employees even in
605. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(x) (1969).
606. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (Supp. IV, 1969).
607. See S. RUBIN, supra note 468, at 613-14, 625-26 (listing 27 states).
608. E.g., DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 21; LA. CONST. art. 8, § 6; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 7; Wis.
CONST. art. 13, § 3.
609. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-912 (Supp. 1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.01
(1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-3 (1966).
610. See generally E. McQUILLIN, supra note498, §§ 12.58, .229-.270.
611. E.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE § 1029 (West 1966) (felons prohibited from being peace
officers).
612. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 31, § 17 (1966) (civil service closed for one year).
613. See S. RUBIN, supra note 468, at 628.
614. See note 344 supra and accompanying text.
615. Thomas v. Evangeline Parrish School Bd., 138 So. 2d 658 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1962).
The Louisiana Constitution was recently amended to provide that convicted felons can hold public
employment not involving responsibility for public funds. LA. CoNsT. art. 8, § 6.
616. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 18935 (West 1963); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 50(4)
(McKinney 1959). See, e.g., Alder v. Lang, 21 App. Div. 2d 107,248 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1964) (denial of
application for job as assistant mechanical engineer because of prior arrest record that included
misdemeanor conviction, reversed because of civil service commission's failure to scrutinize
circumstances surrounding the petitioner's record).
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the absence of a conviction. 617 One state supreme court, for example,
recently upheld the dismissal of a water tradesman with fifteen years'
service on the ground that he had committed adultery and that this
conduct was wantonly offensive to the public and unbecoming an
employee of the city.618 Under the reasoning of this case, 19 it is likely that
many individuals with criminal records will be disqualified from civil
service.
VII. Loss OF JUDICIAL RIGHTS
The American judicial system imposes a number of disabilities on
the citizen with a criminal record. In some states, for example, the prison
inmate lacks the capacity to sue, although he or his representative may
be sued. Similarly, the offender may be unable to execute judicially
enforceable instruments, such as contracts and wills, or to serve as a
court-appointed fiduciary, such as an executor, administrator, or
guardian. A criminal conviction also may affect the offender's
participation in the judicial process as a witness or juror. Convicted
persons, for example, generally cannot testify in judicial proceedings
without their testimony being impeached. Persons convicted of perjury
lack the capacity to testify in some states. Moreover, convicted persons
often are precluded from serving as jurors, irrespective of their individual
qualifications or sentiments.
A. Capacity to Litigate
At common law, citizens imprisoned in a penitentiary lacked the
capacity to sue,"' but their imprisonment did not prevent them from
being sued. 2' This rule developed from the practice that a criminal
617. See, e.g., 4 N.Y.C.R.R. § 3.2 (1969), appearing in N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW, Rules and
Regulations of the Dep't of Civil Service § 3.2 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (applicant who lacks good
moral character or satisfactory reputation may be disqualified from examination or appointment).
See also Berman v. Gillroy, 198 Misc. 369, 97 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1950), affd, 305 N.Y. 688, 112
N.E.2d 771 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954) (upholding civil engineer's removal because of
sodomy charge, even though criminal prosecution dismissed).
618. State ex rel. Gudlin v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 77, 133 N.W.2d 799 (1965).
619. "[T]here must be an area where conduct of an employee of a municipality . . . in
violation of important and fundamental standards of propriety is of legitimate concern to the
municipality.. . . When an employee's unacceptable conduct falls within this area of concern, we
find no implication in the statute or ordinance that such conduct cannot be cause for discharge
unless it can be shown directly to impair performance of duties." Id. at 86-87, 133 N.W.2d at 804.
620. See, e.g., Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888); Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D.
463,253 N.W. 437 (1934); Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590,30 A. 470 (1894).
621. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520, 79 S.W. 505 (1904); Green v. Boney, 233
S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732 (1958).
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conviction resulted in a forfeiture of the offender's goods to the crown. 2
Since prisoners had no property or rights for which suit could be
brought, there was no reason to give them the right to sue.623 Today,
forfeiture has been abolished in all states,6 24 but states that have retained
civil death statutes generally do not permit prison inmates to maintain
civil actions. Most states, however, now permit prisoners to bring civil
actions. The common law rule permitting prisoners to be sued has
remained unchanged.
1. Capacity of Prisoners to Sue .6 --The majority of states today
permit prison inmates to institute civil suits either in their own names or
through personal representatives or committees appointed to manage the
estates of prisoners. Persons imprisoned in the penitentiary, however,
lack the capacity to sue in most of the thirteen states that have retained
civil death statutes.6" The overwhelming majority of states, including
many states that have civil death statutes, provide that imprisonment is a
disability that tolls the statutes of limitations. Consequently, upon
release, most prison inmates, including those who are unable to sue while
incarcerated, can maintain a cause of action that accrued during
imprisonment.
(a) Capacity of prisoners to sue in their own names.-In most
states without civil death statutes, citizens imprisoned in the penitentiary
retain the right to sue in their own names.627 In the absence of a specific
statute, the courts have ruled that prisoners have the capacity to sue since
the legislatures have not provided that criminal offenders lose their civil
rights during imprisonment. 621 Some non-civil death states have enacted
statutes dealing with suits instituted by prisoners. Both New Hampshire
622. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 A. 470 (1894).
623. Id.
624. See notes 103-19 on pages 1080-82 infra and accompanying text.
625. This section will not review general restrictions on prisoners or the remedies available to
prisoners who are mistreated. See, e.g., Hanna, The Convict and the Compensation Law, 34 CALIF.
L. REv. 167 (1946); Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386
(1968); Note, Remedies Available to Penal Inmates For Injuries Received While Incarcerated, 34
IND. L.J. 609 (1959); Note, Federal Remedies for Lawfully Committed Prisoners Who Claim
Mistreatment, 2 J. Pua. LAW 181 (1953); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing
Law, 110 U. PA. L. Rev. 985 (1962); Note, Prisoners' Remedies for Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J.
800 (1950).
626. For a discussion of the civil death statutes, see notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
627. See, e.g., Willingham v. King, 23 Fla. 478, 2 So. 851 (1887); Department of Welfare v.
Brock, 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915 (1947); Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 213 N.W. 809
(1927).
628. E.g., Bosteder v. Duling, 115 Neb. 557, 564,213 N.W. 809, 812 (1927).
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and Kentucky, for example, expressly grant prisoners the capacity to
sue.62
Despite the majority rule that prison inmates have the legal capacity
to sue, prisoners may find it difficult to bring civil actions and secure
remedies for wrongs committed against them. Several courts have
indicated, for example, that prison regulations may deny prisoners the
absolute and unrestricted right to file any civil action they may desire.
6
3
These decisions have been based on the theory that prison discipline
demands reasonable restrictions on the activities of prisoners. The courts
have held, however, that prison regulations violate the fourteenth
amendment if they either frustrate efforts of prisoners to obtain
appellate reviews of their convictions,63' or prevent them from inquiring
into the validity of restraints on their personal liberty and freedom.3 2 In
addition to restrictions imposed by prison regulations, prisoners may be
prevented from suing because courts have held that inmates do not have
the absolute right to appear personally in court to represent
themselvesAm Similarly, courts are not compelled to appoint attorneys to
represent prisoners who institute civil actions.61
Although the majority of states have no legal restrictions on the
right of prison inmates to sue, prisoners in most states that have civil
death statutes are legally incompetent to institute civil actions. The civil
death statutes generally do not expressly provide that prisoners cannot
sue, but the courts have held that the right to sue is a civil right that is
suspended by these statutes during imprisonment.A5 To counter this
629. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (Supp. 1969); Ky. R. Civ. P. 17.04. The New
Hampshire statute adopts the Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons. In Wisconsin, a
statute provides that if the plaintiff in an action is imprisoned, the defendant may require him to file
a security of not less than $250 to cover court costs. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 271.28 (1958).
630. See, e.g., Kirby v. Thomas, 336 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1964) (upholding validity of prison
regulation prohibiting prisoners from mailing legal papers in civil actions unrelated to the validity
of their convictions); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963)
(refusing to permit prisoner to file civil action informapaupers); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526
(5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 890 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956) (holding that
warden did not abuse discretion in advising prisoner he could not file civil action not relating to
personal liberty). See also Seybold v. Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Wis. 1967)
(permitting prisoner to file suit, but holding action in abeyance until after his release).
631. See, e.g., Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (equal protection
clause); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1966) (due process clause); Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d
591 (7th Cir. 1955).
632. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 890
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956); White v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
633. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1965); Rogers v. Youngblood,
226 Ind. 165, 78 N.E.2d 663 (1948).
634. E.g., Davison v. Joseph Horne& Co., 265 F. Supp. 750 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
635. See, e.g., Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376,92 So. 608 (1922) (Alabama has repealed
its civil death statute); Hammett v. San Ore Constr. Co., 195 Kan. 122, 402 P.2d 820 (1965)
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development, the legislatures in at least two civil death states have
provided that prisoners can sue. In Utah, for example, a special statute
states that the loss of civil rights during imprisonment does not render
inmates incompetent to maintain civil actions.63 6 The Missouri
legislature has authorized the appointment of a trustee to sue for and
recover any property or debts owed to a prisoner.3 7 Prisoners in North
Dakota lack the c6pacity to bring most types of civil actions, but the
civil death statute permits them to maintain actions based on their
"natural rights." In defining the capacity of prisoners to sue, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has held that convicts can maintain only
actions that concern their personal liberty, as distinguished from their
legal rights .
31
Although prison inmates lack the capacity to sue in most states that
have civil death statutes, a number of exceptions have been created to
limit the impact of this disability. The courts have held, for example,
that prisoners, even though civilly dead, are entitled to protection under
the fourteenth amendment." ° Consequently, a prisoner has the absolute
right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus64' or to appeal his conviction.
6 42
Moreover, a number of decisions have held that the civil death statutes
cannot prevent a prisoner from bringing suit in a federal court under the
1871 Civil Rights Act.4 3 The courts have ruled that all prisoners may
invoke the provisions of the Act since it applies to any person within the
jurisdiction of the United States.6
4
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a prisoner who is a
(Kansas recently repealed its civil death statute); Green v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938);
Burns v. City of New York, 21 App. Div. 2d 767,250 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1964); Lipschultz v. State, 192
Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Boatwright v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 244 Ore.
140,416 P.2d 328 (1966).
636. UTAH CODEANN. § 76-1-38 (1953).
637. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 460.010, .060, .100 (1956).
638. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960).
639. Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463,253 N.W. 437 (1934).
640. See, e.g., In re Jones, 57 Cal. 2d 860, 372 P.2d 310, 22 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1962); In re
Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663,361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
641. See, e.g., Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); In re Jones, 57 Cal. 2d 860,372 P.2d 310,
22 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1962).
642. See Exparte Robinson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 626,246 P.2d 982 (1952).
643. See, e.g., Cancino v. Sanchez, 379 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1967); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d
598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961);
Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); Beyer v. Werner, 299 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y.
1969). The Supreme Court has held that prisoners can sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries sustained during confinement in a federal prison. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150
(1963).
644. See, e.g., Sewell v. Pcgelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130
F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
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domiciliary of a non-civil death state has the capacity to sue in a federal
district court in a civil death state."- The Federal Rules provide that the
capacity to sue is determined by the law of the plaintiff's domicile., In
addition, at least one court has held that a citizen imprisoned in a state
that permits prisoners to sue may maintain an action in a civil death
state, even though he would have lacked the capacity to sue if he had
been convicted in the jurisdiction where the action is brought." 7
Likewise, a prisoner may file a suit in a state that does not have a civil
death statute, even though he is civilly dead in another state.,
Moreover, courts have held that civil death statutes apply only to
sentences in the state courts."' Consequently, a prisoner under a federal
sentence may maintain an action in a state that has a civil death
statute.60
Other exceptions have been created to narrow the scope of the rule
that prisoners in civil death states lack the capacity to sue. In the past,
for example, the New York legislature has adopted special enabling acts
permitting certain individual prisoners to sue. These acts have not been
satisfactory, however, because most prisoners have not enjoyed special
consideration by the legislature. 51 Prisoners in civil death states also
have been permitted to maintain actions when the courts have found a
superior statutory power, such as that granted by workmen's
compensation laws. 52 In addition, a New York court has held that a
prisoner who is injured before he is sentenced to prison can maintain an
action, despite the fact that he is considered civilly dead after his
sentenceA5 The personal representative of a decedent has been permitted
to maintain a wrongful death action even though the decedent was civilly
dead at the time of his natural death. 654
In at least one case, a prisoner in a civil death state was permitted to
645. Urbano v. News Syndicate Co., 358 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831
(1966).
646. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
647. Panko v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 24 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1938). The federal
district court in this case applied the law of New York, a civil death state.
648. Wilson v. King, 59 Ark. 32,26 S.W. 18 (1894).
649. E.g., Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960).
650. Id.
651. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 397, 400
(1965).
652. See California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200 Cal, 44, 251 P.
808 (1926).
653. Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 182 Misc. 678, 45
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd, 294 N.Y. 743,61 N.E.2d 745 (1945).
654. Breed v. Atlanta, B. & C. R.R., 241 Ala. 640,4 So. 2d315 (1941).
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maintain an action for tort injuries suffered in prison work.6" Most
decisions under the civil death statutes, however, have held that an
inmate injured in prison cannot sue for his injuries during the term of his
imprisonment.6" Since the right to sue in civil death states is merely
suspended during imprisonment, a prisoner on parole can maintain an
action."' If he is recommitted to prison, the action is abated until his
disability is again terminated.0
(b) Appointment of representatives to sue for prison-
ers.-Although a prisoner has the capacity to sue in his own name in
most states, a number of states have passed statutes providing for the
appointment of some type of personal representative to manage the
prisoner's affairs."' The statutes refer to the personal representatives as
guardians,660 trustees, 61 administrators,62 or committees.6 3 In most
cases, a statute expressly provides that the representative has the duty to
prosecute the prisoner's claims and to defend suits brought against
him.'" In other cases, it generally can be assumed that the power to
manage an individual's estate implies the power to bring suit on behalf
of the estate. Some states provide for the appointment of a representative
for the primary purpose of suing for prisoners."5
At least two civil death states, Missouri and New York, have
statutes authorizing the appointment of a trustee to manage prisoners'
estates. The Missouri statute expressly provides that the trustee may sue
655. Bhullar v. State, 248 App. Div. 803,289 N.Y.S. 41 (1936) (the court reached its decision
without mentioning the New York civil death statute).
656. See, e.g., Green v. State, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938); Hewson v. State, 27 App.
Div. 2d 358,279 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1967). Federal prisoners are permitted to sue under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (1964), for injuries sustained during confinement. United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
657. Rich v. Rich, 16 Misc. 2d 619, 185 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
658. Id.
659. For a discussion of the appointment of a representative to protect prisoners' property see
notes 263-301 on pages 1101-07 infra and accompanying text.
660. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 353-34 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3601
(1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 438 (1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2111.01(d), .02 (Baldwin
1964).
661. See. e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-105(k) (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 460.010 (1956);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-18 (1965).
662. See R.l. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-4 (1956).
663. See. e.g.. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-305 to -306 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-33
(1966).
664. See. e.g.. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-35 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 440 (1957); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 460.060, .100 (1956); OHIO-REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.14 (Baldwin 1964); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53-307 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-36 (1966); ME. R. Civ. P. 17.
665. See, e.g. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-232, -237 (1962) (authorizing appointment of
guardian ad litem to bring actions for imprisoned citizens); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-336 (1955)
(authorizing warden of penitentiary to bring suit to recover money or goods belonging to prisoner).
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on behalf of the inmates."' The New York provision, however, does not
expressly permit the trustee to sue,M7 and a New York court has held that
he does not have this power.6
In some states, it is not clear whether a statute permits the
appointment of a representative to manage a prisoner's affairs. Statutes,
for example, may permit the appointment of a representative for an
incompetent 69 or a person under any legal disability. 7 ' Although some
states merely define an incompetent as a person incapable of managing
his property,' 7' at least one state expressly provides that an incompetent
includes any person confined in a penal institution. 62 It has been
suggested that in states that do not authorize the appointment of
personal representatives to manage prisoners' affairs, convicts can
achieve the same result by placing their property and claims in trust
before incarceration. 3 The trust could be created during incarceration
in states where convicts retain the power to convey property.
Statutes authorizing the appointment of personal representatives to
sue for prisoners have been criticized on the theory that they are designed
to benefit the convict's creditors and dependents and show little concern
for the convict's personal desires.7 4 Most statutes, for example, do not
expressly authorize the prisoner to apply for the appointment of a
representative. Many statutes, however, provide that creditors675 or
friends and relatives6 76 may ask that a representative be appointed. Some
states permit "any interested party" to apply to have a representative
appointed.6 77 A prisoner might be able to apply for a representative
under these statutes.
666. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 460.010, .060, .100 (1956).
667. N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 320, 350 (McKinney 1968). Prisoners may be represented in a
New York Surrogate's Court proceeding by a guardian ad litem. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC.
LAW §§ 103(37),403(2) (McKinney 1967).
668. Hewson v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 358, 279 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1967). The court reasoned
that a decision permitting the prisoner to sue through a representative would partially destroy the
effect of the state's civil death statute. Id. at 361, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
669. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 126.106 (1967); IOWA R. Civ. P. 12, 17.
670. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87-1-17,-2-1 (1963).
671. See, e.g.,ORE. REV. STAT. § 126.006 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 319.01(3) (1958).
672. OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2111.01(d) (Baldwin 1964).
673. Note, Methods of Circumventing the Civil Disabilities of Convicts, 48 YALE L.J. 912,
914 (1939).
674. Note, The Effect of State Statutes on the Civil Rights of Convicts, 47 MINN. L. REV,
835,843 (1963).
675. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3601 (1965); R.1. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-4
(1956).
676. See. e.g.. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3601 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-237
(1962).
677. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.02 (Baldwin 1964); VA. CooE ANN. § 53-305
(1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-33 (1966).
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The courts are divided on the question of whether a prisoner can sue
and be sued in his own name in states that provide for the appointment
of a representative to manage the prisoner's affairs. Some courts have
held that the statutes authorizing the appointment of a representative are
not exclusive and that prisoners still can act personally. 78 Other courts
have ruled that after a citizen is imprisoned, all suits must be brought in
the name of his representative or committee . 79 When this view is
followed, it is conceivable that the statutes can have the effect of
preventing prisoners from suing, especially if the courts do not permit
prisoners to apply for a representative. It is unlikely that the legislatures
intended this result when they enacted the statutes. In any case, the
convict can manage his own estate and sue in his own name after he is
released from prison.18
(c) Statutes of limitations tolled by imprisonment.--Since it is
.either extremely difficult or impossible for most prison inmates to
maintain civil actions, a large number of states have provided that
imprisonment is a disability that tolls statutes of limitations.
Consequently, prisoners in these states may wait until after their release
from incarceration to bring their cause of action. Provisions tolling
statutes of limitations for prisoners have been adopted in most civil
death states in order to insure that a citizen who lacks the capacity to sue
while imprisoned will not completely lose his cause of action81
Courts have held that provisions that toll statutes of limitations for
persons under a disability should not be interpreted as restricting the
right to sue.82 Consequently, unless otherwise provided, persons under
the protection of a tolling statute may sue during the period of their
678. Haynesv. Peterson, 125 Va.730, 100S.E. 471 (1919).See also In re Weber's Estate, 165
Misc. 815, 1 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sur. Ct. 1938) (prisoner may sue through attorney rather than trustee
when suit is instituted against him).
679. See, e.g., Rice County v. Lawrence, 29 Kan. 113 (1883); Waynesboro v. Lopinsky, 116
W. Va. 551, 182 S.E. 283 (1935).
680. Nibert v. Carroll Trucking Co., 139 W. Va. 583, 82 S.E.2d 445 (1954). The West
Virginia court has held that a citizen incarcerated in the county jail on a charge of having violated
his parole could maintain an action in his own name and was not required to have a committee
appointed. Craft v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 145 W. Va. 670, 116 S.E.2d 385 (1960).
681. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.140 (1962); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-230 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 516.030, .170 (1952); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§ 93-2515, -2703 (1964); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney 1963); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 96 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.160
(1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 (1956); S.D. CODE § 15-2-22 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-12-36 (1953).
682. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 87 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1937) (disability due to
insanity); Howell v. Gray, 10 F.R.D. 268 (D. Neb. 1950) (disability due to imprisonment); Domann
v. Pence, 183 Kan. 196, 326 P.2d 260 (1958) (disability due to infancy).
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disability as if the statute did not exist. Where prisoners retain the
capacity to sue, therefore, the statutes allow but do not compel them to
wait until after their release to institute their suits.3 In most instances,
prisoners who have a choice will not delay bringing their action because
of the danger that the prospective defendant will have dis appeared or will
be insolvent. In addition, key witnesses may have died or disappeared by
the time the prisoner is released.1m
The tolling statutes are designed to protect persons who are unable
to protect themselves because of their actual imprisonment.",
Consequently, the cause of action must arise while the plaintiff is
imprisoned in order for the tolling statutes to apply." If the cause of
action accrues before the plaintiff is imprisoned, the statute of
limitations continues to run during the period of imprisonment. 87
Courts have held that statutes of limitations are not tolled for a citizen
free on bail6 or parole."' A citizen is imprisoned within the meaning of
the statutes, however, while he is confined in jail awaiting trial.6 '
The provisions that toll the statutes of limitations vary considerably
from state to state. A number of state statutes provide that the period of
imprisonment is not to be included in determining the time allowed for
commencement of an action.691 In these states, prisoners may take
advantage of the full statutory period after their release. Many states,
however, have statutes that are more restrictive. Some states, for
example, provide that the statutes of limitations can never be extended
for more than five years and that all actions must be brought within one
683. E.g., Howell v. Gray, 10 F.R.D. 268 (D. Neb. 1950).
684. See Note, supra note 673, at 914.
685. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659
(1938); Hyde v. Nelson, 287 Mo. 130, 229 S.W. 200 (1921).
686. See, e.g., Williams v. Coughlan, 244 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1957); Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F.
Supp. 477 (E.D. I1. 1948); Bock v. Collier, 175 Ore. 145, 151 P.2d 732 (1944).
687. See, e.g., Vann v. Rogers, 225 Ala. 186, 142 So. 539 (1932); Bock v. Collier, 175 Ore.
145, 151 P.2d 732 (1944).
688. See, e.g., Hyde v. Nelson, 287 Mo. 130,229 S.W. 200 (1921); Bock v. Collier, 175 Ore.
145, 151 P.2d 732 (1944).
689. E.g., Mitchell v. Greenough, 100 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1938),
690. Lasater v. Waites, 67 S.W. 518 ('ex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 95 Tex. 553,68
S.W. 500 (1902).
691. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-502 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-17
(1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-801 (1962); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-230 (1948); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 413.310 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 853 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 7
(1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.250 (1967) (applies only to actions not involving real property); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-1-19 (1956); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 5518, 5535 (Supp. 1969); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-36 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 551 (1958); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.16.190 (1962).
1026 [Vol. 23
1970] CIVIL DISABILITIES 1027
year after the prisoner is released. 92 The courts in these states may
permit a citizen imprisoned for more than five years to file his suit during
imprisonment to stop the running of the statute of limitations. The
action will then be held in abeyance until the prisoner is released and in a
position to prepare and present his case.11 This procedure is unnecessary
when state statutes place no maximum limit on the period for which the
statutes of limitations may be tolled, but provide that all suits must be
filed within a specified period after the disability ceases. 94 In some
states, the statutes of limitations are tolled only for certain specified
causes of action.695 Other states have separate tolling provisions for real
and personal actions. 96 At least two states, Tennessee and Maryland,
provide by statute that imprisonment does not delay the running of
statutes of limitations.697 If the legislature provides that the statutes of
limitation are tolled for persons "under any legal disability," prisoners
are not included. 99
692. See, e.g.. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 12.160 (1963); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-104 (1962); S.D. CODE § 15-2-22 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 330.33 (1958),
recodified at WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.33 (Supp. 1969).
693. See. e.g., Seybold v. Milwaukee County Sheriff, 276 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
694. Some statutes provide that prisoners must file their actions within one year after their
release. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5851 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1-21 to -22
(1953) (applies only to actions involving real property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. § 96 (1960)
(applies only to actions not involving real property). In some states, the statutes of limitation can
never be extended for more than 2 years after the disability ceases. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.10.140 (1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 9, 22 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-
605 (1967); id. § 2-4701 (1968). Other statutes provide that all actions must be brought within 3
years after the disability is removed. See. e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-226 (1962); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 1-22 (1957). A New York statute provides that if the time limit ordinarily is 3 years or
more, the prisoner has 3 years after his release to bring the action. If the time limit ordinarily is less
than 3 years, the time is extended by the period of the disability. A statute of limitation can never be
extended beyond 10 years for a prisoner in New York. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 208 (McKinney
1963).
695. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8121 (1953) (prisoners have 5 years after their
release to bring actions concerning land boundaries); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7903 (Supp. 1968)
(if person is imprisoned when right of entry on lands first accrues, he may make entry or bring
action within 10 years after his disability is removed); IOWA CODE ANN. § 448.12 (Supp. 1970)
(prisoners have 5 years after release to bring actions for recovery of real estate sold for nonpayment
of taxes); id. § 448.13 (prisoners have 6 months after release to attack validity of tax sale or deed):
MISS. CODE ANN. § 739 (1957) (actions for assault, assault and battery, or maiming must be
brought within one year after release from prison); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-757 (1957) (prisoners have
5 years after their release to bring actions against the state).
696. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 9, 22 (Smith-Hurd 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 60-508, -515 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 516.030, .170 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 93-2515, -2703 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-213 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17
(1969); OHIiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.04. .16 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12. §§ 35.82
(1953). In the above listing, where 2 statutes are involved the one dealing with real actions has
been listed first.
697. MD. ANN. CODE art. 57, § 7 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-107 (1955).
698. Mosgrave v. McManus, 2.4 N.M. 227, 173 P. 196 (1918). See also Puckett v.
Springfield, 97 Tenn. 264, 37 S.W. 2 (1896).
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2. Capacity of Prisoners to beSued.-Although prisoners in some
states lose their capacity to sue during their prison term, all states permit
suits against citizens imprisoned in the penitentiary."' s Civil death
statutes do not shelter prisoners from civil suits because the disabilities
resulting from these statutes attach only to the convicted citizens. A
statute or decision prohibiting suits against imprisoned persons would
suspend not only the prisoners' civil rights but also the rights of all
persons who have legitimate causes of action against prisoners.7°°
The courts have held that since prisoners can be sued, they have the
right to defend actions brought against them.70' As defendants, they are
entitled to the protection of the procedural rules designed to protect all
litigants. 70 2 At least one court has implied that prisoners who are sued
should have the right to appear personally to represent themselves. 703 The
prevailing view, however, seems to be that prisoners are not entitled to be
present in person when they are sued,704 although they may testify by
deposition and be represented by counsel. 705 It is not clear whether the
courts must appoint attorneys to defend prison inmates in civil suits. A
recent New York case held that the court should not assign an attorney
to represent a prisoner in a civil suit unless it is shown that the prisoner is
unable to employ counsel for himself.716 Some state legislatures have
passed statutes dealing with this problem. An Arkansas statute states
that a judgment cannot be rendered against a prisoner until a defense has
been made for him by his retained attorney or by a person appointed by
699. See, e.g., Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520, 79 S.W. 505 (1904); Green v. Boney, 233
S.C. 49, 66, 103 S.E.2d 732, 741 (1958).
700. Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520,79 S.W. 505 (1904).
701. See, e.g., Application of McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531,301 P.2d 385 (1956); Garner v.
Garner, 59 Misc. 2d 29, 297 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
702. Brown v. Brown, 444 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. App. 1969) (setting aside judgment because
prisoner was not given notice of order ofjudgment as required by state statute). A number of states
have special statutes dealing with service of process on prisoners. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 48.051 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3471(6) (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 127, § 6
(1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1867 (1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 16-2816 (1967); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2101.27 (Baldwin 1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-436 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 24-1-12 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-6 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 53.02(4) (1957);
Ky. R. Civ. P. 4.04. A fewstates also have statutes dealing with venue in actions against prisoners.
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 452.435 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3237 (1968); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-38(5) (1957).
703. Merchant v. Shry, 116 Va. 437,82 S.E. 106 (1914).
704. See, e.g., Application of McNally, 144 Cal. App. 2d 531,301 P.2d 385 (1956); Garner v.
Garner, 59 Misc. 2d 29, 297 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1969); State v. Slopper, 209 Ore. 346, 306 P.2d 418
(1957).
705. See. e.g., People v. Lawrence, 140 Cal. App. 2d 133,295 P.2d 4 (1956); State v. Slopper,
209 Ore. 346,306 P.2d 418 (1957).
706. Garner v. Garner, 59 Misc. 2d 29,297 N.Y.S.2d463 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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the court to defend him. 70 The Arkansas Supreme Court has ruled that
this statute deprives the courts of jurisdiction in an action against a
prisoner until an answer has been filed by the prisoner's attorney or
appointed counsel.70 Kentucky and Iowa also provide that judgments
cannot be entered against prisoners who have not been defended.70 9 Both
states require the courts, if necessary, to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the defendant-prisoner.7 10 A Tennessee statute provides that a
prisoner "may" be allowed the aid of counsel in preparing his answer.
7 1
1
In at least three states, statutes require attorneys representing prisoners
to file answers denying all the material allegations in the complaint that
are prejudicial to the defendant-prisoners. 712 These statutes, however, do
not expressly require that attorneys be appointed to represent prisoners
who are sued.
A number of state statutes authorize the appointment of a
committee, guardian, or trustee to manage the affairs of prison
inmates. 7 3 The committees or personal representatives generally have
the duty of defending actions brought against the prisoners they
represent.714 Some states authorize the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to defend suits against prisoners. 71 The prisoner can waive his right
to have a guardian appointed, however, by having his counsel file an
answer to the complaint .71  Statutes permitting the appointment of a
committee or personal representative to defend prisoners are procedural
in nature and do not grant prisoners immunity from claims and demands
against them and their estates.
717
Since prisoners can be sued, it follows that their property can be
reached by creditors. 71 Courts have held, for example, that attachment
or garnishment proceedings can be instituted against prisoners 71 and
707. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-833 (1962).
708. Puckett v. Needham, 198 Ark. 123, 127 S.W.2d 800 (1939).
709. IOWA R. Civ. P. 13; KY. R. CIv. P. 17.04.
710. IOWA R. Civ. P. 13; Ky. R. CIv. P. 17.04.
711. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-602 (1955).
712. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1023 (1967); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-212(i) (1964); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2309.20 (Baldwin 1964).
713. See notes 263-301 on pages 1101-07 infra and accompanying text.
714. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-36 (1966).
715. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1704 (1954); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-232,-237 (1962).
716. Green v. Boney, 233 S.C. 49,66, 103 S.E.2d 732,741 (1958).
717. Scott v. Nance, 202 Va. 355,358, 117 S.E.2d 279,281 (1960).
718. See, e.g., Emmanuel v. Sichofsky, 198 Cal. 713, 247 P. 205 (1926); Coffee v. Haynes,
124 Cal. 561,57 P. 482 (1899).
719. Coffee v. Haynes, 124 Cal. 561, 57 P. 482 (1899). Pennsylvania provides by statute that
attachment proceedings can be brought against prisoners. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1381-85
(1953).
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that prisoners are subject to involuntary bankruptcy.'" A number of
coarts, however, exempt from attachment or garnishment money taken
from a prisoner at the time of his arrest and before his final conviction.",
Although all types of actions may be instituted against prison inmates,
the defendant-prisoner's right to file a counterclaim may be restricted if
he is imprisoned in a state that has a civil death statute. Since prisoners
in most civil death states lack the capacity to sue,722 it has been held that
they lack the capacity to file counterclaims in suits brought against
them .721
B. Capacity to Execute Judicially Enforceable Instruments
In some states, a criminal conviction may substantially impair the
offender's right to validly execute and effectively enforce legal
instruments. In the thirteen civil death states, for example, the right of
the convicted citizen to execute and enforce contracts is not uniformly
recognized. In other states, however, the convict retains the capacity to
enforce his contracts. Likewise, a criminal conviction does not alter
testamentary capacity in the majority of jurisdictions. A few states,
nevertheless, place limitations on this right.
1. Capacity to Contract.-Although the convict at early common
law had the right to contract, his status as a civilly dead person rendered
him incapable of suing in court.7A Consequently, he could not enforce his
contracts through the judicial system.7 25 The party with whom the
convict contracted, however, could utilize the courts to secure the
convict's performance according to the terms of the contract. Since the
majority of jurisdictions now have abandoned civil death, the convict in
most states is fully capable of enforcing contracts. The convict may be
unable to enforce contracts, however, in some civil death jurisdictions.
(a) Non-civil death jurisdictions.-In the 37 states that do not
have a civil death statute, the offender retains the right to make and
720. In re Gainfort, 14 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1936).
721. See, e.g., Emmanuel v. Sichofsky, 198 Cal. 713,247 P. 205 (1926); Carmack v. Nichols,
181 Tenn. 551, 181 S.W.2d 977 (1944); State v. George, 116 W. Va. 465, 181 S.E. 713 (1935).
722. See notes 635-58 supra and accompanying text.
723. Garner v. Garner, 59 Misc. 2d 29,297 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
724. E.g., Harvey v. Jacob, 106 Eng. Rep. 59 (K.B. 1817); Banyster v. Trussel, 78 Eng. Rep.
764 (Q.B. 1597).
725. Technically, the denial of a right to sue to enforce a contract would negate the existence
of a contract altogether, since the definition of a contract "is a promise or a set of promises for the
breach of which the law gives a remedy . -RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 1(1932).See 6A A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376 (1962).
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enforce a contract.7 -' The convict's right to contract was recognized at
common law, although civil death denied him a remedy for breach.727
Consequently, when most states abandoned civil death and allowed the
convict to sue in his own capacity or through a representative, the
offender gained the corresponding right to enforce his contracts. 72S At
least one non-civil death jurisdiction has enacted a statute expressly
allowing the convict to make and enforce a contract. 729
(b) Civil death jurisdictions. (i) Jurisdictions without other
statutes affecting contracting power.-In the thirteen states that declare
the convict civilly dead, m there is no uniform rule concerning his right to
contract. Six of these states have not, by decision or statute, dealt
specifically with the offender's right to make and enforce a contract.
Moreover, the approaches taken by the seven civil death states that have
considered this problem are contradictory. Since the capacity to enforce
a contract is a civil right,731 it would appear that the convict loses at least
the capacity to enforce a contract in civil death jurisdictions, which
deprive the convict of his civil rights. This is the common law rule and
has been adopted in New York.731 Missouri courts have gone further,
holding that civil death deprives the convict of all his contractual
powers.
713
726. See, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 US.
887 (1945); People cc rel. Robinson v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N.W. 21 (1888); Haynes v. Peter-
son, 125 Va. 730, 100 S.E. 471 (1919); Martin v. Long, 92 W. Va. 624, 115 S.E. 791 (1923).
727. S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 272 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1959).
728. See, e.g., Haynes v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 100 S.E. 471 (1919) (since Virginia had
expressly repudiated civil death the convict's contractual powers were retained).
729. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (Supp. 1969) (Uniform Act on Status of Convicted
Persons).
730. ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.080 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1956); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-3 10 to -311 (1948); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 222.010 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-4720 to -4721 (1969); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 66 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1969); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-48-35 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-37 (1953).
731. In Byers v. Sun Say. Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731, 139 P. 948, 949 (1914), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court defined "civil rights" to mean "all rights which civilized communities undertake,
by the enactment of positive laws, to prescribe, abridge, protect, and enforce." Cf. Avery v. Everett,
110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888).
732. Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888) (dictum); Stephani v. Lent, 30 Misc.
346, 63 N.Y.S. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
733. Williams v. Shackleford, 97 Mo. 322, 11 S.W. 222 (1889); Jandro v. Jandro, 246 S.W.
609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1923); accord, Gray v. Gray, 104 Mo. App. 520,79 S.W. 505 (1904) (dictum).
See also Ward v. Morton, 294 Mo. 408,242 S.W. 966 (1922). Although Missouri is the only state to
explicitly deny the convict the right to contract on the basis of the civil death statute alone, it
appears to be influenced by a statute providing an exclusive guardianship for a convict while
incarcerated. Mo. REV. STAT. § 460.010 (1956). This provision voids all acts done by convicts
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The common law rule may have been adopted by implication in
some civil death states. A few jurisdictions, for example, have provisions
specifically authorizing the convict to convey property,7m raising the
implication that the convict in these states is not permitted to make other
types of contracts.73 In addition, these statutes may imply that a civil
death statute without this express exception denies the convict the right
to contract. Other civil death states have statutes providing that convicts
may contract for necessities. 73 6 These statutes also may imply that
convicts lack the capacity to make or enforce other contracts. Statutes in
four civil death states, however, indicate that these implications have
questionable validity. In these jurisdictions, statutory provisions
specifically deny the convict all right to contract,737 implying that the
general civil death statute does not include this disability.
The best that can be gleaned from this uncertainty is that the
convict in a civil death jurisdiction may be able to contract if a statute or
decision does not hold to the contrary, but his power to enforce his
contract may be limited or non-existent. This position is consistent with
the common law view of the civilly dead convict's contractual power.
Both the Missouri and New York-common law views present
problems to the prisoner. Although the convict in Missouri is legally
protected by a guardian, he may be compelled to act only through a
guardian, even though he might prefer to act for himself. Moreover, the
New York-common law view invites the other party to breach his
contract with the convict, leaving the convict in a worse position than if
the contract had been prohibited.
73
1
without a guardian, but the convict denied the power to contract still is able to contract through his
guardian. See Williams v. Shackleford, 97 Mo. 322, 11 S.W. 222 (1889). In McLaughlin v.
McLaughlin, 228 Mo. 635, 646-47, 129 S.W. 21,24 (1910), the Missouri Supreme Court stated: "I f
sued, therefore the convict would be powerless to make a contract binding himself and his estate to
procure legal talent to defend the suit, or to procure the necessary incidental expenses of a defense of
the suit. The only way a defense could be properly made would be through the trustee provided for
by the terms of article 2 of chapter 141. . . . IT]he trustee. . .could see that the suit was properly
defended." Thus, the convict's guardian in Missouri would be able to make and enforce a contract
when dealing with the civilly dead convict's property.
734. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240(3) (1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-38 (1953).
735. Everly v. Byrd, 159 Kan. 187, 152 P.2d 831 (1944) (convicts can contract to convey
property despite loss of civil rights by virtue of a statute giving them power to convey property,
construing Law of March 15, 1905, ch. 153, § I (repealed by Law of July I, 1969, ch. 180, § 21-
4615).
736. See notes 755-56 infra and accompanying text.
737. Typical of these statutes is the South Dakota law: "All persons are capable of
contracting except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of civil rights." S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 53-2-1 (1967); accord, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1556 (West 1954); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 29-101 (1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 11 (1966).
738. The theory of the valid, but unenforceable contract has 2 facets: first, the prisoner
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Since civil death jurisdictions adopting the New York-common law
view allow the convict to contract but prohibit him from enforcing his
claim, his rights in any contract are not extinguished by his
imprisonment. Accordingly, the convict in these jurisdictions can avoid
any contractual disability by assigning his contractual claim to a person
capable of enforcing the contract. The New York court adopting this
view permitted a civilly dead convict to assign a monetary claim.
739
While noting that the convict-assignor retained no beneficial interest in
the assignment, the court ignored the fact that the convict may have
profited from the transaction through reduced liability. This court also
did not consider whether a gratuitous assignment by a civilly dead
assignor is enforceable by the assignee. Of course an assignment made
before the assignor's incarceration is not invalidated by his subsequent
imprisonment and civil death. 70
(ii) Express denial of contracting power.-Of the thirteen civil
death states, four have statutes expressly denying contractual capacity to
convicts.7  A fifth state, Rhode Island, prohibits prisoners from making
conveyances without the permission of the superior court.742 Although
several courts in these states have ameliorated the convict's contractual
disability when the contract is for necessities,74 the general application
of these statutes may work a hardship on the convict. In Rosman v.
Cuevas,7M for example, the California court held that even a parolee
could not contract for the purchase of an automobile. The court found
that the loss of civil rights attending imprisonment in California,
combined with the specific statutory contractual disability, 75 rendered
void any contract made by the parolee. 71 In Jones v. A lien,747 however, a
cannot use the courts to bring any action; and secondly, the non-prisoner party should not be placed
at any disadvantage because of the prisoner's confinement. Cf. Dobbs v. Lilley, 86 Kan. 513, 121 P.
505 (1912); O'Reilly v. Martin, 8 Mo. App. 574 (1879); O'Reilly v. Cleary, 8 Mo. App. 186 (1879);
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1796 (West 1952).
739. Bamman v. Erickson, 259 App. Div. 1040, 21 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1940) (mem.).
740. E.g., Rowland v. Smith, 52 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
741. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1556 (West 1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-101 (1967); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 11 (1966); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 53-2-1 (1967).
742. R.L. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 13-6-3 (1969).
743. E.g., Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914).
744. 176 Cal. App. 2d 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 485 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1959).
745. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1556 (West 1954).
746. California does, however, permit the parolee's contract to be ratified in. certain
instances. E.g., Jordan v. Warnke, 205 Cal. App. 2d 621, 23 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1962) (Adult
Authority's permitting parolee to bring suit to quiet title implies ratification of the original
agreement in which civilly dead parolee purchased land with defendant as his trustee). In Hall v.
Hall, 98 Cal. App. 2d 209, 219 P.2d 808 (1950), the court found a resulting trust in favor of the
parolee when the parolee, thinking that he could not take title in his own name, furnished
consideration to the defendant so that the defendant could purchase at a foreclosure sale.
747. 185 Cal. App. 2d 278, 8 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1960).
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California court of appeals held that the parolee could not avoid tort
liability for an automobile accident by asserting that the car dealer was
still the owner of the car because of the parolee's inability to contract.
The Rosman decision was distinguished on the basis that the dealer in
Rosman knew of the parolee's disability, while the dealer in Jones did
not.74 The Jones court stated that persons dealing with parolees in the
ordinary course of business should not be subjected to tort liability when
they have no notice of the parolee's lack of contractual capacity.749 If this
distinction is followed, a valid contract may be formed in California
every time the party with whom a parolee contracts is not aware of the
parolee's disability.71 Although there are no other cases in point, the
same distinction could apply when the offender is incarcerated rather
than on parole.
(iii) Statutes authorizing conveyances.-Seven of the thirteen civil
death states make a distinction between the capacity to enter contracts
conveying property and contracts for other purposes. Two of these seven
states expressly deny the convict the right to make a contract, yet
specifically empower him to make and acknowledge conveyances of
property.751 While holding that conveyances b, prisoners are valid,
courts in one of these two jurisdictions have indicated that all other types
of contracts are prohibited. 72 Five civil death jurisdictions70 authorize
the convict to convey property, without indicating whether his capacity
to make contracts is impaired. Accordingly, these five states leave the
convict's general power of contracting unsettled,7" for there have been
no reported cases in these jurisdictions that indicate an implied lack of
capacity to make other types of contracts. Should these states follow the
748. Id. at 280-81,8 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
749. Id. at 282,8 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
750. This distinction also would pose problems of proof which would be difficult for the
parolee to overcome. In order to hold the other party to his bargain, the parolee presumably would
have to allege and prove that the other party did not have knowledge of the parolee's disability.
Conversely, if the parolee sought to escape the contract, he would have the burden of proving that
the other party actually knew of his disability. Proof of such a subjective state of mind would
involve a swearing contest. When the convict and a reputable business man were the only witnesses
to their contract, the jury will be more likely to believe the businessman than the convict.
751. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1556 (West 1954), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 2603 (West
1956). Compare IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-101 (1967), with IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-312 (1948).
752. E.g., Rosman v. Cuevas, 176 Cal. App. 2d 867, 1 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1959); see notes 74446
supra and accompanying text.
753. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653(c) (1956); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-4722
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1969); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-1-38 (1953).
754. See. e.g., Miller v. Turner, 64 N.D. 463,253 N.W. 437 (1934) (dictum).
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common law rule that a convict could make but not enforce a contract,
the statutes allowing conveyances would partially alleviate the convict's
disability. This follows since an expressly granted power to convey
implies the corresponding power to enforce the contract making the
conveyance. The limited character of the power to convey, however, does
not eliminate the convict's contractual disabilities. Even with the power
to convey property, the convict might not be able to make and enforce a
contract for such essentials as attorney's fees or bonding.
(iv) Statutes authorizing contracts for necessities. -In states that
specifically or impliedly deny the convict the right to contract, contracts
for necessities still may be allowed. The cases upholding the prisoner's
contracts for necessities take two approaches. The first approach holds
that the scope of the particular disability statute prohibiting conveyances
is not broad enough to encompass contracting for a necessity. A Rhode
Island court, for example, held that a convict may contract for an appeal
bond in spite of a statute expressly forbidding conveyances by
convicts. 7 5 The other approach emphasizes that rights given to convicts,
such as the right to petition for parole or to defend a law suit, imply the
power to contract to effectuate these rights. Following this latter
approach, Oklahoma has held that a convict without the power to
contract could make a valid agreement with an attorney for legal
assistance.7 . Under either approach, courts could allow the convict
broad contractual powers. Under the Rhode Island approach, for
example, anything the court found to be necessary could be declared
beyond the scope of the disability, on the theory that the legislature did
not intend to deny the convict necessities when it passed the disability
statute. Similarly, in those states explicitly denying the convict the right
to contract, the court could expand what the Oklahoma court called the
"natural rights" of the convict to include life and liberty, and allow him
the right to contract for any item necessary for the effectuation of these
rights. These two theories, therefore, give the courts power to ameliorate
disability statutes that restrict commonly recognized rights.
2. Capacity to Make a Will.-At early common law, the
convicted felon did not need a will since forfeiture and corruption of
blood effectively deprived him of his property. 757 Since the convict
usually is fully capable of owning property today, however, his ability to
755. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 A. 470 (1894) (construing ch. 248, § 52 [1882] R.I.
Pub. Stat. (repealed 1876)).
756. Byers v. Sun Sav. Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948 (1914). See also Grooms v. Thomas,
93 Okla. 87,219 P. 700 (1923).
757. T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 11 (2d ed. 1953).
1970] 1035
VANDERBILT, LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
execute an enforceable will may be important to him. In the United
States, the capacity to make a valid will is determined by statute.
7- Most
of the state statutes on testamentary capacity were patterned after either
of two English acts759 and generally contain only two requirements: legal
age and soundness of mind.76 In the absence of a more specific statute
denying prisoners the right to make a valid will, these general statutes do
not deprive the convict of testamentary capacity.76 ' Despite this
interpretation, however, at least twelve states have specifically provided
that convicts do not lose the ability to make a valid will.62
A few states have provisions that may limit the-convict's capacity to
execute a valid will.7 63 Rhode Island is the only state with a statute
specifically denying the convict the right to make a will without prior
judicial permission.7 4 This statute does not affect the ex-convict's
758. See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556,562 (1942).
759. Wills Act of 1837,7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 26; Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677). For
about 2 centuries prior to the Statute of Wills of 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, there could be no effective
will of a legal freehold estate except by local custom. The "will in equity" through the feoffment to
use was extensively used during this period. Wills were permitted after the Statute of Wills of 1540,
but until formal requirements were imposed by the Statute of Frauds and the Wills Act of 1837, the
wills were often subject to fraud and improper administration. See generally Maitland, The Origin
of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127 (1894).
760. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-201 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-102 (1955); TEx.
PROa. CODE § 57 (Supp. 1969-70); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-47
(1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.12.010 (1967). See also J. REES. AMERICAN WILLS STATUTES
653-59 (1960).
761. Rankin v. Rankin, 22 Ky. (6 T.B. Mon.) 531 (1828) (person under death sentence may
make a valid will); Avery v. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888) (by dictum, civilly dead
convict may transfer property by will or deed).
762. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2603 (West 1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-206 (1959); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 91-101 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.020 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-1
(Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-02-01 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 41 (1970); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 137.240(3) (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.1 (Supp. 1970); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 29-2-3 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-38 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 41-1-1 to
-2 (1966). Alabama had the unusual provision that the civilly dead convict could make a will for 6
months after sentencing, but that statute has now been repealed. Act of May 5, 1965, 1st Ex. Sess.
381, § 1, repealing ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3 (1958).
763. T. ATKINSON, supra note 757, at § 50; I W. PAGE, WILLS § 12.3 (3d rev. ed. 1960).
See generally J. REES, supra note 760. The convict's capacity to attest a will is limited by statute in
only one state. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1591 (1952). In all other states, the convict's capacity to
attest a will is determined by the same standards used to judge his competence to serve as a witness
in judicial proceedings. Since at early common law the convict was unable to testify, he was also
unable to validly attest wills. Pendock v. Mackender, 95 Eng. Rep. 662 (K.B. 1755). This
view was adopted by early American decisions. E.g., Jones v. Habersham, 63 Ga. 146 (1879). Under
the modern American view, however, conviction of a crime does not affect the offender's capacity to
testify except in very limited situations. Thus, it seems that in all states except Louisiana the
criminally convicted person may validly attest the execution of a will.
764. "No person who shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the adult correctional
institutions shall have any power, during his imprisonment, to make any will or any conveyance of
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capacity to make a valid will, but seems designed to prevent undue
influences upon a prisoner to name a prison authority as legatee or
devisee or to aid the convict in making a will. Since the ordinary
formalities required to execute a valid will are designed to counter such
undue influences, the Rhode Island statute merely increases the
formalities to which a convict must adhere.
The Ohio sfatute also could limit the convict's ability to execute a
will. This provision states that one of the requisites for making a valid
will is that the testator cannot be "under restraint. 7 5 The word
"restraint" is undefined in the statutory and case law. Under accepted
usage of the word "restraint, '"7  however, the Ohio provision appears to
deny anyone under confinement, including imprisonment, the capacity
to make a will. "Restraint" could be interpreted, nevertheless, to refer to
confinement for such infirmities as habitual drunkenness and mental
illness that reflect the testator's mental capacity rather than his physical
limitations.767
C. Capacity to Testify
At common law, citizens convicted of treason, felony, or crimes
involving fraud or deceit were disqualified from giving testimony in
either civil or criminal proceedings. 7 8 This rule was based on the theory
his property or of any part thereof, except by permission of the superior court granted on petition
therefor, and on such notice and on such terms, if any, as said court shall prescribe." R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 13-6-3 (1969).
765. "A person of the age of eighteen years, or over, sound mind and memory, and not under
restraint may make a will." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (Baldwin 1969).
766. Restraint is defined as: "Confinement, abridgement, or limitation. Prohibition of action
.... Hindrance, confinement, or restriction of liberty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (4th rev.
ed. 1968).
767. The District of Columbia has a statute that could limit a convict's capacity to make a
will. This statute states that anyone may make a will if "capable of executing a valid deed or
contract." D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-102 (1967). Therefore, the testamentary capacity of one
imprisoned in another state with respect to land located in the District of Columbia may be
collaterally restricted if the state of incarceration places restrictions on the capacity of a prisoner to
contract. This result follows from the choice of law rule that the law of the situs governs devises of
real property, including the capacity to devise. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 249 &
comment, at 333 (1934). I f a will, made by a prisoner in a state where convicts cannot contract, were
submitted to probate in both the state of incarceration and, by ancillary administration, the District
of Columbia, it is questionable whether the devise would be upheld in the District against a
challenge by an intestate taker. In addition, since there would be 2 forum courts due to the ancillary
proceedings, the possibility of a renvoi is evident. This problem could be avoided by bringing the
wills provision of the District of Columbia into conformity with those of other states. Maryland at
one time had a provision similar to that of the District of Columbia, MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 349
(1964), but recently amended its code as follows: "[A]ny person may make a will if. . . legally
competent to make a will." MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, § 4-101 (Supp. 1969). It is uncertain whether
the amendment is any improvement.
768. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 64, at 141-42 (1954).
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that a man convicted of a serious crime could not be trusted in any
respect and therefore could not be trusted in his testimony.7"' Today, all
states have abolished the common law rule by statute, but a number of
states have retained the disqualification for persons convicted of perjury
or subornation of perjury.770 Statutes abolishing the common law rule
generally provide that if a witness has been convicted of a crime, his
conviction may be shown to impeach or discredit his testimony ,I These
provisions present special problems when the defendant in a criminal
trial has a criminal record.
1. Competency of Witnesses with Criminal Records.-In most
states, statutes provide that citizens who have been convicted of criminal
offenses are not incompetent as witnesses, regardless of the crimes for
which they were convicted.m A number of states, however, provide that
persons convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury are disqualified
from serving as witnesses.713 These statutes are all that remain of the
common law doctrine that all persons convicted of serious crimes were
incompetent to testify. In the absence of a specific statute, convicted
perjurers are permitted to testify, but evidence of their conviction may be
used to discredit their testimony.7 4
The statutes disqualifying citizens convicted of perjury as witnesses
are not in agreement on several issues. In Florida and Mississippi, for
example, the statutes provide that the perjurer is incompetent as a
witness, even if he has been pardoned7 5 The Washington statute, on the
other hand, states that a pardon removes the disability.776 In three states,
the citizen convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury cannot be a
witness in any action in his own behalf or in any action between adverse
769. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519, at 608 (3d ed. 1940).
770. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1958).
771. E.g., MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 944723 (1969).
772. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2201(B) (1956); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 621-14
(1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-49 (1969); ALASKA R. Cw. P. 43(g)(I)(b).
773. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.07 (1960); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421.090 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 1 (1965); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1692
(1957); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-08 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 505 (1958); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 4322 (1963); id. tit. 19, § 682 (1964); id. tit. 28, § 315 (1958); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-201 to -202 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-14 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1608 (Supp. 1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.040 (1963). For an argument that the
Washington statute has been impliedly repealed see 21 WASH. L. REv. 172 (1946).
774. See, e.g., Schoppel v. United States, 270 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1959); State v. Barick, 143
Mont. 273, 389 P.2d 170 (1964). West Virginia specifically provides by statute that a conviction of
perjury does not render the offender incompetent to testify. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-5 (1966).
775. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.07 (1960); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1692 (1957).
776. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.040 (1963).
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parties against a person who objects to his testimony.77 7 In Pennsylvania,
the convicted perjurer, although incompetent as a witness in most
actions, is permitted to testify in proceedings to redress or prevent injury
or violence to his person or property.778
The unpopularity of statutes disqualifying convicted perjurers as
witnesses 79 has resulted in judicial attempts to limit their effectiveness. A
federal district court in Pennsylvania, for example, ruled that a witness
who had been tried and convicted of perjury was competent to testify
because he had not been sentenced.71 The Florida Supreme Court has
interpreted the Florida statute to apply only to perjury convictions in
Florida so that a witness convicted of perjury in another state is qualified
to testify in Florida.7  In addition, irrespective of the state statute, the
testimony of a defendant in a criminal action generally cannot be
excluded as a result of his prior perjury conviction because this exclusion
would violate his constitutional right-to be heard.78 2
2. Impeachment of Witnesses by Showing Conviction of
Crime.-Although the common law disqualification of criminal
offenders as witnesses has been abandoned in all states, proof of
conviction of a crime still may be used in most states to impeach or
discredit a witness. As a general rule, the question of the ompetency of a
witness is for the court to decide, and the weight to be accorded his
testimony is for the jury.7s8 Under the state statutes, therefore, criminal
offenders are permitted to testify in judicial proceedings, but their
testimony may be discredited by proof of their conviction.7 8 There is
777. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31.01-08 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 505 (1958); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 19-1-4 (1967).
778. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 682 (1964); id. tit. 28, § 315 (1958).
779. See Note, Disqualification of a Witness for Perjury, 12U. FLA. L. REV. 315 (1959).
Some writers, however, have favored the disqualification. See Comment, The Effect of Perjury on
Credibility of Witness in New York, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 797 (1963).
780. United States ex rel. Miller v. Rundle, 270 F. Supp. 55, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
78 1. Lefcourt v. Streit, 91 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 1956). See also Marshall v. Amos, 442 P.2d 500
(Okla. 1968).
782. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 38 Ala. App. 581,90 So. 2d 91 (1956); Lowe v. State, 58 Okla.
Crim. 233,52 P.2d 115 (1935). Keptucky provides by statute that a citizen convicted of perjury may
testify in his own behalf in a criminal prosecution. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.090 (1969).
783. See Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394 Ill. 569, 69 N.E.2d 293 (1946).
784. Special problems result when the convicted citizen whose testimony is sought is confined
in a jail or prison. Several states have adopted the Act for the Uniform Rendition of Prisoners as
Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings. The Act permits judges to order the production of prisoners for
criminal proceedings, but only after a hearing at which a number of factors are to be considered.
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 625.1-.12 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.32 (1966). A number
of states that have not adopted the Uniform Act have special statutes dealing with the production of
prisoners as witnesses. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2001 (Supp. 1969); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.1423 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 397 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-300, 8-
1970] 1039
1040 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
considerable disagreement among the states on most of the problems
that have arisen as a result of statutes permitting the impeachment of
witnesses having a record of criminal conviction.
(a) Crimes constituting grounds for impeachment.-In most
states, statutes providing for the impeachment of witnesses who testify in
judicial proceedings are vague and indefinite. Consequently, by
examining the statutes alone it is often impossible to determine what
crimes constitute grounds for impeachment. About half of the states
provide that a witness who has been convicted of "a crime" or "any
crime" may have his testimony impeached.7 85 The courts in these states
have reached conflicting decisions in interpreting the statutes. In some
states, for example, the courts have held that all crimes, either felonies or
misdemeanors, may be used to affect the credibility of a witness.7 6 Other
courts have held that only felonies787 or infamous crimesMa may be used.
In Pennsylvania, felonies and misdemeanors in the nature of crimenfalsi
are admissible for impeachment purposes. 719 Despite numerous
300.1 (Supp. 1968). Statutes also provide for taking the depositions of prisoners. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2623 (West 1956); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(a). Tennessee requires prisoners to testify by
deposition in civil cases, but permits them to appear in person in criminal cases. TENN. CODE ANN,
§ 41-604 (1955); id. § 41-606 (Supp. 1968).
785. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 435 (1960); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-605 (1962); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-145 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.08 (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.31
(1944); HAWAI REV. STAT. § 621-22 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-201 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); id. ch. 51, § I (Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:495 (1967); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 10 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21
(1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2158 (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.07 (Supp. 1970); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 1692 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.050 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-
4723 (1969); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-12 (1952); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4513 (McKinney 1963);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 381 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.020 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-
406 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.040 (1963); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 885.19 (1966); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 43(g)(1 l)(b).
786. See, e.g., Zimmermann v. Goldberg, 277 Mich. 134, 268 N.W. 837 (1936); Fisher v.
Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954); State v. Hurt, 49 N.J. 114, 228 A.2d 673 (1967); State v.
Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961).
787. See, e.g., State v. Sorrell, 85 Ariz. 173, 333 P.2d 1081 (1959); State v. Stein, 60 Mont.
441, 199 P. 278 (1921). For a discussion of what constitutes a felony see notes 108-20 supra and
accompanying text.
788. See, e.g., Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, II A. 861 (1920); State v.
Miller, 23 Conn. Supp. 294 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1962); People v. Kirkpatrick, 413 111. 595, 110
N.E.2d 519 (1953). For a discussion of what constitutes an infamous crime see notes 121-38 supra
and accompanying text.
789. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 405 Pa. 36, 173 A.2d 468 (1961); Commonwealth v.
Kostan, 349 Pa. 560, 37 A.2d 606 (1944). The term crimen falsi includes misdemeanors involving
fraud and falsehood and those which are malum in se rather than malunt prohibitum.
Commonwealth v. Schambers, 110 Pa. Super. 61, 64, 167 A. 645,646 (1933). It also includes any
offense which "tends to affect injuriously" the credibility of the witness. Commonwealth v.
Mueller, 153 Pa. Super. 524, 528, 34 A.2d 321, 323 (1943). In a recent case, the Pennsylvania
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opportunities, some courts still have not established definite guidelines
specifying the crimes that are admissible for impeachment purposes. 790
In South Dakota, for example, the courts have held that witnesses may
be impeached if they have been convicted of any felony,7 1 any criminal
offense, 7 2 any crime relevant to veracity, 793 any crime involving moral
turpitude,"7 or any infamous crime.7
5
In some states, the statutes specify the types of crimes that may be
used to impeach witnesses. In a few states, for example, statutes
specifically provide that a witness who has been convicted of any felony
or misdemeanor may have his credibility attacked. 71 Other statutes
permit the impeachment of a witness convicted of a felony, 797 an
infamous crime,798 or a crime involving moral turpitude.7" In Maine,
conviction of a felony, any larceny, or any other crime involving moral
turpitude may be shown to affect the credibility of a witness.M Kansas
has adopted the provision recommended in the Uniform Rules of
Evidence8"' and consequently has the most liberal statute of any state.
The Kansas statute provides that only convictions of crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement are admissible for impeachment
purposes.8 12 Some states have specific statutes providing that traffic
violations may not be introduced to impeach a witness.103 In most states,
Supreme Court seemed to favor the proposal of the Uniform Rules of Evidence permitting
impeachment only for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. McIntosh v. Pittsburgh Rys.,
432 Pa. 123,247 A.2d467 (1968).
790. See Note, Admissibility of Prior Convictions to Impeach a Defendant-Witness, 15 S.D.
L. REV. 160, 164-65 (1970).
791. State v. Olson, 158 N.W.2d 526, 528 (S.D. 1968). The court in Olson reviews previous
South Dakota cases and acknowledges that the South Dakota courts have failed to establish definite
guidelines as to which crimes are admissible for impeachment purposes. Id. at 527-28.
792. State v. Bechtold, 48 S.D. 219,203 N.W. 511 (1925).
793. Richardson v. Gage, 28 S.D. 390, 133 N.W. 692 (1911).
794. Statev. La Mont, 23 S.D. 174, 120 N.W. 1104 (1909).
795. State v. Tarlton, 22 S.D. 495, 118 N.W. 706 (1908).
796. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-3 (1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-15 (1956).
797. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-1
(1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4303 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.17 (1950); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1214 (1964); id. §§ 48.020,48.130 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-5 (1966); Ky.
R. Civ. P. 43.07.
798. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:33 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2712
(1955).
799. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 434 (1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (Supp. 1969).
800. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 56 (1965).
801. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 21.
802. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964).
803. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.490 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-242 (1957).
Under both statutes, if the traffic violation is a felony, it can be used to impair credibility.
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the courts have held that a witness cannot be impeached for violating a
municipal ordinance.
0 4
As a general rule, federal courts in civil cases apply the rules of
evidence of the state in which the court is held.805 In criminal cases,
however, federal law is unclear." Some federal courts have held that a
witness in a federal criminal trial may be discredited if he has been
convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude."
Others have permitted cross-examination about a former felony
conviction or a misdemeanor amounting to crimenfalsi," or a felony or
petit larceny.8 0' At least one circuit has ruled that misdemeanor
convictions may not be shown in impeachment.810 The proposed rules of
evidence for the federal courts would permit impeachment of a witness
convicted of any crime involving dishonesty or false statement or
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year.811
(b) Interpretation of conviction.-The courts have reached
conflicting decisions in dealing with the problem of whit constitutes a
conviction. 12 The overwhelming majority of courts have held that an
arrest or indictment 813 is not admissible to impeach a witness. A few
804. See, e.g., Neal v. United States, I Fl.d 637 (8th Cir. 1924); Caldwell v. State, 282 Ala.
713,213 So. 2d 919 (1968); Massen v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 245, 163 N.W.2d 616 (1969).
805. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
806. In criminal cases, the federal courts are not bound by the state law of evidence. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 26. See also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Ramer v. United States, 411
F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1969); Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737,740 (5th Cir. 1957).
807. See, e.g., United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904,911 (6th Cir. 1970); Pinkney v. United
States, 380 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908 (1968); Myers v. United States, 377
F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968); Roberson v. United States, 249 F.2d 737
(5th Cir. 1957).
808. See, e.g., Wounick v. Hysmith, 423 F.2d 873,875 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Klass,
166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1948), affd,
173 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1949). Similarly, some circuits permit the impeachment of a witness for his
conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor involving truth or veracity. E.g., Ciravolo v. United
States, 384 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1967).
809. Pearson v. United States, 192 F.2d 681,699 (6th Cir. 1951).
810. Johnson v. United States, 424 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1970).
811. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,
RuLE 6-09 (March 1969).
812. For a general discussion of what constitutes a conviction for the purpose of imposing
civil disabilities on criminal offenders see notes 82-103 supra and accompanying text. Different
considerations may apply, however, when the courts are considering what constitutes a conviction
for impeachment purposes.
813. See, e.g., Ruffalo's Trucking Serv., Inc. v. National Ben-Franklin Ins. Co., 243 F.2d
949 (2d Cir. 1957); Sanford v. United States, 98 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Rogers v. State, 34 Ala.
App. 617, 42 So. 2d 642 (1949); Judy v. McDaniel, 445 S.W.2d 722 (Ark. 1969); State v. Currie,
267 Minn. 294, 126 N.W.2d 389 (1964); Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167,252 A.2d 661 (1969).
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courts, however, have held that the jury is entitled to know all the facts
about a witness, including any arrest or indictment.1 4 Some courts have
held that a witness may be asked if he is under indictment only if this fact
would tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest or
bias or would provide a motive for him to testify falsely.815 The courts
also are split on the admissibility of both a conviction based on a plea of
nolo contenderel' and a conviction from which an appeal is pending., 7
Most courts hold that a conviction in any state may be used for
impeachment purposes."1" As a general rule, a constitutionally invalid
conviction cannot be used to impeach a witness.819
(c) Proof and explanation of conviction.-Most jurisdictions
permit a conviction to be proved for impeachment purposes by the oral
statement of the convicted witness or by production of the official
record.820 Some states outline the procedure for proof of the conviction in
their statutes .82 Louisiana, for example, provides that evidence cannot
be introduced to prove a conviction unless the witness has been asked
about the conviction on cross-examination and has failed to admit it.8"
Generally, only the nature of the offense and the fact of the conviction
can be shown, not the details of the crime.8as If the witness admits the
conviction on cross-examination, he should not be questioned furthersa4
814. See, e.g., State v. Obey, 193 La. 1075, 192 So. 722 (1939); State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590,
197 S.E. 176 (1938). The result in the Obey case has been changed by statute. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:495 (1967).
815. See, e.g., Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir. 1968); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d
167,249 N.E.2d 912,918-19 (1969).
816. See, e.g., Olszewski v. Goldberg, 223 Mass. 27, 111 N.E.404 (1916); Collins v. Benson,
81 N.H. 10, 120 A. 724 (1923) (both cases holding the plea inadmissible). Contra, State v. Herlihy,
102 Me. 310,66 A. 643 (1906).
817. See, e.g., People v. Webb, 80 111. App. 2d 445,225 N.E.2d 679 (1967); Suggs v. State, 6
Md. App. 231, 250 A.2d 670 (1969); Newcomb v. State, 23 Okla. Crim. 172, 213 P. 900 (1923) (all
holding conviction admissible even though appeal is pending). Contra State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d
155 (Mo. 1968).
818. E.g., State v. Witsil, 37 Del. 553, 187 A. 112 (1936). Some courts follow the rules of the
state where the conviction occurred. Soloman v. Shepard Co., 61 R.I. 332, 200 A. 993 (1938).
819. See, e.g., People v. Coffey, 430 P.2d 15, 25, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 467 (1967); People v.
Patterson, 270 Cal. App. 2d 298, 75 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1969). See also Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
(1967) (constitutionally invalid conviction cannot be used to increase punishment under a recidivist
statute).
820. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 768, § 43, at 92.
821. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-1 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:495
(1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1214 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-12 (1952); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-2-3 (1953); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4513 (McKinney 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.19
(1966).
822. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:495 (1967).
823. See, e.g., Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417,421 (5th Cir. 1966); Lebak v. Nelson,
62 Idaho 96, 104, 107 P.2d 1054, 1057 (1940).
824. Hendrick v.Strazzulla, 135 So. 2d 1,2 (Fla. 1961).
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Most courts forbid a witness to make any denial of guilt or
explanation of his conviction.82 5 These courts reason that since the
conviction is conclusive, permitting an explanation by the witness would
involve a retrial of a collateral issue . 2 Other courts permit the witness to
assert his innocence or explain the circumstances of the conviction.
8 2
Wigmore terms it a "harmless charity to allow the witness to make such
protestations on his own behalf as he may feel able to make with a due
regard to the penalties of perjury." ' 8s
The courts are in disagreement on the question of whether a
convicted witness can be impeached if he has received a pardon. Most
courts hold that the pardon does not prevent the conviction from being
used to discredit the witness.82 These courts, however, may permit the
pardon to be admitted into evidence along with the conviction. Other
courts hold that the conviction may not be used because the pardon
nullifies it.Y The California statute provides that a conviction cannot be
used for impeachment purposes if the witness has received either a
pardon based on his innocence or a certificate of rehabilitation .
2
(d) Effect of remote conviction.-In the overwhelming majority
of states, the statute authorizing the impeachment of witnesses with
criminal records fixes no limitation on the length of time since the
conviction. Most courts, therefore, have held that a conviction is
admissible to impeach a witness, regardless of how remote it is. M Other
courts, however, have found that the trial judge has discretion to exclude
past convictions.8 The prevailing view has been that juvenile convictions
825. C. MCCORMICK, supra note768, § 43, at 93.
826. See, e.g., Merrill v. United States, 6 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1925); Territory v. Garcia, 15
N.M. 538, 110 P. 838 (1910); State v. Keillor, 50 N.D. 728, 197 N.W. 859 (1924); Harper v. State,
106 Ohio St. 481, 140 N.E. 364 (1922).
827. See, e.g., United States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); State v. Oxendine, 224
N.C. 825, 32 S.E.2d 648 (1945); McKinstry v. Collins, 76 Vt. 221,56 A. 985 (1904).
828. 4J. WIGMORE, supra note 769, § 1117, at 191.
829. See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 192 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Vedin v. McConnell,
22 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1927); State v. Grant, 33 Del. 195, 133 A. 790 (1926); State v. Serfling, 131
Wash. 605,230 P. 847 (1924).
830. See, e.g., Bryant v. United States, 257 F. 378 (5th Cir. 1919); Rush v. State, 253 Ala.
537,45 So. 2d 761 (1950); Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264, 145 A. 89 (1928).
831. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 21 So. 21 (1896) (dealing with competency
rather than impeachment); Rittenberg v. Smith, 214 Mass. 343, 101 N.E. 989 (1913).
832. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966).
833. See, e.g.. United States v. Plata, 361 F.2d 958 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841
(1966) (I1 years); People v. Smith, 90 Ill. App. 2d 310, 234 N.E.2d 31 (1967) (22 years); State v.
Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,228 A.2d 682 (1967) (20 years); Busby v. State, 10 Okla. Crim. 343, 136 P.
598 (1913) (17 years).
834. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Glauber v. Smith, 10
Ariz. App. 328,458 P.2d 532 (1969); Dillard v. Smith, 153 Tex. Crim. 134,218 S.W.2d 476 (1949).
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are not admissible for impeachment purposes.
At least three states have statutes specifying the time after which
convictions cannot be used to impeach the offender. In Massachusetts, a
misdemeanor conviction cannot be used after five years, and a felony
conviction is inadmissible after ten years from the date of expiration of
the minimum term of imprisonment.131 The Colorado statute provides
that a witness cannot be impeached if he was convicted at least five
years prior to the time when he testifies . 37 In Vermont, only convictions
within fifteen years can be used for impeachment purposes.
3. Problems Facing the Criminal Defendant with a Criminal
Record.-Special problems result if the defendant in a criminal
proceeding has a prior criminal record. His prior conviction may be
admissible into evidence under limited circumstances to prove an
element of the crime for which he is being tried. If not admissible for this
purpose, the prior conviction may be used to impeach the defendant if he
elects to testify in his own behalf. Under both situations, proof of the
prior conviction is highly prejudicial to the defendant.
(a) Use of previous convictions as circumstantial evidence.-The
general rule is that evidence of prior criminal convictions is inadmissible
to establish a defendant's guilt or to show a probability that he
committed the crime for which he is being tried.819 This rule is designed
to prevent the inference that the defendant is guilty because he is a man
of criminal character.840 Despite the general rule, evidence of the
defendant's prior convictions may be admissible to establish some
element of the offense for which he is on trial. The courts have held, for
example, that evidence of a defendant's previous convictions is
admissible when relevant to show such elements as motive, identity,
intent, absence of mistake or accident, or common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each
other that proof of one tends to establish the other.'"' In addition to these
835. See, e.g., Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); Thomas v. United
States, 121 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Deja v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 352, 168 N.W.2d 856 (1969). See
33 N.Y.U.L. REV. 406 (1958).
836. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21 (1956).
837. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-1 (1963).
838. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1608 (Supp. 1969).
839. See, e.g., Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. Ascolese,
59 N.J. Super. 393, 397, 157 A.2d 858, 859-60 (1960). See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 768, § 157,
at 327.
840. See, e.g., People v. Kelley, 66 Cal. 2d 232,238-39,424 P.2d 947,953,57 Cal. Rptr. 363,
369 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Commonwealth v. Trowery, 211 Pa. Super. 171,235 A.2d 171 (1967).
841. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1967); Drew v. United States, 331
F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. Ascolese, 59 N.J. Super. 393, 397, 157 A.2d 858, 860 (196.0);
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purposes, most states have habitual criminal statutes under which
evidence of a defendant's prior convictions may be submitted to the jury,
theoretically only for sentencing purposes .8 2 In 1967, the United States
Supreme Court upheld the Texas procedjure whereby the jury was
informed of the prior convictions at the beginning of the trial .8
3
(b) Use of previous convictions to impeach the defendant-
witness.-When the defendant in a criminal proceeding becomes a
witness for himself, he is subject to impeachment under the same rules
and conditions as other witnesses 44 If the defendant has a criminal
record, therefore, his previous convictions may be introduced to impeach
or discredit his testimony. As a result of this rule, the defendant with a
criminal record faces an insurmountable problem. If he takes the stand
and his prior convictions are admitted as evidence, he is faced with the
danger that the jury, despite instructions, will consider the convictions as
evidence of his guilt rather than as a reflection on his "credibility." On
the other hand, if the defendant does not testify, the jury is likely to infer
that he cannot truthfully deny or explain the charges against him and
therefore must be guilty.8'5
The courts have upheld the use of prior convictions to impeach
criminal defendants who testify, reasoning that the possibility of
prejudice is outweighed by the legitimate purpose served in informing the
jury of the defendant's character.""6 The courts seek to reduce the
prejudicial effect by instructing the jury that the defendant's criminal
record can only be used as a reflection on his credibility, 7 Surveys have
indicated, however, that juries are unable to follow instructions to
Whitty v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 278,293, 149 N.W.2d 557,563 (1967). See C. MCCORMICK. supra note
768, § 157, at 328-31.
842. For a discussion of habitual criminal statutes see Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its
Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264, 283 (1966).
843. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). In his dissent, Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed
out that 31 states postpone introduction of evidence of prior convictions until after the jury has
found the defendant guilty. Id. at 586.
844. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 72 I11. App. 2d 150, 218 N.E.2d 798 (1966), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 1008 (1968); State v. McClaim, 404 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Mo. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1016
(1967); Commonwealth v. Quaranta, 295 Pa. 264,272, 145 A. 89,92 (1928).
845. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 768, § 43, at 93-94. See also Note, To Take the Stand
or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PROB. 215 (1968).
846. State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 297,235 A.2d 111, 116 (1967), cert. denied. 390 U.S. 1025
(1968).
847. See People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779,409 P.2d 222.48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966) (approving
the following instruction to the jury: "You must not use this evidence in determining the defendant's
guilt or innocence of the other charges, nor must you permit yourself to be influenced against the
defendant because he may have suffered a prior felony conviction."). Id. at 791, 409 P.2d at 230, 48
Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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consider prior convictions only as evidence of the defendant's credibility,
rather than as evidence of his guilt.8" Studies show that the defendant is
less likely to be acquitted if the jury is informed of his criminal record.Y4
Many defendants choose not to testify in order to avoid the
prejudicial effects of their impeachment. In 1965, the Supreme Court
ruled that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination
forbids both comment upon a defendant's failure to testify and
instructions by the court that his silence may be considered as evidence
by the jury.5 0 The argument has been advanced that the Supreme
Court's decision has intensified the defendant's dilemma.5 1 Since the
defendant may choose not to testify for numerous reasons,1 2 the
Supreme Court's decision, by forbidding comment entirely, makes it
impossible for his silence to be explained, even though jurors tend to
infer guilt from silence. m
A few states have enacted statutes that partially solve the dilemma
faced by the defendant with a criminal record. Kansas, for example, has
adopted the provision of the Uniform Rules of Evidence4 that permits
the defendant to testify without being impeached by his prior convictions
unless he first introduces evidence to establish his credibility. M Similar
provisions have been adopted in Pennsylvania and Georgia. M The
Kansas Supreme Court has held that the statute was designed to induce
the defendant to take the stand and tell his story without being
prejudiced by evidence of his prior convictions. 7 Accordingly, even
previous convictions of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement
cannot be used to discredit a defendant-witness unless he has offered
evidence to support his credibility. 8
The practice of using prior convictions as evidence to impeach a
defendant-witness has been severely criticized on several grounds. '
848. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-30, 160 (1966). See also Note,
supra note 845, at 217-18; Note, supra note 842.
849. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 848, at 160,177-81.
850. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
851. Note, supra note 845, at 227.
852. Id. at220-21.
853. Id. at 221.
854. UNIFORM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 21.
855. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964).
856. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1964).
857. State v. Motley, 199 Kan. 335, 338-39,430 P.2d 264,267 (1967).
858. Id. at 338, 430 P.2d at 267.
859. See, e.g., Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform, 18
DEPAUL L. REv. i (1968); Note, supra note 845; Note, Impeaching the Accused by his Prior
Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 919 (1968); Note, Constitutional
Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of
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First, the practice may violate the equal protection clause since the
defendant with a criminal record is less likely to take the stand, and, if he
does, he is less likely to be acquitted. The defendant without a record, on
the other hand, may testify freely. Secondly, the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination may be violated when the defendant
who testifies is compelled to answer questions about his prior
convictions." Thirdly, the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by an
impartial jury may be infringed when unnecessary prejudicial
information is introduced about the defendant's past, making it unlikely
that the defendant will have a fair opportunity to prove his innocence of
the crime with which he is charged."6 ' Fourthly, the practice of
impeaching the defendant-witness may violate the due process clause by
subjecting him to unnecessary prejudice.862 So far, however, the courts
have been unwilling to accept these arguments, and there is little
likelihood of any immediate change."
4. Efforts to Liberalize Rules Concerning the Testimony of
Criminal Offenders.--Throughout the years, there have been various
efforts to liberalize the rules of evidence concerning the testimony of
convicted citizens. Both the state legislatures and the courts, however,
have been slow to act. For example, the common law disqualification for
conviction of a crime was not abolished in all states until 1953.864
Statutes that render convicted perjurers incompetent as witnesses have
been criticized, 65 but the disqualification still exists in a number of
states,m6 and there have been recent suggestions that it be adopted in
others." In addition, most courts have appeared satisfied with statutes
Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 168 (1968); Note, The Use
of Prior Convictions to Impeach the Credibility of the Criminal Defendant, 71 W. VA. L. REV. 160
(1969); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763
(1961).
860. Note, The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach the Credibility of the Criminal
Defendant. 71 W. VA. L. REV. 160, 165-66 (1969).
861. Note, The Limiting Instruction-Jts Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264,
286 (1966).
862. Id. at 287. The Supreme Court has held that due process requires that the accused
receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Shepphard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333, 362 (1966). In addition, the Court has held that a procedure that "involves such a probability
that prejudice will result. . . is deemed inherently lacking in due process." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532,542-43 (1965).
863. See Note, supra note 845, at 219-20.
864. Tennessee was the last state to abolish the disqualification for conviction of a crime.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2712 (1955).
865. See Note, supra note 779.
866. See note 773 supra and accompanying text.
867. See Comment, supra note 779.
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permitting the impeachment of witnesses with criminal records. The
statutes are justified by the theory that the conviction indicates a general
readiness to do evil, making the offender unworthy of credit.u8 Courts
have said that a person who violates the laws he is morally and legally
bound to obey is not trustworthy, even though he did not commit a
crime involving dishonesty or false statement.'69
There have been two major efforts to liberalize the state statutes
that provide for the impeachment of convicted persons who appear as
witnesses. Both the Model Code of Evidence 70 and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence 7' recommend that the credibility of a convicted witness should
not be attacked unless the offense he committed involves dishonesty or
false statement. Kansas has adopted verbatim the recommendation of
the Uniform Rules,8 1 but other states that recently have revised their
evidence statutes have rejected it.873 Although the statutory reform
movement has never been substantial, it undoubtedly has been retarded
to some extent by the proposed rules of evidence for the federal courts.
These rules, if adopted, would permit impeachment of a witness
convicted of any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year or involving dishonesty or false statement.8 74 A conviction
would be inadmissible if it occurred prior to ten years before a witness
was released from the penitentiary. s75 The proposed rules have been
criticized for failing to recommend needed reforms. 876
In addition to the efforts designed to achieve statutory reform, there
has been a minor movement among the courts in recent years to narrow
the scope of the impeachment rules through a strict interpretation of the
existing statutes. The movement, however, appears to be confined at the
868. Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
869. State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292,293-94, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
870. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106 (1942).
871. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 21.
872. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964). Several courts have cited the Uniform Rule with
approval. E.g., Mcintosh v. Pittsburgh Rys., 432 Pa. 123, 247 A.2d 467 (1968).
873. New Jersey recently adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence, but omitted rule 21. See
N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-16 (Supp. 1969-70). California recently revised its evidence code, but a
witness still is subject to impeachment if he has been convicted of a felony. CAL. EVID. CODE § 788
(West 1966).
874. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF
PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES,
RULE 6-09 (1969).
875. Id. 6-09(b).
876. PROJECT OF A COMMITTEE OF NEW YORK TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATION AND
STUDY RELATING TO THE ADVISORY COMMIrTEE'S PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 56-61, 181-86 (1970); Spector, Impeaching the Defendant by His Prior
Convictions and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: A Half Step Forward and Three Steps
Backward, I LOYOLA L. J. 247 (1970).
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present time to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. The cases have been concerned with interpreting the
District of Columbia statute providing that witnesses "may" be
impeached if they have been convicted of a crime.87 In Luck v. United
States, 78 the court ruled in dicta that the word "may" leaves room for
judicial discretion in determining if past convictions should be admitted.
Consequently, the court said there may well be "cases where the trial
judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the
probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. '8 7,
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has followed
Luck in subsequent decisions.8 0 In Gordon v. United States,"8 ' it
discussed the factors that the trial judge should consider in determining
whether to admit the prior conviction of a witness for impeachment
purposes. The factors include the type of crime, the time of conviction,
the subsequent history of the witness, and the posture of the case.A82 In
the case of a defendant-witness, the court found that the trial judge
should consider both the similarity between the past crime and the one
for which the defendant is on trial and the importance of his testimony.M
As an example, the court noted that acts of violence have little or no
relationship to veracity, but crimes such as perjury, fraud, cheating, and
stealing do. Although the Luck doctrine has been cited by other courts
with approval, s it has been specifically rejected by the courts in
Californiam and New Jersey.8 7
877. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1967). A number of state impeachment statutes also use the
word "may." E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-145 (1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4303
(1953); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 21 (1956); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.19 (1966).
878. 348 F2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
879. Id. at 768.
880. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Barber v. United States,
392 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Gordon v. United States, 383 F2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Brown v.
United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Most of the cases have involved a criminal proceeding
in which the defendant has a prior criminal record. The court, however, has held that the Luck rule
applies to all witnesses. Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 453,456 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
881. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
882. Id.
883. Id. at 940.
884. Id.
885. United States v. Hildreth, 387 F.2d 328, 329 (4th Cir. 1967); State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho
870,879,434 P.2d 88, 97 (1967) (concurring opinion).
886. People v. Kelly, 261 Cal. App. 2d 708,712,68 Cal. Rptr. 337,340 (Ct. App. 1968).
887. State v. Hawthorne, 49 NJ. 130, 135-36,228 A.2d 682,684 (1967).
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D. Capacity to Serve as Juror
At common law, citizens with criminal records were incompetent to
serve as members of juries.8m This rule developed from the common law
disqualification of criminal offenders as witnesses in judicial
proceedings.8 9 Although statutes in all states now permit convicted
citizens to testify,8 0 most states have retained statutory provisions
excluding persons convicted of certain crimes from serving on juries. The
courts have held that legislatures have broad power to establish the
qualifications for jurors.891 Consequently, the legislatures may enlarge or
deny the right of jury service as long as the reasons for the qualifications
and exclusions are not arbitrary.8 92 Some courts have held that the
common law rule disqualifying criminal offenders as jurors applies even
in the absence of a statute.
13
1. Exclusion of Convicted Citizens from Jury Service.--Citizens
convicted of certain crimes may be disqualified from serving on juries by
a variety of constitutional and statutory provisions. Most states have
express provisions that exclude convicted citizens from jury service
unless their civil rights have been restored. In addition, a number of
states have statutes that indirectly prevent persons with criminal records
from participating in the judicial system through jury service.
(a) Direct disqualification.-Most states have constitutional or
statutory provisions expressly prohibiting persons convicted of specified
crimes, usually felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude,
from serving as jurors. In some states, the disqualification begins at the
time of the indictment. The language of the disqualification provisions
varies considerably from state to state.
(i) Disqualification after indictment.-In several states, statutes
provide that a citizen is not eligible for jury service if he is under
indictment for commission of certain crimes.8s The statutes are not in
888. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 337, 338, 77 S.E. 189, 190 (1913);
Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 186 Mass. 231,234,71 N.E. 292,293 (1904).
889. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 186, 191 (1926).
890. See notes 772-74 supra and accompanying text.
891. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Walter v. State, 208 Ind. 231,
236, 195 N.E. 268, 270 (1935).
892. People ex rel. Denny v. Traeger, 372 Ill. 11, 22 N.E.2d 679 (1939).
893. See, e.g., Watkins v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 130 W. Va. 268, 274, 43 S.E.2d 219, 223
(1947). See also Queenan v. Territory, I I Okla. 261,267,71 P. 218,219-20 (1901), affd, 190 U.S.
548 (1903) (holding that statute is only declaratory of common law rule).
894. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 55 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (1956); Ky.
Ray. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (1969); LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 401 (West 1967); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (1968); MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, § 6 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 1333 (1962) (applies to third class counties only); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.16 (Supp. 1969-
70); TEX. REv. Cry. STAT. art. 2133 (Supp. 1969-70).
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agreement on the nature of the offense that must be charged before the
disqualification will result. In some states, for example, a citizen is
ineligible for jury service while under indictment for any crime, whether
a felony or misdemeanor.8 5 Accordingly, persons have been excluded
from jury service while charged with traffic violations " or with failing to
pay a per capita road tax, a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not
exceeding five dollars or imprisonment not exceeding ten days in jail.897
Other states only disqualify those citizens under indictment for a
felony.898 Congress has provided that citizens are not competent to serve
on federal grand or petit juries while charged in either federal or state
courts with crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year.'"
(ii) Disqualification after conviction.-About three-fourths of the
states expressly exclude from jury service persons who have been
convicted of certain crimes. Since the statutes vary considerably from
state to state, they are difficult to categorize. Several states, for example,
have broad disqualification statutes that encompass several types of
offenses.? ° Other states statutes disqualify persons who have been con-
victed of felonies,"' infamous crimes, ®2 'or crimes involving moral
895. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1333 (1962)
(applies to third class counties only).
896. State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 145, 203 So. 2d 222, 247 (1967). Louisiana law now
provides that only citizens under indictment for felonies are excluded from jury service. LA. CRiM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 401 (West 1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (1968).
897. State v. Nicholas, 109 La. 84,33 So. 92 (1902).
898. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (1956); LA. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art.401
(West 1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (1968). In Maryland, persons are disqualified while
charged with a crime punishable by a fine of $500 or more, or by imprisonment for more than 6
months. MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, § 6 (Supp. 1969).
899. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
900. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. 6, § 3 (treason, felony, embezzlement of public funds, or
other infamous crimes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-202 (1948) (felony or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude); MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, § 6 (Supp. 1969) (crimes punishable by fine of $500 or more,
or by imprisonment for more than 6 months); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 27 (bribery, perjury, forgery,
larceny, or other high crimes); NEV. REv. STAT. § 6.010 (1967) (treason, felony, or other infamous
crime); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1969-70) (convicted of infamous crime or served
term in penitentiary for commission of felony).
901. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-102(e) (Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (1969); LA. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 401 (West 1967); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3041 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.1307 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1969); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2961.01-.02
(Baldwin 1964); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 16-13-10 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 64
(1958). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1965) (disqualifying persons convicted of offenses
punishable by imprisonment in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex); id. § 29-112
(excluding convicted felons from jury service); id. § 29-113 (disqualifying persons imprisoned in
another state for crimes punishable by imprisonment in Nebraska).
902. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Miss. CODE ANN.
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turpitude. 0 3 The statutes in some states exclude from jury service
persons convicted of felonies or certain specified crimes.9 4 Other
jurisdictions list the individual offenses that bring about the dis-
qualification," 5 or provide that citizens are not competent to serve
as jurors if they have been convicted of crimes punishable by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. °6 The New Jersey legislature has
indicated that a citizen cannot qualify as a juror if he has been
convicted of any crime.1 Missouri has several statutes that, taken
together, result in the disqualification of almost every major criminal
offender.0 8 In Maine, the legislature has provided that the jury com-
missioners may exclude from jury service an individual convicted of
any "scandalous crime or gross immorality."
The qualifications for jury service in Pennsylvania vary from
county to county. 910 In first class counties, for example, citizens
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude are ineligible to be
jurors."' In second and third class counties, disqualification results upon
conviction of a felony. 12 In other classes of counties, the statute only
§§ 1762, 1762-02 (Supp. 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-102 (1955); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-2
(1966). Minnesota's statutes do not specifically exclude convicted citizens from jury service. MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 593.04, 628.54 (1947). The Minnesota Attorney General, however, has ruled that
persons convicted of infamous crimes may not serve as jurors, even after their civil rights have been
restored. MINN. Op. ATr'y GEN. 260a-! 1 (Oct. 8, 1959). For a discussion of what constitutes an
infamous crime see notes 121-38 supra and accompanying text.
903. ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1969). For a discussion of what constitutes an offense
involving moral turpitude see notes 139-41 supra and accompanying text.
904. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 199 (West Supp. 1970) (felony or other high crime);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(2) (1961) (bribery, forgery, perjury, larceny, or felony); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 609-2 (1968) (felony or misdemeanor invnlving moral turpitude); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 93-1303(2) (1964) (felony or other high crime); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 596
(McKinney 1968) (felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude); ORE. REv. STAT. § 10.030
(1968) (felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude); TEXAS CONST. art. 16, § 2 (bribery,
pejury, forgery, or other high crimes); Tax. REV. CIVIL STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Supp. 1969-70)
(felony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-9 (1953) (malfeasance in office, felony, or other high crime);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-175 (1957) (bribery, perjury, embezzlement of public funds, treason, felony,
or petit larceny); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-275 (1960) (perjury); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-78 (1957)
(malfeasance in office, felony, or other high crime).
905. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-18 (1964).
906. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09-02 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-100 (Supp. 1969).
907. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:69-1 (Supp. 1968-69).
908. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 560.610 (1953) (disqualifying persons convicted of arson, burglary,
robbery, grand larceny, or other crimes against property); id. § 561.340 (offenses against property
involving fraud, such as forgery); id. § 557.490 (perjury); id. § 559.470 (offenses against persons,
such as murder and manslaughter).
909. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (Supp. 1970).
910. The Pennsylvania Constitution authorizes the classification of counties according to
population. PA. CONST. art. 3, § 20.
911. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1252(c) (1962).
912. Id. §§ 1279(c), 1333.
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requires that jurors be "sober, intelligent and judicious persons." 3 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the disparity of statutory
provisions relating to the qualifications of jurors in the various counties
does not violate the equal protection clause. 914
Congress has provided that citizens are not competent to serve on
federal grand or petit juries if they have been convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.915 This statute
applies to a conviction in either a federal or state court, but the
disqualification ends if the citizen is restored to his civil rights by pardon
or amnesty.9 16
Some authorities have proposed that rehabilitated offenders should
not be excluded from jury service. The Model Penal Code provides that a
convicted person should not be disqualified as a juror after he has served
his sentence.917 The Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons,
which has been adopted by New Hampshire, does not specifically
provide that convicted citizens would be permitted to serve as jurors, but
states that they should retain all rights, "political, personal, civil, and
otherwise." 1 s
(iii) Conviction as grounds for challenge for cause.-In addition
to the statutes expressly disqualifying convicted persons from jury
service, several states have separate statutes providing that a criminal
conviction is a ground for challenge for cause.9 19 Specifically, most of the
statutes state that if an individual has been convicted of a felony, he is
subject to be challenged for cause when a jury is being selected.19 In
several states, the statute specifying that a conviction is a ground for
challenge for cause is not consistent in terminology with the statute
disqualifying the criminal offender from jury service. In Alabama, for
913. Id. § 942.
914. Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 206-07, 216 A.2d 50, 55 (1966). The court
rejected the argument that the disparity of statutory provisibns violates the equal protection clause
without giving its reasons.
915. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (Supp. IV, 1969).
916. Id.
917. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
918. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (Supp. 1969). See also S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 622 (1963) (suggesting that the disqualifications are not necessary).
919. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 55 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.29 (1947); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 572 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 17.130 (1968); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
35.16 (Supp. 1969-70); IOWA R. Clv. P. 187(f)(1). When a jury is being selected, the parties to the
action can challenge an unlimited number of prospective jurors for cause. A challenge for cause
must be made upon grounds of absolute disqualification. Kempe v. United States, 160 F.2d 406,
409 (8th Cir. 1947). Such a challenge leaves nothing to the discretion of the court. Alabama Fuel &
Iron Co. v. Powaski, 232 Ala. 66, 166 So. 782 (1936).
920. E.g.. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.29 (1947); IOWA R. Civ. P. 187(f)(1).
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example, one statute provides that citizens convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude are not qualified as jurors ,921 while another statute states
that a prospective juror can be challenged for cause if he has been
convicted of a felony.91 An Oregon statute excludes a citizen convicted
of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude from jury
service; s23 another Oregon statute, on the other hand, provides that
conviction of a felony is a ground for challenge for cause.9 24
A challenge for cause generally is permitted whenever a prospective
juror does not meet the prescribed statutory qualifications.92 5
Consequently, it is not necessary for states that expressly disqualify
convicted citizens from jury service to have separate statutes providing
that a criminal offender can be challenged for cause.
(b) Indirect disqualification.-Although the majority of states
have express statutory provisions disqualifying criminal offenders as
jurors, convicted persons in most states could be excluded from jury
service even if there were no express provisions. A number of states, for
example, have statutes providing that only qualified electors are eligible
to serve on juries . 2 In addition, some state statutes provide that only
citizens having "good character" or the like can qualify for jury
service.1sn
(i) Requirement that jurors be qualified electors.-A large
number of states have statutes either requiring that all jurors be qualified
voters or specifying that the list of prospective jurors must be prepared
from the list of registered voters.92s In addition to the state statutes,
Congress contemplated in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968
921. ALA. CoDEtit. 30, § 21 (1958).
922. Id. § 55.
923. ORE. REv. STAT. § 10.030 (1968).
924. Id. § 17.130.
925. See, e.g., Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Powaski, 232 Ala. 66,71,166 So. 782,786 (1936);
Robinson v. Territory, 16 Okla. 241,246-48, 85 P. 451,453 (1905); Stone v. Pettus, 47 Tex. Civ.
App. 14, 16-17, 103 S.W.413,414 (1907).
926. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504 (Supp. 1969-70).
927. E.g.,CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 51-217 (1968).
928. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.050 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-205 (Supp. 1969);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 51-217, -221 (1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504 (Supp. 1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(1) (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-7104, -7115 (1968); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 609.2 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-102 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254
(Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 51, § 6 (Supp. 1969); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1968);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1964); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 27; NEV. REV. STAT. § 6.010 (1968);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-I-I, -3 (Supp. 1969); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (Baldwin
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1969-70); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to -9
(1956); S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 22; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 16-13-10 (1967); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.36.070 (1961); id. § 2.36.060 (Supp. 1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.01 (Supp.
1969).
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that voter lists would be the primary source for the names for federal
jurors. 9  Since convicted citizens are disfranchised in most states,9 0 both
the federal and state statutes indirectly exclude the criminal offender
from jury service. Courts have held that it is not improper to use voter
registration lists in selecting jurors."' In the absence of a statutory
requirement, however, the fact that a citizen is not a qualified voter does
not affect his qualifications as a juror.9 32 The use of voter lists for
selecting jurors has been justified on the theory that this procedure
eliminates citizens who are either unqualified to vote or insufficiently
interested in the world about them to register.u The underlying thought
seems to be that persons who register to vote presumably have a stake in
the community and therefore can be expected to have an interest in the
quality of justice rendered in its courts. 934
(ii) Requirement that jurors be persons of good character.-In
addition to requiring that jurors be qualified electors, a large number of
state statutes direct the jury commissioners or other officials to select
only citizens having "good character" or "approved integrity" for jury
service.91 The statutes vary considerably in language from state to state.
The Kentucky statute, for example, requires that a juror be "sober,
temperate, discreet, and of good demeanor . . . ."I" In Georgia, the
statute directs the jury commissioners to select only "intelligent and
upright citizens" for jury duty.17 Some statutes give the trial court
considerable discretion to exclude citizens from jury service. The New
Hampshire statute, for example, states that the court may discharge any
person from acting as a juror "because of vicious habits or other
929. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
930. See notes 242-59 supra and accompanying text.
931. E.g., Chance v. United States, 322 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
823 (1964).
932. Anderson v. State, 40 Ala. App. 509,525-26, 120 So. 2d 397,412 (1960). rev'd on other
grounds, 366 U.S. 208 (1961).
933. H.R. REP. No. 1076,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968).
934. Corlew, Mississippi Jury Selection: A Proposed Statute, 40 Miss. L.J. 393 (1969).
935. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1967); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-201
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-102(g) (1962); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 205 (West Supp. 1970);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 51-217 (1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 40.01(3) (1961); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-106 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 609-1(3) (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); IowA CODE ANN. § 607.1 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-102 (1964);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3935(4) (1962); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 494.010 (Supp. 1969-70); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601(l) (1964); N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW
§ 504(4) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 28 (Supp. 1969-70); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 9-9-23 (1956); S.C. CONsT. art. 5, § 22 (Supp. 1969); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 2133(2) (Supp. 1969-70); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 255.01 (Supp. 1969).
936. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025 (1969). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4505 (1953)
(requiring jury commissioners to select only "sober and judicious persons" as jurors).
937. GA. CODE ANN. § 59-106 (Supp. 1969).
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sufficient cause."8 Since statutes in most states expressly disqualify
convicted citizens as jurors, it generally is not necessary for jury
commissioners or the courts to use these subjective standards to exclude
criminal offenders from jury service. There have been some cases,
nevertheless, where courts have held that convicted citizens do not
possess the good character required by the statutes.9 9 The courts have
upheld statutes requiring that jurors be persons of good character, or the
like, despite attacks that the provisions are inherently vague and
susceptible to discriminatory application. 40
2. Validity of Verdict Rendered by Jury Containing Convicted
Citizen. -Despite statutes excluding citizens with criminal records from
jury service, there have been a number of cases where convicted citizens
have served as jurors. As a practical matter, many criminal offenders
may not be aware that they are ineligible to serve as jurors.
Consequently, if the attorneys trying a case do not question prospective
jurors with respect to their possible criminal background, there is a
possibility, however slight, that one or more disqualified persons will be
members of the jury.
The courts are in disagreement on the validity of ajury verdict when
a convicted citizen was a member of the jury.' Some courts have held
that a criminal offender's disqualification is waived if he is not
interrogated or challenged while the jury is being selected 42 or before the
verdict is rendered.4 3 This rule applies even though the parties were
unaware of the juror's criminal record until after the verdict. 44 These
courts, however, may grant a new trial if the appealing party has used
reasonable diligence to discover a juror's disqualification 4 or if the
juror answered falsely when questioned about his criminal record. 46 In
938. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500:29 (1968).
939. Grant v. New York Herald Co., 138 App. Div. 727, 123 N.Y.S. 449 (1910).
940. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346
(1970); Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161, 167-68 (1910); Woods v. State, 222 Ga. 321, 149
S.E.2d 674 (1966); People v. Ferguson, 55 Misc. 2d 711,286 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
941. In Arkansas, this problem has been solved by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-106
(Supp. 1969) (no verdict or indictment shall be void or voidable because any juror fails to possess
any of the required qualifications unless a juror knowingly answered falsely any question on voir
dire relating to his qualifications).
942. See, e.g., Mullins v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 804, 149 S.W.2d 725 (1941); Stagg v.
Stagg, 96 Mont. 573, 32 P.2d 856 (1934); State v. Benson, 235 Ore. 291, 384 P.2d 208 (1963).
943. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953); Turley v. State, 74 Neb.
471, 104 N.W. 934 (1905).
944. E.g., Stagg v. Stagg, 96 Mont. 573, 32 P.2d 856 (1934).
945. Beasley v. State, 39 Ala. App. 182,96 So. 2d 693 (1957).
946. See, e.g., Gann v. State, 397 P.2d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964); State v. Benson, 235
Ore. 291,384 P.2d 208 (1963).
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addition, some courts will grant a new trial if actual injury or bias is
shown as a result of the juror's ineligibility.947
A number of courts have rejected the theory that a convicted
person's disqualification can be waived. These courts hold that a verdict
is absolutely void if rendered by a jury containing a disqualified juror.94
Courts following this rule do not require a showing of injury or probable
injury as a result of the juror's disqualification.9 These courts reason
that since a jury containing a convicted citizen is illegal under the
statutes, the courts cannot enter a judgment on the verdict.' 5°
3. Judicial Developments.-As a general rule, the courts have held
that state legislatures have considerable power to establish the
qualifications for jurors to serve in the state courts. 51 Although the
courts will not permit arbitrary and systematic exclusions from jury
service,9 2 most state requirements for jury selection have been upheld.
Courts, for example, have held that it is not arbitrary to exempt women
from jury service9' or to require that jurors be able to read and write."4
The United States Supreme Court recently held that "[s]tates remain
free to confine the selection [of jurors] to citizens, to persons meeting
specified qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those
possessing good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character."95
Specifically, the Court has found that the fourteenth amendment does
not bar jury selection on the basis of reputation and community
esteem.9 6 In addition, the Court has held that jury commissioners may
eliminate from jury service anyone who is not an "upright" citizen. '7
There have been a number of cases before the courts as a result of
statutes disqualifying from jury service persons convicted of certain
crimes. In most cases, however, the validity of the provisions has been
assumed, and the courts have been concerned with other issues, such as
the validity of a verdict rendered by a jury containing a disqualified
947. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 201 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1953); State v. Ortega, 77 N.M.
312,422 P.2d 353 (1966); Firestone v. Freiling, 22 Ohio Op. 2d 356, 188 N.E.2d 91 (C.P, 1963).
948. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 54 S.C. 147, 31 S.E. 868 (1899); Garrett v. Weinberg, 54
S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341 (1898); Tweedle v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 200, 218 S.W.2d 846 (1949);
Johnson v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 162, 84 S.W.2d 240 (1935).
949. Exparte Bronson, 158 Tex. Crim. 133, 254 S.W.2d 117 (1952).
950. See, e.g., State v. Robertson, 54 S.C. 147, 31 S.E. 868 (1899); Tweedle v. State, 153 Tex.
Crim. 200,218 S.W.2d 846 (1949).
951. See note 891 supra.
952. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57,59 (1961).
953. Id.
954. State v. Comeaux, 252 La. 481,211 So. 2d 620 (1968).
955. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970).
956. Id. at 331-37.
957. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1970).
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citizen," ' the effect of a conviction in a foreign court,9 59 and the effect of
a pardon on the disability.6 0 The courts have reached conflicting
decisions on these issues."'
In some cases, the courts have excluded convicted citizens from jury
service even though a statute did not require it. A federal district court,
for example, has held that persons convicted of misdemeanors can be
excluded from jury service, even though their rejection is not legally
required, because such persons come from all races and classes and their
exclusion does not materially affect the jury selection process.962
Similarly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has held that it is not
necessary to seat persons with records of conviction on a jury in order to
provide a panel that is representative of the community. 6 3 The
Massachusetts court, however, also has held that a convicted citizen may
be included on a jury list if he is found to be a person of good moral
character by the authorities preparing the jury list."64 The court reached
its decision by interpreting the statute to permit, but not require, the
disqualification of criminal offenders.
9 5
E. Capacity to Serve as Court-Appointed Fiduciary
A criminal conviction may prevent the offender from holding a
court-appointed position of trust. Actual incarceration will, by
necessity, have this result because of the physical incapacity of the
958. See notes 941-50 supra and accompanying text.
959. For a general discussion of the effect of a conviction in a foreign jurisdiction on the
various civil disabilities see notes 142-71 supra and accompanying text.
960. For a general discussion of tne effect of a pardon on civil disabilities see notes 570-608
infra and accompanying text.
961. Some courts have held, for example, that a citizen is not disqualified from jury service in
the state's courts if he has been convicted of a crime by the courts of another state or by a federal
court. See, e.g., Duggar v. State, 43 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1949), noted in 2 ALA. L. REV. 361 (1950) and
3 U. FLA. L. REV. 255 (1950); Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566,34 S.E.2d 849 (1945). See also Browning
v. State, 120 Ohio St. 62, 165 N.E. 566 (1929) (conviction in another jurisdiction of a crime that
would not disqualify juror under laws of Ohio did not amount to disqualficiation). Other courts
have held that convicted persons are ineligible to be jurors, regardless of where they were convicted.
See, e.g., State v. Hermann, 283 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1955); Gann v. State, 397 P.2d 686, 693 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1964); Amaya v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 160,220 S.W. 98 (1920). The courts also are in
disagreement on the question of whether a pardon removes the disability. Compare Easterwood v.
State, 34 Tex. Crim. 400, 31 S.W. 294 (1895), with Anderson v. State, 40 Ala. App. 509, 120 So. 2d
397 (1959), rev'don other grounds, 366 U.S. 208 (1961).
962. United States v. Fujimoto, 105 F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii), motion for leave to file
petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus denied sub nom., Fujimoto v. Wiig, 344 U.S. 852
(1952).
963. Commonwealth v. Martin, 257 N.E.2d 444 (Mass. 1970).
964. Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 186 Mass. 231,71 N.E. 292 (1904).
965. Id. at235,71 N.E. at293.
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convict to discharge the duties required by law of a person in this
position. Likewise, the released convict will, in all likelihood, be unable
either to regain his position of trust or to serve in another fiduciary
position. Although most states do not specifically exclude ex-convicts
from positions of trust, statutory language giving the courts
discretionary power to select fit or suitable persons and to remove unfit
or unsuitable persons allows enough leeway to exclude an ex-convict on
the fact of his conviction alone.
1. Executors and A dministrators.-An executor, the personal
representative of the testator, is named in the will. Generally, the court
will honor the wishes of the testator and appoint the person named,
unless the appointee is legally disqualified."6 Some courts make
appointment of the person designated in the will mandatory unless he is
statutorily disqualified, reasoning that the testator's wisdom is not their
concern. 6 7 Disqualification generally will occur when the statute
expressly excludes a group of persons from serving as executors, or when
the statute gives the court discretion in appointing or removing the
executor nominated in the will. An administrator, on the other hand, is
the court-appointed representative of an intestate. In most states, there
are statutes fixing priorities among persons being considered for
appointment as administrator. A person who is not qualified to serve as
an executor generally cannot serve as an administrator, since most
statutes contain similar qualifications for both positions.
Several states have statutes expressly excluding convicted citizens
from the position of executor or administrator. The grounds for
exclusion include conviction of a felony,9" infamous crime,"' serious
crime,'970 or a crime of moral. turpitude. 971 The wording of these
966. T. ATKINSON, WILLS 604-05 (2d ed. 1953).
967. E.g., In re Flood's Will, 236 N.Y. 408, 140 N.E. 936 (1923); Trustees of House of the
Angel Guardian v. Donovan, 71 R.I. 407,46 A.2d 717 (1946); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 828 (1935).
968. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.20.010(5) (1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.11(7) (1964)
(removal); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 276 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.140
(1956) (removal only); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 138.020(l)(b), 139.010(2) (1969); N.M. STAT,
ANN. § 31-1-6 (1953); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 707(l)(d) (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 28-8(3) (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-11-01(3) (1960); TEX. PROB. CODE § 78(c)
(Supp. 1969-70); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.36.010 (1967).
969. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 69 (1958) (executors); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-
402(2), -418(2) (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-10-8 (1963) ("convicted of a crime"):
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1508 (1953) (crime that would not allow him to take office); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-351 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-302(2), -317(3) (1948); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 91-1302(2), -1405(3) (1947); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 102(2), 126(2) (1965); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 30-9-6(2) (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-3-15(2), 4-4(3) (1953);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-95(3), -107(2) (1957).
970. MD. ANN. CODE art.93, § 5-104(b)(3) (1957).
971. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-6 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.36.010 (1967).
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exclusions usually leaves no room for discretion in the courts.9 2 Most of
the statutes exclude the convict or ex-convict regardless of his
rehabilitation, presumably barring him permanently from these
positions unless his civil rights are restored in accordance with the
appropriate state procedure.
These express exclusions have been avoided by the courts in certain
instances, demonstrating a desire to carry into effect the wishes of the
testator. Conviction of a felony in one state, for example, may not result
in disqualification when the crime is not considered a felony in the state
where the -will is probated . 73 Furthermore, conviction of a felony has
been held' not to disqualify a person whose conviction has been
pardoned, despite statutory language disqualifying all felons.1
74
Statutes in some jurisdictions, although not expressly excluding
felons from serving as executors or administrators, contain language
giving the appointing court sufficient discretion to exclude an ex-convict.
These statutes usually require the court to appoint a "suitable,"97
5
"fit, ' ' 976 or "competent ''  person, or to remove a person who does not
possess these qualities. Although the case law does not indicate
conclusively whether a criminal conviction will result in disqualification
under these statutes, the cases tend to support exclusion of convicts at the
discretion of the court. An Ohio statute, for example, states that
appointment of an executor named in a will is mandatory unless he is not
"legally competent."' 8 Despite the lack of more specific language, an
Ohio court has determined that a person accused or convicted of a crime
is not legally competent to serve as executor. 79 Other jurisdictions, while
972. The Arizona statutes state that "'a person is not competent to serve or to be appointed
as administrator who is . ..[c]onvicted of an infamous crime." ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-
418(2) (1956).
973. See, e.g., In re Johnson's Will, 202 Misc. 751, 112 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sur. Ct. 1952); In re
Duncan's Estate, 181 Okla. 407, 74 P.2d 117 (1937). A New York court has held that a felon was
eligible to serve as an executor since the crime for which he was convicted in federal court was not a
felony under New York law. In re Canter's Will, 146 Misc. 123, 261 N.Y.S. 872 (Sur. Ct. 1933).
974. In re Raynor, 48 Misc. 325,96 N.Y.S. 895 (Sur. Ct. 1905).
975. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.63 (Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-705(2) (1964)
(administrator); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (299) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.501 (1969)
(removal only); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-310 (1964) (removal only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 917
(1959) (removal only); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-116, -118 (1968).
976. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1551 (Supp. 1970) (administrator); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 553:10 (1955) (removal); N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A:6-4 (1953) (administrator); PA.
STAT. tit. 20, § 320.306(3) (Supp. 1970) (administrator).
977. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 107 (1964) (executor); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
192, § 4, ch. 193, § 1 (1969); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2113.05 (Baldwin 1964) (executor); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 310.12, .16,311.02 (1958).
978. OHIO REv. CooE ANN. § 2113.05 (Baldwin 1964).
979. Seasongood v. Seasongood, 23 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1915).
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not ruling specifically on the suitability of an ex-convict, have held that
the court has complete discretion in determining the fitness of the named
executor, restricted only in the sense that it must appoint that executor if
he is suitable, regardless of the availability of a relatively more suitable
person.91° Thus, despite provisions making appointment of the named
executor mandatory unless he is disqualified by statute, the courts in
jurisdictions with discretionary statutes can avoid the appointment of an
ex-convict. The same rules apply when statutes require the court to
appoint as administrator the person with statutory preference, but also
give the court discretion in his appointment or removal.
2. Guardians.-Guardianship is the legal solution for the
management of the affairs of those who are physically or mentally
incompetent. Like an executor or administrator, a guardian is a
fiduciary occupying a position of trust. Consequently, the statutory
qualifications for guardianship are similar to those for other positions of
trust, giving the court, in most instances, discretion in the appointment
or removal of an ex-convict.
(a) Guardians of the person and estate.-The majority of states
utilize the discretionary approach to the appointment or removal of a
guardian. The statutes usually include the words "suitable," 9 '
"'competent," 98 2 "fit,"9813 or other phrases implying discretion.?8 4
Although most cases interpreting these statutes do not deal specifically
with the issue of a criminal conviction, they do reinforce the broad
discretionary powers of the court.8 5 Applying a discretionary statute, a
Mississippi court has held that a criminal conviction is sufficient
grounds for removal of a guardian.'"
980. Grossman v. Grossman, 343 Mass. 565, 179 N.E.2d 900 (1962); Saxe v. Saxe, 119 Wis.
557,97 N.W. 187 (1903) (by implication).
981. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-817(A) (1956) (removal); HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 551-11 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (299) (1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.501
(1969) (removal); NEB. REv. STAT. § 38-507 (1960) (removal); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.12
(Baldwin 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3001 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-10-3 (1966).
982. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 31-5 (1969).
983. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
984. ALASKA STAT. § 20.05.010 (1962) ("fg]ood moral character"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 3902(b) (1953) ("just cause"); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-107 (1965) ("the ordinary . . . may
exercise discretion"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3553 (Supp. 1970) ("welfare of the minor");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 408 (1956) ("sufficient cause"); TEx. PROB. CODE § 114(c) (1956) ("proper
person"). Even in those states where a minor over 14 years of age may nominate his own guardian,
case law establishes that the court must find that the person nominated is "suitable." See, e.g.,
Coats v. Benton, 80 Okla. 93, 194 P. 198 (1920).
985. See, e.g., In re Lancy's Guardianship, 232 Iowa 191, 2 N.W.2d 787 (1942); In re
Carstens' Guardianship, 151 Neb. 425, 37 N.W.2d 581 (1949); Guardianship of Baptiste Minors,
114 Okla. 116,243 P. 938 (1925).
986. Clark v. Smith, 110 Miss. 728,70 So. 897 (1916).
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In establishing the qualifications for guardians, a few states utilize
the express disqualification standards found in the executor-
administrator statutes. 8 7 These provisions vest little or no discretion in
the appointing court to determine whether the convict is qualified to
serve as guardian.91 As a result of an express disqualification statute, a
New York court refused to appoint a child's father as guardian on the
grounds that the father's 22-year-old grand larceny conviction barred his
appointment despite the fact that he had led an honorable life since his
release. The court pointed out that the refusal was "downright
injustice," stating that such a "flat and sweeping disqualification" left
no room for penitence and reform and left no discretion in the court to
alter the result. 9
(b) Testamentary guardians.-The testamentary guardian,
usually a creature of statute, is nominated in the will of the minor's or
incompetent's parents. 9 0 Many courts, under a discretionary statute,
will attempt to honor the wishes of the testator and refuse appointment
only when the person nominated is found unsuitable to provide for the
child's welfare. In these jurisdictions, it is apparent that the court, within
its discretion, could refuse to appoint or could remove a convict on the
basis of his conviction alone. 91 Only a few courts have required
mandatory appointment of the person nominated, 9 2 and no cases have
been found where the courts were faced with an ex-convict nominee.
A few jurisdictions disqualify any nominee who has been convicted
of a felony"9 or infamous crime.94
(c) Guardians ad litem.-The guardian ad litem is a special
purpose guardian who represents the minor or incompetent in
987. States imposing disqualification for felony conviction: ALA. CODE tit: 21, § 123(5)
(1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-607 (Supp. 1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.27 (l)(a) (1964); LA.
CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 4231(3) (West 1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.059(3) (1969); N.Y. SURR.
CT. PROC. LAW § 707(l)(d) (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-11-01(3) (1960); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 126.161(3) (1969); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.020(3) (1967). Utah imposes
an infamous crime disqualification: UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-6-1 (1953).
988. The Florida code, for example, states unequivocably that "no person who has been
convicted of a felony . . .shall be appointed to act as guardian." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.27
(1964).
989. In re Lagrange, 153 Misc. 236,239, 274 N.Y.S. 702,706 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
990. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 245 (1968).
991. Generally, the statutory provisions for appointment or removal of a testamentary
guardian are similar or identical to those for general guardians.
992. See, e.g., In re Welsh's Estate, 50 App. Div. 189,63 N.Y.S. 737 (1900).
993. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 744.14, .27 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.059(3)
(1969); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 103(21) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); id. § 707(l)(d)
(McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-11-01(3) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 126.161(3) (1969).
994. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-6-I (1953).
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litigation.995 Some states allow the general guardian to represent his ward
in suit.9 Although a guardian appointed solely for the purpose of
litigation serves a different purpose than the general guardian, the same
basic standards apply for his appointment. A few states, however,
require that the guardian ad litem be an attorney, a standard as effective
as a felony disqualification in removing the ex-convict from this
position."
7
3. Trustees.-To serve as trustee, the person nominated must be
able to take and hold property and administer the trust. 98 Thus, the
incarcerated offender would be unable to serve as a trustee due to his
physical incapacity to administer the trust while in prison. Furthermore,
a few jurisdictions divest the imprisoned offender of his property,
thereby rendering him unable to be a trustee." 9 The released offender,
however, is legally capable of serving as a trustee, since in every state he
can take and hold property. Statutory appointment or qualification
restrictions, however, may bar the ex-convict's appointment.""00
Moreover, it has been held that the courts have the inherent power to
control or remove trustees, giving them great latitude in the disposition
of the convict-nominee.
VIII. Loss OF DOMESTIC RIGHTS
Conviction of a crime has far-reaching consequences for both the
offender and his family. If an offender is imprisoned following
conviction, his spouse' is deprived of the consortium to which she is
entitled under the marriage contract. His imprisonment for a lengthy
duration may also result in severe financial deprivations for his spouse
and children. In addition, a criminal conviction carries with it a
presumption that the offender is unsuitable for marital and parental
responsibilities. For these reasons, the laws of most jurisdictions provide
995. H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 246 (1968); Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 IOWA L.
REV. 376 (1960).
996. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-120 (1953); NEV. DIST. CT. R. 29.
997. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 177 (1958); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. LAW § 404(I)
(McKinney 1967); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-27 (1957).
998. See generally 2 & 3 SCOTr. TRUSTS §§ 169-96 (1967).
999. See notes 120-43 on pages 1082-86 infra and accompanying text.
1000. Both express and discretionary appointment standards can be found in the state codes,
presumably with the same effect as in other fiduciary statutes. Some states include trustees under the
same general fiduciary statutes with executors, administrators, and guardians. E.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-1-1, 153-10-8 (1963). Other states utilize separate statutes to deal with trustees.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-84 (1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.39 (1963).
I. It is convenient to assume the innocent spouse is the wife and that her husband has been
convicted or imprisoned. The law in this area, however, makes no distinction.
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for the absolute dissolution of the legal bonds between the convict and
his spouse and children. In a few jurisdictions, more serious offenders
may even be prohibited from marrying or becoming parents.
A. Restrictions on the Convict's Right to Marry and Have Children
Conviction of a crime is generally regarded as evidence of the
offender's unfitness for marital and parental responsibilities. Although
the question of a convicted criminal's fitness is most often an issue in
proceedings to terminate existing marital or parental rights, there are a
few situations in which the convict's rights to marry and have children
may be denied, because of his criminal conviction.
A few statutes declare a convict's marriage void if contracted with a
spouse who is without knowledge of his criminal past.2 Several court
decisions also support this policy. Although it is generally held that
misrepresentations of character do not constitute fraud sufficient for
annulment, these courts have granted annulment in cases of concealed
criminal records. 3 Since, however, the ground for annulment in these
cases was fraud, they cannot be taken for the proposition that a criminal
record in and of itself affects the offender's right to marry.
A convict's right to marry also may be challenged in civil death
jurisdictions. One case, not yet overruled, held void the marriage of a
convict on the ground that his loss of civil rights rendered him incapable
of entering a contract.4 No other authority can be found to support this
view, and one state attorney general's opinion expressly rejects it.5
Several jurisdictions have enacted laws designed to prevent
procreation by certain types of criminals on the theory that criminal
tendencies are congenital and transmissible by heredity. Three states
prohibit the marriage of habitual criminals or offenders who have three
felony convictions In these states, the proscription extends only for the
years of fertility. Thus, an habitual criminal who is a woman under age
45 or a man of any age, unless he plans to marry a woman older than 45,
is not permitted to marry.
Other states seek to achieve the same result by the compulsory
2. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (Supp. 1970).
3. E.g., Douglass v. Douglass, 148 Cal. App. 2d 867, 307 P.2d 674 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
Brown v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114 (1922); Lockwood v. Lockwood, 29 Misc. 2d 114, 220
N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
4. Jandro v. Jandro, 246 S.W. 609 (Mo. App. 1923).
5. [1935-36] S.D. ATTY. GEN. Op. 290 (loss of civil rights because of felony conviction is not
a legal impediment to marriage).
6. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-07 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-46 (Supp. 1970);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.030 (1961).
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sterilization of certain offenders. Nine states have statutes authorizing
eugenic sterilization of more serious criminals.7 Under the typical
statutes, sterilization may be ordered for habitual criminals,8 moral
degenerates, 9 and sex offenders. 0 A determination by medical authorities
that the convict would likely produce offspring with similar undesirable
tendencies is usually a prerequisite for compulsory sterilization. In
addition, it must appear that the inmate's health will not be endangered
by the operation.
The convicted criminal's right to become a parent also may be
adversely affected if he attempts to adopt a child. Although there are
only a few cases in point," it appears likely that the character
requirements of many adoption statutes will disqualify an ex-convict
from becoming an adoptive parent.'
2
B. Conviction and Imprisonment as Grounds for Divorce3
At common law, neither criminal conviction nor imprisonment
were grounds for divorce." Thus, in the absence of a specific statutory
provision, the innocent spouse may not maintain an action for divorce
based on the convicted or imprisoned spouse's criminality. 5 Most
jurisdictions, however, have made criminal conviction or imprisonment
a statutory ground for divorce. Moreover, in some states that retain civil
death statutes, 6 automatic dissolution of marriage may occur by reason
of a spouse's sentence to life imprisonment. 7 Similarly, the marriage of
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670 (West 1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-19 (1958); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5703 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-1303 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-
803 (1949); IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.9 (Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 341 (1954),
UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.12 (1957).
8. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5703 (1953).
9. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.9 (Supp. 1970).
10. E.g.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10-1 (1967).
11. See, e.g., Petition of Berkowitz, 88 1II.-App. 2d 1,232 N.E.2d 72 (1967) (evidence that
applicant had committed forgery was proper grounds for denying his petition to adopt child).
12. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 2 (1958) (adoptive parent must be morally fit); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4-1-9 (1963) (adoptive parent must be of good moral character); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 578-1 (Supp. 1969) (adoptive parent must be a proper person); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 461:2 (1968) (adoptive parent must be a suitable person).
13. "Divorce" as used herein refers to divorce from the bonds of marriage, or absolute
divorce, as opposed to divorce from bed and board, often denoted as legal separation.
14. F. KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 403 (3d ed. 1946).
15. Sharman v. Sharman, 18 Tex. 522 (1857).
16. Notes 70-79 supra and accompanying text.
17. In at least one civil death state, the spouse of a convict sentenced to life imprisonment is
free to remarry immediately. E.g., Zizzo v. Zizzo, 41 Misc. 2d 928, 247 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct.
1964). Other civil death states provide that the bonds of matrimony remain unimpaired until the
spouse of the civilly dead convict obtains a court decree dissolving the marriage. E.g., R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956). If the civil death jurisdiction has also enacted a statute that makes
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a convict subsequent to a loss of civil rights may be subject to annulment
because of his incapacity to enter a contract.18 In the six states that have
not made conviction or imprisonment a separate ground for divorce,19
the spouse of a convicted criminal may still be able to use the criminal
conviction indirectly to obtain a divorce under other statutory grounds. 2
1. Statutory Provisions Permitting Divorce on Grounds of
Criminal Conduct.-The jurisdictions vary considerably in their
statutory treatment of conviction and imprisonment as grounds for
divorce. Not infrequently, a conviction or term of confinement that is a
ground for divorce in one state will not support the action in an adjacent
state. Under all statutes, however, the defendant spouse must have been
convicted of a crime; the mere commission of a crime in the absence of a
conviction is not a ground for divorce. 21 In some states, a criminal
conviction alone satisfies the divorce statute. Other states require that
the defendant be sentenced to imprisonment. Still others do not permit
divorce unless the guilty spouse is in prison or has served a specified
period of confinement.
Sixteen states grant divorce to the innocent spouse of an individual
convicted of certain types of crime. In these states conviction for a
felony2' or an infamous crime23 is a ground for divorce, irrespective of
conviction or imprisonment a statutory ground for divorce, the innocent spouse may be required to
institute formal divorce proceedings under the divorce statute before the marriage can be
terminated. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 251 Ala. 124, 36 So. 2d 316 (1948). The Alabama civil
death statute has since been repealed. § 1, [1965] Ala. Acts Ist Ex. Sess. 381, repealing ALA. CODE
ANN. tit. 61, § 3 (1960).
18. Jandro v. Jandro, 246 S.W. 609 (Mo. App. 1923).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.04 (1941); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-2 (1952); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 15-5-1 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (Supp. 1969).
20. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West Supp. 1970) (irreconcilable differences); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 631 (1964) (final judgment sentencing either party to imprisonment for life
and confinement thereunder dissolves bonds of matrimony); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-101 (Supp.
1969) (3-year separation). See also Brady v. Brady, 98 N.J. Super. 600, 238 A.2d 201 (Ch. 1968)
(granting divorce to wife of convict imprisoned for 2 years on the ground that separation caused by
convict's misconduct constituted willful desertion), noted in 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 389 (1969).
21. The Connecticut statute authorizes divorce upon a spouse's commission of any infamous
crime involving a violation of conjugal duty and punishable by imprisonment. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-13 (Supp. 1967). Notwithstanding the use of the word "commission," Connecticut
courts have held that a divorce action must be based upon a criminal conviction. Sweet v. Sweet, 21
Conn. Supp. 198, 151 A.2d 350 (1957); accord, Thomas v. Thomas, 51 11. 162 (1869).
22. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (1963); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 32-603 (1963); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.8 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.020 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 21-103 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-
03 (Supp. 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 107.030 (1968); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-2 (1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-1 (1969); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-4 (Supp. 1969). For a discussion of
what constitutes a felony see notes 108-20 supra and accompanying text.
23. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § I (Smith-Hurd
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sentence or imprisonment.
Thirteen states authorize divorce upon the guilty spouse's sen-
tence to imprisonment. There is no requirement in these jurisdictions
that the defendant actually serve his sentence. In addition, in a
number of these states there is no express requirement that the sen-
tence be of specified duration.24 Since the divorce ground is often
limited to sentences for felony convictions or sentences to the state
penitentiary, these statutes probably contemplate a lengthy term of
imprisonment. Other state provisions expressly require that the sentence
be of a minimum duration, usually one to three years.7 Hawaii 6 and
Massachusetts zr limit the divorce action to sentences of at least seven and
five years, respectively.
In fifteen states and the District of Columbia, a divorce will be
granted only if the guilty spouse is actually imprisoned as a result of his
conviction. A few of these states require that the defendant be
imprisoned when the divorce action is brought.21 Other jurisdictions
specify that the defendant must be serving a sentence of a specific
duration,2 or one that resulted from a felony conviction? ° A number of
Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1201 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 125.010 (1967). For a discussion of what constitutes an infamous crime see notes 121-38
supra and accompanying text.
24. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956) (sentence to imprisonment upon conviction of a
felony; action cannot be brought until one year after final judgment of conviction); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46-13 (Supp. 1967) (sentence to imprisonment for life or commission of any
infamous crime involving violation of conjugal duty); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.06 (Supp. 1970)
(sentence to imprisonment in any state or federal prison or reformatory); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2735
(1956) (sentence to any penitentiary if not pardoned before being sent there); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-801 (1955) (sentence to imprisonment upon conviction of a felony); VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1968) (sentence to imprisonment in any penitentiary); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-38 (1957) (sentence to imprisonment upon conviction of a felony).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1969) (sentence to imprisonment in penitentiary for 2 years or
more for an offense involving moral turpitude); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.86 (1957) (sentence to
imprisonment for 3 years or more); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-301 (1960) (sentence to imprisonment
for 3 years or more); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955) (sentence to imprisonment for 2
years for specified crimes).
26. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-41 (1968).
27. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 2 (1969).
28. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105-01 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271
(1961); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.020 (Supp. 1968).
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-904 (1966) (2 or more years for a felony); N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 458.7 (1968) (oneyear or more); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1959) (3 or moreyears).
30. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601 (Supp. 1969); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 139 (West Supp.
1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953).
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states require the guilty spouse to have served a specified term of years in
prison.3'
2. Problems of Interpretation.-Many statutes that make
conviction or imprisonment a separate ground for divorce leave
important questions unanswered. Moreover, because of the lack of
uniformity in statutory language, the relatively few judicial decisions in
this area are of-little value outside the jurisdiction where pronounced.
Some of the more common interpretational problems include: when 'and
where the conviction or imprisonment must have occurred; the type of
sentence that will satisfy the statute; and when the divorce action may be
brought.
(a) When conviction or imprisonment must occur.-A number of
statutes expressly state that conviction or imprisonment, as a ground for
divorce, must occur subsequent to the marriage.32 A few statutes, on the
other hand, permit divorce on the basis of pre-marriage criminal
conduct when the innocent spouse does not learn of the defendant's
criminal record until after the marriage.3 In the absence of either a
statute deciding the question or deception on the part of a defendant
amounting to grounds for annulment,34 courts are likely to limit the
divorce action to conviction or imprisonment following marriage.?
(b) Where conviction or imprisonment must occur.-Most states
do not specify where conviction or imprisonment must occur in order to
satisfy the divorce statute. Construing the statutes narrowly, a few early
cases refused to grant a divorce when the conviction or imprisonment of
the guilty spouse took place outside the state.? The legislatures of a
number of states, however, now expressly provide for divorce when
31. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 20 (1959) (actual imprisonment for 2 years upon sentence of 7 or
more years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522 (1953) (actual imprisonment for 2 years); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969) (sentence to imprisonment for 3 years or more of which 18 months
have been served); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70) (actual imprisonment
for 3 or more consecutive years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1966) (involuntary separation in
consequence of a criminal act for one year); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (Supp. 1969-70)
(imprisonment for felony; suit not to be brought until 12 months after final judgment); WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 247.07 (Supp. 1969) (actual imprisonment for 3 or more years).
32. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-1-1 (1963) (felony conviction); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAWS § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70) (actual imprisonment for 3 or more consecutive years).
33. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1968). In
Hartwig v. Hartwig, 160 Mo. App. 284, 142 S.W. 797 (1912), the court held that only actual
knowledge on the part of the plaintiff would bar the divorce action.
34. See note 3 on page 1065 supra and accompanying text.
35. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 84 Pa. D. & C. 535 (Fayette County Ct. 1952); Caswell v. Caswell,
64 Vt. 557, 24 A. 988 (1892).
36. Leonard v. Leonard, 151 Mass. 151, 23 N.E. 732 (1890); Daughdrill v. Daughdrill, 180
Miss. 589, 178 So. 106 (1938); Martin v. Martin, 47 N.H. 52 (1866).
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conviction or imprisonment occurs in other jurisdictions.37 A few
statutes even authorize divorce if the guilty spouse is convicted in a
foreign country.3 In the absence of a statutory determination, most
courts now will grant a divorce regardless of where the conviction or
imprisonment occurs.39 A divorce may even be granted on the basis of a
court-martial conviction. 4 Construing statutes that grant divorce for a
felony conviction, courts have held that a foreign conviction must be for
a crime that is a felony under the laws of the forum state41 in order to
satisfy the forum's divorce statute.
(c) When the cause of action arises.-Except when a marriage is
automatically dissolved because of the imprisoned spouse's civil death,
the innocent spouse must institute divorce proceedings to terminate the
marriage. In states that authorize divorce when a spouse has been
convicted or sentenced, it would seem that the innocent spouse may
bring the divorce action immediately upon conviction or sentencing,
without regard to whether the guilty spouse has begun serving his
sentence. When the statutory ground is imprisonment, however, it would
appear that the convicted spouse must at least be in prison before the
action can be brought. When divorce is permitted only after a guilty
spouse's imprisonment for a specified period, it is clear that the action
may not be brought until the statutory period of confinement has been
served.
42
(d) Effect ofpending appeal.-A few statutes expressly state that
a conviction must be final before it may serve as a ground for divorce. 3
Most statutes, however, are silent on the matter and the question is not
raised in many reported decisions. When the ground for divorce is
imprisonment for a specified term and the defendant has served the
requisite period of confinement, a subsequent reversal of the conviction
37. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp. 1969) (any state); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.06 (Supp. 1970) (any state or federal prison or reformatory); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3105-01 (Baldwin 1964) (any state or federal prison).
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1201 (1968) (any country); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (1958)
(foreign country if by jury trial).
39. E.g., Ness v. Ness, 79 S.D. 201, 110 N.W.2d 128 (1961); Kimbrov. Kimbro, 191 Tenn.
316, 232 S.W.2d 354 (1950).
40. Clark v. Clark, 94 N.H. 398,54 A.2d 166 (1947). Contra, Getz v. Getz, 332 I1. App. 364,
75 N.E.2d 530 (1947).
41. E.g., Ness v. Ness, 79 S.D. 201, 110 N.W.2d 128 (1961).
42. E.g., Short v. Short, 57 Misc. 2d 762,293 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
43. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956) (action not to be brought until one year after
final judgment of felony conviction); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (Supp. 1969-70) (action
not to be brought until one year after final judgment of a felony conviction); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-2-4 (Supp. 1969) (final conviction of a felony).
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will not bar a divorce based on the imprisonment.4 Under the typical
statute that permits divorce merely upon the guilty spouse's conviction
or sentencing, however, the effect of a pending appeal is not clear. The
weight of authority indicates that a conviction must be final before a
divorce will be granted.4
(e) Multiple, indeterminate, and suspended sentences.-When the
divorce statute requires a sentence of specified duration, courts generally
look to the sentence actually imposed rather than to the sentence the
defendant is expected to serve. Thus, a divorce will be granted even
though a sentence may be suspended or reduced below the period
specified by the divorce statute.4' Under certain sentencing procedures it
may be difficult to determine whether a convicted spouse's sentence falls
within the statutory ground for divorce. In multiple sentencing, for
example, it is not clear whether an aggregate of the component sentences
may be used to satisfy the divorce statute. In an early case involving a
two-count conviction, it was held that two separate sentences of one and
one-half years each did not constitute cause for divorce under a statute
requiring a two-year sentence. 47 Indeterminate sentences that set
maximum and minimum terms of confinement also may prove
troublesome.4 1 Courts have usually looked to the maximum limit set by
the indeterminate sentence when applying the divorce statutes even
though the minimum term of the sentence falls short of satisfying the
statute.4' These decisions usually reason that the maximum term of the
sentence must be served before the prisoner can, as a matter of right,
obtain his release.5
(f) Confinement in an institution other than that prescribed by
statutes.-A few statutes predicate the divorce action on the convicted
spouse's sentence to or confinment in a particular type of penal
44. Cone v. Cone, 58 N.H. 152 (1877); Colascione v. Colascione, 57 Misc. 2d 199, 291
N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
45. Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P.2d 953 (1949); Rivers v. Rivers, 60 Iowa 378, 14
N.W. 774 (1883). But see State v. Duket, 90 Wis. 272,63 N.W. 83 (1875) (reversal on appeal has no
effect when marriage is automatically dissolved by sentence).
46. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191 (1884) (pardon); Sargood v. Sargood, 77 Vt. 498,
61 A.472 (1905).
47. Kauffman v. Kauffman, 24 Pa. Super. 437 (1904).
48. Delaware is the only state that provides specific guidance for applying the divorce statute
to an indeterminate sentence. The ground for divorce is actual imprisonment for 2 years, but in case
of an indeterminate sentence, at least 2 years of imprisonment. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1522
(1953).
49. E.g., Courtney v. Courtney, 214 A.2d 478 (D.C. App. 1965); Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass.
592,48 N.E. 843 (1897); Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784,263 N.W. 139 (1935).
50. E.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 169 Mass. 592,48 N.E. 843 (1897).
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institution.5' When the defendant is sentenced to confinement in an
institution other than that specified in the divorce statute, courts have
granted the divorce when the convicted spouse is imprisoned under
circumstances similar to the type of confinement contemplated by the
statute.52
3. Defenses.-I f a convict's crime or punishment falls within these
statutory grounds, it is unlikely that he will successfully defend against a
divorce action. As a general rule, the convicted criminal's subsequent
pardon is no defense. Moreover, the convicted spouse will probably have
difficulty in asserting the traditional divorce defenses of connivance,
recrimination, and condonation.0 In some jurisdictions, however, other
statutory defenses may be available to a convict.
A number of statutes expressly state that a guilty spouse's pardon
after divorce will not affect the divorce.54 In a few other states, statutes
declare that a pardon is no defense to a divorce action.0 Only two states
give effect to a convicted spouse's pardon. In Mississippi, for example,
where divorce is authorized upon the defendant's sentence of
imprisonment in a penitentiary, the divorce action will fail if the
defendant is pardoned before being sent to prison.5 In Texas, where the
innocent spouse must wait one year after final judgment of conviction
before bringing suit for divorce, an intervening pardon bars the action."7
In the absence of a statutory provision, courts have generally held that a
pardon after the marriage is dissolved does not restore the defendant to
conjugal rights.m Some courts have granted divorce even though the
51. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1969) (sentence to imprisonment in penitentiary for 2
years or more); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 139 (West Supp. 1970) (imprisonment at hard labor); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1968) (sentence to imprisonment in any penitentiary); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.020 (Supp. 1969) (imprisonment in state or federal penal institution).
52. E.g., Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W. 139 (1935) (sentence to women's
reformatory held to satisfy statute authorizing divorce for sentence to prison, jail, or house of
correction); accord, Bowers v. Bowers, 114 Ohio St. 568, 151 N.E. 750 (1926). But see Hull v.
Donze, 164 La. 199, 113 So. 816 (1927) (sentence to county jail was not infamous punishment
required by divorce statute); Dion v. Dion, 92 Minn. 278, 100 N.W. 4 (1904).
53. "Connivance" is defined as the corrupt consenting by one spouse to an offense by the
other, "recrimination" is a counter-charge in a suit for divorce that the complainant has been guilty
of an offense constituting a ground for divorce; "condonation" is the forgiveness of a marital
offense. See generally J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
294-311 (1931).
54. E.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-41(3) (1968); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 2 (1969);
NEa. REv. STAT. § 42-301(3) (1960); WYO STAT. ANN. § 20-38 (1959).
55. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312(6) (1956); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp.
1968).
56. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1957).
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4629 (Supp. 1969-70).
58. E.g., Gargan v. Sculley, 82 Misc. 667, 144 N.Y.S. 205 (Sup. Ct. 1913); State v. Duket, 90
'Wis. 272,63 N.W. 83 (1895).
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defendant was pardoned prior to or during the pendency of divorce
proceedings.5'
There appears to be no reason why the traditional divorce defenses
of connivance, recrimination, and condonation should not be available
to the convicted spouse. The defense of recrimination, for example, has
been allowed when the plaintiff spouse also has been convicted of a crime
that is a ground for divorce under the statute." One court has held that a
resumption of the marital relationship after the defendant's release from
prison amounts to condonation that bars a divorce action.61 For reasons
that are not always clear, however, some courts have been reluctant to
recognize the applicability of these defenses to the convicted or
imprisoned spouse.62  Most statutes simply list connivance,
recrimination, and condonation among general grounds for denying
divorce; they make no express provision for a divorce based on criminal
conviction or imprisonment. Only one statute specifically provides that
the plaintiff's cohabitation with the defendant following the latter's
release from prison will bar an action for divorce.6
Statutes in some jurisdictions make other defenses available to the
convicted spouse who is a defendant in a divorce action based upon his
conviction or imprisonment. A few statutes expressly provide that
divorce proceedings must be instituted within a specified period
following the conviction or imprisonment." Under these statutes, the
failure to bring the action within the prescribed period has been held to
bar the divorce. 5 Two states have created a unique defense for the
convicted spouse who is being sued for divorce. Under these statutes,
divorce is prohibited when the defendant's conviction was based upon his
spouse's testimony."
59. E.g., Holloway v. Holloway, 126 Ga. 459, 55 S.E. 191 (1906); Davidson v. Davidson, 23
Pa. Dist. 578 (C.P. 1914).
60. Studley v. Studley, 129 Neb. 784, 263 N.W. 139 (1935).
61. Miller v. Miller, 19 Ohio App. 518 (1926).
62. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 204 Pa. Super. 576, 205 A.2d 647 (1964) (denial of divorce
to imprisoned convict's wife who knew of and participated in same criminal activities was based on
her equal fault and not connivance, recrimination, or condonation); Kosanke v. Kosanke, 30 Wash.
2d 523, 192 P.2d 337 (1948) (condonation not available to convict as a defense in a divorce
proceeding).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Supp. 1968) (cohabitation after defendant's release from
imprisonment bars divorce based on his imprisonment).
64. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-615(2) (1963) (suit must be commenced within one year after
pardon or termination of sentence); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 21-130 (1967) (suit must be
instituted within 2 years after final judgment or sentence).
65. Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, 106 P. 353 (1910).
66. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1956); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4629 (Supp. 1969-
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C. Conviction and Imprisonment as Grounds for Loss of Parental
Rights
Conviction or imprisonment may cause the criminal offender to
forfeit forever his rights in his children. If divorce follows his conviction
or imprisonment, the court will probably award the custody of the
children to the innocent spouse. In somejurisdictions, this deprivation of
custody may be the basis for terminating the convict's parental rights.
Additionally, in a number of states the convicted criminal's parental
rights may be terminated under dependency and neglect statutes or in
adoption proceedings.
1. Termination of the Convicted Criminal's Parental Rights
Under Dependency and Neglect Statutes.-All states and the District of
Columbia have enacted legislation providing for the care and protection
of dependent and neglected children.6 Under these statutes, if, after
notice and hearing, a child is found to be dependent or neglected, a court
may direct that he be removed from the custody of his natural parents
and placed in a foster home or institution.'8 In many states, courts are
authorized to terminate the neglectful parent's rights in the child and
make the child available for adoption. 9 Whether a parent may be
67. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 47.1.0.010 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-201 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (Supp. 1969); CAL. CIv. CODE § 232 (West
Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-1 (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-32
(1968); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901, 1101 (Supp. 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-906 (1961);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2427 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-61 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, § 702-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3206 (1956); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.2 (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802 (Supp. 1965); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199.011 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1570 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3792
(Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 52 (1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (Supp.
1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.20) (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (Supp.
1970); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1269-21 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.031 (1962); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 10-501 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-201 (Supp. 1967); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 128.010 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.2 (1964); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-1 (1960);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-9-1 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 371 (McKinney Supp.
1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.01 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (Supp. 1969-70); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 419A76 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 14-1-3
(1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6 (Supp. 1969);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-242 (Supp. 1969); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2330 (Supp. 1969-70);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-64 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 631 (Supp. 1969); VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 49-1-3 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-40 (1965).
68. See generally Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which a Child May Be
Adopted Without the Consent of His Parents, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962); Sullivan, Child Neglect:
The EnvironmentalAspects, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 85 (1968).
69. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-43a
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deprived of custody or have his rights terminated under these statutes
depends upon whether the child comes within the statutory definition of
dependent or neglected children. Under typical statutes, a child may be
declared dependent or neglected when any of the following conditions
exist: he is found to be neglected or abandoned by his parents; 70 he lacks
proper parental care or support;7' he lives in an environment injurious to
his morals; 7 2 or his parents are unfit.73 Only two states make a parent's
criminality an express ground for terminating parental rights in
dependency and neglect proceedings.7 4 These statutes require either that
the offense demonstrate parental unfitness or that the term of
imprisonment be such that the child will be deprived of adequate
support. One state has recently deleted imprisonment of a parent as an
express statutory ground for a finding of dependency or neglect.75 Even
under the statutes that do not mention criminal conviction or
imprisonment, the children of a convicted or imprisoned parent could be
adjudged dependent and neglected. This is particularly likely under the
immoral conduct grounds found in many statutes. In the few reported
decisions in which the question has been raised, however, courts have
been reluctant to declare children dependent and neglected because of the
parent's imprisonment.7 6 These decisions reason that the forfeiture of
parental rights would be additional punishment to the parent-offender.
Implicit in these opinions is the recognition that even though the parent
has committed a crime, his separation from his child and his inability to
provide support are not intentional. Nevertheless, the convicted or
imprisoned parent could be brought within the broad definitional
terminology of many dependency and neglect statutes.
2. Adoption of a Convicted Criminal's Children Without His
(1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.600 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (Supp. 1970); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 43-209 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-288 (1969).
70. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901, 1101 (Supp. 1969-70); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
2427 (Supp. 1969).
71. E.g.,ALA. CODEtit. 13, § 350 (1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (1961).
72. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3 (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-3205 to -
3206 (1956).
73. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-203 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2 (1969).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(d) (West Supp. 1970) (when crime demonstrates parental
unfitness or term of imprisonment will deprive children of adequate care and support); MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (598.2) (Supp. 1970) (when home unfit because of parent's criminality).
75. S.D. Sess. Laws [1968] ch. 164, § 1, amending S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 26-8-6
(1967) (codified at S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. 26-8-6 (Supp. 1969).
76. Diernfeld v. People, 137 Colo. 238, 323 P.2d 628 (1958) (mother serving prison term for
forgery); State v. Grady, 231 Ore. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962) (mother sentenced to prison for forgery
and parole violations); Fronk v. State, 7 Utah 2d 245, 322 P.2d 397 (1958) (father's conviction of
forgery).
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Consent.-All states and the District of Columbia have statutes
providing for the legal adoption of children. Under these statutes, the
consent of the adoptive child's natural parents is a prerequisite to the
child's adoption, except in specified situations." In a number of
jurisdictions, the consent of a convicted or imprisoned parent may be
rendered unnecessary by these statutory exceptions.
Six states expressly provide for adoption of children without the
consent of natural parents who have been convicted and imprisoned for
crime.7 8 With one exception, these statutes require either that the
convicted parent be sentenced for a specified term of imprisonment, for
example, three years, or have a comparable amount of confinement
remaining to serve at the time the adoption petition is filed. One state,
South Dakota, dispenses with the necessity for consent of a parent who
has been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude. 9 At least
three states eliminate the consent requirement when the natural parent
has been deprived of his civil rights as a result of criminal conviction and
77. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.040 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-104 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1948); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West Supp.
1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-6 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-43 (Supp. 1967);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304 (1967); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 63.081 (1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (Supp. 1969); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-2
(Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-120 (Bums Supp. 1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3
(Supp. 1970); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2102 (Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.500 (1969); LA.
REV. STAT. § 9:403 (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 16, § 74 (1966); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (543)
(1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1269-09 (Supp. 1968);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040 (Supp. 1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-205 (1962); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 43-104 (Supp. 1967); NEv'. REV. STAT. § 127.090 (1967); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 461:3 (1968); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-23 (1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-6 (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § Il1 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-9 (Supp. 1969); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-11-04 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 60.6 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.322 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I, § 2.1
(1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-7 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2587.7 (Supp. 1969); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-108 (Supp. 1969); TEX. REV.
Clv. STAT. art. 46a, § 6 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 435 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.32.030-.040
(1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (1957); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 1-7102 (Supp. 1969)..
78. ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.040 (1962) (parent imprisoned under sentence of 3 or more
years); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1970) (parent imprisoned for a felony); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (1969) (parent imprisoned with 3 or more years remaining to serve); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 109.322 (1969) (parent imprisoned under sentence of 3 or more years); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 15-7-7 (1956) (parent imprisoned under sentence of 3 or more years); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (1967) (parent convicted of adultery, offense punishable by imprisonment for
one or more years, or moral turpitude offense).
79. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (1967).
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imprisonment.80 Several states that formerly dispensed with the necessity
of consent by imprisoned parents have deleted this provision from their
statutes.8'
Even in jurisdictions that do not make conviction or imprisonment
an express ground for dispensing with parental consent, the convicted
criminal's consent to his children's adoption may nevertheless be
obviated under other statutory provisions. In many states, for example,
the consent of a parent who has been judicially deprived of the custody of
his children is often unnecessary.82 These statutes vary considerably.
Some jurisdictions require only that the parent be deprived of custody,
while other jurisdictions provide that the loss of custody must be due to
the parent's unfitness or wrongdoing.83 Since child custody will most
likely be awarded to the innocent spouse in a divorce action based on the
other spouse's criminal conviction or imprisonment, a divorced
convict's consent to his children's adoption may be unnecessary under
many of these statutes. Similarly, a convicted or imprisoned parent's
consent also might be obviated under adoption provisions dealing with
parental fault. Most adoption statutes dispense with the need for consent
of parents who have willfully failed to perform their parental
obligations. Typical grounds include abandonment,0 desertion, 5 failure
to support,6 failure to communicate,8 7 neglect,8 and unfitness.8' Several
80. N.Y. DOm. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.6
(1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.040 (1961).
81. Ariz. Laws [1956] ch. 129, amending ARIZ. CODE § 27-203 (Supp. 1952) (now codified
at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-104 (1956)); Idaho Laws [1969] ch. 188, § 1, p. 554, amending
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504 (1948) (now codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1504 (Supp.
1969)); Mo. Laws [1947] vol. 2, § 1, p. 213, amending Mo. REV. STAT. § 9609 (1939) (now
codified at Mo. ANN. STAT. 453.040 (Supp. 1969-70)).
82. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 3 (1958); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1970); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.24 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-6 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 60.6 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (1968).
83. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-205 (1970) (cruelty or neglect); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § III (McKinney 1964) (adultery); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4 (Supp. 1969) (cruelty,
neglect, or desertion).
84. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-43 (Supp.
1967); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-2 (Supp. 1969).
85. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1970); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1269-09 (Supp.
1968).
86. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-1-6 (1963); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06
(Baldwin 1964).
87. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005 (Supp.
1969).
88. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-43 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.040
(Supp. 1969-70).
89. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 1269-09 (Supp. 1968).
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states reach this same result by dispensing with the consent requirement
when the parent's rights have already been terminated in dependency and
neglect proceedings."0 The statutes of a few jurisdictions permit adoption
over the objection of the natural parents whenever it is determined that
consent is withheld against the best interests of the child." Regardless of
the ground that obviates consent, the adoptive child's natural parents are
entitled to notice of the adoption proceedings, unless their rights have
been previously terminated by judicial decree. 9
Judicial approaches to the problem of involuntary consent to
adoption vary considerably among jurisdictions. In states that have
made a parent's imprisonment or loss of civil rights an express ground
for dispensing with his consent, the courts have not hesitated to permit
adoption over the objection of convicted or imprisoned parents. This
may also be the result when the imprisoned parent's rights have already
been terminated in dependency and neglect proceedings. 4 In the absence
of express statutory authority, however, the courts as a rule have been
reluctant to permit adoption of a convicted or imprisoned parent's
children without his consent. This attitude may stem in part from the
traditional view still held by a number of courts that adoption statutes
should be strictly construed since they are in derogation of the common
law.95 These courts apparently focus as much attention on the rights of
the parent as they do on the welfare of the child. Thus, it is generally held
that an imprisoned parent has not abandoned or deserted his children
within the meaning of the provisions dispensing with the necessity for
consent on those grounds." Similarly, a few cases hold that a parent's
conviction and imprisonment do not necessarily demonstrate the
90. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (Supp. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.090 (1967); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-9 (Supp. 1969).
91. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-104 (1956); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304 (1967). VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (1968).
92. Many adoption statutes expressly provide for notice. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-
7-7 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-108 (Supp. 1969). Irrespective of statutory provision, notice to
the natural parents of an adoptive child is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545 (1965); In re Estate of Hampton, 55 Cal. App. 2d 545, 131 P.2d 565 (1942).
93. E.g., In re Anonymous, 17 Misc. 2d 691, 187 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sur. Ct. 1959) (consent of
father serving felony sentence not required); In re Adoption of O'Daniel, 128 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sur.
Ct. 1953) (consent of paroled felon unnecessary).
94. E.g., Hogg v. Peterson, 245 Ind. 515, 198 N.E.2d 767 (1964) (parents whose children had
been made wards of court following parents' conviction could not later object to adoption).
95. E.g., Martin v. Cuellar, 131 Colo. 117,279 P.2d 843 (1955); In reAdoption of McKinzie,
275 S.W.2d 365 (Mo. App. 1955).
96. E.g., Mayfield v. Braund, 217 Miss. 514,64 So.2d 713 (1953); Welker's Adoption, 50 Pa.
D.&C. 573 (Orphans' Ct. 1944); In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Utah 2d 53,432 P.2d 881 (1967).
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unfitness contemplated by adoption statutes.9 7 When, however, the
parent's offense clearly denotes parental unfitness,98 or results in
imprisonment for an extended term,9 most courts will permit adoption
against the parent's wishes. The courts have experienced the greatest
difficulties with the provisions that eliminate the consent requirement
when a parent has been deprived of the custody of his child in divorce
proceedings. Alfhough not limited to divorces based on conviction or
imprisonment, the relevance of these provisions to the divorced convict is
clear. The overwhelming majority of custody decrees provide for divided
custody or at least visitation rights for the divorced spouse.1 Only a few
adoption statutes, however, take partial custody into account. Under
these statutes, if the custody decree provides for divided custody,
visitation, or support payments, both parents' consent to adoption is
required. 01 The majority of statutes are silent on the matter and the
resulting conflict of judicial decisions is not surprising. The weight of
authority holds that the consent of a spouse who retains partial custody
or visitation rights under a zustody decree is a prerequisite to adoption.
102
Probably the most that can be said is that under these statutes the
divorced convict's ultimate rights in his children will depend to some
uncertain extent on the custody decree entered at the time of his divorce.
IX. Loss OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Although in most instances a citizen convicted of a crime is not
divested of his property rights, a criminal conviction may affect these
rights in specific circumstances. In at least three jurisdictions, for
example, statutes provide for partial or complete divestment of the
convict's property. Furthermore, slayer's acts, which are in effect in
many jurisdictions, will prevent the convict from inheriting the estate of
97. E.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy, 10 Ariz. App. 47,455 P.2d 997 (1969) (that natural
mother was convicted of forgery did not constitute the unfitness that justifies dispensing with
requirement that she consent to adoption).
98. E.g., Petition of Kelley Minors, 6 Ariz. App. 299, 432 P.2d 158 (1967) (natural father
convicted and imprisoned for child abuse).
99. E.g., Casper v. Huber, 85 Nev. 474, 456 P.2d 436 (1969) (natural father convicted of
murder and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment).
100. See H. CLARK. THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 637 (1968).
101. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106 (1947) (consent required if parent without custody is
making support payments); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.040 (1961) (consent required of
parent who makes support payments or retains visitation rights).
102. E.g., McGowen v. Smith, 264 Ala. 303,87 So. 2d 429 (1956); Burrel v. Burrel, 256 Iowa
490, 127 N.W.2d 78 (1964); Marston v. Marston, 389 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1964). Contra. In re
Hardesty, 150 Kan. 271,92 P.2d 49 (1939); In re Jordet's Petition, 248 Minn. 433,80 N.W.2d 642
(1957) (dictum).
19701 1079
1080 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
his victim. Some states also deny inheritance to the surviving spouse if he
has been guilty of adultery, bigamy, abandonment, or non-support.
A number of jurisdictions have recognized the problems that the
incarcerated offender faces in trying to manage and protect his property.
These states have enacted statutes providing for the appointment of a
personal representative to manage the offender's property during
imprisonment.
A. Attainder
Modern statutes that deprive the convict of property rights had
their origin in common law attainder and its consequences: forfeiture of
the convict's land and chattels, corruption of the blood, and loss of civil
rights . 03 Although initially adopted by the American colonies, 1°1 the
concept of attainder was limited by the framers of the United States
Constitution, who provided that no attainder of treason shall corrupt the
blood or result in forfeiture, except during the attainted person's life.'05
Most states followed this lead and constitutionally prohibited
103. Attainder, a consequence of conviction for either treason or felony, was applicable only
after judgment was pronounced. Through the incident of forfeiture, the criminal's property, both
personal and real, was subject to seizure by the king. Corruption of blood prevented the criminal
from transmitting his land to his heirs because those of "his blood" were considered "corrupted"
by his crime. Consequently, his property escheated to the lord of the fee, subject to the superior right
of the king to take the property by forfeiture. The third consequence of attainder, loss of civil rights,
was recognized at common law, but its effect upon property was not clear even in feudal times. A
partial explanation for this could be that since the loss of civil rights was concurrent with forfeiture
and corruption of blood, normally the criminal's land and chattels either forf'eited to the crown or
escheated to the lord, leaving no property upon which the attainted felon could exercise civil rights.
The loss of civil rights associated with attainder also seems to have been confused with the concept
of civil death, a more severe disability attached to those sentenced to death. See Avery v. Everett,
110 N.Y. 317,324-29, 18 N.E. 148, 150-52 (1888); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380-81; 1 J.
STEPHEN. A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 487-88 (1883); Annot., 139 A.L.R.
1308, 1309-11 (1942). These sanctions generally were abolished in England and the Continent
during the nineteenth century. Corruption of the Blood Act of 1814, 54 Geo. 3, c. 145; Forfeiture
Act of 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 23; Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their
Removal: A Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347,350-59 (1968). Attainder was strictly
an English common law punishment, but most Continental European countries had similar
punishments derived from earlier Roman law.
104. S. MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 236-37, 285 (1965).
New York and South Carolina had confiscatory laws that continued in use for several years after
the Revoluntionary War. Id. at 286.
105. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3. The last phrase in this provision, "except during the Life of
the Person Attainted," is subject to conflicting interpretations. One view, unsuccessfully argued in
several cases arising as a result of the Confiscation Act of 1862, interpreted the phrase to mean that
the attained criminal's life estate was forfeited immediately, but that he could convey the remainder
at any time. It was held, however, that the entire estate could be forfeited with the remainder going
to the heirs on the attainted criminal's death. Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202 (1876).
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attainder,1°6 forfeiture,' and corruption of blood.'0 These provisions
can be found in a variety of forms. At least one state only limits the
prohibition against attainder for treason,'09 while other states broadly
forbid attainder after "conviction" of any crime.110 Occasionally, the
same result is reached without the use of the terms "attainder" or
"forfeiture." ' 1 Additionally, a number of states have statutes
incorporating the constitutional prohibitions against attainder,
forfeiture, and corruption of the blood.' Only a few states retain the
exception found in the United States Constitution that allows attainder
"during the life of the person attainted."
13
106. DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 20; ME. CONST.
art. I, § 11; MONT. CONST. art. Ill, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 5; PA. CONST. art. I, § 19.See
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 13; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 21; MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 10; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 15; N.J. CONST. art. 4, § 7, 3; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 19;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 22; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 21; UTAH CONST.
art. 1, § 18; VA. CONST. art. I, § 58; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 4; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 26.
107. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 9; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 17; GA. CONST. § 2-203; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 11; IND. CONST.
art. 1, § 30; KAN. CONST. B. OF R., § 12; Ky. CONST. § 20; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 11; MD.
CONST. DEC. OF R., art. 27; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 30; MONT. CONST.
art. III, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 12;
OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 25; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 19; S.C. CONST. art.
1, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
108. Note 107 supra. All state constitutions, except Florida's, forbidding "forfeitures"
include "corruption of blood," usually by a clause such as: "No conviction shall work corruption
of blood, or forfeiture of estate." ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16. For an unexplained reason the Florida
Constitution as appears in the 1968 revision omits the reference to "corruption of blood" which had
been contained in both the 1885 constitution and the Revision Commission proposal. FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 17 (Commentary).
109. IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 5.
110. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16;
ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 17; COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 9; GA. CONST. § 2-203; ILL. CONST. art.
2, § 11; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 30; KAN. CONST. B. OF R., § 12; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 11; Mo.
CONST. art. 1, § 30; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 15; OHIO CONST. art.
I, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 25; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 8; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 12.
I11. E.g., LA. CONST. art. 4, § 4 (no laws allowed affecting estates of persons under
disabilities); MASS. CONST. § 26 (no subjects to be declared guilty of treason or felony by
legislature).
112. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653(E) (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2604 (West
1956); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1109 (1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-314 (1948); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 633 (1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4725 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 212.010
(1967); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:152-2 (1953);
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-28 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 68/(1958); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 137.270, 161.070 (1969); TEX. PEN.
CODE ANN. art. 51 (1952); UTIH CODE ANN. § 76-1-40 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-4 (1969);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.110 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-4 (1966).
113. DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 15; Ky. CONST. § 20; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
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Despite these broad prohibitions, the third element of attainder, the
loss of civil rights, is not forbidden in any state. Consequently, thirteen
states have been able to enact statutes that suspend or deprive the civil
rights of the convict.114 These deprivations are imposed in two ways: (1)
through statutes suspending the convict's civil rights during
imprisonment for a term of years, " 5 and (2) through civil death, which is
imposed if the convict is imprisoned for life."' Although civil death
statutes deprive the convict of many rights and privileges, it is now
generally agreed that a civil death statute alone will not divest the convict
of his property." 7 In this sense, the courts have moved away from the
original concept of attainder. The civilly dead prisoner, however, may be
unable to protect his property effectively in states where he cannot
institute civil suits"' or create judicially enforceable instruments.",
B. Divestment of a Prisoner's Property
Property divestment upon conviction is a limited and almost non-
existent concept. The convict imprisoned for a term of years, for
example, generally is not divested of his property. 2' In addition, it is now
114. ALASKA STAT. § 11.05.080 (1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1653 (1962); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-310 to -311 (1948); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 222.010 (1962); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4720 to -4721 (1969); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 12-06-27 (1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-06-27 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 66
(1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.240 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1956); S.D,
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-48-35 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-37 (1953).
115. A typical statute states that "[a] sentence of imprisonment in the state prison for any
term less than life suspends all the civil rights of the person so sentenced . MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 94.4720 (1969).
116. Utah, for example, provides that "[a] person sentenced to imprisonment in the state
prison for life is thereafter deemed civilly dead." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-37 (1953).
117. See notes 121-33 on pages 1083-84 infra and accompanying text. A few courts, by
interpreting the term "civil death" literally, have applied different rules to it than to the loss of
rights accompanying a sentence for a term of years. A California court, for example, has noted that
"it has never been doubted that one imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term less than life is capable
of inheriting." In re Dickinson's Estate, 51 Cal. App. 2d 638, 640, 125 P.2d 542,543-44 (1942). But
an earlier California decision held that a person who was civilly dead could not inherit. In re
Donnelly's Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61 (1899). See also 16 OPs. CAL. ArT'y GEN. 131 (1950) (one
serving life sentence cannot inherit without the Adult Authority granting restoration of the right to
inherit). Some courts also have found a difference in the effect of these statutes on the convict's
estate. E.g., Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927).
118. See notes 625-98 supra and accompanying text.
119. See notes 724-67 supra and accompanying text.
120. There are, however, limited situations in which divestment may occur. A Michigan
statute, for example, provides that the wife of a convict sentenced to a term of more than 3 years is
entitled to dower. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.104 (1957). In addition, the California Attorney
General ruled that property created by a prisoner in custody was subject to the convict's ownership
only with the assent of the prison authorities. 27 OP. CAL. ATT'y GEN. 241 (1959). The California
District Court of Appeals reversed in Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8,345 P.2d 513
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well settled that a citizen imprisoned for life in a civil death state is not
divested of his estate unless a statute expressly requires divestment. At
least three states have provisions expressly divesting the convict of his
property.
1. The Origins of Divestment as a Result of Civil
Death.-Without an express legislative mandate, modern courts are
reluctant to divest a convict of his property solely on the basis of a
statute that declares life prisoners civilly dead. Historically, however,
this has not been the case. In Troup v. Wood,'2 1 Chancellor Kent,
interpreting the New York civil death statute,1' stated in dictum that
civil death divested the convict of his estate so that the heirs immediately
inherited his property as if he had died a natural death.1 In a later case,
Platner v. Sherwood,24 Chancellor Kent acknowledged that he had been
partially mistaken in his determination that at common law civil death
divested the felon of his estate. Nevertheless, he found that the enactment
of the civil death statute supplanted the common law and deprived the
attainted felon of his estate.
In 1888, the views espoused in Troup and Platner were overruled in
New York by the landmark case of Avery v. Everett,'2 in which a
convict under a life sentence was devised a remainder interest in his
father's estate. The will provided that if the prisoner died without
children, the property would pass to the testator's nephew. If the effect of
civil death was to vest the prisoner's estate in his heirs, the nephew would
have been immediately entitled to the property. The New York Court of
Appeals, however, declared that there was no basis in the history of civil
death for divestment of a life convict's property.'2
A very v. Everett did not fully settle the status of the prisoner's
(1959), holding that the prisoner retained the ownership of his property despite the absence of the
warden's consent. As a result of this decision, the California statute was amended to allow an
inmate, notwithstanding the duration of his sentence, to own all written material produced by him
during the period of imprisonment. The provision, however, applies only to written literary
creations.
121. 4Johns. Ch. 228 (N.Y. Ch. 1820).
122. The concept of civil death and its immediate divestment of the prisoner's property
originated when execution was the common punishment for serious crime. Damanska, supra note
103, at 351. When life imprisonment was substituted for capital punishment, the concept of civil
death accompanied the life sentence. Accordingly, after the New York legislature made life
imprisonment the penalty for a capital offense, a statute was enacted declaring that the convict
sentenced to life was civilly dead. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTs LAW § 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1969).
123. Troup v. Wood, 4 Johns. Ch. 228,248 (N.Y. Ch. 1820).
124. 6 Johns. Ch. 118 (N.Y. Ch. 1822).
125. 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888).
126. Id. at 321-34, 18 N.E. at 150-55. Apparently the felon's property did not pass to his heirs
at English common law either. E.g., The King v. Haddenham, 104 Eng. Rep. 918,919 (K.B. 1812).
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estate under a civil death statute. Nearly 40 years later an Alabama
court, in Holmes v. King,'2 ' interpreted the state's civil death statute to
find that an offender was divested of his estate upon sentence to life
imprisonment. In Holmes, however, the court was faced with a statute
specifying that, even though the convict was civilly dead, he could
"nevertheless" make a last will and testament within six months after
his sentence.12 Since the statute specifically provided for disposition of
the property after civil death, the Alabama court ruled that the
legislative intent required that the civil death statute result in
divestment.'2
The Alabama view, however, has not been followed by other
courts.'3 In Smith v. Becker,'31 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court
recognized the incongruity of divestment by civil death when release
from prison was possible. Construing a statute specifying that the estate
of a life prisoner was to be "administered and disposed of" as if the
prisoner were actually dead, the court held that the words "administered
and disposed of" applied only to the payment of creditors or to the
disposal of personal property by affirmative action. 3 2 The court
conceded that the legislature could, by express language, cause the
convict's estate to be divested upon civil death, but found the necessary
language had not been used in the statute under consideration.'
2. Divestment by Express Statute.-It is now well settled that the
life convict can be divested of his estate only under an express statute. At
least three states, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Michigan, have express
divestment statutes.
(a) Rhode Island.-The Rhode Island civil death statute is
expressly applicable to property: "Every person imprisoned in the adult
correctional institutions for life shall thereupon, with respect to all rights
127. 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927); accord, Wilkerson v. Moorer, 267 Ala. 296, 101 So.
2d 287 (1958).
128. ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3 (1960), repealed by § I, [1965] Ala. Acts Ist Ex. Sess.
381.
129. 216Ala. at415,113 So. at277.
130. See generally Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87,219 P. 700 (1923). Contra, Wilkerson v. Moorer, 267 Ala.
296, 101 So. 2d 287 (1958) (the life convict's interest in land vested in his heirs upon his
imprisonment). This aspect of the Alabama civil death statute has been repealed. § 1, [1965] Ala.
Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 381, repealing A LA. CODE tit. 61, § 3 (1960).
131. 62 Kan.541,64P. 70(1901).
132. For a similar use of "administration" see R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 13-6-4 (1969).
133. Contra, Dobbs v. Lilley, 86 Kan. 513, 121 P. 505 (1912) (only necessary parties to
foreclosure action are the civilly dead convict's heirs). But see In re Zeph's Estate, 57 N.Y.S. Ct. (50
Hun) 523, 3 N.Y.S. 460 (1888) (civil death not to be treated as natural death).
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of property . . . be deemed to be dead in all respects, as if his or her
natural death had taken place at the time of such conviction . . ."13
Since the life convict's property is to be treated as if he were physically
dead, the clear implication is that his estate is to be administered and his
property given to others. Another statutory provision, however,
authorizes the granting of letters of administration only upon
application of a creditor of the inmate. 35 After granting the letter and
giving notice to all interested parties, the probate court is empowered to
"do all other things required and authorized to be done in the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person." 138 Although the obvious intent of
these two sections is to provide a remedy for the prisoner's creditors, the
clause empowering the court to do "all other things" can result in the
divestment of the life convict's entire estate. Under these statutes, there
can be no administration unless a creditor applies for administration of
the convict's estate. Therefore, the general civil death statute' 37 is the
only provision affecting the property of the life convict who has no
creditors. The Rhode Island statute, however, includes much more than
the mere imposition of civil death. The statute clearly states that the
effect upon the life prisoner is the same as at natural death."3 When
combined with the effect upon the estate of the prisoner with creditors,
the overall intent of the legislative enactment can only be interpreted as
divesting every life convict of his estate."'
(b) Hawaii.-Although there is no civil death statute in effect in
Hawaii, the state has retained a provision for the disposition of a life
prisoner's estate that apparently is a holdover from an earlier civil death
statute.4 0 The present Hawaii statute states: "All property given or in
any manner whatsoever accruing to a convict, shall vest in his guardian
134. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-1 (1969).
135. Id. § 13-6-4. The statute also provides for the granting of letters of administration in
the event of imprisonment for a term of 7 years or more.
136. Id. § 13-6-5.
137. Id. § 13-6-1.
138. Id. § 13-6-7. Similar statutes enacted in New Hampshire and Maine have been re-
pealed. Act of Aug. 26, 1967, [19671 N.H. Laws 289:2, repealing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:8
(1955); ch. 276, [1959] Me. Pub. Laws, repealing ME. REV. STAT. Ch. 154, § 20 (1954). After
abolishing the old doctrine of civil death and the added disabilities of that statute, New Hampshire
adopted the Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons, which is designed to eliminate the
many collateral consequences of a felony conviction. Indicative of the approach of the Act is this
provision: -[A] person convicted of a crime does not suffer civil death or corruption of blood or
sustain loss of civil rights or forfeiture of estate or property, but retains all of his rights ... "
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:3 (Supp. 1969).
139. But cf. Kenyon v. Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 A. 470 (1894) (convict can assume liability
on appeal bond and has inheritance interests).
140. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 83-38 (1955), as amended, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-38
(1968).
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. . . or if he is sentenced for life, shall vest in his heirs."'' Since the
wording of this statute includes only property that the convict acquires
during imprisonment, it apparently does not divest the prisoner of his
property acquired prior to his incarceration, but it does prevent the life
convict from retaining property he inherits, receives, or creates.
(c) Michigan.-A Michigan divorce statute provides: "[A]nd.
when the husband shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life. . . the.
wife shall be entitled to the immediate possession of all her real estate, in
like manner as if her husband were dead.'1 2 Interpreted literally, this
statute authorizes the wife to take immediate possession of all her real
estate upon the life imprisonment of her husband. The wife's real estate
interest at her husband's "death," however, is not defined.4 3 In
addition, the statute provides that the wife receives "possession of," not
title to, her real estate, indicating either that other interests and
proceedings may be involved or that she already has title. Finally, the
words "as if her husband were dead" could give her the dower interest in
her husband's land or could only indicate that she is regarded as feme
sole with independent legal authority. Although it is clear that the
Michigan statute is not intended to sever the life convict from all of his
property, it could divest the convict of some of his real property in order
to give his wife possession.
C. Convicted Criminal's Right to Inherit
At common law,"' the convicted felon generally possessed the right
to inherit.4 5 This rule developed because an heir took an interest in the
estate of his ancestor by operation of law and consequently could not
voluntarily renounce his expectancy."4 The estate vested in him eo
instanti, at the instant of death of the ancestor. The convicted felon,
141. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-38 (1968).
142. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 25.98 (1957).
143. No cases or literature have been found to explain this section. The intent of the statute is
not at all clear. In order to arrive at an understanding of "her real estate" it is first necessary to note
both that the wife may obtain a divorce in Michigan if her husband is confined in prison for 3 years
or more, and that the wife is entitled to dower interest of one-third of all the husband's lands if he is
imprisoned for life, or for a term of over 3 years, "as if he were dead." MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 25.86(3), .104 (1957); id. § 26.221, as modified by the 1947 community property law;
id. § 26.216(l)-(20), which was generally repealed in 1948; id. § 26.216(21). See also
id. § 25.131. In addition, she may obtain a divorce on the grounds of his imprisonment and
presumably receive a share of his property in settlement.
144. Hine v. Simon, 95 Okla. 86, 218 P. 1072 (1923) (construing Arkansas law); cf. Avery v.
Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888).
145. In re Estate of Dickinson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 638, 125 P.2d 542 (1942); Kenyon v.
Saunders, 18 R.I. 590, 30 A.470 (1894).
146. Lauritzen, Only God Can Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 568 (1953).
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therefore, retained the capacity to inherit even though the crown could
expropriate his property under the doctrine of attainder. 1 7 Outraged by
the abuses of colonial judges appointed in England, the early
constitutional conventions adopted provisions prohibiting forfeiture of
estate, attainder of felony, and corruption of blood. Although these
provisions do not specifically cover the mere expectancy of an
inheritance, they have been cited as grounds for protecting the convicted
citizen from arbitrary interference with his interest in succession because
of his criminal conduct."
Today, in the United States, the convicted criminal's capacity to
acquire property by inheritance is governed entirely by state statutes of
descent and distribution. The convict clearly retains the right to inherit
in non-civil death states.' In addition, he is generally permitted to
inherit in states having civil death statutes.'1 The rule usually followed is
that the civil death statute does not deprive convicted criminals of all
civil rights but only those specifically enumerated or sanctioned by prior
judicial holding.'5 ' The civil death statute may, however, indirectly
prevent a convict from inheriting. In In re Lindewall's Will, 5 2 for
example, the New York Court of Appeals held that a civilly dead convict
could not inherit as a surviving spouse because his marital status had
ceased upon imposition of his sentence. Nevertheless, the courts have
generally refrained from tampering with property rights or inheritance
rights that have been left undisturbed by statute.1 53
The most significant exception to the rule that a convict may inherit
147. SeeAveryv. Everett, 110 N.Y. 317, 18 N.E. 148 (1888).
148. Department of Welfare v. Brock, 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915 (1947) (dictum); In re
Shaffer, 184 Misc. 855, 56 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sur. Ct. 1945); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87, 919 P.
700 (1923); Davis v. Laning, 85 Tex. 39, 19 S.W. 846 (1892). See also notes 103-19 on pages
1080-82 supra and accompanying text for discussion of these provisions.
149. E.g., Department of Welfare v. Brock, 306 Ky. 243, 206 S.W.2d 915 (1947) (dictum);
Wadsworth v. Siek, 254 N.E.2d 738 (Ohio P. Ct. 1970).
150. E.g., In re Shaffer, 184 Misc. 855,56 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sur. Ct. 1945); Grooms v. Thomas,
93 Okla. 87, 219 P. 700 (1923). This has not always been the case. In 1899, the California Supreme
Court ruled that "[tihe right of inheritance is a civil right. . .[and that] the legislature may make
the deprivation of this right a portion of the penalty to be imposed for the commission of a crime."
In re Donnely's Estate, 125 Cal. 417,419, 58 P. 61, 61 (1899). The civil death statute applicable to
those sentenced to life imprisonment was amended in 1953 to allow convicts to inherit, thus
overruling the Donnelly decision. Ch. 415, § 1, [1953] Cal. Stats. 1665, amending CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968).
151. See, e.g., In re Fein, 51 Misc. 2d 1012, 274 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Rec.
1966); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87,219 P. 700 (1923); Byers v. Sun Say. Bank, 41 Okla. 728,
139 P. 948 (1914).
152. 287 N.Y. 347,39 N.E.2d 907 (1942).
153. In re Shaffer, 184 Misc. 855, 56 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sur. Ct. 1945); Grooms v. Thomas, 93
Okla. 87,219 P. 700 (1923).
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arises when the offender has been convicted of the felonious killing of the
person from whom he would have inherited. The statutes or case law of
virtually all jurisdictions bar such an individual from sharing in the
estate of his victim. A second exception arises in some states when the
surviving spouse has been guilty, even though not criminally convicted,
of bigamy, adultery, desertion, or non-support. The prevailing view,
however, is that the unfaithful spouse is not denied the right to share in
the family's estate.
1. Denial of Slayer's Right to Succeed to Victim's Estate.-The
rule that a killer should not inherit from his victim has had a perplexing
development.'" Although primarily a creature of the twentieth century,
it is founded upon an ancient maxim of equity, nullus commodum capere
potest de injuria sua propria-no one should be allowed to profit by his
own wrong. Historically, the constitutional and statutory provisions
prohibiting forfeiture of estate formed the major roadblock to full
acceptance of this rule. The judicial technique usually employed to
overcome this impediment was to hold that the felonious murder
precluded vesting of the estate in the felon by operation of law.," Thus,
the killer's property was not forfeited; he was merely prevented by his
wrongdoing from acquiring any new interest.-1' Other courts utilized the
constructive trust approach to accomplish the same result.'57 These
courts permitted the killer to take bare legal title but denied him the
beneficial use and enjoyment of the victim's estate.'
154. This topic has received the attention of numerous writers. See generally J. AMES, Can a
Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 310 (1913):
Chadwick, A Testator's Bounty to His Slayer, 30 L.Q. REv. 211 (1914); Lauritzen, Only God Can
Make an Heir, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 568 (1953); McGovern, Homicide and Succession to Property, 68
MICH. L. REV. 65 (1969); Thomas, Trusts and Succession, 10 MIAMI L.Q. 414 (1955); Vanneman,
The Constructive Trust: A Neglected Remedy in Ohio, 3 OHIO S.L.J. 1 (1937); Wade, A cquisition
of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936);
Wade, Restitution-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REV. 857 (1963); Comment,
Homicide-Effect on Wrongdoer's Inheritance, Intestate and Survivorship Rights, 7 MIAMI L.Q.
524 (1952); 9 BAYLOR L. REV. 94 (1957); 70 DICK. L. REV. 213 (1966); 7 S.C.L.Q. 475 (1955); 58
W. VA. L. REV. 197 (1955); 8 Wyo. L.J. 132 (1954).
155. Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57,22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165
A. 470 (1933).
156. Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57,22 So. 2d 525 (1945); In reTyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679,
250 P. 456 (1926).
157. E.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
158. The constititional proscription against corruption of blood was avoided since the killer
never acquired a beneficial interest to pass. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933); In re
Tyler's Estate, 140 Wash. 679, 250 P. 456 (1926). The killer's heirs were not barred from acquiring
an interest in the estate if they could do so directly as heirs of the deceased. Bates v. Wilson, 313 Ky.
572, 232 S.W.2d 837 (1950); Estate of Wolyniec v. Moe, 94 N.J. Super. 43, 226 A.2d 743 (Ch.
1967); Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S.C. 365, 173 S.E. 545 (1934). In addition, no attainder of felony was
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At present, many jurisdictions have slayer's statutes applying the
rule that the killer cannot inherit from his victim. Although the
constitutionality of these provisions is universally accepted, 59 the statutes
have been narrowly construed' on the theory that they are penal
provisions. "' Some courts are reluctant to extend the operation of the
bar without express legislative declaration. 62 Consequently, an offender
convicted of voluntary manslaughter may be allowed to inherit from his
victim where the statute applies only to murderers.6 3 Generally,
however, the courts bar succession to the killer because of the clear
manifestation of the legislative intent to prevent a wrongdoer from
profiting from his crime.
6 4
In the absence of a statute, the courts frequently graft the ancient
maxim onto existing laws of descent and distribution. As one court has
stated in this regard, "to our mind our statutes of descents and
distributions are so largely expressive of the common law that we must
consider these maxims and the whole body of the applicable common-
law doctrines; that we must read them together as parts and parcels of
the same system ... ""
(a) Types of succession barred to the slayer.-The overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions, either by statute, judicial decision, or by
imposition of a constructive trust, deny the inheritance right to
murderers.'66 In states without slayer's acts, the majority6 7 of courts
worked since the killer was not prevented from transmitting his own property or estate. The heirs of
the killer who were unable to take directly as heirs of the deceased were not deprived of any right or
property because the killer himself had no vested interest to pass.
159. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918), aff/don rehearing, 104 Kan.
689, 180 P. 811 (1919); Wilson v. Bates, 313 Ky. 333, 231 S.W.2d 39 (1950); Egelhoff v. Presler, 44
Ohio L. Abs. 376 (Franklin County P. Ct. 1945); cf. Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn.
39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907).
160. Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491, 95 A.2d 71 (1953); see In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal.
91,121 P. 370 (1912).
161. Bird v. Plunkett, 139 Conn. 491,95 A.2d 71 (1953); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64
S.E.2d 809 (1951).
162. Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Contra, Parks v. Dumas, 321
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
163. Strickland v. Wysowatcky, 128 Colo. 221,250 P.2d 199 (1952).
164. Pierce v. Pierce, 309 Ky. 77,216 S.W.2d 408 (1949) (by implication); Conner v. Holbert,
49 Tenn. App. 319,354 S.W.2d 809 (1961).
165. Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621,636, 108 S.W. 641,645 (1908).
166. E.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889) (decisional law); Garner v.
Phillips, 229 N.C. 160, 47 S.E.2d 845 (1948) (constructive trust); Bauman v. Hogue, 160 Ohio St.
296, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953) (statute).
167. E.g., Weaver v. Hollis, 247 Ala. 57,22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505,
165 A. 470 (1933); Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954); In re Miller's Estate, 17
Misc. 2d 508, 186 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sur. Ct. 1959). Of the 17 jurisdictions that have not adopted
statutes barring the killer, 10 have adopted the majority rule by court decision; 3 utilize the
constructive trust; and 4 apparently have not passed on the matter.
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follow the general rule that a felonious killer should be deni(d both
testate and intestate succession.' m
Slayer's statutes have been enacted in 34 states and the District of
Columbia. There is considerable variation in the language employed and
in the specific types of succession denied. The statutes of 29 states", and
the District of Columbia 70 expressly bar the killer from "acquiring" his
victim's estate. Most of these provisions specifically bar both testate and
intestate succession by their plain meaning. Four states prohibit a
168. An analagous situation has arisen when the murderer and the victim have both held
vested rights in the same property at the time of the offense. The reasoning generally employed
to overcome the constitutional arguments against allowing a killer to inherit from his victim has not
always been persuasive with respect to property rights vested at the time of the murder.
Nevertheless, the same fundamental policy considerations exist for denying to the felonious killer
any material gain that might result from his crime. Consequently, a great many courts, perhaps a
majority, have adopted solutions that permit the killer to retain the rights he held prior to the
offense but bar him from acquiring any new or different interest. This bar is generally applied even
though the interest would be acquired pursuant to a contract or conveyance concluded prior to the
killing. The issue has been hotly contested on both sides, but the trend of the decisions points clearly
toward preventing the killer from enriching himself by virtue of his crime. E.g., Budwit v. Herr, 339
Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954) (4-4 decision). See generally Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417,
218 P.2d 514 (1950) (joint tenancy and personalty); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1951) (tenancy by the entirety); Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill. 2d 106, 129 N.E.2d 699 (1955) (joint tenancy;
constructive trust imposed); National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957)
(tenancy by the entirety; constructive trust imposed); In re Foster's Estate, 182 Kan. 315, 320 P.2d
855 (1958) (joint tenancy); Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1953) (tenancy by the entirety);
Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538, 78 N.W.2d 450 (1956) (joint tenancy complicated by an
insanity issue); Van Alstyne v. Tufty, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (tenancy by
the entirety); Porth v. Porth, 3 N.C. App. 485, 165 S.E.2d 508 (1969) (joint and survivor bank
account and tenancy by the entirety); Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N.E.2d 330 (1953)
(joint and survivor bank account); Hargrave v. Taylor, 236 Ore. 451, 389 P.2d 36 (1964) (tenancy
by the entirety; constructive trust imposed); Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100
S.W. 108 (1907) (tenancy by the entirety).
169. ALASKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (West 1954); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.31 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-
909 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
3, §§ 15(a), 49(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-513 (1964); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 964-66 (West 1952); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 525.87 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 479,672 (1942); Nm. REV. STAT. § 30-119 (1964);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 134.130 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-10 (1953); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 112.455-555 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.6 (1950); Id. §§ 3441-56
(1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109,-207 (1955); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. '§§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-46
(1957).
170. D.C. CODEANN. § 19-320 (1967).
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surviving spouse from obtaining an interest in the victim's estate.7 1
Some statutes also have denied acquisition by trust,1 72 deed,'13 remainder,
reversion, or executory devise'74 or through termination of any other
intermediate estate. 75 Several jurisdictions have appended to the specific
exemptions a general catch-all phrase denying acquisition in any other
manner.
7 6
The policy objectives implicit in these statutes have been conducive
to judicial disposition of matters consistent with legislative intent. Thus,
in at least one case, the statute's existence permitted delaying the final
distribution of a son's interest in his father's estate in order to allow
authorities to complete their investigation where the son was suspected
of the killing.'tr
Despite the attention these statutes have drawn, however, they can
precipitate results contrary to their purposes. A slayer's statute for
example, was held inapplicable in a murder-suicide case where the
victim-wife outlived the killer-husband by a few hours. 78 Moreover, in
Pierce v. Pierce,7 9 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that-a son who
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the killing of his father
could take title to his father's land as the heir of his grandfather.
Courts frequently frustrate the intent of the slayer's statutes by
171. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15(a),
49(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15
(1966).
172. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ I12.455-.555 (Supp. 1969).
173. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, -207
(1955).
174. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp.
1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455-.555 (Supp. 1969);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to-20
(1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967).
175. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19
(Baldwin 1964).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 3 1A-3 to -15 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-
04-23 (1960); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, -207 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967). CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp.
1967) provides that the inheritance rights of the killer are "to be determined by common-law,
including equity." IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953) does not prohibit succession to legal title, but
imposes a constructive trust.
177. Blakely Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C.2d 648 (Montgomery County Orphans' Ct. 1962)..
178. Gatto Estate No. 2, 74 Pa. D. & C. 529 (Allegheny County Orphans' Ct. 1950). The
Pennsylvania act is modeled after the statute proposed by Dean John W. Wade in 1936. Compare
Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L.
REV.715 (1936), with PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (1964).
179. 309 Ky. 77,216 S.W.2d408 (1949).
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holding that the manner of acquisition is other than by inheritance. By
employing this technique, courts have allowed the distributive share
provided in lieu of dower or curtesy and the widow's allowance or.
exemption to pass to a felonious killer. One view has been that the widow
is entitled to the distributive share as a matter of contract, not
inheritance."'0 Likewise, the statutory allowance has been treated as
falling outside the ambit of the statutes of descent and distribution. In In
re Mertes' Estate,18' for example, the statutory allowance was viewed as
a "preferred claim." The court stated that "the act in question is
confined to 'devise' and 'descent' and [can] not be made to apply in this
case . . ,,l11 In In re Pinder's Estate,'" on the other hand, a
Pennsylvania court found the statutory allowance to be "a gratuity,"
and held that "the widow's exemption is forfeited where the evidence
establishes that she [is] the slayer of her spouse."u The case law of Ohio
supplies another illustration of this diversity of views and an indication
of the general trend of the decisions. Two decisions by lower courts"i
initially determined that the statutory exemption falls outside the
stricture of the statute barring a killer from inheriting from his victim.
Later, in Bauman v. Hogue'" the Ohio Supreme Court overruled these
cases and denied the exemption. Specifically, the court reasoned: "We
do not . . . have a situation where denial of recovery would amount to
taking away a vested right because of the crime. We have a situation
where allowing defendant recovery would amount to giving [him] a
vested right because of the crime."8 7
Some jurisdictions, in order to avoid frustration of a clear public
policy, have adopted the constructive trust approach.' This theory
involves a blend of the equity maxim and a rejection of the idea that the
court should engraft the bar onto the laws of succession.' This line of
reasoning, however, has not been without its difficulties. One court, for
180. In re Kuhn's Estate, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N.W. 151 (1904), overruled by IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633.535 (1964). But see Wright v. Daniels, 164 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa 1969).
181. 181 Ind.478, 104 N.E. 753 (1914), overruled by IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953).
182. Id. at 481, 104 N.E. at 754.
183. 61 Pa. D.&C. 193 (Delaware County Orphans' Ct. 1947).
184. Id. at 194.
185. Tyack v. Tipton, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 115 N.E.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1951); Egelhoff v.
Presler, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 376 (Franklin County P. Ct. 1945).
186. 160 Ohio St.296, 116 N.E.2d439 (1953).
187. Id.at302, 116 N.E.2d at442.
188. E.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Hargrove v. Taylor, 236 Ore.
451,389 Pl2d 36 (1964); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953).
189. Abbey v. Lord, 168 Cal. App. 2d 499,336 P.2d 226 (1959) (dictum); Vesey v. Vesey, 237
Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952).
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example, sought to invoke the trust to prevent the killer's "unjust
enrichment." 10 Upon analyzing the estate, the court decided that it was
"'considerably less than what' he [had] expended for her during their
marriage of ten months," found no enrichment, and allowed the estate
to pass to the killer.' 9'
(b) Crimes for which inheritance is denied.-Slayer's acts specify
a number of crimes, generally felonies, as grounds for denial of the
killer's right of inheritance from his victim. These acts prevent one who
has "murdered"'' 92 or "feloniously taken the life" of another9 3 from
succeeding to the deceased's estate. Some statutes deny the right of
inheritance: to one who has committed a "willful," "unlawful" or
"intentional" homicide194 or to one who has simply "killed" another."95
In addition to barring the person who actually committed the homicide,
some jurisdictions deny inheritance rights to those who "procure" the
killing of another"' or who are guilty of "aiding or abetting,"
"conspiracy," or "accessory" to an unlawful killing."97 Some statutes
190. Kelley v. State, 105 N.H. 240, 196 A.2d 68 (1963).
191. Id.at243, 196 A.2d at71.
192. ALASKASTAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 731.31 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
3, §§ 15(a), 49(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.130 (1967); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40A-2-10 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 84, § 231 (1970); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968). The statutes of Colorado, Connecticut,
New Mexico, and Ohio specify either first or second degree murder.
193. CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (West 1954); CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp.
1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-513 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87
(1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-10 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 112.455-.555 (Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-46 (1957).
194. CAL. CIr. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (West 1954); CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp.
1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 479,672 (1942); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 1.6 (1950); id. §§ 3441-56 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962) (specifically excepts involuntary manslaughter); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967); WASH. REy. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967).
195. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 964-66 (West 1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-119 (1964); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-109,-207 (1955).
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); KAN.
STAT.ANN. § 59-513 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1969); MIss. CODEANN. §§ 479,672
(1942); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455-.555 (Supp. 1969);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-I to -20
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, -207 (1955); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-46 (1959).
197. ALASKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-
119 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin
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specifically exempt those guilty of accidental killing or homicide
committed in self-defense from being deprived of their right to
succession .198
The typical statutory problem faced by a court interpreting this
portion of a slayer's statute is whether to allow a person guilty of a lesser
offense, such as manslaughter, to succeed to the estate of the victim when
the statute specifies a greater offense, such as murder. A majority of the
jurisdictions that have considered this problem have allowed the estate to
pass.19 These courts have reasoned that the legislative provision has
pre-empted the fieldm or that the technical language used ties the court's
hands.2 0' A minority of courts, however, have denied succession to
intentional killers whose conviction was for a lesser crime than that
specified in the statute .202 These jurisdictions hold that the statute does
not abrogate the common law; and consequently, where the crime does
not fall within the legislative provision, inheritance rights will be
determined in light of common law precepts.?
In jurisdictions without statutes, the rule has been to apply the bar
in cases involving willful and intentional killings only. Thus, wrongful
killers, 20 4 felonious killers,2 intentional killersm and those guilty of
1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.6 (1950); id. §§ 3441-56 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109,
-207 (1955); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2
(1966). Alaska stands alone in specifically denying succession to the "accessory after the fact" to a
felonious killing. ALASKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962). Louisiana, following the civil law, prevents
participation in the estate of the ancestor for those deemed "unworthy." This term covers a
multitude of offenses including killing, attempted killing, calumniously accusing the deceased, or
failing to denounce the killer of the deceased to justice. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 966, 968 (West
1952).
198. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109, -207
(1955).
199. E.g., In re Daniel's Estate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 284,260 P.2d 991 (1953).
200. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 79 N.M. 435,444 P.2d 762 (1968); Wadsworth v. Siek, 50 Ohio
Op. 2d 507,254 N.E.2d 738 (P. Ct. 1970).
201. In re Kirby's Estate, 162 Cal. 91, 121 P. 370 (1912).
202. McGhee v. Banks, 115 Ga. App. 155, 154 S.E.2d 37 (1967) (semble); Wilson v. Board of
Trustees, 108 Ill. App. 2d 210, 246 N.E.2d 701 (1969); Rose v. Rose, 79 N.M. 435,444 P.2d 762
(1968) (semble). In one unusual case, the court allowed the estate to pass to a convicted felon in the
face of a statute barring those guilty of felonious killing. Hatcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F.
Supp. 808 (D. Ore. 1956). A woman was set upon by her husband who was in a drunken rage. She
picked up a knife, and in the resulting melee he was killed, apparently having fallen on the weapon.
She pleaded guilty to "assault with a dangerous weapon." Although the judge hearing the civil case
considered her guilty of "manslaughter," he nevertheless held that the homicide did not constitute
"felonious taking" within the meaning of the statute.
203. Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 108 Il1. App. 2d 210,246 N.E.2d 701 (1969).
204. Horn v. Cole, 203 Ark. 361, 156 S.W.2d 787 (1941).
205. Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131 (Del. Ch. 1969).
206. Wells v. Harris, 434 S.W.2d 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
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manslaughter and murder t have been barred from testate and intestate
succession despite the absence of a statute. A few courts employ the
constructive trust to accomplish the same end.m
Regardless of whether a court employs common law doctrines or
construes a statute, the insane killer has consistently been allowed to
inherit from his victim?0 It has been held, however, that a slayer is
barred if he was sane at the time of the murder but subsequently becomes
insane. 10
(c) Procedural effect of criminal conviction.-The majority view
is that a criminal conviction is not a condition precedent to the civil
adjudication of the killer's inheritance rights. 211 Courts following this
view typically assume jurisdiction and try the relevant issues as an
incident to the disposition of the decedent's estate.212 Thus, regardless of
the outcome of the prior criminal trial or even when there has been no
criminal prosecution, these courts determine the applicability of the bar
on the basis of the evidence before them.
In those states where the slayer's statute requires a criminal
conviction or final adjudication,213 the majority view is that a judgment
207. Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954) (murder); Riggs v. Palmer, 115
N.Y. 506,22 N.E. 188 (1889) (murder); In re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Sur.
Ct. 1939) (manslaughter).
208. Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d 131 (Del. Ch. 1969); Dutill v. Dana, 148 Me. 541, 113 A.2d
499 (1952); In re Estate of Mahoney, 126 Vt. 31, 220 A.2d 475 (1966).
209. E.g., Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956); Anderson v. Grasberg, 247 Minn. 538,78
N.W.2d 450 (1956); In re Estate of Bobula, 19 N.Y.2d 818, 227 N.E.2d 49, 280 N.Y.S.2d 152
(1967) (4-3 decision). The test for insanity normally used is that applicable to the criminal
proceeding. In Anderson v. Grasberg, however, the M'Naghten rule was abolished in favor of a
more realistic test for use in civil trials.
210. Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146, 75 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
211. E.g., Legette v. Smith, 226 S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 575 (1955); cf. Weaver v. Hollis, 247
Ala. 57,22 So. 2d 525 (1945); Goldsmith v. Pearce, 345 Mich. 146,75 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
212. E.g., Bauman v. Hogue, 160 Ohio St. 296, 116 N.E.2d 439 (1953); Conner v. Holbert,
49 Tenn. App. 319, 354 S.W.2d 809 (1961).
213. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia require criminal conviction. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (West 1954); CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.31 (1964); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15(a), 49(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1964); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 964-66 (West 1952); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-119 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.130 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-10
(1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 424-2
(1968). Four states require final adjudication. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1964); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953). N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966) specifically provides for
those who have entered pleas of guilty or nolo contendere that have been accepted by the criminal
court and had judgment rendered thereon. This statute also provides that where suicide is involved,
the civil proceeding may pass upon inheritance rights of the killer in the absence of a conviction.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970) recognizes convictions had under the laws of "any other
state or Foreign Country."
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by a criminal court is the sine qua non for a subsequent civil
determination of inheritance rights.214 Consequently, a complaint that
does not allege a conviction is fatally defective.21- Moreover, the record
of an acquittal is a complete defense at the subsequent civil trial .21 A few
courts have held that the inheritance bar should be applied only after the
crime has been established "beyond a reasonable doubt. t217
Another question raised by the statutory provision requiring
conviction is what precisely constitutes a conviction. At least two
decisions have held that conviction results only after a trial where the
accused has been afforded the opportunity to defend himself.2l8 An
opinion rendered by a coroner's jury is not equivalent to a conviction. 219
In situations where a prior conviction or acquittal has been
obtained, the courts have divided on whether to give the judgment
collateral estoppel affect. The majority view is that the record of the
criminal proceeding should not be determinative of whether the accused
committed the crime.m These cases cite differing standards of proof,
burdens of proof, and public policy as the rationale behind their
denials.22 1 A minority of courts2 and two jurisdictions by statute
2
23
provide that the record of the criminal proceeding must be given
collateral estoppel effect. These courts reason that the retrial of the same
issue is purposeless. Where a criminal conviction has been reached, the
lower standard of proof imposed during the civil trial will inevitably
precipitate the same conclusion. The minority rule has been criticized,
however, because these lower standards may result in barring the slayer
from succession when an acquittal or conviction of a lesser offense has
resulted from the earlier trial.24
214. E.g., Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417,218 P.2d 514 (1950); Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d
847 (Fla. 1956); National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957).
215. Hill v. Morris, 85 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956).
216. McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479,91 S.E.2d 231 (1956).
217. Peeples v. Corbett, 117 Fla. 213, 157 So. 510 (1934).
218. In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 172 A. 139 (1934); Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152
S.E. 506 (1930).
219. United Trust Co. v. Pyke, 199 Kan. 1,427 P.2d 67 (1967); Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323,
152 S.E. 506 (1930).
220. E.g., In re Johnston's Estate, 220 Iowa 328,261 N.W. 908 (1935); Legettev. Smith, 226
S.C. 403, 85 S.E.2d 576 (1955). The Uniform Probate Code recommends that conviction have
collateral estoppel effect, but would deny such effect to acquittals. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-
803, Comment.
221. Note 220 supra.
222. E.g., McMichael v. Proctor, 243 N.C. 479, 91 S.E.2d 231 (1956); cf. In re Kirby's
Estate, 162 Cal. 91, 121 P. 370 (1912); Wilson v. Board of Trustees, 108 111. App. 2d 210, 246
N.E.2d 701 (1969); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968).
223. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (West 1954); CAL. PROB. CODE § 258 (West Supp.
1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953).
224. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803, Comment.
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The majority view, in effect, permits an accused to be tried twice for
the same criminal offense.? This result is favored, it is said, because the
policy against allowing a murderer to inherit from his victim is so strong
that the lower standard of proof in the civil proceeding is necessary to
protect the public interest?2 A second argument supporting the majority
position is that the defendant at the prior criminal proceeding may not
be fully aware of the civil consequences and may therefore refrain from
litigating the issues as vigorously as possible.=
(d) Evidentiary value of judgment record.-Most jurisdictions
have had to decide whether the record of judgment in a prior criminal
case may be introduced into evidence at a civil determination of
inheritance rights?8 An in-depth analysis of this problem is beyond the
scope of this Project.?9 However, the courts have split on the issue with
the majority view holding that such a judgment should not be
admissible?210 A minority of jurisdictions allow the judgment to have
evidentiary value?'31
(e) Transmission of the slayer's portion of the estate.-In states
where a killer is barred from participating in the estate of the deceased,
the final problem is disposing of the portion he would have received?.
32
Some statutes provide that the murderer is deemed to have predeceased
the victim for purposes of transmitting the estate. 2  Other slayer's acts
225. See, e.g., National City Bank v. Bledsoe, 237 Ind. 130, 144 N.E.2d 710 (1957).
226. Id. Judge Alexander expressed a similar feeling in Gholson v. Smith, 210 Miss. 28,48
So. 2d 603 (1950) when he said, "A jury, sympathetic with human frailties, may by acquittal seek to
justify the means by approving the achieved end. In this civil proceeding, we find ourselves in a
forum where misplaced emphases may be reviewed and where civil rights may be pondered in an
atmosphere undisturbed by the invisible currents which are apt to sway the judgment of those who
hold in their hands the life of an accused, and who, despite high resolution, seek out bits of
extenuation amid the wreckage of broken homes." Id. at 32,48 So. 2d at 605.
227. See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1671a (3d ed. 1940).
228. The following statutes provide that the record of judgment of the criminal trial is
admissible as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings: IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142
(Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); ORE.
REv. STAT. §§ 112.455 -.555 (Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.6 (1950); id. §§ 3441-56
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1
to -20 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967).
229. See generally Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 295 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 167 la (3d ed. 1940).
230. E.g., Smith v. Dean, 226 Ark. 438,290 S.W.2d 439 (1956). See also note 229 supra.
231. Smith v. Dean, 226 Ark. 438,441,290 S.W.2d 439,441 (1956) (dissenting opinion). See
also note 229 supra.
232. See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS (2d ed. 1953).
233. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967);
GA. CODEANN. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129to-142 (Supp. 1969); ILL.
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pass the estate to the remaining heirs-at-law.2m
Where the victim dies intestate, the majority of jurisdictions pass
the killer's portion to the other heirs-at-law as provided by the statute,9
of descent and distribution. 25 Under this rule, the killer's heirs are
denied succession. The courts have reasoned that the statutory bar does
not create a new heir but merely deprives the right of succession to one
who, but for his criminal act, could take.2 Generally, this reasoning has
not been extended to cover those cases where a child of the killer can take
directly as an heir of the victim.m A minority of jurisdictions treat the
wrongdoer as having predeceased the victim for purposes of passing the
estate.m
The most common solution adopted where the victim has died
testate has been to honor the deceased's intent whenever possible. 2
Thus, an alternative beneficiary has received the proceeds when the
primary beneficiary feloni6usly killed the testator.2 14 When this solution
is not practical, the testator is frequently deemed to have died intestate,
ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 15(a), 49(a) (Smith-Hurd '1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-119 (1964); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1964); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966) (permits contrary rules of law or equity to take preference).
234. ALASKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.535 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (1969); MiSS. CODE
ANN. §§ 479,672 (1957); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.130 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15
(1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970); PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1.6(c) (1950); Id. 3441-56
(1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109,-207 (1955); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 2-46 (1957). In addition, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967) specifically
bars the killer's heirs from participating in the estate of the deceased. The Indiana act makes the
heirs-at-law the beneficiaries of a constructive trust. The acts of North Carolina and Alaska also
provide that a testate victim will be treated as if intestate unless the provisions of the will indicate
otherwise. Some states specifically protect the rights of the bona fide purchaser by provisions of the
slayer's act. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-320 (1967).
235. Hamblin v. Marchant, 103 Kan. 508, 175 P. 678 (1918), affd on rehearing, 104 Kan.
689, 180 P. 811 (1919); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908).
236. In re Norton's Estate, 175 Ore. 115, 151 P.2d 719 (1944); McGhee v. Banks, 115 Ga.
App. 155, 154 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
237. Bates v. Wilson, 313 Ky. 572, 232 S.W.2d 837 (1950). South Carolina has interpreted
the word "immediately" in its statute to include the children of the killer where they can take
directly as heirs of the slain ancestor. Rasor v. Rasor, 173 S.C. 365, 175 S.E. 545 (1934). See also
Estate of Wolyniec v. Moe, 94 N.J. Super. 43,226 A.2d 743 (Ch. 1967).
238. E.g., Wilson v. Bates, 313 Ky. 333,231 S.W.2d 39 (1950).
239. In an unusual murder-suicide case, the murderess died testate, leaving everything to her
murdered son. The court held that the maxim that a killer or his estate should not profit from the
wrong did not warrant extension to the facts of the case and allowed the estate to pass as provided
by the will of the wrongdoer. In re Meyer's Estate, 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1950).
240. Welch v. Welch, 252 A.2d' 131 (Del. Ch. 1969); see In re Will of Wilson, 5 Wis. 2d 178,
92 N.W.2d 282 (1958) (remanded to trial court to determine intent of testatrix).
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and his property is divided among his heirs as provided by the laws of
descent and distribution.241
2. Denial of Inheritane Rights to Surviving, Spouse for
Misconduct.-In addition to the rule that the killer cannot inherit from
his victim, some jurisdictions deny succession to a spouse guilty of
abandonment, non-support, adultery, or bigamy.A2  The bar typically
operates as a result of statutory provisions.23 Some jurisdictions have
adopted the rule in the absence of a statute by relying on equitable
considerations.2
44
(a) Abandonment and non-support.-The general rule is that
abandonment and non-support will not bar the surviving spouse from
inheriting. Courts have followed this rule regardless of the
circumstances. In In re Torres' Estate,2-1 for example, a husband, who
abandoned his wife and had not contributed to her support for 40 years,
was allowed to inherit notwithstanding the fact that her ,estate was
entirely the product of her own effort. This result is avoided in the
minority ofjurisdictions where the surviving spouse who has deserted the
household cannot inherit from the deceased.4 6
Separation is distinguished from abandonment.24 7 It is uniformly
held that a separation must constitute grounds for divorce before it will
bar the spouse from successionY8s It is also obviously recognized that
living apart by consent of the parties is not in itself desertion.
24 9
However, a separation not originally amounting to willful abandonment
may become so by the commission of acts indicating an intent to desert
the spouse.250 Some jurisdictions also deprive a husband of inheritance
rights for failing to support his wife in the absence of desertion. 21
Few cases have considered whether one confined in prison may be
241. E.g., Whitney v. Lott, 134 N.J. Eq. 586, 36 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1944); Ellerson v. Westcott,
148 N.Y. 149,42 N.E. 540 (1896).
242. E.g., Simms v. Kirk, 81 Ind. App. 515, 144 N.E. 146 (1924); In re Barnes' Estate, 149
Misc. 149,267 N.Y.S. 634 (Sur. Ct. 1943); In re Mehaffey's Estate, 102 Pa. Super. 228, 156 A. 746
(1931).
243. E.g., In re Baker's Estate, 182 Misc. 891, 45 N.Y.S.2d 435 (Sur. Ct. 1943); Shue's
Estate, 52 Lanc. L. Rev. 207 (Pa. Lancaster County Orphans' Ct. 1950).
244. Minor v. Higdon, 215 Miss. 513,61 So. 2d 350 (1952).
245. 61 Nev. 156, 120 P.2d 816 (1942).
246. E.g., In re Browning's Estate, 153 Misc. 564, 276 N.Y.S. 262 (Sur. Ct. 1934); In re
Nixon's Estate, 104 Pa. Super. 506, 159 A. 172 (1932).
247. Fellabaum v. Alvarez, 165 Pa. Super. 173, 67 A.2d 788 (1949).
248. In re Crater's Estate, 372 Pa. 458, 93 A.2d 475 (1953).
249. In re Richardson Estate, 6 Ches. Co. Rep. 221 (Pa. Chester County Orphans' Ct. 1954).
250. In re Williamson's Estate, 123 Conn. 424, 196 A. 770 (1937).
251. E.g., In re Byrnes' Estate, 51 Misc. 2d 567, 273 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sur. Ct. 1966); In re
Finch's Estate, 86 Pa. Super. 238 (1925).
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barred from inheriting as a surviving spouse on the grounds of
abandonment or failure to support. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
however, directly treated this question in In re Buckley's Estate.F2 The
court, interpreting a local statute that barred those guilty of either willful
desertion or non-support from inheriting, held that a prisoner was
precluded from succession. Nevertheless, the court, emphasizing the
husband's duty to support his wife, was careful not to hold that
imprisonment per se constituted desertion23 Rather, it was merely
determined that a record of numerous offenses and resulting
confinement raised a presumption against the prisoner and shifted the
burden of going forward to him. By failing to show that he had
contributed to the support of his wife during the intervening periods of
freedom, the prisoner failed to overcome this presumption and was
barred from participating in her estate.
Other situations may present themselves to the courts. Will the
widow of a deceased convict who deserts her husband be able to claim
his estate by asserting his confinement as ajustifiable excuse for her own
misconduct? A number of factors will have to be weighed before an
equitable result is reached. Most states provide criminal conviction as
grounds for divorce.254 Thus, the conviction and confinement of the
husband might be regarded as legal cause entitling the wife to establish a
separate residence. In the absence of a final decree of divorce, however,
her position would remain unchanged as a surviving spouse and she
would not be barred from participating in the estate.2 The Buckley
case, on the other hand, lends some support to the proposition that
confinement alone does not constitute willful desertion. If this theory is
followed, the wife's activities would be unexcused and she could be
barred as a willful deserter.
252. 348 Pa. 311,35 A.2d 69 (1944).
253. Thomas Buckley, the surviving husband, was shown to have been a persistent offender.
During the period 1926 to 1943, he had been in and out of penal institutions in Ohio and
Pennsylvania. At the time of the audit of the wife's estate, he was serving a prison term for burglary.
The lower court held that for over a year he had willfully neglected to provide for his wife and for
that period had maliciously deserted her. On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had only to
decide whether the proof supported the findings. Under Pennsylvania precedent, applicable at the
time, the burden of proof of non-support or desertion rested with the party asserting it as a bar to
succession.
254. See notes 13-66 on pages 1066-73 supra and accompanying text. At least one state has
held that penal confinement itself constitutes willful desertion within the meaning of the divorce
law. Brady v. Brady, 98 N.J. Super. 600, 238 A.2d 201 (Ch. 1968), noted in 23 RUTGERS L.
REV. 389 (1969).
255. In those jurisdictions applying an inheritance bar for desertion, non-support, adultery,
or bigamy, the general rule has been that excused wrongdoing will not bar the succession. Thus,
adultery has been overlooked when it occurred subsequent to an aggravated desertion. In re
Costello's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 481 (Philadelphia County Orphans' Ct. 1962).
[Vol. 231100
CIVIL DISABILITIES
Another difficulty is encountered when statutes barring inheritance
by willful deserters specify minimum periods for establishing the
necessary abandonment.21 When these statutes are in effect, an initial
question is whether confinement tolls the running of this period if the
abandonment began prior to incarceration. Buckley indicates that it
does not. These statutes raise an additional problem because a prisoner
may be deprived of an opportunity for effecting a limited reconciliation
with the wronged spouse while incarcerated. The general rule is that
reconciliation must be accompanied by cohabitation to restore
inheritance rights.m
(b) Adultery and bigamy.-The general rule is that neither
adultery nor bigamy constitutes grounds for denying inheritance
rights.258 Some jurisdictions, however, bar the wrongdoer for such
conduct under a statutory penaltyss or a common law determination. 2
Where the bar is in effect, a criminal conviction is not required, "2 1 and
the surviving spouse can be denied succession when the preponderance of
the evidence indicates such behavior. Where adultery or bigamy is not
recognized as an independent ground for denying inheritance, such
conduct may indicate a willful, malicious intent, thus transforming mere
separation into desertion that will bar the succession.
22
D. Appointment of a Representative to Protect the Prisoner's Property
Confinement in prison can be particularly burdensome to the
property-owning convict who can no longer effectively supervise his
business interests and protect his property from the acts of others. One
method of circumventing the restrictions on economic activity during
imprisonment and alleviating any hardships upon the prisoner is through
the appointment of a representative to act for him. Although guardians
and conservators have traditionally been appointed only for mental
incompetents and infants, a number of states have statutes making this
protection available to prisoners, but most of these provisions are so
severely restricted that they are of only limited value. Another way of
achieving estate protection for the prisoner is by the use of such devices
as the private express trust, bailment, and agency.
256. E.g., PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 1.6 (1950) (for one year or upwards).
257. In re Shue's Estate, 52 Lanc. L. Rev. 207 (Pa. Lancaster County Orphans' Ct. 1950).
258. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 46 A.2d 619 (1945); Rowell v. Rowell, 251 Miss.
472, 170 So. 2d 267 (1964).
259. E.g., Owen v. Owen, 57 Ind. 291 (1877).
260. E.g., Nedd v. Starry, 143 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
261. Daniels v. Taylor, 145 F. 169 (8th Cir. 1906).
262. In re Lodge's Estate, 287 Pa. 184, 134 A.472 (1926).
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1. Statutes Authorizing the Appointment of Fiduciary
Representatives for Convicts.-Appointment of a fiduciary
representative for an individual who is not sui juris has long been
authorized by statute in Anglo-American law. Many statutory terms
have been utilized to describe this representative, most notably
"administrator," "conservator," ".curator," "committee,"
"guardian," and "trustee." Although these terms are technically
distinguishable, the responsibilities of the representatives are similar and
the terms usually may be interchanged without sacrificing accuracy of
description. In this discussion, the terminology used in particular
statutes will be maintained, unless a common term is more
appropriate23
Although most states have provisions permitting the appointment
of fiduciary representatives to manage property for various classes of
persons, convicts generally are not included in these provisions.2 ,
Eighteen states, however, make some specific provision for the
management of the convict's estate by the appointment of a guardian, a
trustee, or a committee. Five states provide for the appointment of
guardians to protect prisoners' property, 25 and four states permit
trustees to be appointed for prisoners .2  Three states, including New
York, which has provisions for both a trustee and a committee,
authorize the appointment of a "committee" for the prisoner.267 A few
states permit the appointment of representatives different from these
three basic types.28 The representatives generally are empowered to
manage, preserve, and apply the convict's property as required, to sue
and defend for the convict, to insure the estate, pay debts, vote stocks,
263. Terminology has presented a problem in dealing with the care and management of
property belonging to incompetent and disabled persons. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-101,
Comment (3d Working Draft 1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18A,
comment c at 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRusTs § 7, comment c at 23
(1959).
264. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 112 (Smith-Hurd 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-101
(1953).
265. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 353-34 (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3601(3) (1964),
as amended, (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93A, § 201 (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 438
(1956); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (Baldwin 1964).
266. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1901 (1964); id. § 59-1902 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 460.010-.160 (1956); N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 350-57 (McKinney 1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 23-18 (1965).
267. N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 320 (McKinney 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-305 (Supp. 1970);
id. § 53-306 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 28-5-33 (1966).
268. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 965.08 (Supp. 1969) (board of commissioners of state institutions);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.10 (1950) (spouse); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.290 (1969) (curator);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 12 (1958) (spouse); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-4 (1969)
(administrator); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-336 (1955) (prison warden).
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pay taxes, employ agents, continue business associations, and perform
other necessary functions.
Many of these statutory provisions for protecting the convict's
economic interests have limitations that severely restrict the degree of
protection afforded. Some of the statutes limit their protection to
inmates sentenced to specified terms of imprisonment. Others only allow
certain persons to be appointed to act for the prisoner. Finally, a number
of statutes restrict the purpose of appointment.
(a) Limitations because of the term of imprisonment.-Three
states, Kansas, Maine, and New York, restrict the application of their
statutes by using the inmate's term of imprisonment as the criterion for
determining whether he is entitled to the appointment of a representative.
Kansas provides for appointment of a trustee only for the inmate
sentenced to life imprisonment 1' and, if the sentence is subsequently
reduced to a less-than-life sentence, the trusteeship is terminated.Y° On
the other hand, Maine appoints guardians only for those convicts
"committed to the State Prison for a term less than life."'' z New York
paradoxically authorizes a committee for the life convict, and a trustee
for the less-than-life convict.
2
There are several possible reasons for the distinctions made in these
statutes between a convict sentenced to a term of years and one sentenced
to life imprisonment. One possible explanation for the Kansas statute
limiting the appointment of a trustee to life convicts is that, until the
legislature repealed the law in 1969, the less-than-life inmate in Kansas
was authorized to contract, while the life convict impliedly was not. 3
Since it was assumed that the less-than-life prisoner did not need a
fiduciary representative because he could contract and manage his own
affairs,' 4 Kansas provided only for appointment for the life convict. This
distinction may pose problems for the less-than-life convict, who has
many needs apart from the need to contract; such needs could be met by
the appointment of a trustee, who, under the laws of Kansas, 27 has full
power to administer and manage property. The Maine provision also
may be explained by an examination of the state's former civil death
269. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1901 (1964).
270. Id. § 59-1903 (Supp. 1969).
27 1. Ch. 242, § 8, [1959] Me. Pub. Laws, as amended ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3601
(Supp. 1970).
272. N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 320,350-57 (McKinney 1968).
273. Ch. 180, § 21-4701, [1969] Kan. Laws, repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-134 (1964).
274. "Convicts imprisoned for less than life may make contracts for sale, lease, mortgage
and management of their property . . . .Hence, no trustee is necessary . KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-1901, Comment of Judicial Council of 1939 (1964).
275. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-1902 (Supp. 1969).
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statute. The Maine statute, repealed in 1959,276 provided for the
administration of the life convict's estate as if he were actually dead.
When the Maine statute was in effect, the life convict had no estate for a
guardian to manage and only those inmates under a less-than-life
sentence needed a guardian. The current limitation on appointments
apparently is a holdover from that civil death approach. Although New
York's appointment of different representatives for the life and the term
sentence is probably the result of its civil death provision,mn no attempt
will be made herein to rationalize why the varying treatment exists in
New York.
(b) Limitations on who can be appointed.-Another limitation on
the effectiveness of the protecting statutes is that only certain persons
can be appointed to represent the prisoner. Two states, Iowa and
Oklahoma, provide that the prisoner's spouse may be empowered to
manage his estate;218 if the prisoner has no spouse, apparently no one can
be appointed to manage his property. These statutes make the prisoner's
estate available to his family while he is confined, but the protection
given to the convict's property is minimal. The prisoner could lose his
property altogether as the result of his spouse's misconduct or
managerial inexperience. If this happened, he would have no equitable
relief because his spouse would not be under the fiduciary duty to
manage the property for his benefit. In addition, if the wife obtains
control over her husband's estate and then procures a divorce, the
convict-husband's interests are not protected.
(c) Limitations on the purpose of appointment.-A third
limitation on provisions protecting the inmate's economic interests
involves the purposes for which a representative may be appointed. A
few statutes, for example, provide for appointment of a representative
for the sole purpose of reaching the inmate's estate rather than
protecting it. Other statutes only authorize fiduciary appointment for
the purpose of representing the convict in litigation.
(i) Appointment for the purpose of reaching the convict's
property.-Three states have statutes providing creditors with a means
of reaching the property of a prisoner. A North Carolina provision, for
example, specifies that a trustee may be appointed to "take charge" of
the estate when "any debtor is imprisoned in the penitentiary for any
term, or in a county jail for any term more than twelve months." z 9 In
276. Ch. 276, [1959] Pub. Laws repealing ME. REV. STAT. ch. 154, § 20 (1954).
277. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-a (McKinney Supp. 1969).
278. IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.10 (1950); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 12 (1958).
279. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 23-18 (1965).
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Rhode Island, a creditor must make the application for appointment of
a representative for the debtor;2 ° the imprisoned debtor is not given the
right to petition for an appointment or to have any choice in who is
appointed. This statute, therefore, is designed to protect the interests of
creditors rather than the interests of inmates.28' A Michigan statute,
included as a part of its Prison Reimbursement Act, permits the county
attorney general to petition for appointment of a guardian for the
convict in order to reach his estate and recover the expense of his
maintenance in prison .2 2 The statute is not designed to protect the
prisoner's estate.
(ii) Appointment for litigation purposes.-Many statutes provide
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the prisoner in
litigation.m Without such appointment, the inmate would be denied any
opportunity to defend his property because he is not normally permitted
to appear personally in court.2 The appointment of a guardian ad litem,
however, does not provide adequate property management or extended
protection to the convict due to the appointment's limited purpose and
duration.
The prison warden in Tennessee is authorized to serve as the
prisoner's guardian for the special purpose of bringing suit to recover
money or goods belonging to the prisoner.2 8. Other states merely
authorize the warden to hold the personal property and effects of the
prisoner.2
2. Application of the Statutes: The Exclusiveness Problem.-The
courts have liberally construed the guardian statutes to permit the
convict to protect his property and prosecute his claims. 2  The courts,
however, have not been in agreement on the question of whether the
statutory provisions authorizing designated legal acts to be made by or
280. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-4 (1969). Imprisonment of 7 years to life is also required.
Id.
281. For a general background of the purposes of these statutes see 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION
COMM'N REP. 180.
282. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1704 (1954). The provision has been held to be constitutional.
Auditor General v. Hall, 300 Mich. 215, 1 N.W.2d 516 (1942). But cf. Murphy v. Barron, 275 Mo.
282, 291,205 S.W. 49, 51 (1918).
283. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-833 to -834 (1962); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-232, -237
(1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 25-46.13 (1969) (in eminent domain proceedings only).
284. See, e.g., Gamer v. Garner, 59 Misc. 2d 29,297 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
285. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-336 (1955).
286. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 246.37 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 209.197 (1969); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 24-2-5 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-336 (1955); TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. art. 6 16 6(y) (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 46.07 (Supp. 1969).
287. See In re Olson's Estate, 202 Misc. 1113, 1115, 118 N.Y.S.2d 81,83-84 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
(dictum).
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through a representative should be construed to require all legal acts by
the convict to be made through this representative. For purposes of
discussion, this question of statutory interpretation will be distinguished
from the question of whether the acts designated in the statute to be
conducted by the representative must be performed solely by him or may
be performed by both the convict and him. Only the former question will
be denominated as the exclusiveness problem.
If the statute authorizing fiduciary appointment is construed to be
exclusive, then all legal acts by the convict must be made through the
appointed fiduciary and any act by the convict individually will be
invalid.2" Thus, an exclusive statute may result in the loss of certain civil
rights by the convict, even in the absence of a civil death statute.2" The
right to contract or sue, for example, may be lost simply because a
provision for the appointment of a representative is held to be an
exclusive remedy. Nevertheless, under the exclusive statutes the
convicted person usually retains all rights to act personally until
imprisoned ° and any disability to act is terminated when he is no longer
confined2" or when he is on parole. 2 2 If the statute is-not considered
exclusive, then the prisoner individually may carry out all legal acts
except those for which a representative must be appointed n 3
In one state, the statute authorizing the appointment of a
representative is specifically made exclusive2 4 and a person under
guardianship cannot effectively act for himself in any area, with the
exception of making a will.? 5 Moreover, several courts2" have either
288. New v. Smith, 73 Kan. 174, 84 P. 1030 (1906); Commissioners of Rice County v.
Lawrence, 29 Kan. 158 (1883). The repeal of the exclusive provision in 1939 invalidates these cases
holding the trustee to be a necessary party. Act of July 1, 1939, ch. 180, § 280, [1939] Kan. Laws,
repealing KAN. REv. STAT. § 62-2002 (1923).
289. Cf., McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 228 Mo. 635, 129 S.W. 21 (1910); Nibert v. Carroll
Trucking Co., 139 W. Va. 583,82 S.E.2d 445 (1954).
290. Harmon v. Bower, 78 Kan. 135,96 P. 51 (1908); Martin v. Long, 92 W. Va. 624, 115
S.E. 791 (1923).
291. Nibert v. Carroll Trucking Co., 139 W. Va. 583,82 S.E.2d 445 (1954).
292. Ward v. Morton, 294 Mo. 408,242 S.W. 966 (1922); Application of White, 166 Misc.
481,2 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Ct. CI. 1938).
293. Hewson v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 358, 279 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1967); Kugel v. Kalik, 176
Misc. 49, 25 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 823, 28 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1941); Davis v.
Duffle, 8 Bosw. (N.Y.) 617 (1861), affd, I Abb. App. Dec. 486, 4 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 478 (1867);
Haynes v. Peterson, 125 Va. 730, 100 S.E. 471 (1919).
294. "Ifa guardian is appointed thereupon, all contracts, except for necessaries, and all gifts,
sales or transfers of real or personal estate after said filing and before the termination of the
guardianship are void." ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3603 (1964).
295. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3607 (Supp. 1970).
296. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 444 S.W.2d I (Mo. App. 1969); Nibert v. Carroll Trucking Co.,
139 W. Va. 583, 82 S.E.2d 445 (1954).
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expressly or impliedly held their statutes to be exclusive, denying the
person under guardianship the right to act personally. While in many
jurisdictions the interpretation given to the representative statutes cannot
be ascertained, an analysis of the purposes enunciated in the statutes and
of the decided cases indicates that most of these jurisdictions also view
their statutes as exclusive.m The second Restatement of Contracts has
adopted the exclusive rule, stating that a convict has no capacity to incur
contractual duties if his property is under guardianship. 21
A few states, on the other hand, have interpreted their representative
provisions to be non-exclusive.2 g One statute provides expressly that the
appointment of a representative will not render the disabled person
incapable of acting by himself.m Moreover, the Uniform Probate Code
does not impose any incapacity upon a person under guardianship.31
States following this rule apparently reason that the convict usually
needs a representative only because he is physically confined, not because
of personal incompetency. An exclusive interpretation, on the other
hand, is justified on the ground that the one under guardianship must be
protected from his own acts.
3. Property Protection in the Absence of Guardian
Statutes.-The absence of statutes in the majority of jurisdictions
authorizing the appointment of a representative can partially be
explained by the lack of interest on the part of state legislators and
prison authorities in the economic consequences of imprisonment. Little
thought has been given either to the needs of the prisoner upon release or
to the protection of his property during confinement because convicts
and ex-convicts have little contact or influence with lawmakers? 2 A
further explanation for the lack of guardian and conservator statutes is
that only a few prisoners have enough property to need a formally
appointed conservator.m Consequently, most prisoners accept the lack
of adequate protection for their property as a matter of course and do
not request or petition for formal guardians or conservators.
There are three devices that may be used by prisoners to protect
their property where fiduciary appointment statutes are lacking: the
private express trust, bailment, and agency.
297. E.g., In re Hoffman's Estate, 209 Pa. 357, 58 A. 665 (1904); Tucker v. Jollay, 43 Tenn.
App. 655,311 S.W.2d 324 (1957); In re Bean's Estate, 159 Wis. 67,149 N.W. 745 (1914).
298. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
299. See, e.g., Hewson v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 358, 279 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1967).
300. MD. ANN. CODE art. 93A, § 205 (1969).
301. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-420.
302. 1946 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 180.
303. See Hillman v. Stults, 263 Cal. App. 2d 848, 873, 70 Cal. Rptr. 295,309 (1968).
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(a) Private express trust.-One device that may be used by the
convict to achieve the same result that could be obtained through
conservator appointment is the revocable private trust.3" The prisoner
may provide support for his dependents and protection for his property
or business through the trust. Nevertheless, prisoners have not used the
trust to any discernable degree for several reasons.3 Most inmates are
unaware of the advantages of the trust, or are deterred from using it
because of the sophisticated legal procedures involved in its creation.M
In addition, in some states there is uncertainty about whether a convict
can create a trust. Since a settlor can create a trust only if he may
transfer property inter vivos,m and since convicts in some states are
denied the capacity to contract,3 there is a possibility that a trust
created in some states by an incarcerated settlor may be void.M
As a device for protecting the property of an imprisoned person, the
private express trust has some disadvantages. Certain property interests
of the convict may be subject to restrictions or penalties if transferred or
alienated to a trustee.3 10 Moreover, trusteeship usually will deprive the
convict-settlor of a voice in the management of the trust corpus. The
prisoner who creates a trust also may be unable to sue for an accounting
by the trustee.31' Finally, tax considerations surrounding the creation
of a revocable trust may present difficulties to the convict.3 12
(b) Bailment and agency.-If a trust is unavailable or
304. Both the guardian and the trustee are fiduciary positions, but the guardian is court
appointed while the trustee is designated by the contract; in addition, the trustee has legal title to the
trust property while the guardian does not have title to the property of the ward. 1 A. SCOTT.
TRUSTS § 7 (3d ed. 1967).
305. There are no accurate statistics available concerning the disposition of property by the
inmates of state penal institutions, but discussions with Tennessee prison authorities indicate that
the trust is not utilized for property protection and management.
306. Legal assistance would generally be necessary to aid the prisoner in preparation of the
proper trust instrument.
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 18 (1959).
308. See notes 724-56 supra and accompanying text.
309. If "his conveyance is voidable or void because he is under a disability, such as infancy,
insanity, coverture, and the like, the trust is likewise voidable or void." 1 A. ScoTr, TRUSTS § 19
(3d ed. 1967). But see Jordan v. Warnke, 205 Cal. App. 2d 621, 23 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1962) (parolee
given a resulting trust even though denied capacity to contract); Hall v. Hall, 98 Cal. App. 2d 209,
219 P.2d 808 (1950) (a trust created by a parolee was held to have been valid).
310. Homestead exemptions, mortgages, insurance policies, and other property interests may
be subject to restrictions or penalties if the protected persons's title or right is transferred or
alienated. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-420.
311. See notes 625-98 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the prisoner's capacity
to sue.
312. The settlor is liable for federal income tax on the trust's income. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 677. If the settlor's power of revocation is renounced, a gift tax may be imposed.
Id. §§ 2501 etseq.
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unappealing, the person convicted of a crime may use a bailment or
agency to protect his property. These two devices have similar
advantages and disadvantages and hence will be discussed together.
Bailment, which may be used to safeguard the prisoner's personal
property, is easily instituted; the prisoner merely gives his chattels to a
friend or relative for safekeeping. A common form of agency, the power
of attorney, in which the agent is authorized to buy, sell or otherwise act
for the prisoner irrespective of the nature of the property, also is easily
executed. As a consequence, bailment and agency probably are more
commonly used by prisoners than any other means of property
protection.
There are, however, several limitations on bailment and agency that
restrict their usefulness to prisoners. Both devices subject the prisoner to
liability for actions by persons outside of his control. Also, the convict's
remedy in case of waste or wrongful acts is limited; the incarcerated
principal may not have a remedy against the unloyal agent in some
states, and the bailee and the agent are not empowered to bring suit for
the prisoner against third parties.313 Furthermore, since the agent
cannot have any powers denied the principal, the scope of agency is
severely restricted where the actions of the convict-principal are
limited by civil disabilities. 314 Finally, bailment and agency may be
abruptly terminated by the action or death of either party.31 1
X. Loss OF INSURANCE, PENSIONS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
A criminal conviction may prevent the offender from participating
in insurance, pension, and workmen's compensation programs. Life and
automobile insurance, for example, may not be available to convicted
persons at reasonable rates, if at all. Many states also deny pension
benefits to convicts regardless of whether they were convicted during or
after job tenure. In addition to possible forfeiture of workmen's
compensation benefits upon conviction, the convict injured while
incarcerated generally is denied injury compensation.
A. Loss of Insurance Benefits
I. Life Insurance.-A criminal conviction, imprisonment, or
involvement in criminal activity can have a substantial impact upon the
313. For a general indication of the limitations of agency as compared to trusts and
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ability of a citizen to obtain, enforce, or benefit from a life insurance
policy. The citizen with a criminal record may find it impossible to
obtain adequate life insurance coverage at reasonable rates. If an
individual with life insurance dies while engaged in criminal activity, his
designated beneficiaries or estate may be precluded from enforcing the
terms of his policy. In addition, a criminally convicted beneficiary,
especially one who has slain the insured, may be unable to benefit from
the terms of a life policy.
(a) Insurability of the convict.-An offender's imprisonment may
prevent him from obtaining life insurance or place him in a higher rate
bracket.3 1 Most major companies refuse to insure a convict while he is
incarcerated. This denial of insurance is often based upon uncertainty
about the convict's future rehabilitation pending his return to society.
Moreover, some companies take the position that there is no immediate
economic interest in the prisoner's life that will justify insurance
coverage.
The convict's problems in obtaining insurance do not end when he
leaves prison. Few major companies have an express policy against
Writing life insurance on persons convicted of serious crimes after they
have been released from confinement and are no longer on probation, or
parole. Some companies, however, definitely refuse to give insurance to
the offender who is still on parole. Although most companies are willing
to consider each case on its individual merits, an applicant's previous
conviction for a serious offense is generally treated as adequate reason
for refusing coverage, even in the absence of a formal policy. In
determining whether to issue life insurance on an ex-convict, insurance
companies usually consider such factors as the gravity, proximity, and
amount of violence involved in the offense, the likelihood of a return to
crime, the demonstrated degree of rehabilitation, and the number of
convictions. Some companies indicate that even if the ex-convict's
application for life insurance is approved, he may have to pay a higher
than average premium, depending on the above factors. An applicant
who undergoes substantial rehabilitation over a period of several years,
however, could probably expect to obtain coverage at standard rates,
especially if his offenses were few in number and relatively insignificant
in degree.
316. VAND. L. REV., Survey of Life Insurers [hereinafter referred to as Vanderbilt Survey].
The Vanderbilt Law Review sent questionnaires to the 34 life insurance companies in the United
States that ranked highest in premium income, including total life and health premiums, in 1967.
See THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER Co., 249 LIFE lNsuRERS (1968). Completed questionnaires were




Despite the hesitancy of life insurance companies to insure convicts
and ex-convicts, life insurance applications generally do not require any
information about an applicant's criminal record. Independent
investigations of an applicant's background may be made, however,
depending upon the amount of life insurance requested and the age of the
applicant. The period investigated may range from one to ten years prior
to the date of alplication. There is disagreement among the insurers as
to whether these investigations are successful in uncovering criminal
convictions.
Even if an insurance company is willing to underwrite life insurance
for a convict, the inmate may be incapable of entering an insurance
contract in those few states that limit the capacity of prisoners to
contract.3 17 In addition, it is possible that in one state, California, the
parolee may be unable to purchase insurance unless he has been granted
the capacity to contract.318 The incapacity to contract is not always an
absolute bar to obtaining insurance coverage, however, since in some
states a conservator, guardian, or other representative may be
authorized to purchase insurance on behalf of the prisoner.3 1'
(b) Effect of criminal behavior on the offender's life insurance
con tract.-As a general rule, an insured's criminal conviction does not
cause a forfeiture of his life insurance coverage unless the policy so
provides. If the insured dies as a result of participation in criminal
activity, however, the insurer's liability may be limited by the terms of
the life policy. Even if the policy contains no limitation for death
occurring in this manner, some courts have held that public policy
prevents a recovery by the insured's named beneficiaries or estate. In
civil death states, the insured convict may labor under disabilities that
make it difficult or impossible for him to enforce the terms of a life
insurance policy.
(i) Forfeiture.-The life insurance policy of the convicted offender
who is sentenced to prison is normally not subject to forfeiture or
cancellation because of his criminal activity or incarceration).1 The only
reported instances of life insurance forfeiture for criminal conviction
have involved fraternal society life insurance policies expressly providing
that the policy and all benefits thereunder are forfeited upon the
insured's conviction of serious criminal offenses. Courts generally have
317. See notes 724-56 supra and accompanying text.
318. See notes 744-50 supra and accompanying text.
319. See notes 263-301 on pages 1101-07 supra and accompanying text.
320. Vanderbilt Survey, supra note 316.
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upheld these forfeiture clauses,32 ' but have strictly interpreted the
meaning of criminal conviction.3
(ii) Limitation of liability for death.-An entirely different
situation arises if the insured dies during the commission of a crime or as
the result of a lawful punishment therefor. In the absence of a contrary
statute, the insurance policy may limit the insurer's liability to payment
of a reduced amount if death results from specified causes or
circumstances. 323 For example, the National Service Life Insurance
Act,32 which makes life insurance available to present and past members
of the United States armed forces, requires forfeiture of insurance
benefits for "death inflicted as lawful punishment for crime." To avoid
complete forfeiture, however, this act makes the cash surrender value of
the policy payable to the designated beneficiary. This legislation
indicates congressional approval for reduced liability provisions when
the insured's criminal activity causes his death.
In many states, however, the ability of an insurer to limit his
liability on an ordinary life policy is restricted by statutes authorizing
insurers to limit liability only for death resulting from such causes as
war, aviation, suicide, and specified hazardous occupations. 35 One state,
Virginia, expressly precludes any defense by the insurer based on
criminal execution. 32 The positive enumeration of all allowed exceptions
in the other states seems to preclude a limitation based on criminal
321. Overton v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 206 Ala. 584,91 So. 485 (1921).
322. Baker v. Modern Woodmen of America, 140 Mo. App. 619, 121 S.W. 794 (1909).
Woodmen of the World v. Dodd, 134 S.W. 254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
323. 15 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 52:5 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1966). In
the case of a restriction of liability for death resulting from a violation of law, the primary question
is a proximate causal connection. Novak v. Equitable Life Assurance Soe'y, 101 Ill. App. 2d 392,
243 N.E.2d 269 (1968); Ben Hur Life Ass'n v. Cox, 95 Ind. App. 166, 181 N.E. 528 (1932);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 166 Va. 119, 184 S.E. 208 (1936).
324. 38 U.S.C. § 711 (1964).
325. ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.250 (1966); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1226 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 66-3323 (1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2507 (1960); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304.817 (1969) (any life insurance policy); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:170 (Supp. 1970)
(any life insurance policy); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 410 (1968) (any life insurance policy but
group); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-8-1.2 (Supp. 1969) (any life insurance policy but group); N.Y. INS.
LAW §§ 155, 163 (McKinney 1966) (industrial life insurancepolicy); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-03-
26, -31 (1970) (term life insurance policies); Id. at 26-30-35; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4024
(1958) (any life insurance policy but group); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1112 (1968) (any life
insurance policy); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.45 (f63) (any life insurance policy). But see
Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W.2d 857 (1949); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.23.260 (1961) (any life insurance policy); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26.1-362 (1967)
(any life insurance policy but group). None of these statutes is applicable to a provision for
additional benefits in the event of accidental death.
326. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.1-437 (1953).
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activity unless such conduct falls within the permissible exception of
"hazardous occupation."' 3z1 Many statutes limit this exception to death
occurring within two years of the date of issuance of the policy37s By
implication, it appears that the legislatures did not intend to preclude
recovery for death resulting from criminal activity.32 Irrespective of
whether the life insurance policy limits liability, there is a split of
authority on the question of whether public policy will enable the insurer
to avoid payment of death benefits if the insured's death is the result of
his criminal activity.3
0
In the absence of an applicable statute or policy provision, the
majority of courts have held that normal death benefits in a life
insurance policy are recoverable when the insured's death results from
his own criminal activity.? 1 A few cases allowing recovery have indicated
that these proceeds can be recovered by an innocent beneficiary but not
by the insured's estate.332 Recovery is uniformly denied if the insured
contemplated the crime causing his death at the time he procured the
policy m The majority view, based on the realistic assumption that a
dead man cannot profit from insurance payments, 3 4 rejects the
contention that allowing recovery by the insured's beneficiaries or estate
would encourage the insured to participate in crime likely to cause his
327. See note 325 supra (Oklahoma and Washington do not include hazardous occupations).
328. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.817 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:170 (Supp. 1970);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 410 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-03-26, -31, -35 (1970); N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 155,163 (McKinney 1966); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1112 (1968).
329. When it was shown that the legislature enacted a statute governing health and accident
policies that provided for a specific required limitation of liability for death or injury resulting from
illegal conduct of the insured, the New York statute governing life policies was held not only to show
the absence of any public policy against allowing recovery for death resulting from criminal
activity, but also to require recovery in such a case. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Goldstein, 43
F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
330. For a discussion of the current case law in this area see Wooden, Criminal Activity of
Insured as a Defense to Life Insurance Claims-Crime and Punishment, 1 FORUM 40 (1966);
Comment, Insurance-Death from Unlawful Conduct-Recovery Allowed, 13 S.D.L. REV. 239
(1968).
331. E.g., Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957)
(insured killed while engaging in arson); Fields v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249
S.W. 798 (1923) (insured executed for murder). Contra, Malloy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 327 Mass. 181,97 N.E.2d 422 (1951) (insured killed while engaging in armed robbery).
332. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Guller, 68 Ind. App. 544, 119 N.E. 173 (1918); Payne v.
Louisiana Indus. Life Ins. Co., 33 So. 2d 444 (La. Orleans Cir. App. 1948). Contra, Valley Forge
Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 201 So. 2d449 (Fla. 1967).
333. See Valley Forge Life Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 201 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1967); Taylor v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 111. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957); Home State Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 175 Okla. 492, 53 P.2d 562 (1936).
334. Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E. 586 (1924).
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death.3 Similarly, some courts permit recovery in order to benefit
innocent dependents deprived of support and maintenance by the
insured's death. 38 One court has stated that denial of benefits could have
the undesirable effect of making the insured's family dependent upon the
state for support.3 Another court following the majority rule has noted
that insurance companies assume this risk because insurance rates are
calculated from standard mortality tables that do not exclude deaths
resulting from criminal conduct .33  Finally, in the case of capital
punishment, state constitutional prohibitions against corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate for criminal conviction have been used as a
basis for granting recovery.33'
The minority view requires forfeiture of all benefits, even by an
innocent beneficiary, if the insured's death results from his participation
in crime. 0 In perhaps the most extreme application of this position, the
United States Supreme Court held that criminal execution could void an
insurance policy even if the insured was innocent and had been
wrongfully executed.ml Courts adopting the minority view have used
several rationales. The maxim that no one should be allowed to profit
from his own wrong by accelerating the maturity of the policy is often
applied to deny recovery. 2 Other courts reason that allowing benefits to
the insured's estate or named beneficiary would encourage crime . 3
Recovery also has been denied on the theory that death resulting from
criminal activity is not a risk assumed by the insurer.34
(iii) Accidental death benefits.-A related problem of contractual
interpretation arises when the insured, whose life policy or double
indemnity clause depends upon his death by "accidental means," dies as
the result of participation in criminal activity. The authorities are
divided on this question. Some courts have denied recovery, reasoning
that death is a natural and forseeable consequence of intentional illegal
335. Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 232 Ill. 37, 83 N.E. 542 (1907); Fields v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 Tenn. 464, 249 S.W. 798 (1923); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Coates, 112 Tex. 267,246 S.W. 356 (1923).
336. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Goldstein, 43 F. Supp. 765 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
337. Home State Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 175 Okla. 492,53 P.2d 562 (1936).
338. Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223,122 S.E. 586 (1924).
339. Cases cited note 335 supra; Weeks v. New York Life Ins. Co., 128 S.C. 223, 122 S.E.
586 (1924).
340. Malloy v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 327 Mass. 181,97 N.E.2d422 (1951).
341. Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902).
342. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. MeCue, 223 U.S. 234 (1912); Burt v. Union Cent. Life
Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902).
343. Cases cited note 342 supra; Amicable Soe'y v. Bolland, 5 Eng. Rep. 70 (H.L. 1830).
344. Cases cited note 342 supra.
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conduct and therefore cannot be classified as "accidental."us Other
courts, however, have allowed recovery, noting that the insurer can avoid
payment for accidental death only if death was actually intended or
anticipated.36 These cases are so dependent upon their particular facts,
however, that no detailed discussion will be attempted here.3 7
(iv) Civil death.-In some states the law declares the prisoner to
be "civilly dead. " us Although death by execution has been held to make
a life insurance policy payable,us civil death does not accelerate the
policy.3 Accordingly, the insurer is not liable to pay the proceeds to the
beneficiary until the insured is physically and naturally dead.' Any
other result would be contrary to the purposes and obligations of the
insurance contract, for "death," when used in a life insurance policy, is
not an ambiguous term and the risk contemplated is only physical death.
Although the insured convict cannot profit from his civil death, his
ability to enforce his insurance contract may be severely curtailed in
those civil death states that prohibit him from bringing suit.3 The
prisoner may have an immedate need to secure a loan on his policy or to
cash it in for its surrender value in order to pay an attorney, meet
345. For example, in Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 256 Md. 320, 260 A.2d 338
(1970), the court held that death resulting from a self-injection of heroin was not "accidental." In
Winton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 174 Tenn. 252, 124 S.W.2d 712 (1939), the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that an assailant killed by his victim after threatening the latter with a deadly
weapon did not die "accidentally."
346. Death of the insured while attempting to perpetrate arson was held to be "accidental" in
Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 (1957). In Sanders v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239 (1943), the court reached a similar
conclusion in the case of a youth who died while fleeing the scene of a crime in a stolen auto with
police in hot pursuit.
347. For an extensive discussion of the meaning of "accidental" death and "accidental"
means see IA J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 391-93 (rev. ed. 1965); 10 G.
COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 41:2 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1962).
348. See notes 70-79 on pages 950-51 supra and accompanying text.
349. Cases cited note 339 supra.
350. Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777 (1932) (the court
based its reasoning on the rationale of the cases cited note 342 supra).
351. See Sullivan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 131 "Me. 228, 160 A. 777 (1932).
352. See notes 635-58 supra and accompanying text. Thus the various provisions of a life
insurance policy regarding such things as cash surrender value, low interest loans, change of
beneficiary rights, and waiver of premiums clauses become unenforceable promises on the part of
the insurer. Certainly all responsible insurers would continue to honor the terms of their policies,
but there remains the possibility of the irresponsible or inadequately financed company that refuses
to perform because the prisoner cannot sue. In the few jurisdictions where the convict must have a
representative act for him on all legal matters, this "exclusiveness" also would prohibit the prisoner
from personally enforcing the provisions of his insurance policy. In West Virginia, for example, the
convict cannot exercise the option of surrendering his insurance policy for its cash value. His
committee, however, may do so for him and deliver the proceeds to his estate. 51 Ops. W. VA.
ATT'Y GEN. 596 (1965).
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pressing debts, or to provide for his family's support. His ability to
utilize a life insurance policy for these ends may be frustrated if he
cannot sue. The possibility of any loss by the prisoner will be minimized
in states where he can have a guardian or conservator act for him. "
(c) Beneficiary rights of the convict inpoliciespayable on the lives
of others.-Criminal conviction and imprisonment usually have no
effect upon a beneficiary's right'to receive insurance proceeds. When the
beneficiary kills the insured, however, public policy demands that he
should not profit from an intentional illegal act. Therefore, in many
states a beneficiary may be precluded from recovering insurance
proceeds payable on the life of his victim.
(i) Beneficiary not causing death of the insured.-The convict's
right to receive the proceeds of a life insurance policy generally is not
affected by his conviction and imprisonment. Although he may be
seriously hampered in the enforcement of these rights in states where he
is unable to bring suit, he does not forfeit vested insurance contract
rights even in a civil death state.-
(ii) Beneficiary causing death of the insured.-The convicted
person's right to receive the proceeds of an insurance policy as
beneficiary or assignee may be denied when he causes the death of the
insured.3 Under specified circumstances seventeen states have statutes
precluding a killer from taking any interest in the proceeds of the
deceased's life insurance policy or any interest in the deceased's estate.M
The Texas statute covers insurance proceeds alone.u? Other states have
statutes applicable to property interests that do not expressly cover
insurance proceeds. Four states, for example, bar the killer from taking
any interest in the deceased's estate by inheritance, will, or
353. See notes 263-301 on pages 1101-07 supra and accompanying text.
354. Shapiro v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 182 Misc. 678, 45
N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affdon other grounds, 294 N.Y. 743,61 N.E.2d 745 (1945).
355. For a discussion' of problems in this area of the law see McGovern, Homicide and
Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REv. 65 (1969); Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully
Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 HARV. L. REV. 715 (1936).
356. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2506 (1960); id. § 113-909 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODE
ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535-.537 (1964) (held to apply
only to fraternal insurance in Kascoutas v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 193 Iowa 343, 185 N.W. 125
(1921)); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381180 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1969); Na. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-119 to -120 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 231 (1970); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 112.455-555 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56
(1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-46
(1959). Comprehensive coverage is also provided by the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
357. TEx. INS. CODE art. 21.23 (1963).
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"otherwise."3 18 Another state prevents the killer from taking in "any
other manner. ' 359 Authorities are in disagreement, however, as to
whether these statutes apply to insurance proceeds.3 0 Statutes in
California and New Mexico that prevent the acquisition of any benefit
by wrongful acts have been applied to insurance proceeds.36 1
(I) Manner of causing death.-In the absence of controlling
statutory language, courts have uniformly held that a beneficiary or
assignee who feloniously and intentionally takes the life of the insured
cannot recover the proceeds of the victim's life insurance policy.362 The
nature of the crime required to deny the beneficiary insurance proceeds
has been defined by statutory language in other states to comprehend
causing death "willfully,"'3 3 "intentionally," 3  "unlawfully,"3 5 by
"willful and unlawful killing,' 3 6  "feloniously,"3 7 by "murder or
manslaughter in the first degree, '"3 8 or by "murder or voluntary
manslaughter." 3 9 Most courts have held that these statutes continue the
358. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 31-109,-207 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-3-22 (1953).
359. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963).
360. The following cases held that these statutes were applicable to insurance proceeds:
Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959), supplemental
opinion, 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960); Jamison v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 Tenn. App.
398, 145 S.W.2d 553 (1940). Contra, Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Maag, 285 F.2d 558 (10th
Cir. 1960) (denied insurance benefits to killer on nonstatutory grounds' applying Utfh law); Smith
v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950) (denied insurance proceeds to killer on
nonstatutory grounds).
361. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (1954) (applied in Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38
Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-10 (1964); see Rose v. Rose, 79
N.M. 435, 444 P.2d 762 (1968) (allowing recovery of insurance on grounds that no felony was
committed)).
362. E.g., New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886). The cases are so
numerous that no listing will be attempted. For a complete and current collection of cases see
Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1969); 4 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27:149 (2d
ed. R. Anderson 1960).
363. TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.23 (1963).
364. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1954).
365. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-119 to -120 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962).
366. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 3 IA-3 to -15
(1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16
(1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.84.010-
.900 (1967).
367. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535--537 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1964); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.87 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-
04-23 (1960) (see notes 358 & 360 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the
statute is applicable); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455-.555 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-109,
-207 (1955) (applies to any killing not by accident or in self-defense).
368. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970).
369. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2506 (1960).
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common law rule that encompasses murder or voluntary manslaughter,
but not involuntary manslaughter.3 ° Several states have narrowed the
application of the statutes by applying them only in the case of
murder.Y Underlying the common law rule and statutory provisions is
the public policy against providing any pecuniary incentive or reward for
an intentional killing of the insured without legal mitigation or excuse.
The rule denying recovery does not apply to a beneficiary who is
insane at the time he kills the insured.372 Temporary insanity, induced by
emotional disturbance, however, has been held within the rule
prohibiting recovery .
3
(II) Effect of conviction or acquittal.-Although the common law
rule denying recovery does not require a criminal conviction, statutes in
many states now require conviction of the required offense as a
prerequisite to a denial of insurance proceeds to the killer.34 Other states
require "final conviction."' 5 The states do not agree on the procedural
effects of a prior criminal conviction. According to the common law rule
in most jurisdictions, a criminal conviction of the beneficiary for killing
the insured is not admissible in evidence in a subsequent civil suit to
recover insurance proceedsYr6 This rule has been modified by statute in
some states to make the prior conviction "admissible in evidence," 7
370. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 395 U.S. 161 (1969); Greer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 166, 221 S.W.2d 857
(1949); see Conner v. Holbert, 49 Tenn. App. 319, 354 S.W.2d 809 (1961). See also UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-803 (expressly incorporating the common law rule).
371. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-10
(1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968).
372. Holdom v. Grand Lodge of Ancient Order of United Workmen, 159 111.619, 43 N.E.
772 (1895); Ohio State Life Ins. Co. v. Barron, 274 Mich. 22, 263 N.W. 786 (1935); Campbell v.
Ray, 102 N.J. Super. 235, 245 A.2d 761 (Ch. 1968), affd mem., 107 N.J. Super. 509,259 A.2d 473
(App. Div. 1969).
373. United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847,852 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
374. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1954); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-513 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 381.280 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-119 to -120 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-
10 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966) (the statute makes an exception for a "slayer"
who dies or commits suicide before criminal trial and before settlement of the insured's estate if his
status is determined in a civil action within one year of the insured's death); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-
5 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966).
375. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960)
(see notes 358, 360 supra and accompanying text for discussion of whether statute is applicable).
376. Goodwin v. Continental Cas. Co., 175 Okla. 469, 53 P.2d 241 (1936). See generally 5 J.
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1671a (3ded. 1940).
377. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to-142 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to-15
(1966); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 112.455-555 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (1964); RI.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-I to -16 (1970); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-I to -20 (1967);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.84.010-.900 (1967).
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"prima facie evidence of guilt,"378 or "final and conclusive" 379 evidence.
In two jurisdictions the criminal conviction has been given collateral
estoppel effect.3s
Acquittal in a criminal trial ordinarily does not entitle the
beneficiary who has intentionally killed the insured to receive insurance
proceeds.31 Moreover, in the absence of a statute requiring a contrary
result, an acquittal in a prior criminal trial may be inadmissible in a
subsequent civil suit by the beneficiary to recover insurance proceeds.3
2
Even under a statute permitting the claimant to admit into evidence the
judicial record of a determination that the original beneficiary was a
"slayer," an acquittal because of insanity has been held insufficient to
entitle the beneficiary to the proceeds of the policy when his act came
within statutory prohibitions of recovery. m •
(III) Liability of the insurer.-Most major insurance companies
do not attempt to limit their liability by contract if the named
beneficiary kills the insured,m but express policy provisions to this effect
have been upheld by the courts.m If the insurer does not attempt to limit
his liability by express provision, proceeds denied the killer-beneficiary
become payable to an alternate beneficiary, if one is named in the policy,
or to the estate of the insured.3" Most courts have given preference to the
alternate beneficiary over the insured's estate.
17
Some states have codified the majority rule in allowing the alternate
beneficiary or the estate of the insured, if no alternate beneficiary is
378. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2506 (1960).
379. IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1954).
380. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 395 U.S. 161 (1969); Kravitz's Estate,418 Pa. 319,211 A.2d443 (1965).
381. United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Carter v. Carter, 88
So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956).
382. Carterv. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1956).
383. Tew v. Durham Life Ins. Co., I N.C. App. 94, 160 S.E.2d 117 (1968).
384. Vanderbilt Survey, supra note 316.
385. McDade v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Iowa 857, 195 N.W. 603 (1923); Moore
v. American Ins. Union, 135 Kan. 311, 10 P.2d 1084 (1932); Griffith v. Mutual Protective League,
200 Mo. App. 87,205 S.W. 286 (1918); Mackowiak v. Polish Union of America, 236 App. Div. 44,
258 N.Y.S. 134 (1932).
386. Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P.2d 544 (1952) (recovery by
alternate beneficiary); Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42 (1941)
(recovery by insured's estate).
387. Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 643, 241 P2d 544 (1952); Neff v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952); In re Kaplan's Estate,
49 Misc. 2d 335,267 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sur. Ct. 1966). Contra, Beck v. Downey, 191 F2d 150 (9th Cir.
1951), vacated mem., 343 U.S. 912, affd on rehearing, 198 F.2d 626, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952); Bullock v. Expressmen's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.C. 254, 67 S.E.2d 71 (1951) (overruled
by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31 A- 11 (1961); see note 389 infra and accompanying text).
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named in the policy, to receive the insurance proceeds. m Other states
have enacted statutes creating a conclusive presumption that the killer
has predeceased the insured.19 Georgia requires heirs of the insured other,
than the killer to take by inheritance if there is no alternate
beneficiary. 3 0 Oklahoma and Wyoming require the proceeds to be
distributed among the other heirs of the insured, presumably even if
there is an alternate beneficiary. 39' South Carolina's statute provides
that the proceeds shall pass directly to the insured's estate.3 " Iowa allows
others entitled to take by will or inheritance to receive the proceeds.3 3
Persons other than the killer who are legally entitled to the money may
take. in a few states.
3 94
Despite the illogical result, in some states the killer who is denied
insurance proceeds can obtain the same funds in another manner. A
Texas statute provides that funds denied the killer-beneficiary shall pass
to the nearest relative of the insured.3 5 In a Texas case decided prior to
the enactment of this statute, a wife who murdered her husband was
allowed to receive the proceeds indirectly since she was his nearest
relative.3 6 Similar results are possible in those states having statutes that
bar a murderer from taking any interest in his victim's estate, but which
have no similar statutory provision applicable to life insurance
proceeds.3 7 In one of these states, a beneficiary convicted of voluntary
manslaughter of the insured was entitled to receive insurance proceeds as
his heir even though he would have been barred from receiving them as
beneficiary by the common law rule. The court construed the statute
barring a murderer from inheriting his victim's estate as inapplicable to
voluntary manslaughter. 398 Model statutes, such as those proposed by
388. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 14-129 to -142 (Supp. 1969); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.280
(1969); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 1 12.455-.555 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3441-56 (1964); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 29-9-1 to -20 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE §§ i 1.84.010-.900 (1967).
389. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-119 to -120 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31A-3 to -15 (1966);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-04-23 (1960) (for a discussion of whether the statute is applicable see notes
358 & 360 supra and accompanying text); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33-1.1-1 to -16 (1970); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-18 (1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-4-2 (1966).
390. GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2506 (1960).
391. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 231 (1970); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 246 (1957).
392. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-5 (1962).
393. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.535-537 (1964).
394. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2224, 3517 (1954); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-212 (1953); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 31!-109,-207 (1955).
395. TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.23 (1963).
396. Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S.W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
397. ALASKA STAT. § 13.10.130 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-2-13 (1963): CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-279 (Supp. 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.31 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
3, §§ 15a, 49a (Smith-Hurd 1961); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.19 (Baldwin 1964).
398. Strickland v. Wysowatcky, 128 Colo. 221,250 P.2d 199 (1952); see Moore v. Prudential
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Dean John W. Wade 9 and the Uniform Probate Code,4°° prevent the
acquisition of any benefit in insurance or the estate through intentional
and illegal homicide.
There seems to be no limitation on who can take as an alternate
beneficiary aside from a killer-beneficiary or one claiming through him.
It has been held, for example, that the murderer's children by a previous
marriage may take in this capacity rather than the administrator of the
estate of his wife whom he had killed. 01 Certain rights in the estate of the
insured, however, may be cut off for the killer's children in at least two
states .
02
In the absence of a specific statutory or contractual limitation, the
only exception to the insurer's liability on a policy when the beneficiary
is disqualified for killing the insured is based on the ground of fraud. If
the beneficiary procured the policy, either personally or acting through
the insured as an innocent instrumentality, after conceiving the idea of
murdering the insured, the insurer may escape any liability under the
insurance contract.
403
2. Automobile Insurance.-Despite the obvious need to have
every driver insured,411 automobile insurance frequently is not available
to convicted citizens. An insurance underwriter can deny applications for
Ins. Co. of America, 342 Pa. 570, 21 A.2d 42 (1941). After the Moore decision the Pennsylvania
legislature wisely adopted Dean John W. Wade's model statute (Wade, supra note 355), which
would have precluded allowing the "slayer" to receive any benefit from his victim's estate. Other
states mentioned in note 397 supra would do well to follow Pennsylvania's example.
399. Wade, supra note 355.
400. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-803.
401. Neff v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 Ohio St. 45, 107 N.E.2d 100 (1952).
402. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1691 (West 1952); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 479,672 (1956). The
Louisiana statute revokes a legacy or disposition if the legatee unlawfully takes the life of the
testator and deems such a legacy or disposition to be not written. The Mississippi statutes provide
that property of the deceased shall descend as if the killer had "never been in being" and further
provide that any devise to the killer shall be void and that any property so devised should be
distributed as if the deceased had died intestate.
403. Hewitt v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 8 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1925); Colyer v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 300 Ky. 189, 188 S.W.2d 313 (1945); Henderson v. Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 100,
179 S.E. 680 (1935); Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 175 Tenn. 517, 136 S.W.2d 52
(1940).
404. At least 3 states have recognized this need and require proof of insurance as a
prerequisite to automobile registration. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § IA (1967); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1965). The remaining states
have "financial responsibility" or "safety responsibility" laws requiring evidence of adequate
security to satisfy a potential claim arising from an accident. R. HENSLEY, COMPETITION,
REGULATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 120-32 (1962); Note, A Survey of
Financial Responsibility Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal for Reform, 21
VAND. L. REV. 1050, 1081-82 (1968). The statutes are patterned after the UNIFORM VEHICLE
CODE §§ 7-101 to-505.
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new or renewed coverage for any reason, no matter how arbitrary or
capricious."°5 Although an applicant's criminal record does not always
come to the attention of the underwriter,40s the discovery of this fact may
result in a refusal of coverage.401 The insurance industry recognizes that
claim frequency probably is not related to non-traffic convictions, but
contends that the mere existence of a criminal record is so prejudicial
that it adversely affects the insurer's chance of successfully defending a
claim against its insured. Insurers argue that an insured's criminal
record gets before the jury often enough to make the problem a serious
one. Consequently, the insurance company may be compelled to pay on
what would otherwise be an unmeritorious claim. 41 Insurers have not,
however, been able to supply the states with the underwriting statistics
necessary to support an increased rate classification for ex-convicts. 41
If the offender has automobile insurance at the time of his
conviction or if he has been able to acquire coverage after release despite
his conviction, there is a possibility that his policy may be cancelled. At
least nine states permit an insurer to cancel the policy of an insured who
has been convicted of any felony. 410 Another jurisdiction authorizes
cancellation "for any reason it [the insurer] may deem proper."'1 Only
three states provide for appeal from an insurer's decision to cancel .4
The insurance industry, however, rarely exercises its cancellation power
to the legal limit. Since most insurance companies are national
enterprises, efficiency is maximized through standardized business
405. Interviews with general insurance agents in Nashville, Tennessee, August 1970, on
file in the Vanderbilt Law Review office.
406. Most applications contain no request for information on criminal convictions. Local
retail credit bureaus, however, are frequently solicited for information about the applicant and if
their report is unfavorable, a check of police records is made which will, of course, reveal the
criminal record. Id.
407. Id. An agent indicated that practice is not invariable, however, and he knew of one
ex-convict whom his company has insured in the last 20 years.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.0852(2)(e)(6)(a) (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-
2430.1(A)(7)(e)(l) (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755.3(g)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-277(4)(c)(1) (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 379.202(i)(3)(a) (1968);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-310 (b)3)(b)(l) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.51(4)(c)(1) (Supp. 1969);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1154(4)(c)(1) (1968); W. V,. CODE ANN. § 33-6A-l(e)(l) (Supp. 1970).
411. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2908 (1953).
412. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-281 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 113(D)
(1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1008.8-.9 (Supp. 1970).SeealsoCAL. INS. CODE § 669 (West
Supp. 1969). In addition, cancellation effectively precludes coverage since it is the practice in the
industry not to insure an applicant who has once had a policy cancelled. H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th




practices, requiring that the insurer's cancellation policies conform to
the least permissive state statutes. Thus, many companies subscribe to
insurance rating bureaus that recommend business practices that will
comply with the law in every state.4 13 One bureau, for example, suggests
that a policy should be cancelled only for non-payment of premiums or
revocation of the insured's drivers license .41 This voluntary imposition
of a more lenient cancellation standard affords the ex-convict a better
opportunity to retain existing insurance. 15
The ex-convict who is denied insurance by a standard company46
may have other means of obtaining coverage. He may obtain insurance,
for example, from a company that is authorized to write insurance at
higher rates. In addition to the disadvantage of higher premiums,
however, there is a substantial danger that one insured through a "high-
risk" insurance company may lose his coverage if the company fails.
During the six-year period prior to 1967, some 73 "high-risk"
companies went out of business, stranding thousands of policyholders
with millions of dollars in unpaid claims.4 17 The ex-convict may be able
to avoid "high-risk" companies by having himself placed in an assigned
risk pool. Virtually every state provides for an assigned risk plan to
afford coverage to individuals who are unable to obtain insurance
because they are considered poor risks .418 Applicants are allocated on the
basis of volume of business among all insurers doing business in the
state.4 1 9 Since eligibility for participation in the assigned risk plan is
conditioned upon inability to otherwise obtain insurance from a
standard company,4 2 the permissible rates under the plan are much
413. Note 405 supra. These bureaus serve as statistical clearing houses to compile
information to supply to the state regulatory agencies for rate increases, standard form clauses, and
general business practices.
414. Insurance Rating Board, endorsement A 895, Family Amendatory Endorsement,
January 1, 1968. The effect of this lenient cancellation standard is offset in many states which
authorize revocation of drivers licenses for conviction of a felony. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE
CODE § 13350(5) (West Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1048(b)(3) (1965).
415. Although the situation is thus improved, it must be remembered that not all companies
subscribe to bureaus or are otherwise of such a national character as to make this situation
desirable. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE NEW INSURANCE RATING BOARD 7 (1967); see
F. CRANE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 141-42 (1962).
416. A "standard" company, as compared with a substandard company, is an ordinary
insurer not underwriting "high risk" groups. Note 405 supra.
417. H.R. REP. No. 815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1967). R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL,
AFTER CARS CRASH. . . THE NEED FOR LEGAL AND INSURANCE REFORM 93 (1967).
418. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 74(76) (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 28.20.580 (1962); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1223 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1486 (1957); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 652,
665, 11620 (West Supp. 1970).
419. Note405 supra.
420. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2907(a) (1953).
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higher than ordinary. 42 1 Furthermore, personal injury coverage is
available in some states only in limited amounts, 42 and claim treatment
is often less than satisfactory.41 Moreover, even under some assigned
risk plans, an ex-convict may be refused coverage if he has two or more
convictions. 42
4
Although the ex-convict is not considered a good risk under the
negligence insurance system, the Keeton-O'Connell plan, known
officially as the Basic Protection Plan,425 and New York's recently
developed Rockefeller-Stewart plan,426 may improve his status. These
plans, if adopted, would require compulsory insurance for all motorists
and- impose no-fault liability on the insurer. The Basic Protection Plan
necessitates a re-evaluation of the factors relevant in determining
whether an applicant for insurance is a good or a bad risk. This re-
evaluation may place the ex-convict in a better position to obtain
coverage than he enjoys under the existing structure. Under the present
negligence insurance system, the insurance underwriter is primarily
interested in estimated "accident and claim frequency" as a basis for
preferring one kind of policyholder over another.4z' Under the Basic
Protection Plan, however, the focus of the insurance company's concern
will shift to the "average claim cost" since its liability will accrue
automatically if the insured is involved in an accident. The company can
be expected, therefore, to look to such factors as the insured's age,
employment, income and fringe benefits, and the size of the insured's
family and car. 421 Since insurer liability will be predetermined for
accidents involving the ex-convict, the contention that a criminal record
might prejudice a jury's finding of fault will be irrelevant, and the factors
examined to establish the risk classification into which the ex-convict
will fall will be unrelated to his criminal record.
421. Although the rates are higher for assigned risk coverage, usually up to 50% above
normal rates, 2 authorities contend that the insurance companies, nevertheless, are not fully
compensated for the extra risk involved. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 417, at 126-27.See
also H.R. REP. No..815, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967).
422. E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11622 (West Supp. 1970).
423. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 79-82
(1965).
424. Note405 supra.
425. This plan is set out in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 423.
426. Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance: The Rockefeller-Stewari Plan, 37 INs.
COUNSEL J. 324 (1970).
427. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 417, at 88-89.
428. Ghiardi & Kircher, supra note 426.
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B. Loss of Pension Benefits
A criminal's conviction or even his criminal activity may disqualify
him from pension benefits. If he is an employee at the time of his
criminal conduct, a future application for participation in a pension plan
may be denied; if he is retired and already on the pension roll, his
conviction may result in discontinuance of payments. The amount of his
loss might include not only superannuated payments, but also
compulsory deductions taken from his salary and placed in the pension
fund.
1. Nature of Pensions.-With the exception of corporate pension
plans, 42 9 the vast majority of pensions are legislative creations,
established and administered for the benefit of public employees.
Statutory pension plans are created not only by state and federal
enactments, but also by either municipal ordinances4 or city charters.43'
These acts generally provide fori both disability and retirement pensions.
Under the latter program employees attaining a specified age and
number of years of service may retire with a monthly pension. 43 2 The
pension fund usually includes both state appropriations and
contributions or deductions from employee salariesA3
The administration of the funds is ordinarily delegated to a "board
of trustees" or a group of "commissioners" who also serve in a "quasi-
judicial" capacity.4 u In cases involving disqualification of a criminal
from pension benefits, it is usually this body that makes the necessary
dispositions. The board or commission may be given a great deal of
discretion in fulfilling this task .4 The legislature, for example, may give
the board discretion to discontinue pension benefits because of an
429. Corporate pension plans, provided by private employers, vary from corporation to
corporation. In the majority of instances, however, these pension plans are a part of the employment
contract. Gitelson v. DuPont, 17 N.Y.2d 46, 215 N.E.2d 336, 268 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1966); Sheehy v.
Seilon, Inc., 10 Ohio St. 2d 242,227 N.E.2d 229 (1967). For this reason, exclusion of the criminal
from private pension plans depends on the terms of the contract. See, e.g.. Markus v. Boston
Edison Co., 317 Mass. 1, 56 N.E.2d 910 (1944) (7-month incarceration causing continuous
absence from duty in violation of the contract resulted in loss of pension).
430. See, e.g., Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180, 265 P.2d 884 (1954); Ewing v.
Dupee, 104 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Grant v. City of Topeka, 154 Kan. 606, 121
P.2d 224 (1942).
431. See. e.g., Bucher v. Ober, 204 Md. 568,105 A.2d 480 (1954); Van Coppenolle v. City of
Detroit, 313 Mich. 580, 21 N.W.2d 903 (1946).
432. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50870 (West 1966).
433. E.g., N.Y. RETIREMENT & SOC. SEC. LAW § 316 (McKinney Supp. 1969)
(appropriation by state). Id. § 317 (appropriation by participating employees).
434. See, e.g., State ex rel. Court v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, I I
Wash. 2d 681,120 P.2d 519 (1941).
435. State ex rel. Kirby v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 129 Conn. 419,29 A.2d 452 (1942).
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employee's criminal conviction.lu When the legislature has neither given
the board this discretion nor expressly denied the convicted criminal the
right to pension, it has been held that the board does not have the
authority to adopt a rule of disqualification in derogation of that
intent.13 When discretionary power is granted to the board, however, the
courts generally decline to substitute their judgment for that of the board
in the absence of fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious conduct.
34
Perhaps the most unsettled issue is whether pension funds are vested
in the employee or whether they merely represent a "bounty" or gesture
of appreciation awarded by the sovereign to its deserving servants. Those
that favor the latter position contend that pension funds are "an
inducement to conscientious, efficient, and honorable work,"4 39 and are
designed to secure good behavior and discipline during service.44 Thus,
they reason that any pension funds awarded the criminal would impose
an untenable burden on the taxpayer in providing for a person who has
betrayed his trust.
44'
On the other hand, many persons look upon pension funds as
governed by contract law. The funds are viewed as contemplated
payments set forth in the contract of employment as a form of deferred
compensation for services' rendered.442 As such, pension benefits are
vested contractual rights4 43 accruing upon retirement, 4 4 the employee's
fulfillment of contingent requirements of age and years of service, 445 or
the first moment of employment. 46 Although this position does not
436. State ex rel. Court v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, I I Wash.
2d 681, 120 P.2d 519 (1941).
437. Hinman v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, 192 Wash. 562, 74
P.2d 475 (1937); see Freyermuth v. State ex rel. Pinter, 215 Ind. 693, 21 N.E.2d 707 (1939) (when
board is given the power to terminate police pensions under certain circumstances, it does not have
the power to do so in absence of those circumstances).
438. 3 E. MCQUILLEN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.164 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
439. Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383,389, 102 A.2d 662,666 (App. Div. 1954).
440. Hozer v. State Dep't of Treasury, Consol. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund, 95 N.J.
Super. 196,230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967).
441. Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 42, 198 A. 383, 384 (1938);
accord, Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees of Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 62 N.J. Super. 589,
599, 163 A.2d 388, 393 (App. Div. 1960) (payment "would destroy the faith of the public in public
pension plans").
442. Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 497, 275 P.2d 9 (1954); Tembruell v. City of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964).
443. These rights are vested in the sense that authorities administering the pension cannot
deny an employee the pension except in accordance with an express or implied statutory provision.
Anderson, Vested Rights in Public Retirement Benefits in Pennsylvania, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 255 (1961).
See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 437 (1957).
444. See, e.g., N.Y. RETIREMENT & SOC. SEC. LAW § 376 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
445. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3375(6.2) (Supp. 1970).
446. See, e.g., Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319 P.2d 624 (1957);
Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 503,392 P.2d 453 (1964).
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exclude the possibility of disqualifying the criminal from pension
benefits, it may determine the foundation from which a court will
reason. 4 7 Moreover, the courts are more inclined to give a strict
construction to disqualification clauses if they believe that forfeiture will
entail divestment of a contractual right rather than mere revocation of a
gratuity.44 When the employee is said to have a vested right, for
example, it has been held that he cannot be disqualified for a criminal
conviction if the statutory disqualification was added after his right had
accrued." 9 Further significance of the conflict will become apparent in
subsequent discussions of disqualification of the criminal and deductions
from his salary.
2. Exclusion on Basis of Criminal Conviction.-A person who
has fulfilled the statutory requirements of age and years of service still
may be prevented from participating in a pension fund if he is convicted
of a crime. Criminal convictions have served as a basis for both direct
disqualification by express statutory provision and indirect
disqualification because of dishonorable service or discharge for cause.
(a) Direct disqualification.-The federal government has directly
disqualified Social Security recipients and members of its civil and
uniformed services from annuity or retirement programs if they have
been convicted of specific crimes.4 0 In addition, at least eighteen states
have enacted statutes that directly disqualify convicted criminals from
participation in pension funds.451 Under these statutes, the convicted
447. When a vested right in a pension is subject to disqualification, such contingency must be
a term of the contractual agreement, and denial of pension benefits must be predicated on
contractual as well as statutory interpretation. See Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d
523,319 P.2d 624 (1957); Keogh v. Wagner, 20 App. Div. 2d 380,247 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1964).
448. Compare Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954), with
Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 497,275 P.2d 9 (1954).
449. Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180,265 P.2d 884 (1954).
450. Uniformed service as defined by the statute includes armed forces, Coast and Geodetic
Survey, and Public Health Service. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8312-15 (Supp. IV, 1969) (annuity and retirement
pay to civil and uniformed services); 42 U.S.C. § 402(u) (Supp. IV, 1969) (social security). See also
24 U.S.C. § 50 (1964) (forfeiture of Soldiers' Home benefits by soldiers convicted of a felony or
"other disgraceful or infamous crime"); 38 U.S.C. § 3505 (1964) (forfeiture of veterans' benefits).
A federal judge in Georgia has ruled that incarcerated offenders do not have a constitutional right to
Social Security benefits since "[w]hatever right they have to compensation is derived from the will
of the federal legislative branch." Houston Chronicle, Aug. 30, 1970, § 1, at 9, col. 7-8.
451. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 50883 (West 1966) (policemen & firemen); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 185.18(3)(b) (1966) (policemen); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, § 4-138 (Smith-Hurd 1964)
(firemen); id. § 8-251 (municipal employees); id. § 9-235 (county employees); id. § 11-230
(laborers); id. § 12-191 (park employees); id. § 13-221 (sanitary district employees); id. § 15-187
(university employees); id. § 16-199 (teachers); id. § 18-163 (judges); id. § 19-103 (house of
correction employees); id. § 19-203 (library employees); IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4514 (1963)
(teachers); id. § 48-6405 (policemen); id. § 48-6655 (sanitary officers); IOWA CODE ANN. § 410.8
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citizen may be ineligible for annuities after having satisfied the
standards of age and years of service but prior to having applied for
pension benefits, or he may forfeit his benefits while receiving a pension
as a retirant.
(i) 'Ineligibility for pension.-An employee who becomes eligible
for retirement but chooses to remain in active service may be made
ineligible for pension benefits in some states if he is convicted of a felony
before he submits his application for participation in a pension plan. At
least one state statute specifically disqualifies such an employee.45 In
addition, the same result is reached in other states through statutes
providing that no benefits shall be paid to a person convicted of a
felony; 40 or that such a person is not "entitled" to a pension;4 4 or that
he has no "right" to a pension. 455 Moreover, at least four states, while
securing a vested right to pensions for all persons who become eligible to
retire, expressly except the convicted felon.4
In applying these statutes, it has been held that a pension was
properly denied an employee who had become eligible for retirement but,
prior to application, was convicted of a crime related to his
employment.4 7 It also has been held that such an employee was not
(1949) (policemen and firemen); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a08 (1964) (policemen and firemen); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1437 (1965) (policemen); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1593 (1964) (state
policemen); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 15(3),(1966) (all members of state retifement system);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 423.809(5) (1958) (policemen in second class cities); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 86.570 (Supp. 1969) (policemen and firemen); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962) (all state and
municipal employees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-45-15 (1968) (members of police department); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 741.18(E) (Baldwin 1964) (firemen); id. § 741.A9(E) (policemen); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 370 (1959) (firemen); id. § 541p (policemen); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 39323
(1957) (firemen in third class cities); id. § 65599 (policemen in second class cities); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 3-13-33 (1967) (law enforcement officers); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6220 (1962)
(state and county pensioners); id. art. 6243e, § 17 (firemen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18.130
(1961) (firemen); id. § 41.20.110 (policemen). The above statutes do not include those that make it
either a misdemeanor or a felony to defraud the pension fund. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 78-9901
(1964) (felony); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.700, 161.690, .990(5) (1969) (misdemeanor); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 86.193 (1949) (for policemen in cities of 500,000 and over-misdemeanor); Id.
§ 86.317 (for policemen in cities of 300,000-500,000-felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-32 (1964)
(misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-3450 (1955) (misdemeanor).
452. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1437 (1965).
453. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, §§ 8-251, 11-230 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
454. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.18(3) (1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 423.809(5) (1958).
455. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 15(3) (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599
(1957).
456. IOWA CODE ANN. § 410.8 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a08 (1964); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 40-45-15 (1968); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 741A9(E) (Baldwin 1964).
457. Essex County Retirement Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 342 Mass. 322,
173 N.E.2d627 (1961); [1961-62] Op. MASS. ATr'Y GEN. 163.
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entitled to pension privileges even when his crime was totally divorced
from his vocation.45
These holdings, however, have not been without opposition. A few
states secure, without excepting the convicted criminal, a vested right to
pensions for all employees at the time they first become eligible.4 5 Thus,
it has been held that a police officer with twenty years of service could
not be denied annuities because of a conviction for bribery committed
after he had become eligible for retirement.40 The court reasoned that
the right to a pension is contractual, granted by the city in consideration
for services rendered. As such, any event subsequent to eligibility had no
bearing on tights already vested.
(ii) Forfeiture of benefits after retirement.-Once an employee
has retired and his application for pension benefits has been accepted, he
still may have his payments discontinued if convicted of a crime. The
federal retirement statute for civil and uniformed service employees
states that no individual may be paid annuities or retirement allowance if
convicted of specific crimes.46 1 Similarly, at least four states provide that
payments to any retirant must cease if he is convicted of a felony." 2 The
Federal Social Security Act, however, places forfeiture of benefits in the
discretion of the court." 3 Likewise, a number of states vest discretion in
the governing body of the fund to discontinue benefits in such
situations.44 In addition, two states have statutes withholding annuities
from any person incarcerated in a penitentiary.4
5
Forfeitures occurring within the purview of these statutes involve
both crimes that arose out of activities during employment, though
discovered after retirement, and crimes that were perpetrated after
retirement, completely independent of employment. 6 In the former
458. State ex rel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N.E. 891 (1930).
459. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3375(6.2) (Supp. 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 286.6793
(1969); N.Y. RETiREMENT & SOC. SEC. LAW § 376 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
460. Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 497,275 P.2d 9 (1954).
461. 42 U.S.C. § 402(u)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969). The statutory use of "individual" rather than
"employee" suggests that this statute may be applied both to render an applicant ineligible and to
cause forfeiture of pension benefits after retirement.
462. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50883(a) (West 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1593
(1965); Tax. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6243e, § 17 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18.130
(Supp. 1969); id. § 41.20.110 (1961).
463, 42 U.S.C. § 402(u)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
464. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4514 (1948); id. § 48-6405 (1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. §-86.570
(Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 370, 541p (1959); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-13-
33 (1967).
465. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6220 (1962); accord,
Sally v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d 244 (1940).
466. Van Coppenolle v. City of Detroit, 313 Mich. 580, 21 N.W.2d 903 (1946) (pensioner's
allowances discontinued upon conviction for criminal conduct during employment); State ex rel.
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instance, forfeiture has been predicated on the theory that no person
should be allowed to enjoy benefits simply because he has successfully
concealed his crime until after retirement."17 In the latter instance, the
courts have simply reaffirmed the legislative power to enact the
conditions or terms it sees fit."68 Where further justification is offered, it
has rested on the theory that a retired police officer remains a member of
the police force since he is still subject to recall in certain emergency
situations .469
Many courts, on the other hand, have displayed a distaste for this
particular application of the forfeiture statutes. Though few of these
statutes have been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds,
they have often been narrowly construed in order to prevent
discontinuance of payments.4 70 In Landry v. Board of Trustees of Police
Pension Fund,0 ' for example, the court held that the board of trustees
had exceeded its power in terminating payments to a retired policeman
who had been convicted of a felony and incarcerated in the state
penitentiary. The court held that the statute providing that an officer
who is convicted of a felony must forfeit all pension rights acquired
under the act only applied to members of the police department on active
duty and not to retired officers. The court also rejected the argument
that a retirant remained a member of the force. A retired and pensioned
officer, it reasoned, "is no longer entrusted with the obligations that
usually devolve upon an officer of the law. ''47
2
The reluctance of these courts can be partially attributed to a belief
that the retired pensioner has a vested right to payments.473 In Wallace v.
City of Fresno,474 for example, the court carried this reasoning to an
Curran v. Brookes, 144 Ohio St. 582, 60 N.E.2d 62 (1945) (pension discontinued for police officer
upon conviction of intoxication occurring after retirement); f., Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 64
Wash. 2d 503,392 P.2d 453 (1964).
467. Van Coppenolle v. City of Detroit, 313 Mich. 580,21 N.W.2d 903 (1946).
468. Rudolph v. United States ex rel. Rock, 6 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
559 (1925); State ex rel. Court v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, I I Wash.
2d 681, 120 P.2d 519 (1941).
469. Rudolph v. United States ex rel. Rock, 6 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
559 (1925). Rudolph was a retired policeman. His pension was discontinued 5 years after retirement
when he was found guilty of violating the National Prohibition Law, Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85,41
Stat. 305 (repealed 1934), and fined $200.
470. Rockenfield v. Kuhl, 242 Iowa 213, 46 N.W.2d 17 (1951) (unless the statute is
unequivocal and affirmative in its terms, it should be strictly construed in favor of the pensioner);
Williams v. City of Knoxville, 220 Tenn. 257,416 S.W.2d 758 (1967).
471. 58 So. 2d 296 (La. Orleans Cir. Ct. App. 1952).
472. Id. at 298; accord, Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180, 265 P.2d 884 (1954).
473. Rockenfield v. Kuhl, 242 Iowa 213,46 N.W.2d 17 (1951).
474. 42 Cal. 2d 180,265 P.2d 884 (1954).
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extreme in finding that an employee had a vested right at the moment of
employment. Consequently, to avoid an unreasonable impairment of his
contract rights, the court held that the employee was unaffected by a
forfeiture provision enacted after he began work.
(iii) Nature of crimes.-The federal and state statutes that deny
pension benefits on the basis of criminal conviction are not uniform in
the nature of crimes required for disqualification. The federal statutes
focus on conviction for specific crimes involving national security,
irrespective of criminal degrees.4 75 On the other hand, the state
requirements generally turn on the degree of the crime committed rather
than the specific offense. The majority of states require a felony
conviction." In a small minority of states, however, a conviction for a
misdemeanor is sufficient.47 Anomalously, at least one state requires a
felony conviction for one profession and a mere misdemeanor for
another.4 78 The remaining states require conviction for either an
"infamous crime," 479 an offense relating to pension funds, 480 or a crime
involving "moral turpitude." 4 '
475. 5 U.S.C. § 8312(b) (Supp. IV, 1969) (civil and uniformed services); 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(u) (Supp. IV, 1969) (social security). The crimes referred to in these statutes include
sabotage, treason, unpermitted photographing of federal installations (a misdemeanor), and aiding
the enemy.
476. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50883 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, §§ 4-138, 8-
251, 9-235, 11-230, 13-221, 15-187, 16-199, 18-163, 19-103, -230 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 48-6415 (1963) (policemen only); IOWA CODE ANN. § 410.8 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1437 (1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1593 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 423.809
(1958); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-45-15 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 370, 541p (1959); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 3-13-33 (1967); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6220, 6243e, § 17
(1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.18.130, .20.110 (1961). Of these, only Illinois requires
that the felony relate to or arise out of the person's services as an employee.
For a discussion of what constitutes a felony see notes 108-20 on pages 956-57 supra and
accompanying text. See also State ex rel. Beckman v. Bowman, 38 Ohio App. 237, 175 N.E. 891
(1930) (30-day sentence enough to satisfy felony requirement of forfeiture clause, even though same
judgment could be reduced to a misdemeanor in the state). Contra, Keogh v. Wagner, 20 App. Div.
2d 380, 247 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1964) (federal felony conviction insufficient when crime would be a
misdemeanor under New York law). For a discussion of what constitutes a conviction see notes 82-
103 on pages 952-55 supra and accompanying text. See also Keogh v. Wagner, supra. Tembruell v.
City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964) (plea of guilty does not mature into a
conviction until there has been adjudication and a sentence imposed as part of the judgment).
477. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.18(3) (1966) (disability pension denied when injury is
result of participating in fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing a crime); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 28-4514 (1948) (applies to teachers only and misdemeanor must result in imprisonment);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957) (conviction of a crime or misdemeanor).
478. IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4514 (1948) (teachers); id. § 48-6405 (1963) (policemen); id.
§ 48-6655 (sanitary workers). Teachers may lose all pension rights if imprisoned for a
misdemeanor, but police and sanitary officers lose their rights only upon a felony conviction.
479. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 86.193, .317 (1949). For a discussion of what constitutes an
infamous crime see notes 121-38 on pages 957-59 supra and accompanying text.
480. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 15(3) (1966).
481. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962). For a discussion of what constitutes a crime of
"moral turpitude" see notes 139-41 on pages 959-60 supra and accompanying text.
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(b) Indirect disqualification.-In the absence of a direct
disqualification, a criminal conviction still may deprive the offender of
pension benefits. Either discharge from employment or a finding of
dishonorable service may flow from his conviction and bar him from
participating in the pension fund.
(i) Honorable service.-Some pension statutes provide that a
person is eligible for pension benefits only after honorable or faithful
service. 412 Consequently, the convicted criminal may be denied pension
benefits on the theory that his conviction is prima facie evidence of
dishonorable service.413 Ironically, this method of disqualification may
have a greater impact on the criminal than a direct disqualification, since
its vagueness leaves more to the discretion of the pension board and may
permit a denial on the basis of a misdemeanor. 4u Moreover, it may give
the board the discretionary power to deny a pension on the basis of
criminal activity even in the absence of a conviction."'
These statutes, like those requiring a criminal conviction, may
breed denials of pension benefits for dishonorable service discovered
before or after retirement. Moreover, some courts have held that a
person must have faithfully served for the entire tenure of employment.8
Consequently, an employee who commits a crime after having satisfied
the statutory prerequisites of age and years of service still may become
ineligible. In Plunkett v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 7 an
employee who had already served twenty years of honorable service was
disqualified because of embezzlements committed after he had reached
the age of voluntary retirement.
When criminal conviction follows retirement, forfeitures because of
dishonorable service must involve crimes that occurred during
employment.4 s8 Although this requirement restricts the scope of the
"honorable service" statutes, it does not prevent harsh results. In
Fromm v. Board of Directors of Police and Firemen's Retirement
482. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1591 (1964) (state police must retire with a "good
record"); N.J. STAT. ANN. '§ 43:11-1 (1962).
483. Hozer v. State Police & Firemen's Pension Fund, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 230 A.2d 508
(App. Div. 1967).
484. Fromm v. Board of Directors of Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 81 N.J. Super.
138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963).
485. See notes 515-19 infra and accompanying text.
486. Kone v. Baltimore County, 231 Md. 466, 190 A.2d 800 (1963); State ex rel. Idlet v.
Lockwood, 240 Mo. App. 1,201 S.W.2d 514 (1947).
487. 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A.923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), affd, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A.341 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1935) (no conviction attending crime).
488. Bucher v. Ober, 204 Md. 568, 105 A.2d 480 (1954); Hozer v. State Dep't of Treasury,




System,"' a police officer, who was granted a disability pension for
injuries suffered while on duty, forfeited his payments when he
subsequently was convicted of a misdemeanor that had been committed
during his employment. As a result of this minor conviction, for which
he was fined only 100 dollars, the board permanently discontinued his
disability payments of over 346 dollars per month.
Even when the statute does not expressly require honorable service,
some courts have reached the same result by making it an implied
condition.4 When, for example, a state has several pension acts and
only a few demand honorable service, it has been held that the
requirement of honorable service is implicit in all pension acts by sui
generis.49 1 Moreover, the requirement has even been implied when no
pension acts of the state demand "honorable service."
4 92
(ii) 'Discharge and suspension.-Indirect disqualification of the
convicted criminal also may be accomplished by his discharge or
suspension from employment. Several states provide that when an
employee is discharged for cause he may be denied pension benefits.
493
Moreover, when participation in a retirement system is not expressly
prevented by discharge, the same result has been reached by implication.
In Ewing v. Dupee,'" for example, the court held that implicit in the
pension ordinance at issue was the condition that an employee must
"retire" to be within the provision in the first instance. The court
reasoned that an employee who has been discharged for cause has no
status from which to retire; therefore, he is ineligible even to apply for a
retirement pension.
Other courts, however, have not cared to make so fine a distinction,
especially when it is held that an employee has a vested right to a
pension. It has been held, for example, that eligibility for retirement pay
is complete as soon as an employee has reached the age of voluntary
retirement.495 According to this view, the employee has a vested right that
489. 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d32 (App. Div. 1963).
490. Baltimore County Bd. of Trustees v. Comes, 247 Md. 182,230 A.2d 458 (1967); Fromm
v. Board of Directors of Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App.
Div. 1963); State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund, 148 W.
Va. 369, 135 S.E.2d 262 (1964).
491. Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954).
492. State ex rel. Fox v. Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund, 148 W.
Va. 369, 135 S.E.2d 262 (1964).
493. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 10(1) (Supp. 1969) (discharge for offense involving
moral turpitude); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 541k (Supp. 1969) (by implication).
494. 104 So. 2d 672 (Fla. App. 1958).
495. Wallow v. Officers & Employees Retirement Bd., 383 Pa. 199, 117 A.2d 685 (1955)
(vested right had been secured by statute).
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will permit him to retain his pension benefits if he chooses to remain in
active service and is subsequently discharged.
In other cases where discharge is not mentioned in the statute,
its effect has turned on the manner in which the provision has been
written. If, for example, the statute provides that an employee who has
met the statutory contingencies shall receive a pension when his services
have "ceased," it has been held that his discharge has no effect on his
pension benefits. 4" If, on the other hand, the statute provides that upon
application the "board shall retire" the employee, it has been held that
the board may discharge an applicant and thereby prevent him from
"retiring" on pension.9 7
The effect of suspension, like that of discharge, has created much
disagreement. If the statutory requirements have been met but the
applicant is on suspension, it has been held that no successful application
for pension benefits can be made." 8 The majority of courts, however,
insist that the suspended employee is still an employee until discharged
and cannot be denied his pension.'"
(c) Effect of probation and pardon.-There are too few cases to
formulate any general statement on the effect of probation on the
exclusion of convicted criminals from pension funds.- The Special
Project has not found a single case in which probation, in and of itself,
has restored a convicted employee's right to pension funds. °1 The right
to a pension, however, has been restored to an employee against whom
charges were expunged upon a showing of compliance with the terms of
probation 502
The effect of a pardon has tended to turn on the method of
disqualification involved. If, for example, direct disqualification, based
on the conviction itself, has been employed, it has been held that a full
pardon restores a convicted policeman to all his civil rights, including his
496. Stiles v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 281 111. 636, 118 N.E. 202 (1917).
497. Piernev. Valentine, 291 N.Y. 333,.52 N.E.2d 890 (1943).
498. Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954) (suspension
breeds abeyance not only of duties but also of rights to pension).
499. Daigle v. McLaughlin, 193 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1961) (fireman convicted of
embezzlement recovered pension since he had only been suspended and not discharged); State ev rel,
Kirby v. Board of Fire Comm'rs, 129 Conn. 419, 29 A.2d 452 (1942); Pangburn v. Ocean City
Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 136 N.J.L. 501, 56 A.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
500. For a general discussion of restoration procedures see notes 570-659 infra and
accompanying text.
501. See Connelly v. Municipal Employees Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 101, 31 A.2d 488
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
502. Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319 P.2d 624 (1957) (alternative
holding); Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 503,392 P.2d 453 (1964).
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right to pension. 50 3 When an indirect disqualification is involved,
however, pardon has had little effect on a convicted criminal's loss of
pension benefits .504 In Hozer v. State Department of Treasury,
Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Commission,0 a
policeman who had been convicted of nonfeasance in office was granted
a "full and free" pardon. The court found that since dishonorable
service, for which he had lost his pension rights, was distinct from
criminal conviction, the pardon of one was not absolution from the
other. The court reasoned that:
While a pardon may restore to a convicted felon his rights of citizenship and remove
all penalties and legal disabilities, it cannot and does not substitute a good
reputation for one that is bad; it does not obliterate the fact of the commission of the
crime; it does not wash out the moral stain; it involves forgiveness and not
forgetfulness and it does not 'wipe the slate clean.""
The punishment given the policeman had been a suspended jail sentence
and a 1,000 dollar fine. In refusing to allow either the sentence or the full
pardon to "wipe the slate clean," the court denied him pension
payments for the remainder of his life.
3. Exclusion for Criminal Activity in the Absence of Criminal
Conviction.-It is not always necessary that the criminal be convicted to
be denied pension benefits. Many statutes provide for the exclusion not
only on the basis of criminal conviction, but also for specified activities
unattended by a conviction.50 7 Of these, most exclude the habitual
drunkard.0 s Other statutes deny pension benefits to employees for parti-
cular types of conduct, including "dishonesty, cowardice or intemperate
habits,''51 refusal to give testimony concerning one's employment,510
503. People ex rel. Stine v. City of Chicago, 222 111. App. 100 (1921) (certificate of
restoration was given the same effect as full pardon).
504. Ewing v. Dupee, 104 So. 2d 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
505. 95 N.J. Super. 196,230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967).
506. Id. at 202,230 A.2d at 512.
507. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50883 (West 1966); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-319(a)-(b) (1967);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.18(3) (1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4514, 48-6405, -6656 (1963);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 741.17(E), .49(E) (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 370, 541p (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 41.18.130, .20.110 (1961).
508. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50883 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.18(3) (1966); IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4514, 48-6405, -6656 (1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 370, 541p (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 39323, 65599 (1957).
509. State ex rel. Foxall v. Cossairt, 146 Ohio St. 328, 65 N.E.2d 870 (1946) (habitual debts
are evidence of dishonesty and therefore grounds for denial of pension); OHlo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 741.49(E) (Baldwin 1964) (police only).
510. 5 U.S.C. § 8314 (Supp. IV, 1969); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-319(a)-(b) (1967). This
provision has been held unconstitutional as creating arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination
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desertion,-"' suicide,512 excessive use of drugs or narcotics,5 13 or will-
ful and illegal participation in fights, riots, or civil insurrection. 514
In the absence of an express statutory exclusion, criminal activity
still may disqualify the employee. As previously noted, both discharge
for cause and the performance of dishonorable service may result in
denial of pension benefits for criminal activity without a criminal
conviction.5 15 There are, however, limits to the use of these vague
standards. Mere accusations of unlawful conduct resulting in discharge,
for example, have been held insufficient to deprive an employee of his
pension benefits .516
When there is an indictment for a crime but no conviction, federal
employees may lose retirement pay if they willfully remain outside the
country for over a year.517 Among the states, it is generally held that
when an employee is indicted the board has the power to postpone action
on his application for pension benefits until the outcome of the case.518
An indictment does not, however, warrant the board's discontinuing a
pensioner's payments on the basis of "dishonorable service." ' 9
4. Effect of Forfeiture.-The criminal who has lost the right to
pension benefits is subject to varying amounts of forfeiture. He may, for
example, lose only amounts in excess of the money he has placed into the
pension fund, or he may forfeit the full amount previously due. Although
he may himself be excluded from allowances, some states provide for the
reallocation of forfeited benefits to other persons.
(a) Loss of contributions and deductions.-Assuming the
criminal is excluded from pension benefits, he might lose not only
superannuated allowances but also the amounts already deducted from
his paycheck and placed in the pension fund. As justification for this
position, many courts have held that contributions create no vested
against employees who have invoked their fifth amendment rights. Steinberg v. United States, 163
F. Supp. 590 (Ct. CI. 1968), noted in 22 GA. B.J. 114 (1959).
511. GA. CODE ANN. § 78-203 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 112-20 (1966). Though still
unrepealed, both of these statutes are only of historical interest since they concern the Confederate
veteran.
512. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6405 (1963) (if an officer commits suicide, his widow's rights to
pension are forfeited).
513. FLA. STAT. ANN. & 185.18(3)(a) (1966).
514. Id. § 185.18(3)(b).
515. Grant v. City of Topeka, 154 Kan. 606, 121 P.2d 224 (1942); Plunkett v. Board of
Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
516. Trustee of Police Pension Bd. v. Putnam, 162 Colo. 232,425 P.2d 695 (1967).
517. 5 U.S.C. § 8313 (Supp. IV, 1969).
518. Baltimore County Bd. of Trustees v. Comes, 247 Md. 182, 230 A.2d 458 (1967); Van
Coppenolle v. City of Detroit, 313 Mich. 580, 21 N.W.2d 903 (1946).
519. McFeely v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, I N.J. 212,62 A.2d 686 (1948).
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rights in the criminal; therefore disqualification prevents recovery of the
entire amount of anticipated allowance.52 As to the significance of
compulsory deductions, it has been held that the mere fact-that the
employee and his family "were entitled to various sums set forth should
certain contingencies occur is sufficient and ample consideration for the
payments made." 521 These cases make it clear that a claim for recovery
of payments muit be based on the statute governing the fund. Unless the
right to a refund of contributions is expressly or impliedly granted by the
statute,,it rarely exists.52
To prevent the loss of money already paid into pension funds, the
federal government,523 as well as many States, 52' provides by statute that
persons whose employment is terminated may obtain a refund of their
contributions. These statutes, however, are neither uniform in their
application nor always consistent in their effect on various vocations
within a state. Some state statutes follow the federal example52 and
guarantee the employee both contributions and accrued interest.5 6
Others refund only the amount of deductions without interest.52 Kansas,
while allowing police officers a refund of only one-half the total amount
of deductions,52s permits discharged teachers to be paid the full amount
of their contributions.52 Illinois simply states in its provisions excluding
convicted criminals from pension benefits that the statutes do not
520. Sally v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d 244
(Sup. Ct. 1940); Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 198 A. 383 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
521. Krein v. Fairmount Park Guard Pension Fund Ass'n, 14 Pa. D. & C. 186, 187
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1930).
522. See Sally v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d
244 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Krein v. Fairmount Park Guard Pension Fund Ass'n, 14 Pa. D. & C. 186
(Philadelphia County Ct. t930); Anderson, Vested Rights in Public Retirement Benefits in
Pennsylvania, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 255 (1961). Contra, Board of Firemen's Relief & Retirement Fund
Trustees v. Parks, 424 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d
503, 392 P.2d 453 (1964) (dictum). The latter 2 cases question the validity of withholding contri-
butions in states which by statute or constitution forbid property forfeiture for criminal convic-
tion. In Parks, the court held a statute which provided for the denial of employee contributions
an unconstitutional forfeiture of property.
523. 5 U.S.C. § 8316 (Supp. IV, 1969).
524. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-319(c) (1967); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, §§ 8-251, 9-
235, 11-230, 12-191, 13-221 (Smith-Hurd 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a06 (1964) (policemen);
id. § 72-1730 (teachers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1437 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-41(a)
(Supp. 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13438 (1957).
525. 5 U.S.C. § 8316 (Supp. IV, 1969).
526. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-319(c) (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-41(a) (Supp.
1969).
527. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1437 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13438 (1957).
528. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a06 (1964).
529. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1730 (1964).
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"preclude" the right to refunds.m Illinois judges, on the other hand, are
expressly given a vested interest in refunds.01
In other states, statutes expressly deny the criminal the right to
refunds. Massachusetts, for example, does not permit any employee
convicted of an offense involving funds the right to his contributions
until all monies are repaid.02 Washington, while securing the right to
refund for employees if they cease work before eligibility, expressly
excepts the convicted felon. m
In construing those statutes allowing refunds, it is consistently held
that a person disqualified from receiving pension benefits has an
inviolable right to recapture prior deductions from his salary.-- Such
deductions have been considered a part of the employee's salary held by
the city or state as trustee.5 35 This view, however, has not left the
employer without remedy. In Francis v. Corleto,m for example, it was
held that an employer who suffers financial loss due to an employee's
dishonorable service may make a set-off claim as a pro tanto defense to
the employee's claim for salary.
(b) Reallocation of benefits.-A few states provide for the
reallocation of pension benefits upon forfeiture by the felon. 37 Under
these statutes, recipients of pension benefits may include the offender's
immediate dependents,m his wife,0 9 or a legally appointed guardian.A0
In most cases, however, these people are not given a vested right to the
forfeited allowances and receive benefits only at the discretion of the
board.u1 The scope of the board's discretion is broad and may include
the power to discontinue payments already being paid to dependents of
530. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 , §§ 8-251, 9-235, 11-230, 12-191, 13-221 (Smith-Hurd
1964).
531. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1081 , § 18-156 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
532. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 15(3) (1966).
533. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18.130 (Supp. 1969).
534. United States v. Wagner, 235 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Essex County Retirement
Bd. v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 342 Mass. 322, 173 N.E.2d 627 (1961); Eberle v. La-
Guardia, 285 N.Y. 247, 33 N.E.2d 692 (1941).
535. Abraham v. Wilson, 134 Pa. Super. 297,3 A.2d 1016 (1939).
536. 418 Pa.417,211A.2d503 (1965).
537. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. II, § 370 (1959); TEX.
REV. Cirv. STAT. art. 6243e, § 17 (1962); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18.130 (Supp. 1969).
538. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 370 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18.130 (1961).
539. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 6243e, § 17 (1962).
540. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 370 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.18. 130 (Supp.
1969).
541. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (1962) (discretion to decide whether pension is necessary for
maintenance of wife or minor children); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 370 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 41.18.130 (1961). Contra, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 6243e, § 17 (1962).
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the convicted felon.542 On the other hand, if an employee had not been
convicted of a crime prior to his death, but his widow, who is receiving
his benefits, is convicted of a felony, it has been held that the board
cannot discontinue payments.-
C. Loss of Workmen's Compensation Benefits
In many states, a criminal conviction will adversely affect the
convicts' rights to receive workmen's compensation benefits.
Incarceration may result in forfeiture of benefits'for injuries incurred
prior to conviction. Moreover, a majority of states still deny all
workmen's compensation for injuries incurred during imprisonment.
Federal laws are more liberal than comparable state provisions and
generally provide remedies for most injured inmates.M
1. Federal Prisoners. -Federal prisoners who are injured while
incarcerated may receive benefits from the Prison Industries Fund.-
45
This fund compensates prisoners for injuries "in any industry or in any
work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the
institution where confined."54 6 Under the fund, an inmate receives
benefits only upon his release; all benefits are denied if the prisoner
recovers or dies from his disability while incarcerated. The amount of
compensation is determined by the Attorney General and is limited to
amounts provided under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act.14 7
There is no compensation for pain and suffering. In addition, a
subsequent criminal conviction discontinues all benefits for the
convict.m
For injuries caused by the negligence of a federal employee, a fed-
eral prisoner not covered by the Prison Industries Fund may seek relief
under the Federal Torts Claims Act.549 Where both the Prison Industries
Fund and the Federal Torts Claims Act are applicable, federal courts
542. State cc rel. Court v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, I1 Wash.
2d 681, 120 P.2d 519 (1941) (board discontinued payments to wife and daughter of deceased fire-
man who had been convicted of incest).
543. McCarthy v. City of Oakland, 60 Cal. App. 2d 546, 141 P.2d 4 (1943). Contra, Wilson
v. Board of Trustees of State Univs. Retirement Sys., 108 11. App. 2d 210,246 N.E.2d 701 (1969)
(conviction was for the wrongful death of the husband).
544. See generally I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 759-63 (1967).
545. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964).
546. Id.
547. 5 U.S.C. §§ 751-803 (1964).
548. 28 C.F.R. § 301.5 (1970).
549. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1964). See. e.g., United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150
(1963); Cole v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 7 (N.D. Ga. 1965).
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have held that the injured prisoner must rely on the former.51 The
critics of these decisions contend that more liberal compensation should
be allowed than is provided under the Prison Industries Fund.,,,
2. State Prisoners. (a) Preconfinement injuries.-As a general
rule, most states do not suspend workmen's compensation benefits upon
conviction of a crime. Courts in New York and Oregon, however, have
held that if a person who is receiving workmen's compensation benefits
is convicted of a crime, the benefits are discontinued. 5 2 Both states
holding this view have civil death statutes- that deprive the convict of
his legal capacity to sue and prevent him from appealing the rulings of
the workmen's compensation board. The New York decisions imply
that once the prisoner is paroled and his civil rights reinstated, he can
again receive the benefits. In Oregon, however, the opposite conclusion
has been reached. 554 The Oregon court ruled that the statute of
limitations for an appeal was not tolled by the imprisonment, because
the inmate was not in prison when the benefits accrued. Thus, the
prisoner also lost all his future benefits.-
(b) Injuries sustained during confinement.-Although federal
prisoners are compensated for their prison injuries, a majority of states
do not provide for such compensation. At least five states specifically
bar state prisoners from workmen's compensation benefits by statute."
In four of the five states, city and county prisoners are included in this
exemption.557
550. United States v. Demke, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Sigmen v. United States, 110 F. Supp.
906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
551. E.g., United States v. Demke, 385 US. 149, 154 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
552. Pallas v. Misericordia Hosp., 291 N.Y. 692, 52 N.E.2d 590 (1943); Boatwright v. State
Indus. Accident Comm'r, 244 Ore. 140,416 P.2d 328 (1966). But see Garner v. Shulte Co., 23 App.
Div. 2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1965). An employee receiving workmen's compensation benefits
was 6onvicted of a felony. The court viewed, for workmen's compensation purposes, the prisoner's
civil death as equivalent to his physical death. Thus, his wife continued to receive benefits. In Testa
v. Sorrente Restaurant, Inc., 10 App. Div. 2d 133, 197 N.YS.2d 560 (1960), workmen's
compensation benefits were continued to a foreign national in the United States illegally, due to a
treaty provision. In Dutton v. Clancy Carting & Storage Co., 258 App. Div. 837, 15 N.Y.S.2d 630
(1939), workmen's compensation benefits were continued to a claimant who had pleaded guilty to
rape but was found legally insane and confined to mental institution before sentencing.
553. For a discussion of civil death statutes see notes 70-79 on pages 950-51 supra and
accompanying text.
554. Boatwright v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 244 Ore. 140,416 P.2d 328 (1966).
555. This case points out an anomaly in Oregon law. If a prisoner is injured while confined,
he is awarded workmen's compensation benefits by statute. See note 560 infra and accompanying
text. If a person already receiving benefits is incarcerated, however, the benefits can be dis-
continued.
556. CAL. LABORCODE § 3352 (WestSupp. 1970);CAL. PENALCODE §§ 2700,2766 (West
1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.49 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 86F (Supp. 1969);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-108.1 (1962).
557. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.49 (Supp. 1969); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 86F (Supp.
1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-108.1 (1962).
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In the absence of a specific statute, the courts or attorney generals'
opinions of at least fourteen states have denied workmen's compensation
benefits to injured prisoners.m These decisions generally turn on the
definition of "employee" or "contract for hire" in the workmen's
compensation laws. The courts have reasoned that an inmate, who is
required by law to perform labor while incarcerated, is incapable of
entering into a "contract for hire." Accordingly, he is not an employee
of the state entitled to workmen's compensation benefits, irrespective of
any remuneration he receives from his work.0 9
Other states, however, have followed the federal example and have
permitted prisoners to recover under workmen's compensation or by
civil suit for prison injuries. At least five states specifically include
prisoners under their workmen's compensation laws." ° In four of these
states, a prisoner receives no benefits until his release from
confinement." 1 In one state, all benefits are discontinued during any
subsequent imprisonment, and there is no compensation for pain and
suffering .562 Many other states have waived their tort immunity and
permit injured prisoners to maintain civil suits against the state for
negligence."
558. Watson v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327,414 P.2d 144 (1966); Lawson v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 377 Ga. App. 85, 139 S.E. 96 (1927); Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292,291
P.2d 870 (1955); Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 137, 212 P.2d 654 (1949); Schraner v.
Department of Correction, 135 Ind. App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119 (1963); Jones v. Houston Fire and
Cas. Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 377 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1961); In re Greene, 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E.
857 (1932); In re Kreth, 408 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1965); Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okla. 167, 21
P.2d 754 (1933); Brown v. Jamesburg State Home for Boys, 60 N.J. Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445
(Passaic County Ct. 1960); Goff v. Union County, 26 N.J. Misc. 135, 57 A.2d 480 (Workmen's
Comp. Bureau 1948); Scott v. City of Hobbs, 69 N.M. 330,366 P:2d 854 (1961); Garner v. Schulte
Co., 23 App. Div. 2d 127, 259 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1965); HAWAII Ar'y GEN. Op. 69-11 (1969);
[1928-30] Op. MICH. ATr'y GEN. 135, Op. Mo. AT'y GEN. No. 203 (June 9, 1964); 1961 Op.
OHIO ATr'y GEN. 2313; [1931-32] S.D. ATr'y GEN. REPORT 822.
559. Courts have adopted a number of rationales for the holding that the prisoner's
compensation does not create an employer-employee relationship. Watson v. Industrial Comm'n,
100 Ariz. 327,414 P.2d 144 (1966) (compensation is an incentive to do a better job); Shain v. Idaho
State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291 P.2d 870 (1955) (compensation is a mere gratuity); Jones v.
Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 134 So. 2d 377 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (compensation is for
rehabilitation).
560. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 35 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (Supp. 1969); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 655.510, .515, .550 (1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 56.21 (Supp. 1969); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 27-57 (Supp. 1969). See also CAL. LABOR CODE § 3365 (West Supp. 1970) (convicts
engaged in firefighting expressly included under workmen's compensation laws); COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 23 (1965) (provides injury benefits when
prisoner is released, and death compensation).
561. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 35 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(c) (Supp. 1969); ORE.
REV. STAT. §§ 655.510, .515, .550 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 56.21 (Supp. 1969).
562. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 655.510, .515, .550 (1969).
563. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.74 (1967).
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In the absence of a specific statute including prisoners under
workmen's compensation laws, at least three cases have allowed
recovery of workmen's compensation benefits for prison-related injuries.
A California case decided prior to the enactment of the'statute denying
compensation to injured prisoners allowed recovery by an inmate who
was injured while working on a state road crew.'" The court held that the
California legislature, in passing legislation authorizing the use of
convict labor on road crews, "5 had restored the prisoner's civil right to
enter into a contract for hire with the state highway department.
Consequently, it found that since the prisoner was injured in the course
of his employment, he was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits.
Other courts that have denied recovery have distinguished this case as
resting on "special" legislation.5" The wording of the California statute,
however, is similar to the wording of statutes authorizing similar activity
in those states that have denied recovery."
7
In the two other cases permitting recovery, a convict was "loaned"
to another governmental agency or private group."' The work was
entirely voluntary and the convicts received extra compensation, such as
sundries, cigarettes, and a lessening of sentence. The convict's activity
was not under the control of prison employees in either case. The
opinions in these two cases emphasized these factors as well as the
liberality in coverage allowed under workmen's compensation laws.
These cases have been distinguished by other courts that have denied
recovery for in-prison injuries."' The voluntary nature of the work and
564. California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200 Cal. 44, 251 P. 808
(1926); see Annot., 49 A.L.R. 1377 (1926).
565. California Road Camp Bill, [1923] Cal. Stats. ch. 316, § I at 667, as amended, CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 2760-2767 (West 1956).
566. Schraner v. Department of Correction, 135 Ind. App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119 (1963);
Brown v. Jamesburg State Home for Boys, 60 N.J. Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445 (Passaic County Ct.
1960); Scott v. City of Hobbs, 69 N.M. 330, 366 P2d 854 (1961).
567. "[S]tate highway commission may employ or cause to be employed, convicts confined
to state prisons." California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 200 Cal. 44, 47,
251 P. 808, 809 (1926). The court noted "[t]he word 'employ' has a definite legal meaning, and legal
terms when used in a statute are to be construed according to the context and the approved usage of
language unless a different sense is obviously intended." Id. at 47, 251 P. at 810.
568. Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Ariz. 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960); Pruitt v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 261 Cal. App. 2d 546, 68 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Ct. App. 1968).
Special note should be given the Pruitt decision. California Penal Code had specially excluded state
prisoners from workmen's compensation benefits. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2700, 2766 (West 1956).
This court, however, did not follow this statement of legislative policy for a county prisoner who
applied for workmen's compensation. This recent decision is a step towards the liberalization of
workmen's compensation laws to include prisoners.
569. See, e.g., Watson v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327,414 P.2d 144 (1966). This case
points out the superficial distinctions employed in these decisions. Here the Arizona Supreme
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the lack of control by prison authorities have been stressed as the
distinguishing factors. Since prisoners receive some form of
compensation for nearly all work activity, the nature and amount of
compensation received in these cases was not deemed important.
XI. RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
Relief from civil disabilities has traditionally been granted once the
offender has been released from correctional supervision and has
demonstrated that he can live a life that is consistent with the demands of
society. Every state provides one or more procedures by which the
offender may apply for a restoration of the civil rights that he forfeited
upon conviction. Most procedures can be classified into three categories:
pardon, automatic restoration, and expungement. In addition, several
states have adopted procedures that cannot properly be classified in any
of these groups. Several model restoration acts have also been
formulated, but have received little support.
A. Pardon
The pardon was derived from the English practice by which the king
granted clemency to those offenders who were worthy of release from the
penal sanctions.5 70 Generally, the pardoning power was used to release
the convict from imprisonment when he was proven innocent or when the
strict application of the laws had produced a harsh and unjust result that
was unacceptable to the general public. 71 Although the pardon is still
used in this manner, it is more frequently utilized to restore the
offender's civil rights after release from a correctional institution.572
Forty-nine states have a pardon procedure. Generally, the
pardoning power is delegated to either the governor or a board of
pardons. In 23 states,573 the governor has exclusive power to grant a
Court, only 6 years after its decision in Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Ariz. 354, 356 P.2d 1021
(1960), denied benefits to an injured convict because in Watson, the convict was not working
"voluntarily."
570. C. JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 1-3 (1922).
571. See Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
572. See S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 577-78 (1963).
573. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.070 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-300(m) (1968); ILL. CONST.
art. 5, § 13; IOWA CONST. art.4, § 16; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2216 (1964); Ky. CONST. § 77; ME.
CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 11; MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 118 (Supp. 1969); MICH. CONST. art. V,
§ 14; MISS. CONST. art. 5, § 124; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 549.010 (1953); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:167-
1 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 692,697 (1958); N.C. CONST. art. Ill, § 6; OKLA. CONST.
art. 6, § 10. By statute the Oklahoma Governor may grant a pardon only when he receives a
favorable recommendation from a majority of the Board of Pardon and Parole. Id. By case law,
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pardon, while in eleven states 74 the governor can grant a pardon only
after a favorable recommendation from the board of pardons. In
California, Colorado, and New Mexico, the governor's pardoning power
can be exercised only after an applicant has obtained a certificate of
good conduct.5 In eleven states, on the other hand, a board of pardons
has the exclusive pardoning power. 57' In six of these eleven states, the
governor is a member of the board.5"7 Ohio's pardoning procedure is
unique in that either the Governor or a board of pardons may award a
pardon.58 In Rhode Island, the only state that does not have a pardoning
procedure, the legislature may restore an offender's right to vote and
hold public office.Y9 The United States Constitution provides that the
President has the power to grant pardons to offenders who have been
convicted of federal crimes."'
Several jurisdictions provide by statute that a pardon restores only
the rights specifically enumerated in the pardon.511 In the other states, the
judiciary must determine whether a pardon obliterates the conviction
and guilt and establishes the offender as an innocent man without a
criminal past. The United States Supreme Court has twice, in dicta,
addressed itself to this problem, but the decisions have expressed
opposite views. In Exparte Garland,58 2 the Court stated:
however, the Governor's power is exclusive and the Board's recommendation only advisory. Wright
v. Page, 414 P.2d 570 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966). See ORE. REV. STAT. § 143.010 (1965); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-3501 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 902 (1970); VA. CONST. § 73; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.01.120 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-16 (1966); WIS. CONST. art. 5, § 6;
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-386 (1957).
574. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-402, -443 (1956); DEL. CONST. art. 7, § I; HAWAII
Rav. STAT. § 353-72 (1959); IND. CONST. art. 5, § 17; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572 (1967);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 127, § 152 (1965); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-9841 (1969); N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 52; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 9; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 23-58-1, -59-1
(1967); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 48.01 (1966).
575. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.16-17,4853 (West 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-6-
2 (1963); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-21 (1953).
576. ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 16 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-26 (1968); FLA. CONST.
art. 4, § 12; GA. CONST. § 2-3011; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-240 (Supp. 1969); MINN. CONST. art.
5, § 4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2604 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.090 (1967); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-55-05 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-642 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-62-3 (1953).
577. FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 12; MINN. CONST. art. 5, § 4; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2602
(1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 12-55-01 (1960); UTAH CONST.
art.7, § 12.
578. OHIO REv. CODE §§ 2965.09-.10 (1968).
579. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
580. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
581. ALA. CODE tit. 42, § 16 (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-26(b) (1958); NEV. REV,
STAT. § 213.090 (1967).
582. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
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A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender. . . it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the
offense . it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores to him all his civil
rights.m
Nearly half a century later, however, the Court in Burdick v. United
States s4 , noted that there is a "confession of guilt implied in the
acceptance of a pardon." These conflicting opinions have created
confusion among the lower courts. Although the Garland dictum has
often been quoted arid occasionally used as controlling authority, r 5 the
majority of courts have held that a pardon neither obliterates the
conviction nor re-establishes the offender's good character.
58 6
Nevertheless, most civil rights that Were forfeited on conviction are
restored by a pardon.5 Therefore, the courts have generally held that a
pardoned offender is entitled to vote,5 file suit, 589 and serve as a juroir91
or witness.59  Although most authorities and jurisdictions have found
that the pardoned offender is eligible to hold public office, 592 several
recent decisions have held to the contrary.59 3 Regardless of its effect on
eligibility for public office, it is well established that a pardon does not
reinstate the offender to an office that had been forfeited because of his
conviction .59 4
Although a pardon usually restores most of the released offender's
civil rights, it often does not affect several important disabilities. Most
583. Id. at 380.
584. 236 U.S. 79,91 (1915).
585. See, e.g., Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1953); State v. Childers, 197 La. 715,2
So. 2d 189 (1941).
586. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE
PROCEDURES: PARDON 268, 292-93 (1939). See, e.g., Mason v. State, 39 Ala. 1, 103 So. 2d 337,
affd, 267 Ala. 507, 103 So. 2d 341 (1956); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196,230 A.2d 508 (App.
Div. 1967).
587. Adamany, Executive Clemency in Wisconsin, 36 Wis. B. BULL. 54, 59 (1963). See, e.g.,
State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487,247 P. 957 (1926).
588. See, e.g.. Hogan v. Hartwell, 242 Ala. 646, 7 So. 2d. 889 (1942); In re Executive
Communication, 14 Fla. 318 (1872).
589. White v. State, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1940), affd, 285 N.Y. 728, 34
N.E.2d 896 (1941).
590. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Lewis, III La. 673, 35 So. 816 (1904); Puryear v.
Commonwealth, 83 Va. 51, 1 S.E. 512 (1887).
591. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892). The fact of conviction, however, might still
be shown to affect the offender's credibility as a witness.
592. S. RUBIN, supra note 572, at 606. See, e.g., Slater v. Olson, 230 Iowa 1005, 299 N.W.
879 (1941); State ex rel. Cloud v. Election Bd., 169 Okla. 363, 36 P.2d 20 (1934).
593. Ridgeway v. Catlett, 238 Ark. 323,379 S.W.2d 277 (1964); Commissioner of the Metro.
Dist. Comm'n v. Director of Civil Serv.,',348 Mass. 184, 203 N.E.2d 95 (1964).
594. E.g., Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753,55 S.E.2d 115 (1949).
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courts, following the principle that a pardon does not obliterate the
conviction, hold that a pardoned offender is ineligible for an
occupational or professional license that, by statute, can be issued only
to persons without a criminal record.9 The disqualifications have been
upheld on the rationale that the pardoned offender's scar of guilt'"
prevents him from meeting the standard of good character that is a
prerequisite for issuance of most licenses. Using this line of reasoning,
the courts have consistently upheld the denial and revocation of licenses
to practice medicine"1 and law598 and to drive a taxi.5" If the issuance of
a license depends in any way on a character qualification, the pardoned
offender may be denied a license or reinstatement of a forfeited license."O
Similarly, most courts have held that a conviction, although pardoned,
can be used to apply the harsher sanctions of an habitual criminal
statute at a later trial for a subsequent offense. 0 In addition, if the
offender's spouse has grounds for divorce based on a criminal
conviction, a pardon does not erase the conviction and destroy the action
for divorce.602
In addition to determining what rights are restored by a pardon, the
judiciary must decide two additional questions that the pardoning
provisions leave unanswered. First, the courts must determine whether a
pardon granted by the pardoning authority of the jurisdiction where the
offender was convicted is effective to restore the offender's civil rights in
another jurisdiction. The courts generally hold that a pardon granted by
-the convicting jurisdiction will be honored in other jurisdictions, 3
595. S. RutBIN, supra note 572, at 608.
596. E.g., State v. Hazzard, 139 Wash. 487,247 P. 957 (1926).
597. E.g., Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938); Jablon v. Board of Regents, 271
App. Div. 369,66 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1946).
598. E.g., Exparte Stephenson, 237 Ala. 488, 187 So. 461 (1939); Feinstein v. State Bar, 39
Cal. 2d 541,248 P.2d 3 (1952).
599. Baldly. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div.425, 198 N.Y.S. 493 (1923).
600. Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?. 28 HARV. L. REV. 647,656-57 (1915).
601. E.g., People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 71 P.2d 214 (1937); State v. Cullen, 14 Wash. 2d
105, 127 P.2d 257 (1942). Contra. Fields v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1956).
602. Holloway v. HollowAy, 126 Ga.459,55 S.E. 191 (1906).
603. Hildreth v. Heath, 1 111. App. 82 (1878) (presidential pardon of a federal offender
-removes the civil disabilities imposed by state law); Cowan v. Prowse, 93 Ky. 156, 19 S.W. 407
(1892) (presidential pardon of a federal offender restores the offender's right to vote in state
elections); Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766 (1879) (presidential pardon of a federal
offender restores the offender's right to vote in state elections); Wickizer v. Williams, 173 S.W. 288
(rex. Civ. App. 1914) (pardon granted by Mississippi pardoning authority restores the offender's
right to serve as ajuror in Texas). See S. RuBIN, supra note 572, at 610.
In State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 81 S.W.2d 419 (1935), the Arkansas Supreme
Court held that a presidential pardon of a federal offender was ineffective to restore the offender's
right to hold a state office. Even though this holding appears to be contrary to the general rule, it
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because a pardon restores all the civil rights of the offender, irrespective
of whether the rights were lost by state or federal law.0' Secondly, the
courts must decide whether the pardoning authority in one jurisdiction
can pardon an offender who was convicted in another jurisdiction. It is
generally held that the pardoning authority can restore the civil rights
lost in that state because of a foreign conviction.60 The courts have
reasoned that th6 restoration of the offender's civil rights, which were
denied under the laws of the pardoning state, is within the scope of
authority of the pardoning jurisdiction.6 The pardon issued by the
pardoning jurisdiction, however, does not affect the penal sanction
imposed by the convicting jurisdiction.0 7 The constitutional provision
that authorizes the presidential pardon precludes the President from
pardoning a state offender."
B. A utomatic Restoration
Automatic restoration procedures were enacted to facilitate the
restoration of the criminal's civil rights and to make the administration
of restoration more efficient and economical. 0 9 These automatic
procedures restore the criminal's civil rights automatically upon
fulfillment of conditions enumerated in the statutes.
Thirteen states have adopted automatic restoration procedures.
Although basically similar, these laws differ significantly in the
conditions that must be fulfilled before the offender's civil rights are
restored. In three states, 10 civil rights are restored automatically upon
completion of the prison sentence, probation, or parole. Kansas and
actually is in line with the above authorities. The court held that a presidential pardon restores civil
rights but not political rights. The court refused to restore the right to hold public office because it
viewed this right as a political right.
604. Jones v. Board of Registrars, 56 Miss. 766,768-69 (1879) (relying on the language cited
in Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)). See notes 582-83 supra and accompanying
text.
605. Hogan v. Hartwell, 242 Ala. 646,7 So. 2d 889 (1942) (pardoning authority of Alabama
can restore the civil rights of a federal offender); State ex rel. Dean v. Haubrich, 248 Iowa 978, 83
N.W.2d 451 (1957) (pardoning authority of Iowa can restore the civil rights of a federal offender);
Arnett v. Stumbo, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889 (1941) (pardoning authority of Kentucky can
restore the civil rights of a federal offender).
606. Arnett v. Stumbo, 287 Ky. 433,437-38, 153 S.W.2d 889,891 (1941).
607. Id. at 437, 153 S.W.2d at 891. S. RUBIN, supra note 572, at 610.
608. In re Bocchiaro, 49 F. Supp. 37, 38 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
609. See Note, Restoration of the Civil Rights of Convicted Criminals, 1951 Wis. L. REV.
378 n.3.
610. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:5(l) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.250 (1967)
(in Oregon parolees and probationers may exercise all civil rights; id. § 137.240(2)); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 57.078 (1957).
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Ohio require the offender to complete only his prison term or parole
period in order to have his civil rights restored."' In these states, the
offender presumably may have his rights restored when he is still on
probation. In three states,612 restoration is awarded upon completion of
the prison term. Missouri and Washington condition the restoration on
satisfactory completion of the parole period, 13 and South Dakota "'
allows automatic restoration only after the completion of a suspended
sentence. The procedures of Nebraska and Wyoming differ from those
of other states in that restoration is conditioned upon a post-
imprisonment presentation of a certificate of good conduct, obtained
from the prison warden. 15
There are few cases that have discussed the nature and effect of the
restoration resulting from the automatic restoration statutes. From the
cases reported, however, it is clear that the courts consider an automatic
restoration equivalent to a pardon.1 6 Consequently, an automatic
restoration grants the released offender his customary civil rights,617 but
it does not restore his eligibility to receive an occupational or
professional license.' Under the prevalent interpretation, therefore, the
only remaining difference between a restoration by pardon and one by
automatic restoration is that the former is discretionary and limited in
application while the latter becomes operative automatically and
indiscriminately.
C. Expungement and Annulment
Expungement and annulment are the product of the recent emphasis
in corrections on rehabilitation. 69 Both kinds of statutes are designed to
restore forfeited rights and uplift the offender's status by exonerating
611. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-2252 (1964); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2965.17 (Baldwin 1964).
612. COLO. CONST. art. 7, § 10; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 640.53 (1945); PA. STAT. ANN. tit,
19, § 893 (1964).
613. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 216.355(3) (1966) (Missouri's automatic restoration procedure also
applies to first offenders 2 years from the date of discharge from imprisonment; id. § 216.355(1)(2)
(1966)); WASH. REv. CODE Ann. § 9.96.050 (Supp. 1969).
614. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-57-7 (1967).
615. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2634 (1964); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-311 (1957).
616. Cf United States ex rel. Consola v. Karnuth, 27 F. Supp.461 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); United
States ex rel. Malesevic v. Perkins, 17 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Pa. 1936), affd, 99 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.
1938).
617. Gough, The Expungement ofAdjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 151.
618. Papatheodoro v. State Dep't of Liquor Control, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 556, 118 N.E.2d 713
(Franklin County Ct. C.P. 1954).
619. See Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal.2d 62, 71-72, 206 P.2d 1085, 1091
(1949) (Carter, J., dissenting).
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him from the fact of conviction and concealing the conviction from the
public view. 6 0 These statutes are unique because their primary objective
is the elimination of the penalties imposed by public opinion rather than
those imposed by law. 21
Nine states have enacted expungement procedures,612 three6'2 have
annulment procedures. In all twelve states, the offender becomes eligible
for expungement or annulment upon the fulfillment of specific
conditions. In ten states6" expungement or annulment is conditioned
upon the satisfactory completion of probation. The procedures adopted
in Michigan and New Jersey, although not limited to probationers, are
quite restrictive. In order to obtain relief in Michigan, an applicant must
have been a first offender convicted before his twenty-first birthday, and
his application cannot be submitted until at least five years after his
conviction s62 The New Jersey statute imposes a ten-year waiting period
after discharge from correctional authority before an application can be
filed.6"6 It specifically denies restorative relief to offenders who have
committed particular crimes. Only California has adopted a provision
that requires the sealing of the criminal record of an applicant who is
under 21 years old.62
The courts have generally held that expungement restores the
offender's civil rights, such as the rights to vote62 and hold public
office .6 2  Numerous exceptions, however, have made expunge ment
somewhat ineffective in the area of licensing.6m While openly declaring
620. Gough, supra note 617, at 149.
621. Comment, Criminal Records ofArrest and Conviction: Expungement From the General
Public Access. 3 CALIF. W.L. REV. 121, 124 (1967).
622. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2604 (Supp. 1969);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 28.1274(101)-(102) (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.31, 638.02
(Supp. 1970); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.225 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:164-28 (1953); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-53-18 (1960); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 7 (1966); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.95.240 (1961).
623. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4332(i) (Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-315 (1957).
624. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4332(i) (Supp.
1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2604 (Supp. 1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 242.31 (Supp. 1970);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.235 (1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-53-18 (1960); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 42.12, § 7 (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.95.240 (1961); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-315 (1957).
625. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1274(101) (Supp. 1970).
626. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:164-28 (1953).
627. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.45 (West Supp. 1968). "Sealing" procedures provide that all
government records relating to an offender's criminal record are closed to public inspection.
628. See Truchon v. Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (1953).
629. Matsen v. Kaiser, 74 Wash. 2d 231, 237, 443 P.2d 843, 846 (1968) (Hamilton, J.,
concurring).
630. Comment, supra note 621, at 125.
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that expungement proceedings do not remove the stain of guilt from the
criminal character,6' the courts have stated that these statutes release
only criminal penalties and disabilities, not civil disabilities." Since the
statutes providing for the revocation or denial of a professional or
occupational license because of a criminal conviction have consistently
been held to be civil in nature, they are outside the purview of the
"penalties and disabilities" clause of the expungement statutes.6 33
Despite the evident trend toward a narrow and restrictive interpretation
of the expungement statutes, several California courts have given these
statutes a liberal constructionYm The effect of these California cases,
however, has been negated by subsequent legislative amendments6 that
create an extensive list of exceptions to the California expungement
statute.61 When the prior case history and legislative exceptions are read
in conjunction with the recent case of Copeland v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, which is subject to the interpretation that
the license revocation was upheld because the court felt assured of
legislative approval,6 38 it is evident that the California expungement
procedure provides little relief for those offenders who choose to apply
for expungement. Since California is the only state that has experienced
extensive litigation under its expungement statute, its approach might
serve as a precedent for litigation arising in other states.3 9
631. See Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 66-67, 206 P.2d 1085, 1088
(1949); In re Presentment, 10 N.J. 23,67-68,89 A.2d 416,444-45 (1952).
632. E.g., Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 46, 324 P.2d 990, 994 (1958)
(criminal disabilities are defined as those sanctions whose purpose is punitive in nature, and civil
disabilities as sanctions whose primary purpose is the protection of the public welfare).
633. See Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62,206 P.2d 1085 (1949) (license
to practice medicine); In re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941) (license to practice law);
Ready v. Grady, 243 Cal. App. 2d 113, 52 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1966) (license to sell insurance); Epstein
v. California Horse Racing Bd., 222 Cal. App. 2d. 831, 35 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1963) (license to engage
in pari-mutual wagering).
634. People v. Taylor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 3 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1960); People v. Mackey, 58
Cal. App. 123,208 P. 135 (1922).
635. Note, The Effect Of Expungement On A Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 127
n.3 (1967).
636. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1679 (West 1962) (dentists); id. § 2383 (physicians);
id. § 2555.1 (dispensing opticians); id. § 2963 (psychologists); id. § 6102 (attorneys);
id. § 10177(b) (real estate brokers); id. § 10562(b) (mineral-oil-gas brokers); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 12911 (West 1969) (school teachers).
637. 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1966).
638. Note, supra note 635, at 138.
639. Several federal courts have rejected a liberal interpretation of the California
expungement statute. E.g., Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804
(9th Cir. 1965); Taylor v. Macy, 252 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D. Cal. 1966). Contra, In re Ringnalda, 48 F.




Many states have adopted procedures providing restorative relief in
addition to the traditional restoration procedures described above.
Although these procedures have taken a variety of forms, they can be
classified according to the authority by whom the relief is granted.
At least two states empower the governor to grant relief from civil
disabilities. In Illinois, the offender may apply for restoration of lost
rights at any time after conviction. 4 Mississippi's procedure author-
izes the governor, at his discretion, to grant a restoration of civil
rights after the offender has successfully completed probation. 41
Three -additional states provide that an administrative board has
authority to restore civil rights. In Connecticut, a petition for the
restoration of the right to vote may be filed with the commission on
forfeited rights after six months from the date of conviction or discharge,
whichever is later." ' New York has established two separate procedures.
Under the first procedure, five years from the date of the applicant's
discharge from correctional authority, the board of parole may issue a
certificate of good conduct restoring only those rights that a statute
specifically enumerates as subject to restoration. 3 The second New
York procedure, which applies only to first offenders, authorizes either
the court or board of parole to issue a certificate of relief from
disabilities.644 Neither procedure limits the discretion of licensing boards.
In California, the board of parole has the authority to allow the parolee
to exercise most of his civil rights during the parole period.
In four states, restoration powers are vested in the judiciary. The
New Hampshire procedure authorizes the supreme court to restore the
elective franchise upon request of the attorney general.'" In North
Carolina two years after discharge from correctional authority the
released offender may file with the court a petition for the restoration of
his civil rights.647 Tennessee's procedure is similar to that of North
Carolina, except that the petition date is conditioned upon two time
limits, depending upon the crime committed. Persons convicted of
640. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 124-2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1964); id. § 49.
641. MISS. CODE ANN. § 4004-27 (1956).
642. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-48 (1958).
643. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 242(3) (McKinney Supp. 1969).
644. N.Y. CORREC. LAW §§ 701-03 (McKinney 1968).
645. The rights to hold public office and serve as a trustee or an elector are excluded. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3054 (West Supp. 1968).
646. N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11.
647. N.C.GEN.STAT. §§ 13-1 to-2, 13-5, 13-7 (1969).
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murder in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, malicious
maiming or wounding, rescuing a person under lawful arrest, and
offenses related to dueling, may apply for restoration six months after
conviction. Persons convicted of all other crimes may apply for
restoration three years after conviction."" In California, the court may
restore most civil rights for the interval between the imposition of
sentence and imprisonment." 9
In three states, the legislature may restore some civil rights on an
individual basis. In Rhode Island, for example, the right to vote and hold
public office can be restored only by an act of the legislature.10 The
legislatures of Mississippi and Virginia, by a two-thirds vote, can
restore, respectively, the right to vote65' and the disability resulting from
a conviction for dueling.5
2
There have been few decisions that have addressed the effect of a
restoration of rights under the miscellaneous procedures described
above, and these primarily have involved certificates of restoration
issued by a governor. If the rights restored are not limited by statute and
the conviction is not federal, it has been held that a governor's certificate
of restoration is synonymous with a pardon and restores the recipient to
all his civil rights.61 A more difficult question, however, was raised in the
recent case of People ex rel. Symonds v. Gualano,6  in which an Illinois
court was asked to determine the effect that a state certificate of
restoration has on a federal conviction for which a pardon can be
granted only by the President. The court held that notwithstanding the
lack of a presidential pardon, state restoration proceedings can still
remove all the civil disabilities that flow from state law. Thus, in cases
of federal convictions, restoration by a governor, although not as broad
as a presidential pardon, can have a substantial impact on returning
forfeited civil rights.
648. TENN. CODEANN. § 40-3701 (1955).
649. The rights to serve as a trustee, hold public office, vote, and hold the general power of
attorney are excluded. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1968).
650. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-2 (1956).
651. MIss. CONST. art. 13, § 253.
652. VA. CONST. § 57.
653. People ex rel. Stine v. City of Chicago, 222 IiI. App. 100 (1921) (governor's certificate of
restoration returned to the recipient all civil rights, including the right to a pension).
654. 260 N.E.2d 284 (I11. App. 1970) (plaintiffs sought to prevent defendant, who had a prior
federal conviction for mail fraud, from holding 3 public offices on the basis of an ineligibility clause
in the Illinois Constitution, art. IV, § 4); accord, Arnett v. Stumbo, 287 Ky. 433, 153 S.W.2d 889




E. Model A cts
Several model restoration acts have been proposed in order to
stimulate reform and promote uniformity. The model acts on the whole
reflect the drafters' belief that rehabilitation of the criminal is of
primary importance to society.6'
The Uniform Act on the Status of Convicted Persons,"'6
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, provides that a certificate of discharge is given to every
person who has completed parole, probation, or a sentence in a
correctional institution. This certificate states that the rights to vote and
hold public office, which were forfeited by conviction, are restored and
that the person is subject to no other disability, except as otherwise
provided in the act. The restoration is automatic and the certificate is
merely evidence of the restoration. The act does not affect the issuance of
occupational and professional licenses, the acceptance of applications
for public or private offices, or the qualification to serve as a juror or
elector.
The Model Penal Code's proposal65 7 is more liberal than the
Uniform Act but more conservative than several other model acts. This
proposal combines several features of both the automatic and the
annulment procedures presently used by some states. Under this Code,
the release from all disqualifications and disabilities is available to all
young adult offenders, to any offender who has completed his sentence
and has not committed another crime for two years, and to probationers
and parolees who successfully fulfill the conditions of their probation or
parole. Annulment of a criminal conviction is provided for an offender
who has satisfied his sentence and has not reverted to criminal behavior
for five years. An order of restoration or annulment does not limit a
licensing board from denying a license solely because of a prior criminal
conviction, nor does it justify the offender in denying his prior
conviction.
The model act proposed by the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency6 is more far-reaching and contains fewer restrictions than
either the Uniform Act or the Model Penal Code. Under this procedure,
all persons discharged from probation, parole, or imprisonment have
655. National Council on Crime & Delinquency, Annulment of a Conviction of Crime, CRIME
& DELIN. 97 (1962).
656. COMMISSION OF UNIFORM STATE LAW, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 295 (1964).
657. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
658. National Council on Crime & Delinquency, supra note 655, at 100.
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both their civil rights restored and their conviction annulled. The
proposal also limits the discretion of licensing boards in denying licenses
on the basis of criminal conviction. As a result of this so-called "limited
inquiry" provision, the only question that can be asked of a license
applicant is, "Have you ever been arrested for or convicted of a crime
which has not been annulled by a court?" This limitation would
effectively end the discrimination against convicted criminals in the field
of licensing.
Under the model act submitted by the National Probation and
Parole Association,"9 full restoration of civil rights would be awarded
automatically to the offender on discharge from prison. The relief also
would be available to a discharged parolee one year after the termination
of his parole if his parole board were convinced that his prognosis for
rehabilitation was good. Under this act, probationers would not lose any
civil rights as the result of their conviction.
The impact of the model acts has not been substantial. Although
some form of their basic proposals has been enacted in 26 states, these
provisions were passed before the model acts were promulgated.
659. N.P.P.A. STANDARD PROBATION & PAROLE AcT §§ 12,27 (1955).
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Part Two: Evaluation
The foregoing survey makes it clear that a convicted criminal is
potentially barred from exercising many of the rights and privileges of
normal citizens. Not only do these civil disqualifications affect an
offender during imprisonment, but in many instances they restrict the
ex-convict's liberty long after his return to society. Undoubtedly, some
proscriptions are necessary. Many of these deprivations, however, are
patently unreasonable. Moreover, both the scope and operation of a
number of provisions raise serious questions concerning their constitu-
tionality. More importantly, the entire scheme of civil disabilities
appears to obstruct modern correctional goals. The following evaluation
explores each of these objectionable aspects.
I. NECESSITY AND REASONABLENESS OF CIVIL DISABILITIES
A. General Criticisms
1. Overbreadth.-One of the most objectionable aspects of civil
disability laws is their overbreadth. The laws of most jurisdictions
provide for the blanket imposition of disabilities upon criminal
conviction. The fault lies with the statutory terminology used to
designate disabling crimes. Constitutional and statutory provisions, for
example, frequently deny rights and privileges to individuals convicted of
felonies, infamous crimes, and moral turpitude offenses. These
categorizations undoubtedly represent an attempt by legislatures to limit
disqualifications to the more serious crimes. Overbreadth results,
however, because these definitional categories embrace many types bf
criminal conduct that are unrelated to the rights or privileges forfeited.
The felony disqualifications, for example, impose a broad range of
disabilities for conviction of an offense that is punishable by one year
imprisonment in the penitentiary. In many states, involuntary
manslaughter is a felony.' In one state, defacing a gravestone is
punishable by imprisonment for one year. 2 A member of the Armed
Forces can be sentenced to imprisonment for one year because of
absence from his unit.3 Conviction of any of these dissimilar offenses
would disqualify the offender under the felony provisions of typical
disability statutes. Clearly, the forfeiture of rights and privileges, such as
voting and holding employment, should have a more substantial basis
1. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17, 192, 193 (West 1970); WIS. STAT. §§ 939.60, 940.05
(1958).
2. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 73 (1968).
3. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 127C (rev. ed. 1969).
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than merely the length of a prison term. Even more objectionable are the
moral character standards that may bar ex-convicts from exercising
certain rights and privileges, particularly in the area of employment.,
Moreover, many rights and privileges are forfeited automatically with
no notice to the offender. Thus, in some instances, an ex-convict may not
learn of a deprivation until he tries to exercise the right or privilege years
after his conviction. These disabling provisions are most objectionable,
however, for their failure to deal with the individual offender. Few
statutes consider the convict's past history, the nature and circumstances
of his offenses, and his record of rehabilitation. As a result, the ex-
convict may be barred from exercising the rights and privileges of other
citizens because of a wholly unrelated offense. Furthermore, he may
continue under this disability long after he has become fully
rehabilitated.
2. Inconsistency. -The survey disclosed striking inconsistencies in
the civil disability laws of various jurisdictions. A comparison of
different states' statutory disqualifications, as well as the varying
judicial treatment of these provisions, makes it clear that in a number of
instances, the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction may be as
much a function of geography as they are the nature of the criminal
conduct. Even the definition of conviction, for example, is the subject of
varying interpretations. In most states, conviction means a
determination of guilt, followed by judgment and sentence.- In a few
states, however, the definition of conviction is limited to a determination
of guilt by plea or verdict.6 Thus, under the former view, a convict
serving a suspended sentence has not been convicted for purposes of the
civil disability statutes. Under the minority definition, however, a
suspended sentence will not prevent the imposition of civil disabilities.
Another conflict centers around the effect that states give to foreign
convictions. A clear majority of states impose disabilities upon residents
who were convicted in another state,7 while a minority limits the
imposition of civil disqualifications to individuals convicted in the forum
state.' Another variance is found in the manner in which states
4. E.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-122(A) (Supp. 1969-70); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 332.030(l) (1966).
5. E.g., People v. Loomis, 231 Cal. App. 2d 594, 42 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1965); Summerour v.
Cartrett, 220 Ga. 31, 136 S.E.2d 724 (1964).
6. E.g.,Tucker v.Tucker, 101 NJ. Eq.72, 137 A.404 (Ch. 1927).
7. E.g., People ex rel. Keenan v. McGuane, 13 Ill. 2d 520, 150 N.E.2d 168 (1958) (conviction
in federal court of crime involving moral turpitude is equivalent to conviction of infamous crime
under state law); State ex rel. Arpagaus v. Todd, 215 Minn. 91, 29 N.W.2d 810 (1947) (felony
conviction under federal law is a misdemeanor under state law).
8. E.g., State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190, 407 P.2d 571 (1965) (state law requiring removal
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characterize foreign convictions. The majority of states imposing
disabilities on residents who were convicted in foreign jurisdictions
classify offenses according to the laws of the forum? Thus an offense
that is a misdemeanor in a foreign jurisdiction could be regarded as a
felony under the civil disability laws of a state where the offender later
resides. The provisions for restoring forfeited rights and privileges also
differ widely among jurisdictions. In several states, for example, a
convict's rights and privileges are restored automatically upon his
release into the community. 10 In other states, however, a released
offender often must wait years before the disabilities are removed.,
Even more disparity is encountered among specific disabilities. In
many states, for example, a conviction of a felony or a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for divorce.12 In some states, however, the
convicted spouse must serve a term of years in prison before the divorce
action can be brought.'3 Disqualifications from licensed occupations
based on criminal conduct also differ widely among jurisdictions.' 4
Varying judicial interpretations of disability statutes reinforce these
inherent inconsistencies. Courts have experienced considerable difficulty,
for example, in applying disqualifying provisions based on "infamous"
and "immoral" crimes. Not infrequently, an offense that is held to
involve moral turpitude in one state will not be similarly construed in
another state.' 5
Civil disability statutes not only vary considerably among
jurisdictions, but a notable lack of consistency is found within individual
states. In several states, for example, conviction of crime disqualifies
members of certain occupational groups from receiving pension benefits,
from office of any public official convicted of a misdemeanor does not apply to misdemeanor
convictions under federal law); lsaacs v. Board of Ballot Comm'rs, 122 W. Va. 703, 12 S.E.2d 510
(1940) (constitutional prohibition against person convicted of infamous crime from holding
legislative seat applies only to convictions under West Virginia law).
9. See. e.g., Du Vail v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329,340, 66 P.2d 1026, 1031
(1937); In re Weathers, 159 Fla. 390,393, 31 So. 2d 543,544 (1947).
10. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:5(l) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 137.240, .250 (1969); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (1957).
II. See. e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1274 (101) (Supp. 1970); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:164-
28 (1952).
12. See, e.g., ALASKA STAr. § 09.55.110 (1962); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.020 (1970);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.010 (1949).
13. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. LAWS § 580-41 (1968) (7 years); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 2
(1969) (5 years).
14. See notes478-573 on pages 1002-13 supra and accompanying text.
15. In re Bartos, 13 F.2d 138, 139 (D. Neb. 1926); In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 151,73 P.2d
885, 887 (1937); see Huff v. Anderson, 212 Ga. 32,90 S.E.2d 329 (1955) (presenting false claims to
government for wages is a crime involving moral turpitude).
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while other occupational groups are unaffected. 6 Similarly, a criminal
conviction may bar the offender from some licensed occupations and not
from other related occupations.17 From these examples it is clear that
convicted criminals are subjected to inconsistent treatment under
disability statutes. These illogical and inexplicable inconsistencies have
no place in a body of law that restricts the rights and privileges of
citizens. If the extent of an ex-convict's civil disqualification is
reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, he should be treated
uniformly by all jurisdictions.
3. Interminability.-Most jurisdictions provide for the eventual
restoration of convicted criminals' rights and privileges. These
procedures, however, are of limited effectiveness and, as a result, many
ex-convicts suffer disabilities long after deprivation is justifiable. Of the
procedures currently in use, the automatic restoration provisions come
closest to achieving a desirable result. Unfortunately, in most states that
have these procedures, relief is not available to all offenders. In some
states, for example, the remedy is only available to parolees,'8 while in
others it is limited to released prisoners." In only three states are rights
and privileges automatically restored upon discharge from either
probation, prison, or parole.20 Moreover, not all rights and privileges are
restored under these provisions.21 Another shortcoming is the failure to
provide for notice to the offender. Without this knowledge, some ex-
convicts may fail to exercise rights or privileges that have been restored.
The executive pardon available in most states is used infrequently as
a restoration device since the burden of seeking relief is placed on the
offender. Many ex-convicts probably lack the persistence or resources
necessary to pursue this remedy. 22 Other ex-convicts may not seek
pardons because of the detailed investigation and attendant publicity
16. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a08 (1964) (disqualifying policemen with no similar
provision for teachers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1593 (1964); id. tit. 5, § 1121(4)
(disqualifying state policemen but not firemen).
17. In Arizona, for example, although a felony conviction is not a ground for refusing a
barber's license, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-353 (Supp. 1969), felons are excluded from the practice of
cosmetology, id. § 32-552.
18. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 216.355(3) (1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9,96.050
(Supp. 1969).
19. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 7, § 10.
20. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607-A: 5(l) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.250 (1969);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (Supp. 1969).
21. See Papatheodore v. State Dep't of Liquor Control, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 556, 118 N.E.2d
713 (Franklin County Ct. C.P. 1954) (another statute denying liquor permits to convicts held
controlling).
22. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 92 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
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involved? Another inherent weakness of the pardon procedure is that
the decision rests with the executive rather than the judiciary, which is
the appropriate forum for determining the propriety of restoring
deprived rights and privileges. Moreover, a pardon does not normally
remove all disabilities. It is generally held, for example, that a pardon
does not preclude exclusion from licensed occupations based on criminal
conviction.21
The expungement procedures provided by some states are similarly
ineffective as restoration measures. In most of these states, the remedy is
available to successful probationers but not to convicts paroled or
released from prison. 25 Moreover, unfavorable public reaction to
concealment of criminals' records has forced the judiciary and
legislatures to limit the application of these procedures. 26 In California,
for example, the expungement device has no effect on prohibitions
against licensing or employing convicted criminals.2? Although there is
much to commend a policy that permits a reformed offender to erase all
records of his criminal past, the public will often have a justifiable need
for this information. Much preferable to a system of concealment is one
that enables the ex-convict to demonstrate to the community that he has
been fully rehabilitated.
The procedures just discussed, as well as similar devices employed
in other jurisdictions,2 8 are clearly inadequate. Undoubtedly, their
ineffectiveness is partially attributable to the large number of civil
disqualifications that accompany a criminal conviction. In any event,
functional methods for timely restoration of all deprived rights and
privileges to reformed offenders are essential if ex-convicts are to make
satisfactory readjustment in the community.
B. Evaluation of Specific Disabilities
1. Loss of Employment Opportunity. -Under the laws of the
federal government and every state, a convicted criminal is potentially
23. Id.
24. E.g., Page v. Watson, 140 Fla. 536, 192 So. 205 (1938) (physicians); Englander v. Florida
Real Estate Comm'n, 228 So. 2d 415 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1969).
25. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 43320) (Supp.
1968); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-315 (1957).
26. E.g., Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 241 Cal. App. 2d 186, 50
Cal. Rptr. 452 (1966) (does not prohibit revocation of beer license pursuant to statutory authority);
Epstein v. California Horse Racing Bd., 222 Cal. App. 2d 831,35 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1963) (Board not
prohibited from considering conviction in determining applicability of exclusionary rules).
27. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1679 (West 1962) (dentists); id. § 2383 (physicians).
28. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-48 (1964) (procedure for restoring privileges of
elector); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 242 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (certificate of good conduct to remove
disabilities).
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barred from a broad range of private and government regulated
employment. Since exclusion is generally discretionary with employers
and licensing authorities, there is usually no fixed relationship between
criminal conviction and employment future. The reported cases
primarily concern licensing of professionals, such as physicians and
lawyers, probably because members of this group are better able to bear
the expense of litigation. Moreover, these men possess superior
knowledge of the available legal remedies; hence they are more likely to
use them. Most convicted criminals, however, are faced with exclusion
from semi-skilled and unskilled employment.?
The convict who is refused private employment has no legal remedy.
In all probability, he also lacks the resources or persistence to contest
arbitrary government action denying him public or licensed
employment. In the rare cases in which judicial relief is sought, the
extent of disqualification from even the most routine occupations
becomes quite apparent. A young man with an arrest record for
participating in college demonstrations, for example, has been denied a
license to drive a taxicab.? A federal court recently has upheld a city's
refusal to employ an ex-convict as a tree-trimmer because of his criminal
record .3 At the same time, the list of occupations from which convicted
criminals are excluded continues to grow .3 2 The relationship between the
ex-convict's ability to earn a decent living upon his release from prison
and his rehabilitation is unmistakably clear.3 Yet in all too many cases
the law either discourages or prevents the former offender from securing
a job. The alarming recidivism rates make it apparent that the many
social and legal obstacles to former criminals' employment must be
lowered.
(a) Private employment.-Under existing laws, discrimination
against convicted criminals by private employers is perfectly legal. A
federal law prohibiting private employers from denying jobs to
individuals with criminal records has been suggested u It is believed,
however, that such a law would encounter substantial resistance and
29. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROL SYSTEM 359-61 (1964).
30. Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
849 (1965).
31. Atencio v. Rossmiller, Civil No. C-1493 (D. Colo., order rendered Jan. 13, 1970).
32. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1613 (Supp. 1969) (inhalation therapists); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 493.43 (Supp. 1970) (detection of deception examiners).
33. One study concluded that recidivism of adult male offenders varies inversely with their
post release employment. See D. GLASER, supra note 29 at 359. See also TASK FORCE REPORT.
supra note 22, at 31.
34. See S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 607 (1963); Note, Employment of
Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306,317-20 (1970).
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probably do more harm than good. A better approach would be to
encourage private employers to hire ex-convicts. Federal legislation, for
example, authorizing tax credits to private employers who hire and
retain ex-convicts would likely create more job opportunities for former
offenders. Detailed analysis of this proposal is beyond the scope of the
present inquiry. It is sufficient to note that similar incentives have been
proposed to induce in private employers a responsiveness to the needs of
the economically underprivileged.3
Another method of increasing the ex-convict's employment
opportunities in the private sector is fidelity bonding. Presently, former
offenders are frequently disqualified from both public and private
positions due to their inability to be bonded.3 A government-sponsored
program designed to provide fidelity bonding for released convicts could
create many job opportunities for the ex-convict.37 Moreover, such a
program would do much to dispel the private businessman's
understandable reluctance to hire applicants with criminal records.
Several experimental attempts at providing fidelity bonding for ex-
convicts have already proved highly successful.3 It is believed that a
federal program of bonding released offenders would contribute
significantly to the elimination of existing barriers to private
employment of convicted criminals.
Clearly, the most convincing inducement for private employers to
hire applicants with criminal records would be demonstrative evidence of
the released offender's rehabilitation. It is here that work-release
programs offer great promise. These programs permit trustworthy
prisoners to work at full-time jobs in the community, requiring
confinement only at nights and on weekends. Available information
indicates that the work-release programs now conducted by the federal
government"9 and half the states 0 have realized substantial success with
35. Several incentive proposals of this type are currently pending before Congress. E.g., H.R.
1380, H.R. 1381, S. 2192, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). At least one state has already enacted
legislation granting tax incentives to encourage the employment of the economically
underprivileged. N.Y. COMM. LAW §§ 100, 115-20 (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX
LAW § 485 (McKinney Supp. 1969); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 210, 219-q, 219-rr, 683, 707, 1083
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
36. See note 470 on page 1002 supra and accompanying text.
37. It should be noted that the Manpower Development and Training Act authorizes direct
governmental payments or contracts to indemnify employers who hire persons that have
participated in federal counseling or training programs against infidelity, dishonesty or default on
the part of such employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2572c (Supp. IV, 1969). This program, however, is limited
to a miniscule maximum expenditure of $300,000 annually, and this amount must suffice to bond
all federally assisted applicants.
38. Bonding Ex-convicts Proves a Success, 71 NAT'L UNDERWRITER 1,4 (Aug. 11, 1967).
39. Federal Prisoner's Rehabilitation Act of 1965, 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (Supp. IV, 1969).
40. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.250 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 123-7 (Supp.
1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 700A (Supp. 1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-321.1 (Supp. 1969).
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private employers.4 1 The training programs for released offenders
recently established by several unions and employers also may prove
useful in preparing convicts for regular employment.42 Undoubtedly,
future employment opportunities for many prisoners are greatly
improved through participation in these activities. Beyond this, liberal
government licensing and employment policies would reinforce private
employer decisions to give convicted criminals a second chance. It is at
least anomalous that governments should encourage private
employment of released prisoners, while restricting the licensed and
public employment opportunities of the same convicts.
.(b) Licensed and public employment.-Under the most recent
Supreme Court pronouncements, 43 exclusion of convicted criminals
from licensed or public employment appears constitutionally permissible
when three conditions exist. First, government regulation of the
occupation must be a legitimate and necessary exercise of police power.
Secondly, exclusion from the regulated occupation on the basis of prior
criminal conduct must be reasonable. Thirdly, the procedures whereby
employment or licensing is denied must comport with due process. As
already observed, however, only patently unreasonable regulations are
striken by the courts. Moreover, only clear abuses of discretion by
employment and licensing agencies are overruled. As a result, senseless,
oppressive, and totally unrealistic restrictions of the ex-convict's right to
work have been upheld. 4' In addition, innumerable restrictions, the
legality of which remains untested, confront the offender whose
occupational pursuit may in some way affect the public interest. It is
essential, therefore, to examine more closely the standards of necessity
and reasonableness that have heretofore provided the legal basis for
denying the convicted criminal the right to work in licensed or public
employment. Of equal concern, moreover, are the procedures by which
these standards are applied.
(i) The necessity for regulation.-Provisions restricting the
convicted criminal's right to work are usually encountered as a part of
the broad scheme of regulations considered necessary to protect the
41. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at I1. Carpenter, The Federal Work
Release Program, 45 NEB. L. REv. 690 (1966); Long, The Prisoner Rehabilitation Act of 1965, 29
FED. PROBATION 3 (Dec. 1965).
42. SeeTASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 33.
43. For extended discussion of the Constitutional questions surrounding goveinment
restrictions on the convicted criminal's employment opportunity see notes 206-83 infra and
accompanying text.
44. E.g., Thomas v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 138 So. 2d 658 (La. Ct. App. 1962)




public health, safety, and morals. As a general rule, if an occupation is
licensed or classified as public employment, past criminality may denote
unfitness. It is clear that the public interest requires regulation of a wide
variety of occupations and activities. No one disputes the right of
governments to subject their own employees to reasonable regulations.
Similarly, many professional callings are proper subjects for licensing,
including imposition of reasonable entrance requirements and standards
of performance for practitioners. When regulatory provisions extend to
semi-skilled and unskilled pursuits, however, the necessity for regulation
becomes questionable. Obviously, a government must regulate the hiring
and performance of even its most routine employees. Occupational
licenses, however, are now so extensive as to invite serious questions
regarding their necessity and purpose.
No attempt is made to explore fully the prostitution of occupational
licensing that has occurred in recent years. Others have documented the
process in graphic detail. 5 It suffices to point out that licensing
regulations now embrace nearly every conceivable occupation and trade,
and the process appears never-ending." It is not difficult to understand
this phenomenon since most licensing legislation is induced by
occupational groups rather than initiated by legislators.41 Motivated by
a desire for professional status or perhaps competitive advantage,
occupational associations have frequently convinced legislatures to
accord them licensed status and confer upon members of the occupation
broad authority in the issuance and revocation of licenses.
The public often places heavy reliance on the ability and fidelity of
individuals in unlicensed occupations. Salesmen, service station
attendants, and lifeguards, for example, are not required to be licensed.
General law, however, protects the public against incompetence and
immorality in these areas. It would be equally effective in the case of
many licensed occupations. Nevertheless, the procession to licensed
status continues at a steady pace and it is likely that most of the
legislation will be upheld as a legitimate exercise of police power.
Aside from objections of being monopolistic and in restraint of
trade, .the over-extension of licensing is particularly ominous for a
person with a criminal record. Almost invariably, the convicted criminal
45. W. GELLORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 105-51 (1952);
Affeldt & Seney, Group Sanctions and Personal Rights-Professions, Occupations andLabor Law,
II ST. Louis U.L.J. 382, 399-414 (1969); Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-
California, A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 649-54 (1966).
46. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2322 (Supp. 1970) (pest controller); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 62-6-13 (1963) (fur dealers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 821 (Supp. 1970) (minnow
dealers); id. tit. 59, § 1101 (sewage work operators).
47. Sources cited note 45 supra.
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is slated for exclusion from the newly licensed group. Thus as each new
occupation achieves licensed status, another employment barrier is
erected for the convicted criminal. It is believed that a comprehensive
and realistic review of existing licensing laws would reveal that many
licensed occupations are subjected to unnecessary regulation.
Elimination of these unnecessary restrictions would undoubtedly
enhance the employment opportunities for a number of former
offenders.
(ii) The reasonableness of regulation.-Although regulation of
many public and licensed occupations is necessary, it remains to inquire
whether exclusion of individuals based upon criminal conduct is always
justified. Clearly, a criminal conviction may be a proper ground for
excluding the offender from certain types of employment." In some
cases, licenses should be revoked and public employment terminated
when an individual is convicted. Moreover, a criminal record will often
be strong evidence that an offender is unsuitable for a particular
occupation. Since, however, restriction of an ex-convict's right to work
punishes him indirectly long after imprisonment and also impedes his
rehabilitation, courts have consistently stated that the restrictions must
be reasonable. 49 Generally, reasonableness is measured in terms of the
necessity for protecting the public. The standard has not been applied
uniformly, however, and judicial approaches to the question vary
considerably.e Irrespective of judicial guidelines, any realistic view of
society's need to achieve rapid and complete rehabilitation of offenders
clearly precludes unreasonable and unnecessary obstacles to an ex-
convict's employment.
Under what circumstances, therefore, is exclusion of convicted
criminals from public and licensed employment reasonable?
Understandably, the extent of regulation necessary for public protection
varies considerably among the many occupations and classifications of
public employees. Thus, while a criminal conviction may be convincing
evidence of unfitness for a particular profession, it may only be of
questionable relevance to fitness for an unskilled occupation. In any
event, exclusion is justifiable only if the convicted criminal's pursuit of
48. E.g., Yeoman v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 78 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Ct. App. 1969)
(upholding revocation of school bus driver's license for conviction of driving under influence of
intoxicating liquor).
49. E.g., Schwarev. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
50. Compare Kaufman v. Taxicab Bureau, 236 Md. 476, 204 A.2d 521 (1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 849 (1965) (refusing taxicab license to applicant with arrest record), with Pond v.
Lomenzo, 32 App. Div. 2d 887, 302 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1969) (finding evidence insufficient to




the occupation would represent a danger to the public. The question to
be asked in every case, therefore, is whether the crime of which the
individual was convicted demonstrates unfitness for the regulated
occupation.5' In the absence of demonstrative unfitness, exclusion is
unreasonable.
Unfortunately, most legislatures have failed to limit exclusion of
convicted criminals to instances of demonstrative unfitness. Criminal
conduct itself is generally an express ground for disqualification, and
employment and licensing authorities do not hesitate to bar individuals
with criminal records.5 2 As a result, many convicted criminals have been
and continue to be barred from regulated employment without regard to
the relationship of past criminal conduct to job qualifications.0 Many
statutes authorize exclusion on the basis of a felony conviction.
Although it is true that felonies are usually crimes punished by
imprisonment in a penitentiary for at least a year, this classification is
hardly a basis for determining the relationship of the crime to the
occupational pursuit.s' Clearly, in establishing a test for determining the
conduct that makes a person ineligible to pursue a particular
occupation, the emphasis should be on the nature of the conduct rather
than simply on the duration of imprisonment. A few statutory provisions
achieve this result by authorizing disqualification only for certain
enumerated crimes related to the occupation.- Occasionally a statute
may limit revocation to crimes committed while using a license." For the
most part, however, statutes are unrealistically broad. Perhaps a
51. This approach is recommended by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice. SeeTASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 91.
52. The likelihood of unreasonable exclusion based on past criminal conduct is illustrated by
a recent New York case. The petitioner was denied a liquor license renewal based on his conviction
of aggravated assault by an army court-martial 23 years earlier, even though shortly after
conviction he was restored to duty and later received an honorable discharge. This action was taken
despite the fact that the petitioner had held a similar license in good standing for a period of 15 years
prior to the instant application. Not surprisingly, the New York Supreme Court found the agency
determination patently unreasonable, and reversed. The Appellate Division, however, would not go
that far. It remanded with directions that the petitioner first make application for a certificate of
good conduct and, if successful, then apply for a license. Dicarlo v. State Liquor Authority, 54
Misc. 2d 482,282 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1967), modified, 29 App. Div. 2d 757, 287 N.Y.S.2d 960
(1968).
53. See, e.g., In re Morris, 74 N.M. 697, 397 P.2d 475 (1964) (attorney disbarred for
involuntary manslaughter conviction).
54. This argument was advanced in Reddy v. United States, 403 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1085 (1969), discussed at note 238 infra.
55. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 575 (Supp. 1970) (embezzlers barred from becom-
ing collection agents); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 74 (McKinney 1968) (conviction of illegal pos-
session of weapons disqualifies for guard duty).
56. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2322 (Supp. 1969-70) (structural pest control).
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standard based on conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is
more indicative of unfitness, but so much difficulty has been experienced
in defining moral turpitude that its effectiveness is limited.
Moral character standards are particularly susceptible to
unreasonable exclusion of convicted criminals. Putting aside the
argument that all character standards are unconstitutionally vague," it
is clear that their imposition as entrance requirements for many
regulated occupations borders on the ridiculous.5 Yet, in many instances
a criminal conviction has been held conclusive evidence of unsatisfactory
character. Criminal or immoral conduct in the absence of conviction is
often given the same effect. In one recent case, for example, a licensing
authority refused to issue a taxicab operator's permit to a middle-aged
married man, based partly upon the fact that as a young man he had
been discovered about to engage in sexual intercourse in his car. 9 If
licensing authorities continue to be this concerned about the morals of
the occupational group, it is clear that many convicted criminals will be
barred.
Even a determination that a conviction.demonstrates unfitness for a
particular occupation should not complete the inquiry. It remains to ask
how long the presumption of unfitness raised by past criminality is
unrebuttable. At some-point, evidence of general rehabilitation and
satisfactory employment in unregulated occupations, parole and
probation records, certificates of good conduct, expungment, and
pardon, all become relevant to the question of fitness. This is the view
adopted by the draftsmen of the Study Draft of the New Federal
Criminal Code. 0 Under the proposed provision governing
disqualification from federal office or employment because of criminal
conviction, the matter is left entirely to the sentencing court's
discretion."1 Moreover, the Draft provides for automatic removal of the
disqualification five years after the defendant has completed his
sentence.6 2 Implicit in this approach is the recognition that failure to give
consideration to a convicted criminal's record of rehabilitation is both
arbitrary and unreasonable. Unfortunately, most licensing and
57. Notes 274-78 infra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1107 (Supp. 1970) (water and sewage works
operators required to be of good moral character).
59. Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962).
60. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970).
61. Id. § 3501.
62. Id. § 3503.
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employment authorities are not required to take note of post-conviction
records and only a few courts have commanded it.6
It is submitted that laws regulating licensed occupations and public
employment should be revised to insure that individuals are not unduly
prejudiced by reason of past criminal conduct. Unreasonable and
undesirable results can be avoided only by expressly limiting exclusion
from occupations to criminal conduct indicative of unfitness for the
particular occupation. Moreover, licensing and employment agencies
should be required to giVe full consideration to all the circumstances
surrounding an individual's criminal record with particular emphasis on
his rehabilitation.
(iii) The fairness ofprocedures.-Quite apart from the problem of
overly broad disqualifications based on criminal conduct, unwarranted
exclusion of ex-convicts may result because of the typically broad
discretion accorded most licensing and employment authorities. The
possibility for abuses in the field of occupational licensing is all too
clear. It has been suggested that only by removing regulatory power
from occupational groups can fair and impartial adjudications be
obtained." This is the usual situation with drivers' licenses. Not only are
driver disqualifications limited to crimes in connection with the use of a
license or vehicle," but discretion to refuse or revoke licenses is vested in
officials employed by the state. The likelihood of detached impartiality
seems far greater than what might be expected of a board of examiners
composed primarily of competitive tradesmen. Inclusion of non-
associational members on licensing boards would appear to be a partial
solution. More important, however, is the need to limit employment and
licensing agency consideration to the sole question of an ex-convict's
overall fitness for the occupation sought. Explicit, definitive, and
63. See, e.g., Tanner v. DeSapio, 2 Misc. 2d 130, 150 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
Although the court reversed on due process grounds the refusal to license a former convict to
operate a beauty parlor, it emphasized the importane of criminal rehabilitation: "The State Prison
for women . . . is maintained both for the security and reformation of women prisoners ....
Among the vocational training programs offered to inmates . . . is a complete course in
hairdressing and cosmetology. It would seem most inconsistent and improper to have one
governmental department stress a vocational training in a correctional institution . . . and have
another governmental department deny the right to a reformed convict . . . to enter upon such a
vocation. ... Id. at 134-35, 150 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45.
64. See, e.g., Barron, Business and Professional Licensing-California, A Representative
Example, 18 STAN. L. REv. 640, 665 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 783
(1964).
65. E.g.. ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 68 (1959); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2019 (1968); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-17 (1965); cf. CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 12809, 13350 (West Supp. 1970) (driver's license
may be refused or revoked when individual has been convicted of an offense involving use or
possession of narcotics).
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realistic guidelines are needed. One of the most enlightened legislative
enactments in this field is the recent California statute requiring licensing
authority recognition of occupational training received in prison."
Hopefully, other states will follow this example.
Of equal importance is the necessity that licensing and employment
agency determinations be subject to full judicial review. Exclusion from
either a licensed occupation or public position undoubtedly impairs an
individual's economic and social opportunities. For an ex-convict the
deprivation may be especially severe. It is essential, therefore, that all
decisions excluding ex-convicts from government regulated employment
be reviewed by independent, prestigious tribunals in a trial de novo. A
full measure of judicial scrutiny will be an added safeguard against
unnecessary and unreasonable restrictions of the convicted criminal's
right to work.
2. Loss of Domestic Rights.-No civil deprivation is likely to
affect the convict more adversely than the loss of domestic rights. One
recent study of post-release failures among federal prison releasees found
that released convicts who resumed residence with their wives
experienced the lowest recidivism rate. 7 Ex-convicts who lived alone,
however, were determined to be the most likely to return to crime. These
findings dramatically illustrate the interest that society has in preserving
the family ties of imprisoned convicts. Unfortunately, present laws
largely ignore this interest.
(a) Restrictions on the right to marry and have children.-The
statutes restricting the convicted criminal's right to acquire a family are
exceedingly limited in scope. The prohibitions against marriage and
procreation are almost exclusively directed at habitual criminals.
Nevertheless, to the extent that these laws fail to take account of the
nature and circumstances of the offender's crimes, as well as his
subsequent rehabilitation, it is arguable that they exceed the scope of
constitutionally permissible regulation of human affairs. The myriad
arguments for and against eugenic sterilization lie beyond the scope of
the present inquiry and are detailed elsewhere." It suffices merely to
point out that the divergence of scientific and medical opinion about the
origin, nature, and inheritability of mental disorders and criminal traits
66. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23.8 (West Supp. 1970).
67. See D. GLASER, supra note 29, at 379. The author concludes that those marriages that
survive the husband's imprisonment are a major asset to rehabilitation.
68. See, e.g., H. BECKER, G. FELKENES, & P. WHISENAND, NEW DIMENSIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 115-201 (1968); Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST.
L.J. 591 (1966); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J. 20 (1956).
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raises serious constitutional questions concerning sterilization laws. It is
anticipated that a future Supreme Court ruling will conclude the practice
to be unconstitutional.6' The express prohibitions against marriages by
habitual criminals are even more objectionable from both a
constitutional" and a social viewpoint. If procreation is the evil sought
to be avoided, even sterilization of the convict is preferable to an
absolute bar to rharriage. Moreover, if a prospective spouse is aware of
the convict's criminal past and still desires to marry, the law should not
prohibit consummation of the marriage. Doubtlessly, these statutes will
also be stricken.
(b) Loss of marital rights.-6ndoubtedly, the welfare of the
spouse and children of a convicted criminal will often be best served by
permitting the spouse to obtain a divorce. Although the state has a legi-
timate interest in the preservation of marriages, little is gained from
requiring innocent spouses to remain tied to imprisoned convicts against
their wishes for a period of years. Both the spouse and children may
suffer emotional and psychological harm in this situation. Moreover, the
loss of the husband's support while he is imprisoned may force his family
to turn to public welfare for assistance, thereby making them an addi-
tional burden on the state. Divorce also may be justified when the con-
victed offender does not go to prison. The mere gravity of the offense
itself, for example, may so seriously disturb the innocent spouse or
cause such embarrassment to the offender's family that the marriage
should be dissolved.
The wide diversity in statutory treatment of conviction and
imprisonment as grounds for divorce illustrates the futility of attempting
to define the type of criminal conduct that will in every case justify
dissolution of a marriage. There is no reason why, for example, in one
69. The Supreme Court's most recent consideration of the constitutionality of involuntary
sterilization laws was Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The challenged statute provided
for sterilization of criminals thrice convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude. The Court found
Oklahoma's classifications of crimes on the basis of moral turpitude unreasonable and held that the
sterilization statute deprived defendants of equal protection of the law. The 2 concurring opinions,
however, expressed the belief that involuntary sterilization laws were also objectionable on due
process grounds. Id. at 543-47.
70. The authority of states to regulate marriage has long been recognized as a constitutionally
permissible exercise of police power. E.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888) (upholding
legislative divorce); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding state prohibition
against polygamy). In a recent case, however, the Supreme Court has described marriage as a basic
civil right. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (declaring antimiscegenation statutes
unconstitutional). It is arguable, therefore, that the right to marry is entitled to constitutional
protection. See Foster, Marriage: A "'Basic Civil Right of Man", 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 51 (1968-
69).
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jurisdiction a criminal conviction should be an immediate ground for
divorce, while in another jurisdiction the innocent spouse must wait
several years before bringing suit. Clearly, the availability of divorce
should not depend solely on the type of crime committed or the length of
a prison term. It is submitted that the spouse of a convicted criminal
should be able to obtain a divorce in every case in which either the nature
of the crime or sentence imposed engenders a reasonable desire in the
spouse to terminate the marriage. All jurisdictions should provide for
this result either expressly or under grounds such as incompatibiiity" or
irreconcilable differences. 72 The terminology is not important. What is
important is that a marriage that has broken down will not be prolonged
needlessly. It is not suggested that a convict's spouse should be
encouraged to seek a divorce. On the contrary, every effort should be
made to preserve the marriage. When, however, the spouse earnestly
desires freedom, the law should not stand in the way.
Although it is recognized that many unsuccessful marriages should
be terminated, the role of divorce in perpetuating criminal behavior
cannot be ignored. It is clear that a convict's rehabilitation is adversely
affected by the dissolution of his marriage. The hope of eventual reunion
with his wife and family may be the mainspring of whatever incentive he
has to reform. Once forsaken by his wife, he may lose the motivation
necessary to break the cycle of recidivism that follows many criminal
convictions. Domestic relations law is incapable of resolving the
conflicting goals of terminating unsuccessful marriages and,,preserving
the convicted criminal's ties with his family. Divorce statutes, for
example, that grant divorce only when the convicted spouse has been
sentenced to an extended prison term satisfy neither goal. The spouse
who is denied a divorce under this type of statute will only be more
resentful and further disillusioned with the marriage. Her loyalty and
affection for the imprisoned spouse cannot be preserved by this artificial
approach. Only by broad penal reforms can the marriages of many
imprisoned convicts be saved. Reforms are needed that will both ease the
family's economic burden during the breadwinner's absence and permit
a husband and wife to enjoy the minimum consortium necessary to keep
alive their affection for each other during their separation. Work-release
programs, conjugal visits, good behavior furloughs, and marriage
counseling are measures frequently discussed in connection with penal
71. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.110 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-1 (1953); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961).
72. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
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reform. 3 Full-scale institution of these programs is thought by many
scholars to be essential if correctional systems are to make any progress
in rehabilitating offenders. Another equally important result of these
reforms could be the salvation of many convicts' marriages.
(c) Loss ofparental rights.-Both adoption laws and dependency
and neglect statutes have the common purpose of providing for the wel-
fare of children whose parents are either unable or unwilling to do so. In
many cases, the children of convicted criminals need this protection,
and the parental rights of some convicted or imprisoned parents should
be terminated. Similarly, there will be situations in which adoption of a
convict's children without his consent is warranted. It is clear, however,
that these measures are not justified in every case.
Unfortunately, most provisions regarding conviction and
imprisonment are overly broad. One adoption statute, for example,
dispenses with the requirement of consent of a parent imprisoned for a
felony. 4 In several states a sentence of three years' imprisonment may
obviate the consent requirement." Clearly, not all felons are unfit to
continue as parents. Nor should a sentence of three years' imprisonment
be conclusive on the question of fitness. The inquiry in every case should
embrace the total parent-child relationship and not merely focus on what
may have been isolated misconduct on the part of a devoted parent. It is
of equal importance to consider the nature of the crime, the
circumstances surrounding its commission, possible arrangements for
the child's care during the parent's imprisonment, the parent's
rehabilitative potential, and, when possible, the child's wishes. To the
extent that the statutes just mentioned prevent this comprehensive
inquiry, they are objectionable. Equally objectionable are those
adoption statutes that do not require the consent of a parent who has
been deprived of the custody of his children. Surely, the custody award
of children to the innocent spouse in a divorce based on the other
spouse's imprisonment should not foreclose the issue of the convicted
parent's parental rights. Nevertheless, this result appears likely under a
number of these statutes.
To be considered also is the effect on the convict of the involuntary
termination of his parental rights. As already observed, the dissolution
of family ties adversely affects an offender's rehabilitation.
Undoubtedly, the adoption of an imprisoned convict's children without
his consent could have a devastating effect. Although it was earlier urged
73. See notes 321-35 infra and accompanying text.
74. IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.3 (Supp. 1970).
75. E.g.. ALASKA STAT. § 20.10.040 (1962); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (1969).
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that a convict's spouse who earnestly desires a divorce should be
permitted to terminate the marriage contract, it does not follow that the
convict's parental rights should be as easily forfeited. While in many
cases the emotional and physical welfare of the spouse may justify a
divorce and the best interests of the children may necessitate deprivation
of their parent's custody, only the most extreme circumstances should
justify a complete termination of the convict's parental rights.
3. Loss of Political Rights and Privileges.-Many civil disability
laws severely restrict the convicted criminal's participation in the
political process. In most jurisdictions, individuals convicted of certain
crimes are denied the right to vote and are prohibited from holding
public office. Although there are instances when the imposition of civil
disabilities is necessary to protect the public interest, the present scope
and operation of these disabilities raises serious questions regarding their
necessity and reasonableness.
(a) Voting.-The right of suffrage has long been recognized as one
of the most fundamental rights of American citizens. 6 In recent years,
both Congress and the courts have taken steps to expand and protect
voting rights n Only a few challenges, however, have been directed at
state constitutional and statutory provisions that deny the franchise to
convicted criminals. In general, the courts have indicated no desire or
intention to declare these laws unconstitutional. 7 Nor have the
legislatures shown any interest in eliminating these proscriptions. Only
one state, 79 for example, has adopted the Uniform Act on the Status of
Convicted Persons, which limits the voting disqualification to the period
of a convict's imprisonment. 10 Moreover, since voter qualifications in
most states can be changed only by constitutional amendment, it is
doubtful that either the Uniform Act or the similar Model Penal Code
disfranchisement provision81 will be enacted into law by many states.
Legislative and judicial acquiescence in the proscription of voting
rights stems from a concern that the elective process should not be
influenced by criminal elements. It is not disputed that some restrictions
76. E.g.. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 870 (1964).
77. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring equal legislative
representation for all citizens of state); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV (suffrage not denied because of
race, color, or servitude); id. amend. XIX (suffrage rights granted to women); Voting Rights Act of
1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. IV, 1969); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,7 U.S. CODEl
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2097 (1970) (granting suffrage rights to 18-year-olds).
78. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
79. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A (Supp. 1969).
80. UNIFORM ACT ON THE STATUS OF CONVICTED PERSONS §§ 1-8.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 306.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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are necessary to achieve this purpose. When it is recalled, however, that
the right to vote is one of the most important symbols of the democratic
process, it is clear that it should be denied only for the most compelling
reasons. It is submitted that the traditional justifications for
disfranchising convicts fail to demonstrate this compelling necessity. It
has been suggested, for example, that individuals who have been
convicted of crimes may be more susceptible to corruption and
fraudulent practices at the polls. s2 Although this suspicion may be
justified in individual cases, such as convictions of treason, bribery, or
election violations, it is hardly a basis for the broad disqualifications
found in most jurisdictions. In many states, for example, the franchise is
regularly denied to felons and persons convicted of infamous crimes.
Clearly, not all offenses encompassed by those provisions demonstrate
unfitness to participate in the elective process. Only one state supreme
court, however, has recognized that these proscriptions far exceed the
scope of regulation necessary to protect the ballot box. In holding that a
state cannot constitutionally disfranchise a convict without a
determination that his offense denotes unfitness to vote, the California
court pointed out that:
[S]ince conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is itself a felony ...
disfranchisement would automatically follow from conviction of conspiracy to
operate a motor vehicle without a muffler. . . or to violate any other of the myriads
of lesser misdemeanor statutes on the books. No reasonable relation is apparent
between this result and the purpose of protecting the integrity of the elective
process.8
A statute that disqualifies felons from voting is not only objectionable
for its overbreadth, but also for its failure to disfranchise certain
criminals who probably should not vote. There are misdemeanors, for
example, that are more serious from a moral standpoint than some
felonies.8 4 It is readily apparent that meaningful standards for
determining an individual's fitness to vote are necessary if unreasonable
discrimination is to be avoided.
Courts in upholding provisions that disqualify convicted citizens
from voting have reasoned that since the state is simply establishing
voter qualifications, the deprivation is non-penal in nature., Although
this reasoning may reflect the true intent of the statutes, it nevertheless
82. See Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596,603,414 P.2d 412,417,51 Cal. Rptr. 284,289 (1966).
83. Id. at605,414 P.2d at418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
84. In Arizona, for example, the offense of willfully setting fire to a forest is a misdemeanor.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-941 (1956). In the same state, however, a citizen commits a felony if
he wears a mask with the intent to intimidate a person. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-981 (1956).
85. E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,96-97 (1958).
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ignores the penal effect that these deprivations have on ex-convicts. In
many states, the convicted criminal is not only denied the right to vote
during incarceration, but his disqualification may continue for years
after his release from prison. Prohibiting the released offender from
participating in the political processes that affect his life may further
alienate him from society and its institutions. Moreover, the loss of
voting rights could be an additional source of embarrassment for the ex-
convict, particularly in a small town where voting disqualifications often
become matters of common knowledge.8'
In addition to other constitutional objections,87 disfranchisement of
criminal offenders also can be challenged on a separate constitutional
ground. The fifteenth amendment prohibits a state from denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.88 If confinement in a penitentiary can be
categorized as a previous condition of servitude, the fifteenth
amendment would invalidate any law impairing the released offender's
right to vote merely because of his previous conviction. An in pari
materia construction of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments
supports the contention that "previous condition of servitude" includes
penal confinement. The thirteenth amendment contains the following
disclaimer: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction."" The omission of this disclaimer in the fifteenth
amendment seems to permit inclusion of the term "punishment for
crime" into the phrase "previous condition of servitude." This
interpretation implies that the right to vote should not be denied to an
individual previously convicted of a crime. This novel argument was
flatly rejected by the court in People v. DeStefano," which affirmed the
conviction of an ex-offender who had illegally voted in a municipal
election. The court stated that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
exclusively applied to the Negro, adverting to a 1947 federal circuit court
decision declaring that both amendments were designed to insure to the
86. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347,358 (1968).
87. Notes 137-315 infra and accompanying text.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
89. Id. amend. XIll,§ I.
90. 64 Ill. App. 2d 389, 212 N.E.2d 357 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 989 (1966). See also
Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1967), in which an incarcerated prisoner alleged a
fifteenth amendment violation in his unsuccessful attempt to compel election officials to establish
voting procedures for prison inmates.
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Negro the right to full participation'in the process of government.91 The
DeStefano court's outdated limitation of the fourteenth amendment to
rights of the Negro casts doubt on its restrictive reading of the fifteenth
amendment. This conclusion gains support from the expansion of the
fourteenth amendment in voting cases as well as from the fundamental
relationship between the two amendments. Construing the fifteenth
amendment to forbid disfranchisement on account of penal confinement,
therefore, would be consonant with the contemporary realization that
the right to vote "is the sacred and most important instrument of
democracy.""
Voting disqualifications for imprisoned convicts also are difficult to
justify. This deprivation is most often explained in terms of the
administrative difficulty in extending the franchise to incarcerated
offenders. In addition, the idea has been opposed on the ground of
possible bloc voting in the prison community.Y It is believed, however,
that the positive benefits from extending the franchise to prisoners would
clearly outweigh the tenuous arguments opposing it. There would appear
to be no great administrative burdens involved in providing absentee
ballots or polling booths at prisons. Surely, custodial personnel could
provide adequate supervision. On the positive side, the participation in
current political developments would mitigate the isolation and
alienation from the community engendered by confinement. Moreover,
the retention of the right to vote would serve as a reminder that society
recognizes the prisoner's existence-a missing ingredient in the
correctional atmosphere of today.
(b) Holding public office.-Laws excluding criminal offenders
from public office serve primarily to protect the public rather than to
punish the criminal. Although the public undoubtedly may often need
this protection, it remains to inquire whether the disqualifications now
effective in most states are necessary to accomplish this result. It is
suggested that the state's compelling interest in excluding corrupt and
dishonest persons from positions of public power does not require
that all felons, for example, should be barred from holding office. It
would seem that the public interest could be adequately safeguarded
by making a convicted person ineligible for a public office only when the
offense he committed is directly related to the duties of the office he is
seeking. A convicted embezzler, for example, should be ineligible to hold
an office in which he would be responsible for public funds, but eligible
91. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387, 392 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
92. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231,250 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
93. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONs 85 (1969).
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to serve on the local school board. Even if this position is adopted, the
offender should not be disqualified permanently from holding any office.
Rather, he should be ineligible only for a limited number of years.
Adoption of this test for eligibility would enable members of the public
to retain confidence in their public officials without unduly restricting
the number of persons qualified for public office.
Constitutional objections to civil disability laws in general are
detailed elsewhere.' 4 In addition to these challenges, it is arguable that
laws prohibiting offenders from holding public office restrict the
freedom of association protected by the first amendment. It has been
suggested, for example, that the right of political association embraces a
right of candidacy. In his concurring opinion in Williams v. Rhodes,"
Mr. Justice Harlan contended: "The right to have one's voice heard and
one's views considered by the appropriate governmental authority is at
the core of the right of political association."" The right to promote a
political philosophy means little if the spokesman for a political faction
can be kept off the election ballots and thus denied an equal opportunity
to be heard.9 To be considered also is the extent that provisions making
convicted persons ineligible for office unreasonably restrict the general
public's right to elect candidates of its choice. It is not uncommon for
one candidate to represent the views of a segment-of the electorate. I t has
been argued, and reasonably so, that if this candidate is prevented from
running, then those voters who support him have lost an opportunity to
cast their votes effectively.'" The Supreme Court essentially adopted this
position in Williams v. Rhodes," which concerned the right of the
American Independent Party to have a place on the ballot in Ohio for
the 1968 presidential election. Although the case concerned a political
party rather than an individual, it would seem that the same reasoning
could be applied, especially since the party involved was formed
primarily to further the candidacy of a single political spokesman. 10 In
his concurring opinion in the Rhodes case, Mr. Justice Douglas said, "I
would think that a State has precious little leeway in making it difficult
or impossible for citizens to vote for whomsoever they please and to
organize campaigns for any school of thought they may choose,
94. See notes 137-315 infra and accompanying text.
95. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
96. Id. at41.
97. See id. at 31.
98. Comment, Equal Protection and Property Qualifications for Elective Office, 118 U. PA.
L. REv. 129, 137 (1969).
99. 393 U.S.23 (1968).
100. Comment, supra note 98, at 140.
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whatever part of the spectrum it reflects."'' 01 Applying this reasoning, it
is submitted that if a convicted citizen has become a public figure and
has achieved considerable political support, disqualifying him from
public office would deny political expression to his supporters.
On balance, there appears to be considerable justification for the
argument that convicted citizens should be permitted to seek public
office. The Swedes support the former convict's right to hold public
office, reasoning that if an ex-convict becomes a candidate, his former
conviction probably will become an issue during the campaign. If the
voters are informed about the candidate and nevertheless choose to elect
him, the Swedes believe that the legislature should not interfere with
their choice. 0 2 Adopting the same rationale, a report of the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
suggested that the states should rely on the judgment of the voters for
elective officials and on the appraisal of the persons with appointive
power for appointive positions./°3 It is difficult to find fault with this
conclusion. The public can be adequately protected by narrow
provisions temporarily disqualifying a convicted citizen if the offense he
committed is directly related to the duties of the office he is seeking. This
approach was adopted by the draftsmen of the New Federal Criminal
Code, which proposes that disqualification of convicted citizens from
federal office be discretionary with the sentencing court. Under the
proposed Code, in no case would the period of ineligibility extend longer
than five years following completion of sentence.'0'
4. Loss of Judicial Rights.-For many convicts the only exposure
to the judicial system is as a criminal defendant. Under statutes in a
number of states, convicted criminals lack the capacity to sue, to execute
judicially enforceable instruments, and to serve as witnesses'05 or jurors.
Not only do many offenders fail to develop an appreciation for the
judicial process, but in some instances they may be denied judicial relief
without justification. Moreover, the denial of a convict's legal capacity
may work hardships on innocent citizens. For these reasons, it is
essential that these restrictions be narrowly drawn.
(a) Capacity to sue.-It is well recognized that the administrative
101. 393 U.S. at 39.
102. Damaska, supra note 86, at 358.
103. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 22, at 90.
104. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT
OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3501 (1970).
105. In some states, a conviction of perjury or subornation of perjury will completely exclude
a person from testifying. See notes 772-82 on pages 1038-39 supra and accompanying text.
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problems inherent in the penal system necessitate the withdrawal of some
rights and privileges from criminal offenders. 06 It has been suggested
that the prisoners only have the right to those liberties that are
indispensable to fair and decent treatment, to the avoidance of cruel and
unusual punishment, and to the preclusion of invidious discrimination. I°0
Although the rights of prisoners have been expanded throughout the
years,es prison inmates in a number of states still lack the capacity to
institute civil actions. In analyzing this procedural incapacity, it is
necessary to balance the importance of the right to sue against the
administrative problems involved in permitting prisoners to initiate civil
suits.
A number of reasons have given support to the theory that prisoners
should not be permitted to sue. First, it has been suggested that prisoners
are likely to file many suits based on illegitimate claims, creating an
enormous amount of litigation for the already overcrowded courts.,"
This rationale seems questionable since the courts in those states
permitting prisoners to sue apparently have not been overburdened with
litigation instituted by inmates. Secondly, the argument has been made
that prisoners may instigate suits in order to be temporarily absent from
prison. 10 There is no basis for this argument since most courts that
accept civil suits by prisoners do not allow the prisoner-plaintiffs to
appear personally in court. Thirdly, there has been some concern that
prisoners might harass public officials with countless lawsuits.",
Although this may be a possibility, most prisoners who are treated fairly
probably will not bring spurious suits against public officials. When they
are treated unfairly, they should have the opportunity to obtain the
appropriate judicial relief. In addition, laws prohibiting prisoners from
suing make it possible for dishonest public officials and citizens to take
advantage of inmates without fear of facing civil liability. Prisoners are
less likely to receive unfair treatment if they have the capacity to
maintain civil actions.
106. See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948); Courtney v. Bishop, 409 F.2d
1185 (8th Cir. 1969).
107. Nolan v. Scafati, 306 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Mass. 1969) (prisoner does not have right to be
represented by counsel or to cross-examine witnesses at prison hearing that might result in solitary
confinement or in postponement of his release date).
108. See, e.g., Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REv.
397 (1965); Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985
(1962).
109. Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 386, 394
(1968).





The strongest indication of the unreasonableness of the rule
prohibiting prisoners from suing is that the majority of states now
permit inmates to institute suits. All states have been slow to abolish the
numerous common law disabilities imposed on criminal offenders.
Consequently, it is significant that at least three-fourths of the states
apparently have recognized that prisoners should retain the right to sue.
In addition, most foreign countries have abolished this "anachronistic
procedural incapacity."" 2 It seems clear that any conceivable benefits
that society receives by denying prisoners the capacity to sue are
outweighed by the excessive personal hardships caused by this
disability.1 3 In fact, society will be better served if prisoners are
permitted to seek judicial relief for wrongs committed against them. One
of the major obstacles facing rehabilitative efforts today is that many
prisoners think society is unwilling to give them a second chance.114 An
inmate who is denied access to the courts when he has a legitimate cause
of action might reasonably think he is receiving unnecessary punishment
for the offense he committed. His natural reaction will be one of hostility
toward society, making it less likely that he will be willing to comply
with society's demands. If the prisoner is permitted to sue, however, his
hostility may be reduced and he will have the opportunity to start putting
his affairs in order before his release from prison.1"5 This, in turn, will
make his adjustment period after release less difficult.
(b) Capacity to execute judicially enforceable instru-
ments.-Fortunately, in most states the capacity to execute judicially
enforceable instruments is not affected by a criminal conviction.
Statutes and decisions limiting the convict's contractual and
testamentary capacity are primarily confined to civil death
jurisdictions."' It suffices merely to observe that these disabilities are
clearly detrimental to the convict, his dependents, and society.
Restrictions on the convict's power to contract are contrary to the
general public policy supporting free economic intercourse. Moreover, a
convict under this disability may be unable to procure the ordinary
necessities of life. So too, denying a convicted criminal's testamentary
capacity clearly contravenes the accepted policy favoring testate
112. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study (pt. 2), 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 542,561 (1968).
113. See34 VA. L. REV. 959,960 (1948).
114. See note 355 infra and accompanying text.
115. S. RUBIN. THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 621 (1963).
116. Rhode Island is the one non-civil death jurisdiction that limits the convict's power to
contract and make a will during incarceration by requiring court approval prior to the execution of
a valid instrument. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 13-6-3 (1969).
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distribution of decedents' property. It may be argued that imprisoned
convicts may be subjected to unlawful pressure in reaching contractual
and testamentary decisions and are therefore protected by the
disabilities. It is readily apparent, however, that appropriate remedy for
this supposed evil is elimination of the oppressive influences, rather than
deprivation of these basic rights. In any event, no conceivable purpose is
served by denying the released convict's rights to manage his affairs and
control the disposition of his property.
(c) Capacity to serve as a witness.-The rules of evidence dealing
with the testimony of citizens who have been convicted of certain crimes
are badly in need of reform in almost all states. The offender who seeks
to testify in a judicial proceeding can be affected by his prior criminal
conviction in two ways: First, a citizen who has been convicted of perjury
or subornation of perjury, will be completely excluded from testifying in
some states;" 7 secondly, in all states, the criminal record of a witness
who has been convicted of certain crimes will be introduced to discredit
his testimony."'
It is difficult to justify statutes forbidding citizens who have been
convicted of perjury or subornation of perjury from testifying. There is
no valid reason why a person with material knowledge of facts in a case
should not be permitted to tell them, regardless of his character or
previous criminal acts. If the witness has been convicted of perjury
within recent years, the jury should be informed of his conviction and
allowed to weigh his testimony accordingly. Although the convicted
perjurer's testimony will not be considered reliable in most cases, he
should at least be permitted to take the stand and testify. Laws
completely excluding an individual from testifying because of his prior
criminal record not only are detrimental to the convicted citizen's rights,
but also can adversely affect the rights of innocent third parties who may
need to rely on his testimony.
It is equally difficult to justify statutes that permit witnesses to be
impeached by a showing that they have been convicted of criminal
offenses having no relation to veracity. Under a number of statutes,
many offenses that are admissible for impeachment purposes do not
necessarily reflect on the credibility of the witness. As one progressive
court has observed: "Acts of violence . . . which may result from a
short temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes,
generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity."'" 9 The
117. See notes 772-82 on pages 1038-39 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 783-838 on pages 1039-45 supra and accompanying text.
119. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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existing impeachment rules can produce anomalous results. A given
individual, for example, might prize his reputation of veracity to such an
extent that he would be provoked to violence if another person called him
a liar. The individual might be convicted for his violent acts and later
called 'to testify in a judicial proceeding. His conviction, ironically,
would be introduced to imply that he is a liar.'2
The use of a conviction for impeachment purposes should be limited
to crimes that indicate a lack of veracity. The laws of evidence generally
do not permit the introduction of irrelevant facts as evidence. 2 1 There is
no reason, then, why irrelevant facts should be admitted for
impeachment purposes. The existing impeachment statutes not only are
too broad to accomplish their legitimate purpose, but they also have a
highly prejudicial effect. If the witness is the defendant in a criminal
action, the jury will tend to infer that he is guilty of the crime charged
because of his prior record. 22 If the defendant does not have a criminal
record, but his chief witness does, then the defendant may be condemned
through guilt by association.' 3 The prejudicial effect also extends to civil
cases. If an innocent party has only one witness and this person has a
criminal record, the jury is likely to disregard the witness' testimony,
even though he was convicted of a crime having no relation to his
honesty and integrity. The fact that the courts instruct juries that prior
convictions are introduced for limited purposes does not eliminate the
resulting prejudice.2 4 As Mr. Justice Jackson observed: "The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to
the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."'
The practice of admitting prior convictions to impeach the credibility of
witnesses always will have a prejudicial impact, but unnecessary
prejudice can be minimized if evidence of prior convictions is limited to
crimes relating to veracity.
In addition to the adverse affect that the broad impeachment
statutes have on the administration of justice, the statutes also are
detrimental to the convicted citizen whose credibility is attacked. If a
criminal offender has paid his debt to society andhas been rehabilitated,
120. See 7 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 407 (Bowring ed. 1827), quoted
in 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (3d ed. 1940).
121. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 151, at 314 (1954).
122. See Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant
With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (1968).
123. Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time For Reform, 18 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1968).
124. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 127-30, 160 (1966).
125. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (concurring opinion).
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it seems unfair to introduce his prior conviction to imply that he is a liar.
Ex-convicts should be encouraged to assume the role of responsible
citizens. The impeachment rules, however, are based on the theory that a
person with a criminal record cannot be trusted, even after his
rehabilitation. This inconsistency undoubtedly makes it more difficult
for the convicted citizen to be accepted among his peers as a responsible
member of the community.
(d) Capacity to serve as a juror.-Laws disqualifying convicted
citizens from jury service apparently are based on the theory that a
citizen with a criminal record may discharge his duties as a juror in a
dishonest and disinterested way. Some persons believe, for example, that
a criminal offender may be more susceptible than the average citizen to
threats or bribes. 126 The United States Supreme Court has upheld the
validity of statutes confining the selection of jurors to citizens of good
moral character and approved integrity.'2 It does not follow, however,
that disqualification of persons with criminal records is necessary to
achieve this result. Not all persons with criminal backgrounds are
dishonest or lacking in moral character. Theoretically, a citizen
convicted and sentenced for a crime has been rehabilitated by the time he
is released into the community. Moreover, a criminal conviction does
not and should not indicate that the offender has a weakness of moral
character incapable of correction.'2
The Supreme Court also has held that jury competence should be an
individual rather than a group or class matter.129 Most, if not all, state
statutes violate this principle by automatically excluding a convicted
citizen without reference to his character or integrity. Since many states
already have statutes providing that only persons of good character can
serve as jurors,'3 0 the provisions disqualifying convicted citizens are
altogether unnecessary. Statutes that make character a factor in jury
selection may be valid, but states should adopt specific guidelines so that
jury commissions will not assume that a criminal conviction is
conclusive evidence of bad character.
The statutes automatically disqualifying convicted persons from
jury service are also detrimental to the convicted citizen who is excluded
126. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 37 (1968).
127. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 354-55 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320,
332 (1970).
128. See State v. Benson, 235 Ore. 291, 294, 384 P.2d 208, 210 (1963). See also
Commonwealth v. Wong Chung, 186 Mass. 231,235-36, 71 N.E. 292,294 (1904).
129. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,220 (1946).
130. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 205 (West Supp. 1970); N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW § 504(4) (McKinney Supp. 1969-70).
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from jury service. It is unfair to prevent rehabilitated citizens from
participating in the administration of justice. Moreover, it is conceivable
that allowing persons with criminal records to serve as jurors would have
beneficial effects. Many convicted persons, for example, think that they
were not treated fairly by the courts. An effective way to help restore
their confidence in the judicial system would be to permit them to serve
as jurors after their rehabilitation.
5. Loss of Property Rights and Other Vested Inter-
ests.-Although forfeiture of property has been abolished in the United
States, vestiges of this ancient criminal sanction linger in the laws of
three states.'31 While these obscure statutes apparently are no longer
enforced, the fact that convicted criminals in those states remain subject
to the forfeiture provisions indicates that the statutes should be repealed.
Although the convicted criminal does not forfeit his property, he
may, nevertheless, experience considerable difficulty managing it during
the period of imprisonment. Only a few states make provisions for the
imprisoned convict to manage and maintain his property. 32 Even in
states that authorize appointment of a guardian or representative for
convicts, the purpose of the appointment may be for the protection of
third parties rather than the prisoner.'3 Clearly, a desirable solution to
this problem would be the appointment of a trustee to manage the
property. This approach is recommended by the Uniform Probate
Code.iu
Although forfeiture of real or personal property is unlikely, the
convicted criminal may be deprived of certain vested property interests.
The most serious loss that may result from conviction and imprisonment
is the forfeiture of pension benefits. Under both federal and state
statutes, accrued retirement and disability pensions may be withheld
from retirants who are convicted of certain crimes. Many of the
disqualifying provisions appear wholly unjustified. As already observed,
legislation regarding pensions varies considerably among the states and
131. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 353-38 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.98 (1957); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 13-6-1,-6-4,-6-7 (1956).
132. See notes 263-68 on page 1102 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 279-86 on pages 1104-05 supra and accompanying text.
134. The Uniform Probate Code provides an integrated statutory approach to assisting those
persons who are unable to manage their own property, including those under "confinement." The
powers of the appointing court are quite flexible, permitting protective arrangements most suitable
to the needs and desires of the convicted prisoner. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 5-401, -407,-408,-
524 to -53 1. The powers and duties of the court and the appointed representative also are clearly
delineated, a notable improvement over most current statutes in which these duties are impossible to
ascertain. Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45 IOWA L. REv. 264, 291-92
(1960).
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even among separate occupations within a state. Rarely do
disqualifications based on criminal conviction apply uniformly to all
occupational groups. In a number of states, for example, policemen are
regularly disqualified, but pensions of judges, teachers, and firemen may
not be subject to forfeiture.13 . It is difficult to rationalize these
inconsistencies. If conviction of a crime justifies the forfeiture of pension
rights it would seem that disqualifications should apply to all employees.
The broad discretion vested in pension boards contributes further to the
disparity of treatment received by employees and pensioners who have
been convicted. The function of these administrative bodies should be
restricted to the management of pension funds. In the absence of special
circumstances, the decision to punish employees and pensioners
convicted of crime seems to be an appropriate subject for criminal
courts.'3
It is not suggested that criminal conviction should never disqualify
an employee from receiving a pension but only that the disability should
be limited to crimes committed before the employee has become eligible
for his benefits. Moreover, only crimes that bear a direct relationship to
the individual's employment should work a forfeiture. Whether
payments to pensioners are viewed as a gratuity or performance of a
contractual duty, they are in consideration of past services. Under no
circumstances should a retired or disabled pensioner's vested rights be
proscribed because of his subsequent conduct. To be considered also is
the potentially detrimental effect of this deprivation on a retired
pensioner. The convicted pensioner may in some cases be released from
prison as an aged indigent with no source of income and no possibility of
employment. Clearly, the forfeiture of a pension could have devastating
impact on the offender's chances of rehabilitation.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL DISABILITIES
The collateral consequences of a criminal conviction generally have
not been affected by the extension of constitutional guarantees to other
stages in the criminal process. The low visibility level of these restraints
may account for their virtually unchallenged tenure.1n Moreover, the few
135. Kansas, for example, expressly disqualifies policemen but has no provision excluding
teachers. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 13-14a08 (1964). Maine disqualifies state policemen but not firemen.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1121(y) (1964); id. tit. 25, § 1593. North Dakota excludes its
policemen but not its judges. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-45-15 (1968).
136. Landry v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 58 So. 2d 296, 298 (La. Ct. App.
1952).
137. See generally Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
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direct constitutional challenges to civil disability laws have been rejected
by the courts on the basis of archaic case law and unsupported
reasoning~lu
A recent federal case illustrates the difficulties involved in
challenging disability laws. In Morrison v. California,3 1 a paroled felon
sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing
constitutional and statutory provisions depriving criminal offenders of
various civil rights. The plaintiff asserted that the California Penal Code
sections
violate due process, inflict punishment by legal fiat, are retroactive laws, abridge the
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, are Bills of Attainder and
are ex post facto laws, and that the said California constitutional provisions are
likewise unconstitutional and violate Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the 13th
Amendment and the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 4 '
Additionally, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment for breach of
contract, alleging that the state breached the implied "social compact"
by which government secures and protects individuals in the enjoyment
of vested rights of citizenship . 4 1 The court held that the complaint was
without merit, citing four Supreme Court cases as controlling the
constitutional issues.
The court's treatment of the constitutional challenges typifies the
existing judicial reluctance to re-examine the dubious precedents used to
uphold civil disability statutes. Furthermore, the breach of contract
allegation demonstrates the disillusionment and frustration fostered by
these laws. This section will evaluate various constitutional avenues that
may be used to challenge civil disability laws.
A. Related Judicial Developments
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the adverse
consequences of criminal convictions,'4 2 it refused to overturn a civil
138. A recent order, sustaining an agency ruling denying an applicant with a criminal record
employment as a tree trimmer, typifies the conclusions given by some courts when confronted with
claims by former criminals: "The Court ...determines that the denial of employment to an
applicant because of his criminal record is not an invasion of the applicant's Federal Constitutional
rights." Antencio v. Rossmiller, Civil No. C- 1493 (D. Colo., order rendered Jan. 13, 1970).
139. 238 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
140. Id. at 23.
141. But see Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967). In Green the
court reasoned that "[a] man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent [the legislature] to
make for his own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to
participate in further administering the [social] compact."
142. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,790 (1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576,579 n.3 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,55 (1968). See also Pollard v. United States,
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disability law as recently as 1960.' 3 Political and judicial developments
since then, however, indicate that civil disability laws may come under
close scrutiny by the courts in the future. The increasing number of
criminal convictions among the nation's youth, for example, has
produced a class of offenders highly cognizant of their political,
economic, and social rights.'44 These offenders can be expected to initiate
numerous challenges to the disabilities that will adversely affect their
lives.4 Moreover, active judicial protection of fundamental rights under
the due process and equal protection clauses casts doubt on the validity
of the constitutional methodology used by the courts in past attempts to
invalidate civil disability statutes."' In addition, judicial intervention in
the correctional process and expansion of post-conviction relief have
flluihinated the severity of the deprivations imposed upon prisoners.
1. Judicial Intervention in the Correctional Process.-One
development that foreshadows a more active judicial involvement in civil
disability laws is the growing body of literature and case law dealing
with prisoners' rights. 47 Judicial incursions on the formerly unchecked
discretionary authority of correctional administrators have forged a new
balance between the interests of the prisoner and the prison.'" The
courts, previously disposed to noninterference in prison affairs, have
now recognized that prisoners retain fundamental constitutional
352 U.S. 354, 358 (1957); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 519 (1954) (Minton, J.,
dissenting).
143. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). Since De Veau, the Court has not reviewed a
civil disability resulting from a criminal conviction.
144. Violations of the selective service and marijuana laws are the most common offenses.
See J. KAPLAN, MARIJUANA-THE NEW PROHIBITION 29 (1970) (approximately one-fourth of all
felony complaints in California during 1968 were for violation of the marijuana laws); Note,
Prosecutions for Selective Service Offenses: A Field Study, 22 STAN. L. REV. 356 (1970).
145. See, e.g., Kronlund v. Hornstein, Civil No. 14103 (N.D. Ga., filed Aug. 25, 1970)
(voting); Muhammad Ali v. Division of State Athletic Comm'n, 308 F. Supp. I I (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
rev'd on rehearing, Civil No. 69-4867 (Sept. 14, 1970) (licensing).
146. Compare Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), with Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
147. See, e.g., Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights
of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669 (1966); Hirschkop & Millemann, Unconstitutionality of
Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Rubin, Developments in Correctional Law, 15 CRIME &
DELIN. 283 (1969); Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRNI. L. 386 (1968);
Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 Gho. L.J. 1270 (1969); Note, The Problems of
Modern Penology: Prison Life and Prisoners' Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 671 (1967); Note,
Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 985 (1962); Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
148. E.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Washington v. Lee, 263




rights."' This trend could signify an increased judicial scrutiny of the
effects that civil disabilities have on the rights of offenders during and
after incarceration.
The decision in Mempa v. Rhay,'s extending the right to counsel to
probation revocation hearings, may also have a significant impact on
disability laws. This case has been liberally interpreted as the
springboard for increased judicial activity in the discretionary peno-
correctional stage of the criminal process.' 5' According to this theory,
the convict's disadvantaged position may impel the court to view itself as
the only institution capable of representing an unpopular cause on behalf
of an unpopular group.' One result of this increased court activity may
be the requirement of fair hearings before the various agencies that
regulate the offender's activities. Inevitably, as the sentence-to-final-
discharge area of the penal law is more clearly defined, the courts will
begin to review those disability laws tainted with irrationality and
unstructured discretion.
Finally, recent constitutional developments in juvenile corrections
imply that the lack of procedural safeguards in the imposition of
disability laws may not comply with due process requirements. In
extending due process standards to juvenile hearings, In re Gaultlu
implicitly recognized the need for fairness in all proceedings that deny
basic constitutional rights. Furthermore, Gault emphasized the
rehabilitative harm in not according due process to offenders: "Unless
appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile who has
violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and may
therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel."'"
Consistent with these principles, civil disabilities laws are vulnerable to
potential challenge to determine whether additional due process
protections are necessary to comport with the requirement of procedural
fairness.
149. See, e.g., Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1944) (a right not specifically
lost by operation of law is retained); cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
150. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
151. Cohen, Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View From Mempa v.
Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1,5-6 (1968).
152. Id. at 5. Paralleling an increased concern for the rights of prisoners is an effort to define
the rights of the mentally ill, a group that has been as nonvisible as the prisoner population. Civil
liberties organizations are advocating the abolition of certain disabilities which the mentally ill
share with the prisoner, including disenfranchisement and certain occupational disabilities. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 12, 1970, at 24, col. 4 (city ed.). See generally Morris, "Criminality" and the Right to
Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 784 (1969).
153. 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
154. Id. at 26.
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2. Expansion of Post-Conviction Relief-Several recent develop-
ments have emphasized an increased judicial awareness of the post-
release consequences of existing civil disabilities and a determination
to alleviate some of these restrictions. In Carafas v. LaVallee,1'5 for
example, the Supreme Court rejected New York's claim that a petition
for habeas corpus was moot, recognizing that the petitioner, although
released from physical custody while his petition was pending, was still
subject to an impaired status resulting from civil and occupational dis-
abilities. This decision indicates that the Court has fully recognized
the excessive burdens that civil disabilities impose on the liberty of
the ex-convict, but leaves open the question whether an unconstitutional-
ly released prisoner may collaterally challenge his conviction by habeas
corpus. If read narrowly, Carafas may be viewed as a decision reached
only by a strained interpretation of the language of the federal habeas
corpus statute. As a result, the Court "was consciously eschewing its
opportunity to extend the custody concept to include petitioner's dis-
abilities."' 56 This narrow interpretation may result in an untenable
distinction: habeas corpus relief is not available to those who apply
for the writ after their release, even though they may be subject to
the same disabilities that were sufficient to warrant a remedy where
application was made prior to release. 157 The Court's explicit recognition
of the restraints imposed by civil disabilities, however, supports a
155. 391 U.S. 234 (1968), overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). Earlier cases
rejecting writs of habeas corpus did not fully recognize the substantial restraints on liberty imposed
by civil disabilities. See Miller v. United States, 324 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1963); United States ev rel.
Rivera v. Reeves, 246 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
156. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1077
(1970). By relaxing the custody requirement, habeas corpus would become a general post-conviction
remedy for ex-convicts faced with civil disabilities. One writer views this "extreme result" as
inconsistent with the statutory requirement of custody, since the non-physical restraints of civil
disabilities cannot be squared with the custody requirement. Note, TheSupreme Court, 1967 Ternt,
82 HARV. L. REv. 95, 254 n.41 (1968).
157. Expansive definitions of the custody language of the federal habeas corpus statute have
been developed by the courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (restraint upon personal liberty
fulfills "custody"); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole restrictions fulfill
"custody"); Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965)
(probation restrictions fulfill "custody"). Even before Carafas, one commentator, basing his
argument on these definitions and the dissent in Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960), concluded:
"For if the imposition of civil disabilities will support retention of a case after release, it is difficult
to see why the same sort of restraint on personal liberty should not support initiation of the action in
the first place. . . . [lI]t does not appear why the difference between parole or probation on the one
hand . . . and civil disabilities on the other. . . is sufficient to justify a refusal to grant relief in the
latter instance." Note, Habeas Corpus, Custody and Declaratory Judgment, 53 VA. L. REv. 673,
680 & n.37 (1967); see Note, Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful Conviction, 74 HARV. L. REV.
1615, 1616 n.9 (1961).
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broader view.' s Accordingly, a federal district court recently extended
the writ to an unconditionally released offender' by equating civil
disabilities with the burdens on liberty required by the habeas corpus
custody requirement.
In addition to the developments precipitated by Carafas, several
state statutes have abolished the custody requirement for a post-
conviction challenge to a completed sentence. 60 Moreover, at least one
state court, recognizing the stigmas and disabilities attending a criminal
conviction, has broadened the scope of review for post-conviction
applicants in a manner similar to that in Carafas.'6' The custody
requirement also is not a prerequisite for the common law remedy of
coram nobis, a limited federal procedure that has been used successfully
to attack a satisfied conviction that might result in the future loss of civil
rights.6 2 In United States v. Cariola,'6 for example, a voting disability
resulting from a 24-year-old conviction fulfilled the jurisdictional
requirement in a coram nob is proceeding to vacate the conviction. Other
avenues for avoiding the custody requirement include a declaratory
judgment' and relief under the Civil Rights Act. 165
158. The unequivocal language of Carafas states: "Because of these 'disabilities or burdens
[that] may flow from' petitioner's conviction, he has 'a substantial stake in the judgment of
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him'. . . . On account of
these 'collateral consequences,' the case is not moot." 391 U.S. at 237-38. Opponents of this
position argue that it will foster innumerable habeas corpus petitions that will overburden the
courts. This argument, however, has been rejected in similar contexts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963). Contracting the number of disabilities by re-examining the relationship between the
specific disability and the crime would measurably reduce the number of petitions. See Smith,
Federal Habeas Corpus: State Prisoners and the Concept of Custody,4 U. RICHMOND L. REv. 1,39
n.188 (1969).
159. Glover v. North Carolina, 301 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.C. 1969). At the time of filing his
petition, the petitioner in Glover was incarcerated for a conviction that was unrelated to the one he
was challenging by habeas corpus. Following an extensive analysis of the case law interpreting the
custody requirement, particularly Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) and Carafas, the
court emphasized the substantial yet subtle restraints disabilities impose on the lives of released
convicts. 301 F. Supp. at 367; cf. Jones v. Cunningham, 294 F.2d 608, 612-13 (4th Cir. 1961)
(Sobeloff, C.J., concurring), rev'd, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). But see United States v. Flanagan, 305 F.
Supp. 325, 326-27 (E.D. Va. 1969).
160. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 138.510 (1969); ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING AND
REVIEW, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO POST-CONvICTION REMEDIES §§ 2.3-4 (Tent. Draft 1967) (recommends elimination of custody
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to post-conviction relief when the petitioner is burdened by a civil
disability that prevents him from engaging in a desired and otherwise feasible action or activity).
161. People v. Davis, 39 Il1. 2d 325, 235 N.E.2d 634 (1968).
162. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Kyle v. United States, 288 F.2d 440
(2d Cir. 1961). Contra, United States v. Oddo, 129 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See generally
Note, Habeas Corpus, Custody and Declaratory Judgment, 53 VA. L. REV. 673,685-87 (1967).
163. 323 F.2d 180 (3dCir. 1963).
164. See Note, supra note 162 at 687-98.
165. The novel remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) is proposed in Note, The
Development of Independent Jurisdictional Significance for Civil Disabilities: The Post-Custody
1190 VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23
B. Civil Disability Laws as Bills ofAttainder
Civil disability laws have frequently been challenged as violating the
bill of attainder clause of the federal constitution. " ' The argument used
is that legislatures, by precluding convicted citizens from exercising
certain rights or participating in certain functions, have punished them
without judicial trial.167 "In determining whether a particular statute is a
bill of attainder, the analysis necessarily requires an inquiry into whether
three definitional elements-specificity in identification, punishment,
and lack of a judicial trial-are contained in the statute."6
1. Specificity in Identification.-A legislative act, in order to
constitute a bill of attainder, must first involve named individuals " or
members of a readily ascertainable group. In Hawker v. New York, 70
the Supreme Court confirmed that criminal offenders compose an easily
ascertainable group, but held that a statute barring all felons from
medical practice was not a bill of attainder since the disqualification was
based on "the well recognized fact of human experience" that criminal
offenders can be conclusively presumed to lack good moral character.
The legislation challenged in Hawker was both overinclusive and
underinclusive:
Felons were not the only persons who might possess character defects making
them unsuitable practitioners of medicine; and, as the Court expressly noted, not all
felons would lack good moral character. Nevertheless, the legislature was permitted
to disqualify all members of the class, rather than being required to delegate to the
courts the responsibility of determining the character of each individual based on all
relevant factors, including prior conviction . 17
Petition, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 436. The writer views Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957),
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954), and United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.
1963), as forging a guarantee that release from custody will not forfeit a petitioner's right to
collateral relief from a prior unconstitutional conviction where civil disabilities are imposed. This
approach was successfully utilized in Pales De Mendez v. Aponte, 294 F. Supp. 311 (D.P.R. 1969).
166. See, e.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1967); Postma v. Teamster Local 294, 337 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1964). The bill of attainder
and ex post facto proscriptions are contained in U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 9-10. Civil disabilities are
properly denoted bills of pains and penalties since bills of attainder were exclusively capital
sanctions. See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the
Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 331 (1962). Bills of pains and penalties, however, have
been incorporated into the bill of attainder clause. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 138
(1810).
167. See Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403,418 (1963).
168. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30 (1968).
169. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (bar of named individuals from
government employment a bill of attainder).
170. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
171. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,469 (1965) (White; J., dissenting).
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Despite this imprecise definition, the Hawker holding controls and
satisfies the definitional element of specificity in identification.
2. Punishment or Regulation.-To satisfy the second definitional
prerequisite for a bill of attainder, the court must determine whether the
statute is penal or regulatory. 172 Two variant tests have been applied to
determine penal or regulatory character, and the "problem has been
extremely difficult and elusive of solution."'1 3
An application of the first test can be found in Trop v. Dulles,74 in
which the Court based its determination upon the evident purpose of the
legislature, recognizing "that any statute decreeing some adversity as a
consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal and a nonpenal
effect."'' 75 As an illustration, the Court discussed the case of the ordinary
felon who loses both his right to liberty and his right to vote. It
concluded that the former sanction is penal, imposed for the purpose of
punishing bank robbers, whereas the voting disability purports merely
to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting, a nonpenal
exercise of the state's power to regulate the franchise.
In applying the Trop test, the first step should be to determine the
evident purpose of the legislative body in enacting the disability
statutes. 76 This analysis should be made despite statements by the
majority of courts that disabilities prescribe tenable regulatory grounds
for depriving former criminals of certain rights and privileges. Although
there are nonpenal reasons for disabilities, their original legislative
purpose may have been to impose additional punishment. Legislative
172. This requirement, as enunciated in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30
(1968), applies in cases where statutes are challenged as bills of attainder (e.g., United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)) and where punishments are challenged as unconstitutionally cruel and
unusual (e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)). The requirement of inquiry into legislative
purpose to determine if the necessary element of punishment exists in these 2 classes of cases has
been criticized since the cases "appear to require no such inquiry at all" because of the Court's past
preference for deciding whether a sanction is punitive by considering the operation of the sanction
rather than the intention of the imposing body. Note, Legislative Purpose and Federal
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1887, 1889 (1970). The present discussion is directly
applicable to determine whether civil disability statutes are punitive in nature for purposes of the
eighth amendment. See notes 191-205 infra and accompanying text.
173. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
174. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
175. Id. at 96. If the effect of a disability is to punish, it may be inferred that the
statute was passed with a hidden intent. See Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to
Separation of Power and Substantive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop,
Perez, andSpeiser Cases, 34 IND. L.J. 231 (1959).
176. "To determine purpose, the court may consider both the language of the statute and
general public knowledge about the evil which the legislature sought to remedy; prior law;
accompanying legislation; enacted statements of purpose; formal public pronouncements; and
internal legislative history." Note, supra note 172, at 1887 n.1.
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history, however, is not available in most states. Consequently, other
historical documentation must be relied upon to rebut Trop's
classification of disability laws as a nonpenal exercise of state power.
The history of disability statutes177 demonstrates that these laws were
imposed in England as punitive measures and were perpetuated by
American legislatures without consideration of their rationale or effect.
The prevailing European view that disabilities form an additional
punishment is also convincing evidence of their punitive purpose. 7 The
large majority of disability statutes, therefore, should be classified as
penal under the evident purpose test notwithstanding the conclusions in
Troti .
The second traditional test, enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 79 concentrates on the operation or effect of the sanction
rather than the intention of the imposing body. is° The Court listed seven
factors relevant to the inquiry of punitiveness, noting that they often
point in different directions.' An analysis of disability statutes using
these seven factors likewise points to the penal nature of these laws. The
statutes squarely meet four of the seven criteria: (I) they involve an
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) they have historically been
regarded as punishment; (3) they promote the xetributive aim of
punishment and implicitly purport to further the goal of deterrence; and
(4) they appear excessive in relation to the alternative purposes assigned
for their imposition. Disability statutes, however, do not fall within the
remaining three criteria: (1) they do not come into play only upon a
finding of scienter; (2) they do not attempt to regulate criminal conduct;
and (3) they may rationally be attributed to an alternative nonpenal
purpose. Absent conclusive evidence of contrary legislative intent, the
application of the Kennedy criteria, on balance, should demonstrate that
most disability statutes have the requisite element of punishment
necessary to be classified as bills of attainder.
Other cases also support the conclusion that civil disability statutes
may be considered punishment for purposes of the bill of attainder
clause. In Cummings v. Missouri,12 a test oath requiring applicants for
177. See notes 1-69 on pages 941-50 supra and accompanying text.
178. See Schofield, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 5 ILL. L. REV. 321,330 n.17 (1911). See
also People v. Russell, 245 I11. 268, 277, 91 N.E. 1075, 1077 (1910) (disabilities constitute part of
punishment).
179. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
180. See Note, supra note 172 at 1889 n.6. But cf. Comment, The Concept of Punitive
Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. Cm.
L. REv. 290 (1965).
181. 372 U.S. at 168-69.
182. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); accord, Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)
(oath required as condition of practicing law).
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various professions to disavow Confederate participation was
invalidated as a bill of attainder since the disclaimers in the oath were
not relevant to the activities in question. The Supreme Court, stressing
that the occupational disabilities were punitively imposed by legislative
act without judicial trial, offered a categorical and egalitarian
explanation of the importance of occupational rights:
The theory upon which institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable
rights-that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and that in
the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions are alike open to
every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any
deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and
can in no otherwise be defined.'1
The Court in United States v. Brown"8 4 expansively interpreted the
concept of punishment by equating it with the mere deprivation of a
right or privilege. The Court rejected the argument that only a
retributive legislative measure can be characterized as punishement:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of 'punishment' to 'retribution.'
Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, rehabilitative, deterrent-and
preventive. One of the reasons society imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep
them from inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any less the
punishment.
. . . Historical considerations by no means compel restriction of the bill of
attainder ban to instances of retribution.lu
By implicitly holding that legislative purpose may be omitted in an
analysis of a statute's punitive nature, Brown supports the proposition
that civil disability laws impose additional punishment under the
Kennedy operation or effect test. Thus, the requirement that a law be
punitive in nature to constitute a bill of attainder seems to be satisfied.
3. Lack of a Judicial Trial.-The lack of a judicial trial in the
imposition of punishment is the final definitional component necessary
183. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 321-22. But see De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (refining
the unqualified language of Cummings by classifying occupation disabilities as a "relevant incident
to a regulation of a present situation").
184. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). The Court ruled that § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964), was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The statute
provides: "No person who is or has been a member of the Communist Party or who has been
convicted of, or served any part of a prison term resulting from his conviction of robbery, bribery,
extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape,
assault with intent to kill, assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury. . . or conspiracy to commit
any such crimes shall serve [in certain official capacities of any labor organization] . . - ." The
exclusionary provisions for felons were not in issue in Brown, but were sustained in De Veau v.
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) and Postma v. Teamster Local 249, 337 F.2d 609 (2d Cir.
1964). Both cases refused to classify the occupational disability penal in nature, a dubious
conclusion in view of Brown.
185. 381 U.S. at 458.
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to invalidate statutes as bills of attainder. The dissent in Brown supports
the proposition that civil disability statutes impose punishment without
a judicial trial. In his dissent, Justice White viewed the disqualification
of Communists from positions in labor unions as indistinguishable from
the civil disability statute upheld in Hawker."6 He maintained that there
was a legislative finding in both cases that the average propensities of a
given class presumptively preclude its members from engaging in
particular conduct. Reasoning from this dissent, it would be possible to
infer that Brown impliedly overruled Hawker and established that any
statute excluding persons from certain activities on the basis of character
or past conduct, without an independent judicial determination, is
invalid as a bill of attainder. The Brown majority, however, did not
equate the two statutes, finding instead that the legislature had specified
the class that should be penalized under the statute in question without
providing for a judicial determination of the individuals capable of
serving in these positions. Although there was a legislative classification
involved in Hawker, the element of judicial determination that was
independent of legislative control prevented the statute from being
classified as a bill of attainder. Thus, the Brown decision does not
provide a constitutional precedent for invalidating civil disability laws
on bill of attainder grounds. In Hawker, the impersonal judicial
determination was outside the control of the legislature, thereby
distinguishing it from Brown and Cummings.'87 Furthermore, the statute
in Hawker relied exclusively on a judicial conviction rather than mere
past conduct.'"
It could be argued that the trial, the only conceivable judicial
determination involved in the imposition of civil disabilities, adjudicates
the issue of guilt or innocence for the specific crime and not the moral
character or fitness underlying the exercise of rights and privileges lost
by civil disabilities.' This approach, however, does not comport with
the classical definition of a bill of attainder, which does not forbid a
legislative classification so long as there is some independent
186. Id. at 469.
187. Commentators are virtually unanimous in supporting this distinction. See Wormuth,
Legislative Disqualifications as Bills ofAttainder,4 VAND. L. REv. 603,613 (1951); Comment, The
Constitutional Prohibition of Bills of Attainder: A Waning Guarantee of Judicial Trial, 63 YALE
L.J. 844,858 (1954).
188. In Hawker, the Court also viewed the statute as prescribing a reasonable qualification
under the due process clause, removing it from the bill of attainder proscription. See Linehan v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 347 U.S. 439 (1954); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
189. Note, supra note 167 at 421. See also Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 347 U.S. 439
(1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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determination of the individuals affected by the statute in question.
Thus, until this third definitional element is further explicated, prior




C. Civil Disabilities as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The inflexible and mandatory burdens imposed by civil disabilities
may be recognized as punishment that contravenes the eighth
amendment.1 91 This conclusion is supported by the implicit degradative
effect of disability laws despite nonpenal justifications for their
existence." 2 The contention that civil disabilities constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, however, has been dismissed in recent decisions. 93
Nevertheless, it can be plausibly argued that since disability laws impose
degrading and excessive punishment and perpetually restrict individuals
because of former criminal status, they conflict with the basic concept
underlying the eighth amendment. This concept embodies "nothing less
than the dignity of man. . . .Fines, imprisonment and even execution
may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is
constitutionally suspect."' 94
1. Degrading and Excessive Punishment.-As early as 1888, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that occupational disabilities imposed on
a druggist, convicted of failing to keep records of liquor sales, violated
190. A recently docketed case, challenging the constitutionality of the Hiss Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 2282-88 (1964), as amended 5 U.S.C. §§ 8311-22 (Supp. IV, 1969), which prohibits
the payment of annuities to government employees convicted of certain offenses, may allow the
courts to further expand on the bill of attainder formula. The plaintiff, Alger Hiss, convicted in
1950 of perjury, is seeking a monthly annuity of $61 based on his tenure in government service. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1970, at 29, col. I (city ed.).
191. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The provision has been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514 (1968).
192. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 347,354 (1968).
193. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967). But cf. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal.
2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966). Green reasoned that disfranchisement was not
punishment, and if it were punishment, the framers of the eighth amendment would not have
regarded it as cruel and unusual. Moreover, the court relied heavily on the large number of states
with disfranchisement provisions.
194. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); see United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social
Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 434 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
generally Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REv. 839 (1969).
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the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'95
In reaching its decision, the court found that the defendant's preclusion
from selling liquor for five years was a penalty involving practical ruin to
him. The excessiveness of the disabilities prompted the following
statement, reflecting the historical perspective overlooked by mod-
ern disability cases:
These punishments have always been regarded as incompatible with our
constitutions, and there can be no doubt that the cruel and unusual punishments
forbidden by the United States Constitution had special reference to the old law of
felony . . . . It is safe to say that throughout the United States . . . any
punishment is unusual which forfeits civil rights . . . . Disabilities to transact
business are almost or quite unheard of in this country.""
The Michigan court's opinion found support from the United
States Supreme Court in a 1910 decision noted for its progressive
construction of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. In Weems v.
United States, 197 a disbursing officer in the Philippines, convicted of
falsifying a government payroll, was fined and sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment at hard labor and was subjected to specific political and
civil disabilitites. The punishment was held to be cruel and unusual since
it was not graduated and proportioned to the offense. The Court's
landmark interpretation was strongly influenced by the imposition of
accessory civil and political disabilities. 9 ' The holding stressed that the
offender, when released, would be subjected to degrading perpetual
limitations on his liberty flowing directly from the sentence.,
The Weems doctrine is particularly relevant in light of the broad
interpretation given the term "felony" in applying civil disability laws.
The practice of arbitrarily attaching the disabilities to felons and not to
misdemeanants emphasizes the labels given to the particular offense
rather than the substantive relationship between the offense and the
195. People ex rel. Robinson v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549,37 N.W. 21 (1888). See also Hoboken v.
Baur, 137 N.J.L. 329, 59 A.2d 809 (1948) (ordinance providing for licensing of sellers of vending
applicances and subjecting violators to fines and jail sentences is unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual punishment for failure to establish standards for all applicants).
196. People cc rel. Robinson v. Haug, 68 Mich. 549,563-64,37 N.W. 21,28 (1888).
197. 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Note, 24 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1910). For the contemporary
implications of Weems see Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970); Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-
Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996 (1964).
198. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,412 (1910) (White, J., dissenting); see Schofield,
supra note 178, at 326.
199. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). The disabilities included depriva-
tion of the rights of parental authority, marital authority, and the administration of property, re-
gistration and work requirements, and absolute disqualification from public office, voting, and
retirement pay. Id. at 364.
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interest protected by the disability.2 As a result, persons convicted of
relatively minor felonies are subjected to disability laws while serious
misdemeanants escape all disabilities. This imposition may violate the
eighth amendment as interpreted in Weems, since the disabilities
imposed are not proportioned to the crime. Weems implicitly recognized
that unrelated disabilities imposed for relatively less severe crimes are
punitive and serve no nonpenal legislative interest.
Further support for this position is found in Trop v. Dulles,fl in
which the Supreme Court held that deprivation of United States
citizenship for military desertion in time of war constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Trop's description of the punishment entailed by
denationalization is analogous to the effect that civil and political
disabilities have on offenders:
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is
instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It
[denationalization] is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it
destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the
development.
2*2
The striking similarity between the effects of denationalization and civil
disabilities indicates that these disabilities should be within the eighth
amendment prohibition enunciated in Trop. Certainly it can be argued
that civil disabilities destroy an individual's political existence. The
Supreme Court, for example, has characterized the right to vote as being
preservative of all rights,203 implying that its deprivation would abolish
the political rights to which all citizens are entitled. By equating the
deprivation of civil rights with denationalization, the Trop reasoning
may be applicable to the disabilities that accompany all criminal
convictions.
2. Punishment for Status.--Statutory penalties that punish an
individual because of his particular status also may violate the eighth
200. In Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596,414 P.2d 412,51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966), the California
Supreme Court found a voting disability not to be violative of the eighth amendment. The court
reached this decision only by limiting the definition of "infamous crimes," the criterion for
imposing the disability, to persons who had been convicted of crimes that evidenced a threat to the
electoral process. The opinion noted that the term "felony" was overinclusive and thus deprived
offenders who did not endanger the public interest of the fundamental right to vote. In declaring a
state statute requiring vasectomies for twice convicted felons violative of the eighth amendment, the
court in Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914), also emphasized the anomaly in using
the blanket term "felony".
201. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
202. Id. at 101.
203. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). For a summary of decisions that
emphasize the fundamental nature of the right to vote see United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp.
234 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 384 U.S. 155 (1966).
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amendment. This issue was faced by the Supreme Court in Robinson v.
California,2 when a California statute imposing a criminal penalty for
narcotics addiction was constitutionally challenged. Reasoning that
addiction is a disease like mental illness, the Court held that a law
making the "status" of a narcotic addict a criminal offense violates the
eighth amendment. While the status of an addict, like that of an ex-felon,
entails no overt antisocial or irregular behavior, it clearly allows a
person to be continuously guilty of the prescribed offense. Civil
disabilities punish the offender because of his status as a former
criminal, even though he may not have exhibited criminal behavior for
many years.25 These disabilities, when imposed on the rehabilitated
offender, seem to fulfill the conditions that resulted in the invalidation of
the statute in Robinson.
D. Civil Disabilities and Due Process
The due process clause provides a flexible method to suppress
unreasonable or arbitrary state action. Even if the state action is taken
to protect a legitimate public interest, a due process objection will be
sustained if the law is unreasonable and will have an adverse effect on
basic liberties. Accordingly, the methods by which civil disabilities are
imposed may be susceptible to several due process objections. First, at
the trial level, the relationship between the nature and circumstances of
the crime and the various rights that are automatically forfeited upon
conviction is never considered. The conviction raises a conclusive
presumption of permanent unfitness to exercise certain rights and
privileges without a substantive evaluatioi of the connection between the
disabilities and the crime. Secondly, various regulatory bodies are
guided either by mandatory disability provisions 206 or admission
standards that lack the objective criteria necessary to establish the
offender's capacity to perform the regulated functions. The best example
204. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
205. For a discussion of the failure of the criminal law to clarify the status of the reformed
offender see Gough, The Expungement of A djudication Records ofJuvenile andA dult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147.
206. In 1928, Professor Ernst Freund, commenting on license revocation, expressed a view
that appears to command a consensus among commentators: "It is a very questionable policy to
make revocation either mandatory upon conviction or an automatic consequence of conviction. The
commission of a crime, even if it is a felony, is no evidence of lack of qualification; and it may not
even be evidence of lack of character . . .. . If conviction perpetually disqualifies, the handicap
under which a discharged offender inevitably suffers will be greatly increased." E. FREUND,
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 125 n.25 (1928); see W. GELLHORN,
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 128 (1956); Note, Entrance and
Disciplinary Requirementsfor Occupatidnal Licenses in California, 14 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1962).
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of the vague standards is the generic "good moral character" test used
as a formula for admission to many occupations, for selections ofjurors,
and for qualifying for other positions of public and private trust. Even
more objectionable are blanket exclusions that fail to provide for even
the most rudimentary procedural safeguards.
Since occupational and professional rights have the most practical
value to individuals, the case law applying due process to civil disabilities
has concentrated on occupational disqualifications. The right to earn a
living and to pursue freely all occupations is recognized as a fundamental
interest that society seeks to protect.2 08 The loss or refusal of an
occupational license constitutes a penalty that impairs personal rights of
liberty and property.20 These rights are defeasible, however, if they are
not arbitrarily or unreasonably revoked or denied. 210 Although the focus
of this section will be on occupational disabilities, the methodology
applies to the imposition of any disability that lacks a direct relationship
to the nature of the crime.
1. Conclusive Presumption of Unfitness.-Most civil disabilities
have the effect of creating a conclusive presumption that the offender is
unfit to perform various functions.21 ' This presumption generally has not
been questioned by the courts. The United States Supreme Court in
Hawker v. New York, 2 for example, sustained a statute excluding
offenders from the medical profession, reasoning that it is common
207. See Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 606, 414 P.2d 412, 422, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 294
(1966) (voting). No attempt is made in this section to distinguish between initial denial and
revocation, although the latter may require more stringent due process standards because the
particular right already has been vested. See Note, Due Process and the "'Right" to a Job, 46 VA. L.
REV. 323 (1960).
208. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
492 (1959); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262 (1932); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,41
(1915); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See generally Monoghan, The
Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L. REv. 157 (1961); Note,
Administrative Law: Right to Hearing Before Refusal of an Occupational License, 17 OKLA. L.
REV. 316 (1964). The fundamentality of other rights that civil disabilities abridge is discussed in text
accompanying notes 291-92 infra.
209. See Spevak v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,515 (1967); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878,882 (1st Cir.
1953) (driver's license an aspect of personal liberty); Note, Administrative Law: Professional and
Occupational Licensing: Standard of Conduct for Administrative License Revocation, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 403,405 (1956).
210. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). See also Garner v.
Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
211. The presumption is best stated in Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884): "The
presumption is, that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative
of great moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage, or to hold office, upon terms of
equality with freemen who are clothed by the State with the toga of political citizenship." Id. at 585.
212. 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1889).
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knowledge that ex-convicts lack the character required to practice
medicine.213 In Heiner v. Donnan,2 4 however, the Supreme Court held
that failure to give a party an opportunity to prove the irrationality of a
statutory presumption violates the due process clause, since changing
circumstances may invalidate assumptions that were once reasonable.
Since civil disability statutes frequently cannot be justified in the context
of modern correctional theory, the same due process requirements found
in Heiner should apply to any proceeding involving the imposition of
disability statutes.
In rebutting the factual foundation for these presumptions, the
offender should be permitted to cast the burden of proving their validity
on the body imposing the disability. In Leary v. United States,25 the
Supreme Court required the prosecution to prove the rationality of a
presumption that mere possession of marijuana is proof of illegal
importation.2 1 6 In its decision the Court emphasized the need for
empirical evidence to prove the validity of the presumption.
2. Direct and Rational Connection. -Serious constitutional
objections to both automatic and discretionary imposition of civil
disabilities have been raised in recent cases restricting state power to use
a criminal arrest or conviction as a disqualifying standard. In Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners,2 7 for example, the Supreme Court narrowly
defined the scope of a state's authority to exclude from certain
professions persons with arrest records. The Court held that
occupational disqualifications must bear a rational connection to the
applicant's fitness to perform the particular function involved.218 The
213. The Hawker court also based its justification for the absolute test on a rule of evidence
that has doubtful validity: "At common law one convicted of crime was incompetent as a witness,
and this rule was in no manner affected by the lapse of time since the commission of the offense and
could not be set aside by proof of a complete reformation." 170 U.S. at 197. Some recent courts
have held that remote convictions may be excluded by the trial judge in determining competency to
testify, thus eliminating the harshness of the common law rule. See, e.g., Brown v. United States,
370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Glubauer v. Smith, 10 Ariz. App. 328,458 P.2d 532 (1969); Dillard
v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 134, 218 S.W.2d 476 (1949). Contra, People v. Smith, 90 Il1. App. 2d 310,
234 N.E.2d 31 (1967); State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,228 A.2d 682 (1967). See also MASS, ANN.
LAWS ch. 233, § 21 (1956) (specifying inadmissibility of felony conviction 10 years from the date
of expiration of the minimum term of imprisonment).
214. 285 U.S. 312 (1932); cf. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6 (1929).
215. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
216. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (invalidating the statutory presumption
that possession of firearms by a convicted person is conclusive evidence of interstate transportation
ofthese firearms); cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,364 n.29 (1970).
217. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). The Court reversed New Mexico's denial of admission to the bar to
an applicant who had been arrested 3 times, heavily weighing the mass of affirmative character
evidence adduced by the applicant against the culpability of his past actions. See also Konigsberg v,
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962).
218. 353 U.S. at 238-39.
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decision implied that the automatic exclusion of a convicted citizen from
a regulated employment opportunity without a consideration of the
nature of his offense could violate the due process clause.219 This holding
appears to compel inquiry by the state into the relationship between the
right or privilege that the offender is seeking to exercise and the crime
that he committed.
The necessity for determining whether a conviction is relevant to the
offender's capacity to perform the duties of a particular occupation also
was emphasized in Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners,m in which
the California Supreme Court held that several convictions arising from
civil rights demonstrations were not determinative of unfitness for
admission to the bar. The court noted that the convictions did not
constitute a threat to the interests protected by the character
requirement-namely the prevention of harm to clients and to the
judicial process. 221 After a thorough analysis of the facts and
circumstances attending the convictions, the court promulgated a direct
and reasonable relationship test:
The nature of these acts, moreover, does not bear a direct relationship to petitioner's
fitness to practice law. Virtually all of the admission and disciplinary cases in which
we have upheld decisions of the State Bar to refuse to admit applicants or to disbar,
suspend or otherwise censure members of the bar have involved acts which bear
upon the individual's manifest dishonesty and thereby provide a reasonable basis
for the conclusion that the applicant or attorney cannot be relied upoll to fulfil the
moral obligations incumbent upon members of the legal profession.m
Thus, according to the California court, it is impermissible to presume
that a past conviction is sufficient proof that an individual is predisposed
to further criminality. In a different context, the United States Supreme
Court also has rejected the presumption of present criminality based on
past criminal acts.223
219. ld. at 243.
220. 65 Cal. 2d 447,421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
221. See Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78
YALE L.J. 1352, 1363 (1969).
222. 65 Cal. 2d at 471,421 P.2d at 93, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (emphasis added).
223. In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), a 9 year-old narcotics sales
conviction and a 5 year-old possession conviction were held insufficient to prove a present readiness
to sell narcotics, particularly in light of the petitioner's evidence that he was attempting to overcome
the narcotics habit at the time. See F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORECTrIONs 83 n.86
(1969). In addition to this criminal decision, the principles derived from subversive activity cases are
analogously useful in refuting the inference of present lack of moral character based on prior
behavior. The subversive activity cases are concerned only with current membership in subversive
organizations and contemporaneous unlawful activities. Past activities might be relevant to
establish a chain from which present bad moral character may be presumed, but past actions alone
do not justify an inference of bad moral character. See De Gregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825
1970]
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The process used by the courts to determine if a direct and rational
connection exists in a particular case focuses on the relevant
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and the interests
sought to be protected by the disability. Numerous cases arising under
the Nationality Act of 1940224 illustrate the intensive scrutiny courts have
given to the facts of individual cases in determining if the present status
and behavior of an individual comports with the interests that the
disability seeks to safeguard. Under this Act, a resident alien could
obtain United States citizenship only if he could demonstrate his "good
moral character" in the five years preceding his application. Although
the opportunity to become a citizen was considered a bare privilege,2
the courts used an "elastic test of good moral character, ' 226 thus
extending due process protections to applicants by requiring a review of
each case on its particular facts. This careful examination resulted in
granting citizenship to aliens either convicted or technically guilty of
first degree murder,m2 voluntary manslaughter, 8 negligent homicide,2 2
assault with intent to commit murder,2 30 attempted automobile
larceny,21 adultery,2 32 and incest.23 In these cases, the courts considered
affirmative evidence of good character; mitigating circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, and evidence of the criminal's
reformation. 234 Realizing that one of the primary functions of
governmental agencies was to assist the rehabilitation of convicted
persons, the courts consistently recognized the potential for
responsibility that each applicant had demonstrated, regardless of the
seriousness of his crime?25 In conjunction with Schware and Hallinan,
(1966); Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 380 U.S. 513 (1965); American Comm. for
Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 380 U.S. 503 (1965); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
(1957); Bell v. Waterfront Comm'n, 20 N.Y.2d 54,228 N.E.2d 758, 281 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1967).
224. 8 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
225. Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926). The responsibilities of citizenship far
outweigh the duty to the public owed by many licensed professions or occupations. Cf. Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
226. E.g., United States v. Cunha, 209 F.2d 326, 329 (1st Cir. 1954).
227. Petition ofSperduti, 81 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1949); In re Balestrieri, 59 F. Supp. 181
(N.D. Cal. 1945).
228. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); In re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44
(W.D. Pa. 1951).
229. In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
230. Marcantonio v. United States, 185 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1950).
231. United States v. Cunha, 209 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1954).
232. Petition of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947).
233. United States v. Francoso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947).
234. E.g., In re Bespatow, 100 F. Supp. 44,45 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
235. E.g., Daddona v. United States, 170 F.2d 964, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 961 (1949); see Petition of Sperduti, 81 F. Supp. 833, 835 (M.D. Pa. 1949) ("A person so
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the nationality cases should compel the courts to give exacting review to
each offender who is denied an opportunity under the "good moral
character" test or under other discretionary standards.
Despite the emergence of the foregoing standards, courts have
almost unanimously upheld civil disability statutes as reasonable
regulations to protect the public interest. After Hawker v. New York,'
each successive case has relied on the often antiquated doctrine of the
immediately preceding decision, resulting in a narrow body of case law
that has never fully incorporated the more individual-oriented principles
of due process.
In Hawker, the Court articulated a broad standard permitting
states to prescribe qualifications for professions that affect the public
interest:
[The state] may require both qualifications of learning and of good character, and if
it deems that one who has violated the criminal laws of the state is not possessed of
sufficient good character, it can deny to such a one the right to practice medicine,
and further, it may make the record of a conviction conclusive evidence of the fact of
the violation of the criminal law and of the absence of the requisite good
character. m
Both the decision and the statute it interpreted can be criticized. Since
the offender's post-conviction character was not considered relevant to
his fitness, the statute disqualified individuals without regard for their
present fitness for the practice of medicine. The broad scope of
legislative discretion approved by the Court, however, may be vitiated by
mitigating language in the opinion recognizing the potential
arbitrariness of an inflexible exclusionary law applied to offenders who
have reformed.?8 Furthermore, the particular crime involved in Hawker
was criminal abortion, which seems directly related to a physician's
fitness to practice medicine.
handicapped [by serving time in prison] and [who] by the exercise of mental and moral courage
acquires good moral character deserves more credit than the person who never had the temptations
and suffered the disgrace of imprisonment and parole .... ").
236. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). In Watson v. Commissioner, 223 A.2d 834 (Me. 1966), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 9 (1967), the court relied on Hawker to sustain a state statute that mandato-
rily excluded any person convicted of certain criminal offenses from receiving a license to operate a
collection agency. As in Hawker, the plaintiff's embezzlement conviction can be considered as
directly related to the protected function.
237. 170 U.S. at 191. An unrelated qualification imposed by a state on an applicant for ad-
mission to a profession deprives that person of his fourteenth amendment right to pursue a
lawful vocation. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
238. 170 U.S. at 197; see Cohen, supra note 223, at 85. Civil disability cases challenging the
Federal Firearms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-09 (1964), demonstrate the judicial reluctance to overrule
the result-oriented precedent of Hawker. The leading case, Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916
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The Hawker reasoning emerged again in 1954 in another case
involving the medical profession. In Barsky v. Board of Regents,,9 the
Supreme Court upheld the six-month suspension of a doctor's license
based on his contempt conviction for failure to produce subpoenaed
papers before the House Un-American Activities Committee. Although
the charges did not relate to the physician's professional capacity, the
Court found that the strict suspension statute was reasonable and did not
violate due process. The Court made no effort to show how the
suspension promoted high professional standards.' ° "[T]he [Barsky]
Court gave great weight to the fairness and flexibility of the New York
procedure for administering discipline and little weight to the substantive
rationality of the statute."?'
Unfortunately, most constitutional challenges to disability statutes
have ifivolved professionals, as in Barsky and Hawker. These cases have
had a substantial impact on laws regulating nonprofessional positions
less infused with public accountability. As a result, many
nonprofessional occupations, often sought by ex-convicts, 212 are subject
to the same strict standards applied to professions.2m In De Veau v.
Braisted,244 for example, the Supreme Court sustained a New York
(1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), rests squarely on the broad holding of Hawker. A
more recent decision, however, intimates that the statute may be unconstitutional since it does apply
to offenses not indicative of unfitness to possess firearms. Reddy v. United States, 403 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1085 (1969). But the holding, as in Hawker, found the defendant
to be within what the court considered would be a properly drawn statutory classification. This
finding obviated an adjudication of the constitutional issues. See also Brown v. Clark, 274 F. Supp.
95 (E.D. La. 1967).
239. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
240. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 775 (1964). Professor Reich sharply
criticizes the Barsky decision as indicative of the one-sidedness of the public interest concept when
wielded by the state so as to erode personal liberties. Also citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
(1960), he examines the judicial tendency to vindicate trivial public policy when government largess
is involved. In Flemming, the Court held that a statute terminating the social security retirement
benefits of the wife of an alien deported for past membership in the Communist Party did not
constitute a taking of property without due process of law. I f such a deprivation could be levied for
prior lawful conduct, it is simple to rationalize the imposition of dramatic deprivations for prior
unlawful conduct. But as Professor Reich notes, Flemming profoundly distorts the concept of the
public interest in a society dominated by government largess. Since this view that treats such largess
as a right has received apparent acceptance (see Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), Barsky
and Flemming should no longer be relied on as precedent for exacting deprivations for past conduct
without a modicum of due process safeguards.
241. Note, supra note 221, at 1364 n.77. This commentary reconciles Schware with Hawker-
Barsky by considering the former case as a contemporary refinement rather than a deviation from
the latter position. Id.
242. E.g., Hirsch v. City and County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 313, 300 P.2d 177
(1956) (sales by public outcry of certain enumerated goods, including jewelry and leather goods).
243. See Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306 (1970).
244. 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (plurality opinion).
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statute2 45 that automatically excluded the offender from a job as
secretary-treasurer of a waterfront labor organization on the basis of his
40-year-old grand larceny conviction. Since this position seemingly does
not require the irreproachable conduct expected by the state of doctors
and lawyers, the Court's holding, on the surface, may be questionable.
The statute in De Veau, however, was enacted after a comprehensive
investigation confirming that corruption on the waterfront stemmed
from "corrupt hiring practices and the fact that persons conducting such
hiring are frequently criminals and persons notoriously lacking in moral
character . "...-246 The De Veau Court supported the legislative
judgment behind the statute because of overwhelming evidence
establishing a causative connection between ex-felons holding union
office and corruption on the waterfront.2 7 In its decision, the Court
indicated that it will sustain a disability law, mandatorily excluding all
persons with a record of criminality, only when a substantial legislative
finding links past criminal acts with present corruptness in a specified
area.2418 Thus, De Veau should not be an obstacle to a due process
challenge of a disability statute that is unsupported by specific causative
evidence. Even if a comprehensive legislative finding supports a statute
on its face,?Al the application of the statute to an individual who poses no
threat to the particular function may lack the minimum rationality
required by the due process clause.21 The remoteness of the defendant's
245. The exclusionary provision was part of New York's Waterfront Commission Act, ch.
882, § 8, [1953] N.Y. Laws, as amended, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 9933 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
246. 363 U.S. at 148.
247. Id. at 159-60; Note, supra note 167, at 417. The Court stressed its commitment to
rehabilitation: "Duly mindful as we are of the promising record of rehabilitation by ex-felons, and
of the emphasis on rehabilitation by modem penological efforts, it is not for this Court to substitute
its judgment for that of Congress and the Legislatures of New York and New Jersey regarding the
social surgery required by a situation as gangrenous as exposure of the New York waterfront has
revealed." 363 U.S. at 158.
248. But cf. Postma v. Teamsters Local 294, 337 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam);
Watson v. Commissioner, 223 A.2d 834 (Me. 1966), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 9 (1967).
249. In Thorn v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub
nom. Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970), a New York law requiring all employees of member firms of national security exchanges to
be fingerprinted as a condition of employment was upheld as a reasonable exercise of the state's
power to deal with the serious problems of theft in the securities business. The lower court
thoroughly documented the evils that gave rise to the statute, noting that it was reasonably
calculated to meet the evils toward which it was directed without any undue burden upon
individuals. This holding squares with the De Veau requirement of legislative exigency and may also
be distinguished from civil disability cases since fingerprinting is a lesser intrusion on individual
liberty than outright denial of a right or privilege.
250. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Reddy v. United States, 403 F.2d 26 (1st
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1085 (1969).
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conviction in De Veau, for example, coupled with the absence of evidence
demonstrating his repeated criminality, raises the issue of whether his
exclusion resulted from an illogical and unreasonable application of a
statute valid on its face.
Judicial reluctance to interfere with administrative decisions further
impedes the application of due process standards to the imposition of
civil disabilities. A recent case using due process reasoning clearly
illustrates the strength of judicial precedent in this area and the tendency
to magnify the state's subjective determination of public interest in
derogation of individual freedom. In Muhammad Ali v. Division of
State Athletic Commission,21 a federal court refused to review the New
York State Athletic Commission decision denying a license to a former
heavyweight champion on the basis of his conviction for draft evasion, a
decision that was still pending appeal. "21 Although the case was reversed
on rehearing on equal protection grounds,213 the court did not reconsider
its due process reasoning. 214 In its first decision the court failed to
scrutinize the nature of the crime as required by Schware. Furthermore,
reference to the historical sensitivity of the boxing profession failed to
include a showing of immediate legislative exigency as was present in De
Veau.2 55 Although an alternative ground for the holding may be
attributed to the court,2 the broad scope of discretion accorded the
Commission "sanction[s] a State's deprivation or partial destruction of
a man's professional life on grounds having no possible relation to
251. 308 F. Supp. II (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd on rehearing, Civil No. 69-4867 (Sept. 14,
1970).
252. The Commission's reason for refusing the license epitomizes the unconfined discretion
vested in licensing bodies: "By refusing to serve his country, Muhammad Ali is guilty of an act
detrimental of the best interests of boxing generally or to the public interest, convenience or
necessity, and therefore not entitled to the privilege of a boxing license which is within the power of
this Commission to grant." Exhibit D, Plaintiff's Brief on Rehearing.
253. See notes 305-07 infra and accompanying text.
254. The court relied heavily on Hawker and economic regulation cases that grant the states
sweeping powers to control regulated employment opportunities. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464 (1948) (statute denying bartending licenses to all women except wives or daughters of male bar
owners valid under equal protection clause); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552 (1947) (statute permitting state-licensed river pilots to be selected on the basis of lineage
valid under equal protection clause).
255. Although no present corruption was documented, the particular sensitivity of the boxing
profession to corrupt influences was recognized: "Even judges have some awareness of the brutal,
corrupt and dirty chapters in the history of this subject." 308 F. Supp. at 16. This peculiar feature of
the boxing profession may bring the result of this case within the De Veau exception for purposes of
the due process clause.
256. The court emphasized that the prospect of a 5 year sentence supplied a rational ground




fitness . . . to pursue his profession." 7 The decision amply illustrates
the danger of automatically according public policy greater weight than
individual rights.75 The concept of rational connection should require a
more balanced approach when the permanent harm to the individual is
considered.
3. Overbreadth of Legislative Infringement.-Many civil
disability statutes may violate the due process clause because they
contain language that is overly broad in light of the interests sought to be
protected. In enacting civil disability laws, states have attempted to
protect the public from corruption in certain areas. In defining the limits
of a state's police power, however, courts have explicitly recognized the
prominence of private interests:
To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public . . . require such interference; and,
second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.219
In cases involving first amendment protections, the Supreme Court has
required states to promulgate the narrowest workable means to
accomplish legitimate legislative ends.2 11 Statutes that broadly stifle
fundamental liberties are invalid when the end can be achieved by
narrower means. 211 Similarly, the Supreme Court has applied this
restrictive standard to cases involving the due process clause when
first amendment rights have not been involved.
2 2
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,26 the Supreme Court applied a
strict standard of review to section 6 of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950.64 The Court reasoned that section 6, which
made it a crime for members of Communist organizations to apply for
257. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442,470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
258. Reich, supra note 240, at 769.
259. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590,594-96 (1962).
260. See Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REV.
254 (1964); Note, Power of the State to Restrict One's Right to Engage in Lawful Occupation, 25
VA. L. REV. 219 (1938); Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842 (1969);
Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 465 (1969).
261. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960); City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,
466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. I (1970).
262. The first amendment aspects of political disabilities subject these to substantial
overbreadth objections. Voting and holding public office have been recognized as forms of political
expression and association deserving stringent protection. E.g.. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968) (public office); United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234,249-50 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 384 U.S.
155 (1966) (voting).
263. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
264. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
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or use a passport, was overly broad and violated due process because it
indiscriminately treated all party members alike regardless of their
threat to the protected interest. As a result, party members were
compelled to choose between their right to unrestricted travel and their
lawful association with the Communist Party. At issue in United States
v. Robel,2 5 was a similar provision of the Subversive Activities Control
Act that forced an individual to choose between his party membership
and a job. Strong precedent existed for the proposition that the right to
hold specific private employment free from unreasonable governmental
interference was a fundamental right within the "liberty" and
"property" concepts of the due process clause. 26 The Court declined,
however, to follow the Aptheker rationale, choosing to base its decision
of unconstitutionality on the first amendment. Although this approach
implies that the Aptheker reasoning may not apply to legislative
restrictions on public or private employment, this reasoning may have
been reserved by the Robel court for a more appropriate factual
situation. 2 7 The Aptheker approach should invalidate a statute that
indiscriminately restricts fundamental rights or employment
opportunities if a more narrow means of protecting the particular
interest exists. Despite the administrative inconvenience, the duty of
determining whether an ex-convict poses a present threat to the function
regulated could be delegated to the courts. Such a method would protect
the rights of individual ex-convicts while preserving the state's interest in
safeguarding the particular right or privilege.
4. Procedural Inadequacies.-In many instances, criminal
offenders are denied rights and privileges without even minimum
procedural safeguards. This lack of protection should be examined in
light of recent cases extending due process rights to both applicants for
and members of various professions3n Perhaps the most significant
development has been the abrogation of the "right-privilege"
distinction,29 which was utilized to deny procedural safeguards on the
ground that mere privileges, as opposed to rights, were not
constitutionally protected. One of the few aberrations in the steady
265. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
266. See cases cited note 208 supra.
267. See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 146 (1968).
268. Should the disability be accepted as penal, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963), requires full due process limitations before the sanction is imposed.
269. See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254,262 (1970); Schwarev. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957); Byse, Opportunity To Be Heard in License Issuance, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 57, 69 (1952); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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progress toward the demise of this distinction is found in Barsky v.
Board of Regents, ° in which the Supreme Court, in upholding a six-
month suspension from medical practice, referred to the practice of
medicine as a "privilege granted by the State." Today, such a
characterization would be an anomoly in light of the exacting standards
of due process required of state administrative bodies. The Court
recently explained the necessity of stringent procedural due process
safeguards:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and
depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the
governmental interest in summary adjudication. Accordingly, as we said in
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961),
'consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.'2'
Certainly, the loss of livelihood by the ex-convict is a sufficiently
compelling private interest to require full procedural protection. This
protection should include confrontation, cross-examination, and a
formal hearing to rebut allegations of bad moral characterY2 Before an
applicant is rejected, the reviewing body should be required to
demonstrate a direct, adverse connection between the applicant's past
criminality and the interest the state seeks to protect.m By scrupulous
adherence to such procedures an ex-convict will be afforded an
opportunity to prove his present fitness before administrative bodies.
5. Vagueness.-Another due process objection to civil disabilities
may arise from the vagueness of the standards used to determine whether
to impose a particular disability. Both the generic "good moral
character" standard and the term "crimes involving moral turpitude"
have been sufficiently interpreted to have an established meaning. zY 4
270. 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
271. Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254,262-63 (1970).
272. See Wiliner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (lawyer);
Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926) (accountant); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S.
165 (1923) (dentist).
273. Cf Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962); Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461,
121 N.E.2d 421 (1954).
274. The Supreme Court, however, has noted the vagueness of the term "good moral
character": "[T]he term, by itself, is unusually ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited
number of ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes, experiences, and prejudices
of the definer. Such a vague qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and
predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and discriminatory denial of the right to
practice law." Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1957) (footnotes omitted); see
LSCRRC v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Motley, J., dissenting), prob.
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Nevertheless, it can be argued that the severity of the disability statutes
requires more exact standards to enable the offender to determine
whether he is legally qualified to perform particular functions.
Penal"15 and regulatory" 6 statutes have been invalidated when they
have been so vague and indefinite that they constituted no standard at
all. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,2"' for example, the Supreme Court
invalidated a state statute allowing jurors to assess costs against
acquitted defendants on the basis of "loose and unlimiting terms" such
as "reprehensible," "improper," and "outrageous to morality or
justice." Although these standards had been judicially interpreted, their
use in this context lacked the requisite certainty demanded by the due
process clause. This reasoning could be applied to those disability
statutes that are characterized by similarly vague standards. The broad
language of the opinion suggests this result, implying that any statute
providing for the deprivation of liberty or property must contain definite
standards, susceptible to objective measurement."7
8
6. Scienter: The Enforcement of Civil Disability Laws.-Most
criminal offenders probably are not fully aware of the specific
restrictions civil disability laws place on their freedom. As a result, they
may resume their normal activities and unknowingly violate specific
statutory prohibitions.279 In People v. DeStefano,m for example, the
Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an ex-convict for
juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3006 (July 14, 1970). A recent decision reflecting thejudicial trend toward
confining the discretion of administrative agencies held that an ordinance that allows a
discretionary judgment of the "good character" of the applicant as a condition precedent to
granting a permit to distribute newspapers was overly vague and unconstitutional on its face.
Strasser v. Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716 (D.R.I. 1970).
275. E.g., Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (wage law); United States v.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (pricing law).
276. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (deportation); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson
v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (commitment to mental hospital); Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302
F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)
(deportation).
277. 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
278. 1966 DUKE L.J. 792, 795. It has been suggested that "[d]enial of admission to the bar
[or any profession or occupation] entails a loss which is far greater than the sum Giaccio paid
($230.95) and carries with it at least as great a stigma as that left on Giaccio's character. It is
therefore also a 'forfeiture' and must be carefully scrutinized for vagueness." Note, supra note 221,
at 1360. One writer notes that the broad discretionary powers vested injury commissioners by virtue
of a "good character" standard may contravene due process by being unduly vague. Note,
The Congress, the Court and Jury Selection: A Critique of Titles I and 1 of the Civil Rights Bill of
1966, 52 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1140-51 (1966); cf. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)
(voting).
279. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9907 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.59 (1967).
280. 64 Ill. App. 2d 389, 212 N.E.2d 357 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 821 (1966); see People
v. Cordovano, 94 II. App. 2d 106,236 N.E.2d 374 (1968).
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illegally attempting to vote, even though he had no knowledge of his
voting disability. The defendant relied on Lambert v. California,2 1
which held that a statute requiring all convicted felons to register with
the police permitted conviction of those who had no knowledge or reason
to know of its provisions, thus violating fundamental principles of due
process; but the DeStefano court distinguished Lamb ert by categorizing
nonregistration his passive conduct and illegally attempting to vote as
positive conduct.282 Such a distinction, however, ignores the scienter
element basic to the Lambert rationale. A recent decision recognized the
problem in attempting to distinguish between passive (nonfeasance) and
active (misfeasance) conduct when the actor has no knowledge of the
controlling statute:
When there is no knowledge of the law's provisions, and no reasonable probability
that knowledge might be obtained, no useful end is served by prosecuting
"violators." Since they could not know better, we can hardly expect that they
should have been deterred. Similarly, it is difficult to justify punishment on other
traditional grounds such as retribution, rehabilitation or disablement. Without
knowledge, the moral force of retribution is entirely spent; we do not rehabilitate
conduct which is by hypothesis not faulty; and there is little to recommend
incarcerating those who would obey the law if only they knew of its existence.2
Until more effective methods are devised to inform offenders of the
rights and privileges lost through civil disability laws, penalties for the
unknowing violation of these statutes seem constitutionally suspect on
due process grounds.
281. 355 U.S. 225 (1957); see Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974,
3 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960). See generally Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police
Control over Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60 (1954).
282. The court also relied on an 1888 Texas decision, Thompson v. State, 26 Tex. App. 94, 9
S.W. 486 (1888), proposing that knowledge of conviction was equivalent to knowledge of
disfranchisement. The DeStefano court admitted, however, that actual knowledge of the voting
disability existed in Thompson, a factor significantly absent in the Illinois decision. 64 I11. App. 2d
at 394, 212 N.E.2d at 360. The maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" was utilized to impute to
the defendant knowledge of all the legal consequences flowing from his conviction. Id. at 399, 212
N.E.2d at 363.
283. United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556,559 (2d Cir. 1970). The defendant, convicted of
violating the federal narcotics laws in 1950, failed to register with customs officials on leaving and
entering the country as required by statute. The court overturned his conviction on the specific
finding that he had no knowledge of the statute. The court expressed hope that the decision would
prompt improved enforcement of the act by stimulating efforts to inform those likely to be affected
by the statute. Additionally, the maxim "ignorance of the law is no excuse" was undercut, the court
noting its inapplicability in cases where there is "ignorance of a malum prohibitum and little known
statutory command that can be found only by going to the statute books .... 420 F.2d at 559
n.5. L'ambert, as interpreted by Mancuso, provides cogent reasoning for overruling DeStefano and
invalidating all convictions under disability statutes that do not adequately provide notice to
criminals upon their release from prison.
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E. Equal Protection and Civil Disabilities
Civil disabilities restrict numerous rights and privileges by means of
broad classifications that include all offenders convicted of certain
crimes. 2" These imprecise classifications 25 generally deprive felony
offenders of numerous rights but do not affect misdemeanants, whose
offenses may directly relate to the interests the disability statutes are
designed to protect.2"
1. Standards of Review.-The traditional equal protection test is
concerned with the rational connection between the particular legislative
classification and the interest the state seeks to protect. 27 This test has
been supplanted by a more exacting standard if the classification affects
a "fundamental right." Under the more stringent standard, the state
interest in perpetuating the classification must be "compelling" in order
to be sustained. 28 A three-step analysis has evolved under the strict
review standard: (1) whether the interests the classifications purport to
protect are legitimate state interests; (2) whether the statute is drawn
narrowly enough to meet the test of necessity;29 and (3) whether the
interest of the state is sufficiently compelling to warrant the resulting




The personal rights that have been singled out as fundamental and
thereby accorded this special treatment "include voting, procreation,
rights with respect to criminal procedure, and, to a lesser degree,
education."' The identification of fundamental interests proceeds on an
284. See DuFresne & DuFresne, The Case for Allowing "Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for
Judges": Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of New York City, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 112 (1969);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the States' Power to Disfranchise Those
Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 297 (1967).
285. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1084-87
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
286. See66CoLUM. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1966).
287. See. e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911) (classification must be "without any reasonable basis"
to be invalidated by the equal protection clause).
288. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Board of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
289. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969). See also United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
290. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). A recent case applied the
strict equal protection test to a state statute providing longer incarceration for women than for men
convicted of similar offenses. After the court explored the state's reasons justifying the
classification, the statute was found to be invidious and violative of equal protection. United States
ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); see United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York,
288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968). Similar scrutiny of civil disability statutes, probing the long
accepted justifications for their existence, is likewise a prerequisite for their invalidation.
291. See Developments, supra note 285, at 1127-28. The right to travel has also been termed
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ad hoc basis with the severity of the detriment serving as the controlling
factor.212 It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that the Court will
recognize that the rights affected by disabilities are "fundamental" in
light of the severe penalties that result from these statutes. Taken in
totality, the disability scheme deprives an ex-convict of most
opportunities to participate in the political, economic, and social
processes of society. These broad deprivations should be scrutinized
under the strict test to determine if they meet equal protection standards.
Application of the strict standard of review should demonstrate the
inequities inherent in these laws. First, as under the traditional standard,
the legitimate state interests must be carefully examined. Secondly, the
necessity for the laws must be measured against their overbreadth and
their arbitrary definition of classes. Denying all felons the franchise, for
example, clearly contravenes the test of necessity since this regulation
restricts the right of those ex-convicts who pose no threat to the
protected interest.
If the traditional test is utilized,2 3 state justifications for disability
laws should not be accepted without an investigation of their factual
foundations. The view that ex-convicts endanger the protected interest of
the state should no longer be a viable justification without empirical
support. It is believed that definitive examinations will reveal that these
laws do not reasonably implement either the retributive or
nonretributive purposes upon which the states have based their
continuation. It is plausible to conclude, therefore, that even under the
traditional test, these statutes will be found utterly lacking in
reasonableness.
2. Application of the Standards.-Two recent cases challenging
provisions that disfranchise criminal offenders have taken different
approaches in discussing equal protection requirements. In Green v.
Board of Elections,24 the Second Circuit sustained a New York statute
disqualifying all felons from voting. The court relied heavily on Supreme
Court dicta approving disfranchisement of convicted citizens,25 but this
fundamental. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). If criminal registration statutes or
occupational restrictions, for example, are found to impede or burden this preferred right, the strict
standard of equal protection review would require the states or municipalities to develop substantial
supportive rationales. The demonstrated inefficacy of these laws indicates that serious constitutional
questions are presented by their perpetuation. See note 357 infra. Likewise, it has been contended
that disqualification from public office should be tested by the strict standard of review. See Turner
v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346,362 (1970).
292. Developments, supra note 285, at 1130.
293. Cf Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,484-86 (1970).
294. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
295. E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,51 (1959).
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authority now seems doubtful in light of more recent decisions
invalidating various state voting qualifications.2 6 The Green court also
relied on a 1935 equal protection case2 t utilizing the traditional standard
of review, but failed to consider recent decisions requiring a strict
standard of review in equal protection adjudications involving voting.298
Although the Green decision can be criticized for the foregoing
reasons, there may be justification for the ultimate result. The offender
in Green had been convicted of "flouting a constitutional statute
designed to prevent violent overthrow of the government."' 9 It may be
inferred that the court considered this serious offense to be directly
related to the exercise of the franchise. The decision contained mitigating
language:
There may, of course, be crimes that would not come within the definition of a
particular state law on exclusion from the franchise. . . or which are of such minor
significance that exclusion for their commission might raise not only a question of
wisdom . . . but even a substantial constitutional question at least if we looked at
§ I of the Fourteenth Amendment alone.3
The Green decision was preceded by Otsuka v. Hite,301 in which the
California Supreme Court interpreted Supreme Court precedent to
require a narrow definition of the term "infamous crime" as a standard
for disfranchisement. In Otsuka, conscientious objectors who pled guilty
to Selective Service violations during World War II were excluded from
voting under a state constitutional provision that disfranchised all
persons convicted of "infamous crimes." The court, on federal
constitutional grounds, 30 2 deemed the interpretation of "infamous
crimes" as felonies to be an unreasonable classification in violation of
the equal protection clause. The court found that there was no
"reasonable relation" between certain felonies, such as wife beating or
conspiracy to operate a motor vehicle without a muffler, and the purpose
of protecting the integrity of the elective process. After narrowing the
meaning of the term "infamous crimes," the court was able to find that
296. See 3 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 423,431 (1968). In a recent challenge to
disfranchisement provisions, Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), affd, 396 U.S.
12 (1969), a 3-judge court found Green and the Supreme Court dicta dispositive of the constitutional
issues without engaging in the requisite equal protection analysis that should accompany denial of
the franchise.
297. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
298. E.g.. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 23 (1969).
299. 18U.S.C. §§ 10-11, 13 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
300. 380 F.2d at 452; see note 404 infra.
301. 64 Cal. 2d 596,414 P.2d 412,51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).




the restriction was sufficiently specific to meet the test of necessity under
the strict standard of review. The court determined that the term
"infamous crime" could be defined consistently with fourteenth
amendment standards if narrowly restricted to focus on the nature of the
crime. The Otsuka opinion, by recognizing the broadness of the felony
classification and utilizing the strict standard of review, comports
closely with Supreme Court decisions invalidating statutes that
arbitrarily deny fundamental rights.?3
3. Unequal Treatment of Offenders.-Some licensing boards,
exercising their broad discretionary authority, often refuse to renew or
issue a license solely on the basis of an applicant's criminal conviction.
Recent developments, however, indicate that the board's action may be
challenged on equal protection grounds if similar licenses have been
granted to other applicants who also possess criminal records. The equal
protection clause guarantees impartiality in the administration of the
law. The Supreme Court has found that "[w]hen the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense. . . it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it has selected
a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." 34 This
reasoning was recently applied in Muhammad Ali v. Division of State
A thletic Commission,3°- in which a federal district court enjoined the
New York State Athletic Commission from denying a former
heavyweight champion renewal of a license to box because of his prior
conviction for draft evasion. The Commission had denied the license on
the basis of the broad "character and general fitness" standards
employed by most licensing bodies. 30 6 An investigation, however,
revealed that the Commission had customarily granted licenses to
hundreds of other applicants convicted of numerous crimes involving
moral turpitude, leading the court to conclude that the Commission's
303. Cf., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (" '[flencing out' from the franchise a
sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible").
304. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964); Yick Wo'v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74
(1886).
305. Civil No. 69-4867 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 14, 1970). The Commission decided not to
appeal the decision. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1970, at 58, col. I (city ed.).
306. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8912 (McKinney 1961) provides in part: "If in the judgment
of the commission the financial responsibility, experience, character and general fitness of an
applicant. . . are such that the participation of such applicant will be consistent. . . with the best
interests of boxing or wrestling generally. . . the commission may grant a license." Additionally,
the commission is expressly empowered to refuse to renew a license, if it finds that the applicant has
been convicted of a crime or is associating or consorting with persons who have been convicted of
crime. Id. § 8917.
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action was an "intentional, arbitrary, and unreasonable
discrimination" against the plaintiff. The court stated:
It is not suggested that any rational basis exists for singling out the offense of draft
evasion for labelling as 'conduct detrimental to the interests of boxing' while
holding that all other criminal activities such as murder, rape, arson, burglary,
robbery and possession of narcotics are not so classified. All other things being
equal, the convicted murderer, burglar, rapist, or robber would seem to present a
greater risk of corruptibility as a licensed boxer, and a greater likelihood of bringing
boxing into disrepute than would a person who openly refused to serve in the Armed
Forces.0
The implications of this decision are twofold. First, licensing bodies
vested with broad discretionary authority apparently can reject all
applicants convicted of crimes without violating the equal protection
clause. This result, however, would deprive many qualified applicants of
the opportunity to earn a living and excel in a chosen profession.M
Secondly, the decision provides a constitutional approach by which
convicted persons can challenge the determination of any licensing body
that rejects them solely because of their criminal record. For this
challenge to be successful, however, an investigation of the past practices
of the determining body would have to reveal that applicants with
criminal records had previously been accepted.
The Ali decision, moreover, should compel licensing bodies to
define their rejection standards more precisely. If evidence of unequal
treatment or inconsistent practices is uncovered, the licensing body
should be required to demonstrate explicitly the particular
characteristics of unfitness that distinguish the individual applicant from
previously accepted offenders who had committed crimes of similar
degree. This standard should prevent the rejection of offenders who have
not committed crimes that are directly related to the interests sought to
be protected unless other factors are present in individual cases.
4. Equal Access to Restoration Procedures.-The equal
protection clause also has been applied to regulate the various state
procedures that provide for the restoration of civil rights lost as the
result of a criminal conviction. A recent decision held that requiring a fee
as a prerequisite for access to the restoration machinery denies equal
307. Civil No. 69-4867, at 11. The court rebutted certain of the Commission's justifica-
tions such as the recentness of the conviction by citing previous instances in which a person
similarly situated, had been granted a license. Furthermore, the court emphasized that granting
plaintiff a license would advance the accepted penological view that rehabilitation should be
commenced as soon after the conviction as possible. Id. at 15.
308. In the course of plaintiff's investigation, for example, it was recorded that Sonny Liston,
former heavyweight boxing champion, was licensed although he had been convicted of armed
robbery and assault with intent to kill. Id. at 5.
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protection to indigents.m This decision also could be applied to the
pardoning power, frequently used to restore civil rights. If it can be
shown that the pardoning power is used arbitrarily to deny some
prisoners their civil rights, an equal protection challenge might lie, even
though a pardon is considered a discretionary privilege. Acceptance of
such a contention is unlikely, however, until the executive pardon power
is subject to judicial review, a development thus far rejected by all courts
that have considered the issue.310
F. Miscellaneous Constitutional Considerations
Other constitutional limitations might be utilized to minimize the
effects of a prior criminal conviction. Since, for example, a convicted
felon cannot be refused permission to speak on a college campus,31' it can
be argued that a prior conviction, if irrelevant to the exercise of a first
amendment right, should likewise be discounted in determining whether
an ex-offender can exercise other equally fundamental rights. A second
contention may arise in the case of a military conviction. Under the
principle of O'Callahan v. Parker,3 1 1 it may be argued that a court-
martial conviction cannot disqualify the offender from exercising his
civil rights because full due process requirements were not accorded in
the trial.313 Finally, the nascent right of privacy may be invoked to nullify
the legal consequences of a criminal conviction.314 A recent California
case concluded that indiscriminate financial disclosure required of
candidates for public office violated the right of privacy.315 It is not
implausible to extend this protection to former criminals who are
required to disclose their past record in practically 'every pursuit they
309. Bynum v. Connecticut Comm'n on Forfeited Rights,410 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969).
310. E.g., Murray v. Louisiana, 347 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1965) (equal protection not
violated where Louisiana refused to accord Missouri pardon the same effect as its own pardon);
Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F2d 770, 779 (4th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 384 U.S. 737
(1966); United States v. Patti, 291 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1961).
311. Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 412 F.2d 1171'(5th Cir.
1969).
312. 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (a serviceman accused of a nonservice-connected crime is entitled to
civilian trial with full procedural safeguards).
313. But see Hodges, The Wayward Serviceman: His Constitutional Rights and Military
Jurisdiction. 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 185 (1970).
314. The entrenched traditional view is exemplified in the reasoning of one court, rejecting a
former prisoner's attempt to expunge his prison records: "[T]he relation to the public of one who
has been convicted of crime is such as to forfeit whatever right of privacy he may be said to have ever
possessed. This is true at least to the extent that the protection of society requires such forfeiture."
Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 150 P. 1122 (1915).
315. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. I
(1970).
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undertake. Reasoning from this recent case, it should not be difficult for
the judiciary to develop a principle allowing offenders freedom from the
consequences of their former convictions.
III. VALIDITY OF CIVIL DISABILItIES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
MODERN CORRECTIONS
The development of correctional science has been characterized by
isolation, inertia, and ill-defined goals.316 As a result, the critical
importance of corrections in the administration of criminal justice was
not recognized until recent years. One difficulty that has traditionally
confronted correctional programs has been the inability to achieve a
satisfactory balance between two major objectives-protection of
society and rehabilitation of offenders.3 1 The dilemma posed by these
conflicting goals is clearly reflected in existing civil disability laws. In the
apparent interest of societal protection, legislatures have seen fit to place
numerous restrictions on activities of convicted criminals, both while
incarcerated and after ,release from prison. Although these laws were
enacted in piecemeal fashion over a period spanning two centuries and
in many instances were founded upon penal concepts that have long since
been discredited, they continue to deprive former convicts of many rights
and privileges exercised by normal citizens. Modern correctional theory,
however, now recognizes that rehabilitation of former offenders can only
be achieved by their complete and rapid reintegration into society.
Fostering community acceptance of ex-convicts is at best a difficult
proposition.318 Moreover, existing disability laws probably reinforce
community hostility and general distrust of former offenders. It is
necessary, therefore, to re-examine both the scope and purpose of these
316. See JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, A TIME To ACT
2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as A TIME To ACT]. Observing the incongruity among correctional goals,
one author has noted: "Ironically, there seems to be a general unawareness that much of the
confusion and inconsistency in correctional objectives and the vacillation in implementing these
objectives is directly attributable to society's indecision regarding the criminal and its failure to
provide the means to utilize existing knowledge or to acquire further knowledge of the variables of
crime to permit optimal treatment." Schnur, Some Reflections on the Role of Correctional
Research, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 772 (1958).
317. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949); Abbot v. Los Angeles, 53
Cal. 2d 674, 687, 349 P.2d 974, 982-83, 3 Cal. Rptr. 127, 135 (1960); Federal Offender's
Rehabilitation Act, 18 US.C. §§ 4082, 4284 (Supp. IV, 1969); Correctional Rehabilitation
Study Act of 1965, 29 U.S.C. § 42 (Supp. IV, 1969).
318. See Lasswell & Donnelly, The Continuing Debate Over Responsibility: An Introduction
to Isolating the Condemnation Sanction, 68 YALE L.J. 869, 896-97 (1959); Patterson, Civil and
Social Barriers to Treatment, 4 NAT'L PAROLE & PROBATION Ass'N J. 268, 270 (1958); accord,




civil disqualifications to determine the extent they obstruct
accomplishment of modern correctional goals. Likewise, these
restrictions must be viewed in light of the urgency of the crime problem
as a whole. The alarming recidivism rates make it clear that
rehabilitation of criminals is one of the most crucial tasks facing our
society.319 It is not suggested that protection of legitimate public interests
should not remain a primary concern. To the extent civil disability laws
serve this purpose, they are justified. The public, however, has a
compelling interest in enhancing the opportunity for post-release success
for the thousands of convicted criminals who return to the community
each year.. It is likely that many of the civil deprivations currently
experienced by ex-convicts only frustrate their chances for
rehabilitation ".3
A. Rehabilitation-The Focus of Modern Correctional Theory
Rehabilitation, the foremost concept of modern correctional
theory'32 utilizes the various disciplines of law, sociology, psychology,
and psychiatry to achieve the social and economic restoration of the
offender.En To realize the goal of rehabilitation, therapeutic and
reformative concepts are employed to treat the offender's needs and
problems and assist his adjustment to the environment he will encounter
upon release from custody.3 2 This treatment is designed to equip the
offender with the social and economic skills that will promote his human
dignity while affording society the protection it desires. Judicial
acknowledgement of the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs 2 is
319. See D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY at v (1967).
320. A sociologist writes: "According to current theory, deviant behavior is most likely to
occur when the sanctions governing conduct in any given social setting seem contradictory ....
Erikson, Notes on the Sociology of Deviance, in THE OTHER SIDE 9 (H. Becker ed. 1964).
321. See, e.g., Abbot v. Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1960)
(rehabilitation paramount legislative policy); ORE. CONST. art. !, § 15 ("Laws for the
punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation and not vindictive justice.");
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 (1964); McGee, " What's Past is Prologue."
381 ANNALS 1 (1969); Mueller, Punishment. Corrections and the Law, 45 NEB. L. REV. 58, 80
(1966).
322. See, e.g., Moeller, Corrections and the Community: New Dimensions, 32 FED.
PROBATION 25, 26-27 (June 1968).
323. See id. at 27; H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 54 (1968).
324. Several scholars, however, have criticized modern correctional theory and its goal of
rehabilitation. They have submitted that rehabilitation is an unrealistic goal. This objection is based
on the proposition that society does not yet know how to rehabilitate offenders. H. PACKER, supra
note 323, at 55. But cf. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
1970] 1219
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
now leading to a recognition that the offender has a right to
rehabilitative treatment.32
Ideally, the process of rehabilitation should attempt to overcome the
bitter feelings that the offender may have developed for society and the
criminal process. In seeking to achieve this goal, correctional programs
include positive measures3 21o that are designed to re-establish the
offender's dignity, enabling him to achieve a new social identity '7 and
re-enter society with confidence and a sense of personal responsibility.
32
Rehabilitation also strives to provide the criminal with an easy
transition from the rigidity of custody to the relative freedom of the
community. Progressive correctional programs are based on a
recognition that assimilation into society is necessary to successful
rehabilitation.32 These programs are designed to involve the community
in the rehabilitation and reintegration of the law violator through the use
of prerelease centers, 3 0 half-way houses,3 3 1 job-skill training, 32
CONTROL 120-21 (1969). Other critics dislike the involuntary nature of rehabilitation and the
consequent deprivation of liberty in furtherance of a generic scheme of social planning. See H.
PACKER, supra note 323, at 57; F. ALLEN, supra note 321 at 37. To other critics, rehabilitation uses
an approach that is as compulsory as punishment and leaves the offender stereotyped and unable to
function as a normal citizen. See, e.g., Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in
CRIMINAL LAW 499 (R. Donnelly, J. Goldstein, & R. Schwartz eds. 1962); Rubin, Illusions of
Treatment in Sentences and Civil Commitments, 16 CRIME & DELIN. 79 (1970); Schrag, The
Correctional System: Problems and Perspectives, 381 ANNALS 11(1969).
325. See generally Penegar, The Emerging "Right to Treatment"-Elaborating the Process
of Decision in Sanctioning Systems of Criminal Law, 44 DENVER L.J. 163 (1967); Note, The
Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and
the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
326. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 51-55 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]. The Commission's recommendation suggests providing the inmate with educational,
vocational, and clinical services as the first stage of rehabilitative treatment. Next, the prisoner will
be provided with an opportunity to reduce the isolation inherent in his institutional setting by
allowing exposure to the community. Programs such as work-release and study-release will be
utilized. Outright discharge is the final stage of this rehabilitative scheme.
327. See E. JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION, AND SOCIerY 527 (1968).
328. See Note, Criminals'Loss of Civil Rights, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 328,339.41 (1963).
329. A comprehensive study conservatively hypothesizes that the recidivism rate for the first 2
to 5 years after release includes one-third of all men released from an entire prison system. D.
GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964). See generally Reitzes,
The Effect ofSocial Environment upon Former Felons, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 226 (1955).
330. Inmates are assigned to prerelease centers for a period of time before release from
prison. Ideally, such centers are centrally located in the community and allow inmates to work in
the community and return to the center at night for consultation and guidance. TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 326, at 68.
331. The half-way house method places preparoled offenders in small correctional
institutions staffed by trained personnel who reintroduce the individual to the community and his
family. See. e.g., Hobbs & Osman, From Prison to the Community, 13 CRIME & DELIN. 317,321
(1967); Turner, The Lessons of Norman House, 381 ANNALS 39 (1969).
332. SeeTASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 326, at 53-55.
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community correctional volunteers, m prisoner aid societies,m and work-
release programs.3
B. Traditional Rationales for Civil Disabilities
The civil disability laws of most states were enacted in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many of the penal and non-
penal rationales that prompted disability statutes have long since been
discredited. An examination of these traditional rationales graphically
illustrates the inconsistencies between civil disabilities and modern
correctional goals.
1. Nonpenal Rationales for Civil Disabilities.-Protection of
society from corruption in specified vital areas has been the primary
nonpenal justification for civil disabilities.36 Supporters of this theory
contend that a criminal conviction indicates that the offender is
incompetent to perform the function regulated by the disability.
Although some disabilities are still necessary to protect society, most
existing disability statutes are questionable because of their
anachronistic features and pervasive application.
Statutes that deprive criminal offenders of many rights and
333. A community correctional volunteer is a member of the community who personally
assists the offender in his re-establishment in society. See Parole, 1967 Survey, 13 CRIME &
DELIN. 209,261 (1967).
334. The Fortune Society, for example, is a lobby dedicated to arousing greater public
awareness of prison conditions and the problems of rehabilitation confronting former prisoners.
Though a private organization, it cooperates closely with correctional agencies. See Rothenberg,
The Fortune Society, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 80 (1968); Samuels, A New Lobby-Ex-Cons. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
335. A work-release program allows prisoners to be employed in the community during the
day and return to the prison in the evening. This concept is designed to ease the inmate's eventual
return to society. See, e.g., Grupp, Work Release and the Misdemeanant, 29 FED. PROBATION 6
(June 1965); Note, Prison Work Release Programs-A Rehabilitative Approach to Sentencing, 1
COLUM. SUR. HuM. RIGHTS 99 (1968); N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1969, at 45, col. 6 (city ed.).
336. See, e.g.. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1960) (protection against
corruption in occupations). The concept of administrative convenience also has been a nonpenal
justification for civil disabilities. This concept places highest priority on internal prison functioning
often in derogation of inmate rights. The doctrine, however, has come under close scrutiny by the
courts because of its potential for misuse. Administrative convenience, expanded to its logical
extreme, could be used to justify numerous restrictive disabilities that are legally and penologically
unacceptable. Thus, when the rationale of administrative convenience is invoked, careful inquiry is
required to determine whether the particular administrative benefit intended by the disability is
greater than its adverse effect on the offender. The judicially formtilated "hands off" doctrine that
allowed correctional administrators maximum discretion in controlling the lives of prisoners is
slowly eroding, and unnecessary deprivations are viewed by the courts as inconsistent with proper
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 985 (1962); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
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privileges are outmoded when compared with the theories and practices
of modern criminal law administration. Legislatures, laboring under
outdated theories of criminal behavior, did not consider the importance
of rehabilitating offenders when they enacted most disability statutes. In
addition, these laws were enacted before the indeterminate sentence,
probation and parole, and other rehabilitative techniques became part of
the American criminal system. 37 As a result, deprivations that are
appropriate only for prisoners are hindering offenders serving their
sentence in the community. Furthermore, the severe hardships caused by
some disability statutes outweigh their limited value in protecting
society.
The goal of societal protection is not advanced by most disability
laws. The overbreadth of these laws creates confusion among judges,.
parole and probation officers, prison personnel, and the officials
responsible for administering the regulated functions. Since these
officials are often unaware of the extent and duration of the forfeitures,33
the inclusive effect that is designed to protect society is lost.
2. Penal Rationales for Civil Disabilities.-Several justifications
for punishing criminal offenders have been used to support statutes that
deprive offenders of many rights and privileges. Traditionally, criminal
punishment has been justified on four bases: retribution; deterrence;
incapacitation; and rehabilitation. Two of these rationales-retribution
and incapacitation-have been used to justify the imposition of civil
disabilities. In addition, deterrence is an implicit rationale for all statutes
imposing sanctions.
(a) Retribution.-Historically, public retribution has been
accepted as a primary justification for the imposition of penal
sanctions.-3 In Europe, political and civil disabilities were considered
additional punishments essentially retributive in nature. This view had a
significant influence on early American legislatures,uI and it has been
suggested that civil death statutes are statutory manifestations of the
337. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 326, at 89; see Note, Legislation-Civil Death
Statutes-Medieval Fiction in a Modern World, 50 HARV. L. REV. 968 (1937); Note, Civil
Death-A New Look at an Ancient Doctrine, I I WM. & MARY L. REv. 988 (1970). See also Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1957) (Brennan, J., concurring).
338. See notes 1-4 on pages 1155-56 supra and accompanying text.
339. See, e.g., D. DRESSIER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 294 (2d cd.
1969).
340. See H. PACKER, supra note 323, at 37. See also Parsons, The Social System, in
CRIMINAL LAW 503 (R. Donnelly, J. Goldstein & R. Schwartz eds. 1962).
341. 1 H. SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND EQUITY 433 n.17 (1921);




retributive function of criminal law. 2 Since revenge is not designed to
strengthen the offender's desire to obey the lawu or to reintegrate him
into society, this rationale seems to conflict with modern correctional
theory.
(b) Incapacitation.-The incapacitation theory advocates the
incarceration of criminal offenders to keep them from committing
further crimes. 4 Civil disabilities are consistent with this theory because
they diminish the offender's capacity to commit crimes, even though he
still has the opportunity to participate in functions or secure positions
that may stimulate his criminogenic impulses and result in repeated
offenses.
The incapacitation theory assumes that only those offenders who
are likely to commit other crimes will be incarcerated.34 Civil disabilities
can be distinguished from incapacitation, therefore,, because of the
dissimilarity between the imposition of the primary sentence and the
imposition of the disabilities. While the prinary sentence is imposed
with the idea of incapacitating the offender for the term deemed
necessary to prevent him from committing additional crimes, civil
disabilities 'lack this selective and variable quality because they are
automatically imposed upon all offenders for an indefinite period. Since
the disabilities are imposed without regard to the nature of the offense,
they have a more attenuated relationship to the offense than does the
prediction upon which the primary sentence is based.
(c) Deterrence.-According to the deterrence theory, criminal
action is inhibited by the use of threatened punitive and monetary
sanctions for specified crimes. For several reasons, civil disabilities were
not intended to and do not serve a deterrent function. First, the economic
origin of many statutes indicates they were not originally intended to
repress crime.3 Secondly, one prominent school of thought concludes
that since criminals do not refrain from criminal conduct-because of the
possibility of even harsh primary punishment, the secondary punishment
imposed by civil disability laws serves no deterrent function.34 Lastly,
342. Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506,516 n.57 (1963).
343. See J. WAITE, THE PREVENTION OF REPEATED CRIMES 27 (1943).
344. See H. PACKER, supra note 323, at 48-50.
345. It is fundamental to note, however, that this prediction cannot be made accurately or
consistently.
346. See notes 30-47 on pages 945-48 supra and accompanying text.
347. See H. PACKER, supra nbte 323, at 40. A recent study by the California Legislature
concluded that there is no evidence to prove that more severe penalties deter crime more effectively
than less severe penalties. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968).
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the difficulty of determining the disabilities imposed in any state,
coupled with widespread public ignorance of criminal penalties, makes
the deterrent function of civil disability laws highly questionable.M8 In
addition to these observations, there is no evidence that states with few
disability statutes have a higher incidence of crime than those with a
myriad of such statutes.34
C. The Impact of Civil Disabilities on Rehabilitation
Civil disability statutes have a significant impact on the lives,
attitudes, and rehabilitation of most criminal offenders. These laws
directly affect the convict by restricting his activities both while he is in
prison and after he has been released into the community. At the same
time, civil disabilities indirectly affect rehabilitative efforts by implicitly
sanctioning community attitudes of mistrust toward all offenders.
Under the guise of societal protection, these laws often encourage
behavior that works to the disadvantage of both the community and the
offender.
1. Direct Effect of Disabilities on the Offender. (a) In-prison
rehab ilitation.-Criticism of the present prison system inevitably centers
on the debilitating effects of prison life on the inmate. By limiting the
offender's contact with the groups and institutions on which he
previously relied for identification, the prison environment fosters a
stigmatized status that replaces his former familial, occupational, and
educational ties.m Civil disabilities contribute to this process by severing
meaningful contacts, restricting many channels of communication with
the outside world, and extinguishing interest in events odcuring outside
the prison environment. Statutes that facilitate the dissolution of an
offender's marriage and permit the forfeiture of parental rights without
his consent, for example, have the effect of closing meaningful lines of
communication. Loss of the right to vote, moreover, may diminish the
inmate's desire to keep abreast of current political affairs since his
ability to influence such events is impaired.S t The psychological impact
of losing these common civil liberties "contributes to ... the
348. The California survey found that the general public displayed a profound lack of
information about criminal penalties while those prsons who had engaged in crime had a more
extensive knowledge of penalties. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DETERRENT
EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS (1968).
349. S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 620-21 (1963).
350. Goffman, Characteristics of Total Institutions, in CRIMINAL LAW 429 (R. Donnelly, J.
Goldstein & R. Schwartz eds. 1962).
351. Isolation from the outside world may foster prison disciplinary problems or violence.




mortification and stripping processes common to total institutions. 352
Standing physically and psychologically stripped of the means of
identification with the outside world, the inmate is compelled to rely
totally on the prison environment for his identity and to look within the
prison for valuable personal relationships. As the offender's re-
identification progresses, the tension between the institutional world and
the outside world is heightened, creating an atmosphere that allows full
management of the inmate's conduct by the prison environment. Once
the reidentification is complete, the offender frequently develops a
hostile and suspicious attitude toward society that makes him
unamenable to rehabilitative programs.
Civil disability laws may influence the prisoner's response to
rehabilitative programs,-even though not directly affecting him during
incarceration. Inmates, for example, frequently become aware of the
detrimental effect that employment and licensing disabilities will have on
their post-institutional life.353 Since the inmate is understandably
reluctant to train for employment when his prospects for legitimate work
are limited,35' the knowledge of employment disabilities may hinder his
adaptation to correctional programs.3 In addition, these disabilities
may prompt a prisoner to become pessimistic about his chances of
leading a law-abiding life upon return to society. These attitudes may
breed recurring deviancy and recidivism.
352. F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECTIONS 66 (1969).
353. See note 355 infra. Most convicts are not accurately informed of the civil disabilities at
the time of their conviction. Although they become aware of these disabilities during incarceration,
they may often continue to hold common misconceptions concerning the legal and civil status of
prisoners. A typical erroneous impression held by the general public is that a person automatically
loses his citizenship upon criminal conviction. Gathings, Loss of Citizenship and Civil Rights for
Conviction of Crime, 43 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1228 (1949); see People v. Russell, 245 111.268,272,91
N.E. 1075, 1076 (1910) ("[a felon] has become an alien in his own country").
354. Cf. Wheeler, Socialization in Correctional Communities, 26 AM. Soc. REV. 697,
699-700 (1961). The author observes that an inmate who accepts an easy prison job rather than a
more difficult one that might be useful on release is not adhering to expectations of rehabilitation.
355. The Vanderbilt Law Review administered an informal, open-ended questionnaire to a
sampling of prisoners at the Tennessee State Penitentiary in Nashville, Tennessee. Information
obtained from the questionnaire is cited to the Vanderbilt Law Review Prisoner Survey, on file with
the Vanderbilt Law Review. The Vanderbilt Law Review Prisoner Survey found that inmates were
overwhelmingly alert to the effect their conviction will have on future job opportunities. These
observations were offered:
"The law states and society agrees that ex-convicts should not hold certain jobs no matter how
much one adjusts or readjusts to society's environment";
"This is my second offense, and when I was released the first time it was hard for me to get a
job anywhere. I tried but it didn't do much good";
"I have heard that an ex-convict wIll have little chance of getting a civil job or banking or any
of the executive fields";
"Ex-convicts have difficulty in securing employment-its [sic] the nature of things."
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Furthermore, the complexity and haphazard application of civil
disability statutes gives the prisoner a feeling of uncertainty about the
status of his civil problems and their eventual outcome. Parole boards
will be reluctant to grant a parole request when the inmate himself is
uncertain about his marital statutes or financial condition,
(b) Post-release rehabilitation.-Once the offender is released
from custody, civil disabilities discourage him from participating in
normal community life by preventing him from engaging in activities
that other members of the community routinely perform. These
disabilities pervade his post-release life, inhibiting his conduct and
according him special treatment in each area regulated. As a
consequence, the offender is segregated from society and cannot pursue
an ordinary life. The offender's life style, for example, is radically
changed by the many occupational and professional disabilities that
frequently prevent him from practicing his former profession and force
him to accept demeaning employment. Moreover, typical requirements
that ex-convicts must register with lqcal authoritiess? may impede some
individuals from travel, even to a nearby town. The prohibition against
356. Comment, Resolving Civil Problems of Correctional Inmates, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 574,
578-79; see Baker, Preparing Prisoners for Their Return to the Community, 30 FED. PROBATION 43
(June 1966).
357. Criminal registration statutes require that persons convicted of enumerated crimes
register with the local police officials after entering the jurisdiction governed by the statute. Most
statutes prescribe that the registration take place within a specified time after arrival. The time
period for registration varies from a few hours to 30 days. The registrant must furnish a detailed
explanation of his past criminal record and his current activities, and often must submit to
fingerprinting and photographing. Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over
Potential Recidivists. 103 U. PA. L. REv. 60, 75-76 (1954).
The purpose of criminal registration statutes is to aid the police in preventing criminal activity.
The statutes are based on the premise that recidivism is a reality. Therefore, the information
provided by the criminal upon registration will be a valuable aid to law enforcement agencies in
locating probable perpetrators of crime. State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26, 27,252 A.2d 720,721 (1969).
Although the alleged purpose of the statutes appears permissible under the states' police power, the
application of the statutes deserves sharp criticism. The registration statutes are frequently used by
the police to harass persons who have a criminal record rather than to aid the police in the
prevention of crime. For a detailed discussion of the harassment tactics employed by the police see
Note, supra at 102-05. Obviously the requirement of registration and the subsequent police
harassment severely burden the released offender's rehabilitative efforts. See Comment, 'Criminal
Registration Ordinances and The Consequences of Judicial Consideration. 19 OHIo S. L.J. 324,
333 (1958).
At least 8 states have enacted criminal registration statutes. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 448,
453 (Supp. 1967) (sex offenders and persons convicted more.than twice of a felony); AIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1271 (1956) (sex offenders); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1955) (sex
offenders); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.13 (1965) (all convicted felons); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2563.7
(Supp. 1968) (all convicted felons);,NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 207.090, .152 (1968) (all convicted
felons and sex offenders); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:169A-I to -2 (1953) (narcotic offenders); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 41-354 (Supp. 1969) (parolees). In addition, many municipalities enact criminal
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released convicts' owning firearms 35 8 may prevent them from
participating in hunting and related sports that serve significant social
functions in many rural areas. In at least one state,35 the offender,
deprived of full contract rights, may be unable to obtain such mundane
necessities as an automobile, home furnishings, or basic self-
improvement tools, such as a correspondence course to further his
education. A felon, in addition, may be unable to obtain or continue his
education because he is automatically excluded from some state
universities.8
These examples illustrate that civil disabilities require ex-convicts to
make drastic readjustments upon their return to the community. The
rare offender who is successfully rehabilitated while incarcerated may
find himself unable to cope with the multiplicity of rules and restrictions
registration ordinances. An extensive survey of municipal ordinances in 1954 revealed that 49 of the
municipalities that responded to the survey had enacted criminal registration laws. Note, supra at
108. Today, however, the results of this survey appear to be a conservative estimate because other
municipalities have enacted similar statutes since 1954. E.g., NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE § 34-2-6
(1967).
The constitutionality of both the state and municipal criminal registration statutes has
generally been upheld despite numerous constitutional challenges. Although the United States
Supreme Court held that the application of criminal registration statutes was an unconstitutional
denial of due process in the absence of actual knowledge by the offender of his duty to register, the
Court's decision did not declare criminal registration statutes unconstitutional per se as long as the
offender has knowledge of the duty imposed by the statutes. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957). It was initially believed that the limitation imposed by Lambert would effectively limit the
use of criminal registration statutes; the Lambert decision, however, has not curtailed the operation
of the statutes. Comment, supra at 325-26. Recently, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of that state's criminal registration statute. Atteberry v. State, 438 P.2d 789 (Nev.
1968). The constitutional challenges which have been rejected by the courts include: (1) the denial of
due process, Atteberry v. State, 438 P.2d 789 (Nev. 1968); (2) the denial of the right to free travel
under the privileges and immunities clause, State v. Ulesky, 100 N.J. Super. 287, 241 A.2d 671
(Monmouth County Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 54 NJ. 26, 252 A.2d 720 (1969); (3) uncon-
stitutional as a bill of attainder and ex post facto law, id.; (4) the denial of equal protection of the
law. Note, supra at 105; and (5) unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable application of a
state's police power, id. at 98-102.
Two municipal criminal registration ordinances, however, have been declared unconstitutional
on the grounds that the area of criminal registration was pre-empted by state legislation. In State v.
Ulesky, 54 NJ. 26, 252 A.2d 720 (1969), rev'g 100 NJ. Super. 287, 241 A.2d 671 (Monmouth
County Ct. 1968), the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the state's laws on probation, parole,
and criminal registration of narcotic offenders manifest a complete legislative scheme in the area
of supervision of criminals that precluded local ordinances in this area. In Abbott v. City of Los
Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674,349 P.2d 974, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1960), the California Supreme Court used
similar reasoning to reach the same result.
358. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 922(0, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (Supp. IV, 1969), amending 15
U.S.C. § 902(e) (1964).
359. See notes 744-50 on pages 1033-34 supra and accompanying text.
360. North Texas State University, for example, will not admit persons convicted of a felony
who are not free of the sanctions of the court. Houston Chronicle, Aug. 22, 1970, at 8, col. 7.
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imposed upon release.3 1 Additionally, since civil disabilities only directly
affect a small segment of the community, the inmate who becomes fully
institutionalized while imprisoned may recidivate so that he can return
to a social structure where all persons are treated equally.32 The goal of
allowing the released offender to develop a normal life will be impossible
to achieve as long as he must remain an unequal member of society,
forced to follow a restrictive pattern of conduct.
Civil disabilities also have a significant effect on the attitudes of
released convicts. By denying offenders access to the norms of
community living, civil disabilities deter their full socialization in
society.3 As a result, the offender loses any self-respect he may have
retained during incarceration .3  In addition, when an ex-convict is
unsuccessful in seeking legitimate employment, he may develop feelings
of frustration and rejection that can find expression in antisocial
behavior.3 Similarly, the offender's inability to vote, serve as a juror, or
hold public office prevents him from appreciating the society to which he
returns. Psychologists have recognized that "no more fiendish
punishment could be devised . ..but if every person we met 'cut us
dead,' and acted as if we were nonexisting things .... "36 This feeling
of rejection both reinforces the pessimistic view of societal authority that
convicts often form in prison67 and heightens their lack of faith in
society.3 This sense of rejection may produce a feeling of estrangement
from the institutions that foster the development of law-abiding
conduct.39
2. Indirect Effect of Disabilities on the Offender. (a) The public's
361. Margolin, Postinstitutional Rehabilitation o the Community Offender: A Community
Effort, 31 FED. PROBATION 46, 49 (Mar. 1967); Reinhardt, The Discharged Prisoner and the
Community, 21 FED. PROBATION 47 (June 1957).
362. Cf. State v. Huffman, 207 Ore. 372, 377-80, 297 P.2d 831, 833-35 (1956) (defendant
actively protests release from prison).
363. See Reinhardt, supra note 361.
364. E. JOHNSON, supra note 327, at 620. See generally Edminson, Civil Rehabilitation, 27
CAN. B. REV. 1091 (1949).
365. A study based on the operations of the only employment agency in Britain for former
prisoners concluded that the inability to obtain employment is directly related to repeated crime.
The results demonstrated the necessity of utilizing the ex-prisoner's capabilities in jobs that would
provide sufficient remuneration to allow an adequate start for rehabilitation. The employment
agency, for example, had placed a former embezzler as an accountant, with satisfactory results.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1969, at 72, col. I (city ed.).
366. See Slovenko, supra note 341, at 538 n.42, quoting W. JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY 293 (1890).
367. Id. at 460.
368. See Schrag, supra note 324, at 1i, 18.
369. TASK FORCE REPORT 326, at 7; cf Faia, Alienation, Structural Strain, and Political
Deviancy: A Test of Merton's Hypothesis, 14 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 389 (1967).
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ambivalent reaction to corrections.-The offender who is released from
a correctional institution will face a public with ambivalent views on
crime and corrections. The general public agrees with rehabilitative
methods of treating criminals, yet its emotional fear of released
offenders colors its overall response. A 1967 survey concluded that 72
percent of the adult population supported rehabilitation as the primary
goal of correctional agencies.30 Sixty percent of the public consider
finding employment as the ex-offender's most serious difficulty, while 42
percent think that being accepted and trusted in the community is a
major obstacle to reintegration.' Despite these expressions indicating a
philosophical commitment to rehabilitation and a knowledge of the
problems faced by ex-convicts,32 this survey also found adverse attitudes
controlling the public's actual response to released offenders. In
response to a questionnaire, most businessmen stated that they would
hesitate to hire a person who had a criminal record. For example, 43
percent of those surveyed admitted they would hesitate to hire as a
janitor an offender who had shot someone in an armed robbery; 54
370. JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, THE PUBLIC LOOKS
AT CRIME AND CORRECTIONS 7 (1968). The survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates,
utilized a national sample of adults and teenagers.
371. Id. at 13.
372. A 1949 survey concluded that most offenders felt that specific disabilities made it more
difficult for a man with a criminal record to be a good citizen and earn a decent living. Tappan, Loss
and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, in YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL PROBATION AND
PAROLE ASSOCIATION, CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH TREATMENT 86, 89 (1952), citing Wallerstein,
Testing Opinion of Causes of Crime, 28 Focus 103 (July 1949). The results of the Wallerstein
questionnaire are reprinted below. The answers represent responses by 223 business and
professional men and 258 men with criminal records who were living in New York. The results
indicate the percentages of businessmen and ex-offenders who believe that the particular disability
listed will hinder the offender in becoming a "good citizen" and securing a "decent living."
Disability Businessmen Ex-Offenders
Loss of voting rights 74% 88%
Difficulty in getting driver's license 78% 92%
Difficulty getting other occupational
license (barber, plumber, bartender) 78% 93%
Difficulty getting professional license
(doctor, accountant) 55% 63%
Difficulty getting civil service jobs 64% 69%
Difficulty getting bond 63% 85%
Loss of civil rights Uury service, etc.) 56% 74%
Use of criminal record in court testimony 61% 94%
There is no reasonable basis to conclude that these figures are not as valid in 1970 as they were in
1949.
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percent would hesitate hiring him as a salesman; 63 percent, as a
supervisor; and 71 percent, as a clerk handling money n
Civil disability laws may negatively influence the public's
ambivalent response to the ex-convict by sanctioning overt
discrimination in areas vital to his reintegration into society.", By
focusing on all ex-convicts as a class, disability laws may justify and
reinforce the public's reluctance to aid ex-convicts and accept its
responsibility in the "collaborative regime" of corrections. Society's
response to corrections must be transformed by a broad program of
community education and orientation on progressive penal policy. Yet
the perpetuation of civil disabilities will continue to create a
preoccupation with the worst traits of the ex-convict, who might not
have evinced antisocial behavior for many years.376
(b) Stigmatization and social degradation.-The ex-prisoner re-
enters a world vastly different from the one he experienced in prison.
Although correctional personnel have attempted to prepare the inmate
for his release, the community has not been so educated. The community
initially reacts to the releasee with distrust, suspicion, and hostility.3 77
Civil disabilities play a significant role in fostering these attitudes by
affixing an additional stigma on the offender's already inferior status.3 78
These disabilities trigger a societal response that groups all offenders
together and ostracizes them, despite personal differences and all
attempts to reintegrate them into the community.3 7 The United States
373. JOINT COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL MANPOWER AND TRAINING, THE PUBLIC LOOKS
AT CRIME AND CORRECTIONS 15 (1968).
374. One writer has recognized the persistence of discrimination against ex-convicts: "For
the most part groups that are discriminated against are able to organize legitimately for counter
action. Not so the former inmates. Counter action gets them arrested. The discrimination against
such people may be very subtle." Reinhardt, supra note 361, at 47; see Note, Employment of
Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 306,317 (1970).
375. The collaborative regime is a new concept that entails increased communication in the
correctional institution among custodial staffand inmates. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 326, at
1I. As corrections moves into the community, the lay public ideally will cooperate with correctional
workers and offenders, thus adding a new dimension to the collaborative regime.
376. E.g., De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (the Court affirmed the statutory
exclusion of the plaintiff from union office on the basis of a 40-year-old grand larceny conviction
resulting in a suspended sentence).
377. Menninger, The Criminal Law System, 45 NEB. L. REv. 22,30 (1966).
378. See E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 319-21 (7th ed. 1966);
S. RUBIN. supra note 349 at 150; Neithercutt, Consequences of "Guilty," 15 CRIME & DELIN. 459
(1969).
379. See J. WAITE, supra note 343, at 30-31; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543,545
(1960); Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A
Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q..147; Swartz, Punishment and Treatment of Offenders, 16
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Supreme Court recently recognized that the inferior status of the
convicted person and the diminution of his legal personality is directly
promoted by civil disabilities.3 10 Correctional' officials also have
observed the stigma to which the offender is subjected by his forfeiture of
civil and economic rights.31 In recognition of the stigma attached to civil
disabilities, the judiciary characterizes them by such expressions as "the
badge of 'convict,' ' 382 "the brand of iniquity,' 3 3  "indelible
disgrace,' " 4 and "stain on his reputation."
Civil disabilities also renew or perpetuate the status degradation of
the trial by legitimating continued state interference in the ex-convict's
life long after his release from imprisonment. Status degrddation in the
criminal process is officially entrusted to the courts,1 where the trial
and conviction focus public denunciation upon the offender.
Unfortunately, this status degradation outlasts his discharge from the
criminal process. The lack of a status elevation ceremony, a terminal
procedure that cuts off stigma, has been recognized as a significant flaw
in the criminal system.3 The rarely used and inadequate restoration
procedures do not provide the symbolic ceremony necessary to confer
public respect on the. rehabilitated offender. Instead, civil disabilities
allow the public 'to equate the primary criminal sanction, which should
terminate at discharge from correctional custody, with the post-prison
status of the offender. This further facilitates the characteristics of the
statui degradation ceremony.3
Civil disabilities operate as a causative factor in social degradation
by promoting what one writer has termed the "management of status"
in the community.38 ' According to this theory, community attitudes
BUFFALO L. Roy. 368, 374-75 (1966); cf. Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing, and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 550,555-56.
380. Carafasv. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574
(1960). See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
381. S. RUBIN, supra note 349, at 162 n.1.
382. United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp.'601,608 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
383. Webb v. County Court, 113 W. Va. 474,476, 168 S.E. 760,761 (1933).
384. United Statesy. Waddell, 112 US. 76, 82 (1884). See also United States v. Hines, 256
F.2d 561,563 (2d Cir. 1958).
385. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502,519 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting); see Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946) (stigma attached to conviction of
juvenile will remain for life).
386. A status degradation ceremony is defined as: "Any communicative work between
persons, whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into something looked on as lower
scheme of social types .... Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61
AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 420 (1956); see Goldstein, supra note 379, at 590.
387. Goldstein, supra note 379, at 590; Gough, supra note 379.
388. Erikson, supra note 320, at 16-17.
389. Schrag, supra note 324, at 11.
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prevent offenders from attaining a higher station in life than those
without a criminal background. Civil disabilities visibly mark the
offender as automatically unworthy and unfit for the performance of
certain functions. This badge helps to shape society's concept of the
lawbreaker and demonstrates to the offender that he is not free to pursue
an ordinary life. Licensing and public- office disabilities, for example,
appear to implement and preserve this social phenomenon. Because the
ex-convict is often limited in his occupational choice to jobs that society
views as menial,310 he is accompanied by a life-long inferior status.
The public then views all ex-convicts as holding menial jobs and imme-
diately characterizes the entire class as members of the lower stratas
of society.39' Until the machinery of status management is dismantled by
enlightened public opinion, the imposition of civil (disabilities will remain
an arbitrary societal control over the status of convicted persons.
It is not suggested that the removal of civil disabilities will prevent
all societal disapproval. Careful reconsideration of their relevance in the
rehabilitative process can, however, lead to the elimination of many
disabilities that adversely shape attitudes toward prisoners. The
disabilities now imposed allow the community to concentrate its punitive
predilections on the class of people who can least afford to be treated in
any way less than normal. Although the tremendous force of public
opinion and established custom will no doubt remain as a sanction
against the hard-core offender,- the present civil disability statutes
solidify public sentiment against the criminal, causing all law violators
to suffer. This result is not desirable since it creates a permanent class of
outcasts who can never be assimilated into the main stream of
community life.3 13 Strict application of disabilities in accordance with a
direct relationship test may allow public opinion to distinguish between
390. An empirical study established that the social stigma of a prison record would severely
prejudice the employment opportunities of unskilled workers upon release from prison. Swartz &
Skolnick, Two Studies of LegalStigma, in THE OTHER SIDE 107 (H. Becker ed. 1964).
391. See H. BECKER, OTrrSIDERS 31-35 (1963). A recognized theory of antisocial behavior
suggests that deviance is not inherent but is conferred by the audiences that react to perceptions of
the person's conduct. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 327, at 617. Thus, civil disabilities, by reflecting
society's response to the criminal, may cause the former prisoner to think that he is expected to
commit criminal acts.
392. The need for community education regarding corrections is necessary so that public
opinion will not be formed in the existing informational vacuum. A TIME TO ACT, supra note 316, at
67.
393. The isolating effect of civil disabilities finds its origin in early attempts to banish the
offender from the community. In isolating the offender from the citizenry, civil disabilities relegate
the suffering of the offender to a position secondary in importance to the public's interest in pro-
tecting its political and social institutions. It is axiomatic that assimilation is not promoted
by this device (civil disability laws) for maintaining social distance. See E. SUTHERLAND
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offenders who are rehabilitated and those who will continue to pose-a
threat to the social order.3 4
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The foregoing discussion points out the need for major alterations
in the present system of regulating the civil rights and privileges of
convicted criminals. Although some disabilities adversely affect the
convict while he is in prison, the disabilities that are most objectionable
prevent the offender from becoming a normal citizen in the community
upon his release from prison. In addition to the need for uniformity
among jurisdictions, remedial action of a threefold nature is required.
First, the entire scheme of civil disabilities must be re-examined and
restrictions that are not necessary to protect the public must be
eliminated. Secondly, existing provisions that call for the blanket
application of disabilities must be replaced by procedures whereby a
convicted criminal will lose only those rights and privileges that are
directly related to the nature and severity of his criminal offenses.
Thirdly, imaginative measures are needed to ensure that the disabilities
imposed are removed as soon as the convict's rehabilitative progress
indicates this action is warranted.
A. Elimination of Unnecessary Restrictions
The threshold problem of determining which civil disabilities are
necessary must be approached with the recognition that disabilities can
only be justified when they are needed to protect the public. When
measured against this standard, it is clear that many existing restrictions
of convicts' rights and privileges are without foundation. This holds true
whether the convict is incarcerated'or has been released from prison.
Statutes that deny convicts the capacity to contract, for example, serve
no public purpose. General contract law is adequate to prevent
corruption in this area. Equally objectionable are those provisions that
deprive an individual of property rights upon criminal conviction. With
the exception of those few situations in which an offender's wrongdoing
clearly warrants forefeiture of a particular property interest, such as
denying a killer's right to inherit from his victim, divesting a convict of
& D. CRESSEY, supra note 378, at 321, 651-52; cf Garabedian, Challenges for Contemporary
Corrections, 33 FED. PROBATION 3, 5-6 (Mar. 1969). In addition, this permanently excluded group
will be predominantly youthful. The highest median age for major felony offenses was 32.8 for
embezzlement and fraud. The median age dropped to as low as 16.9 for auto theft. The majority of
offenders was concentrated around the age of 20. D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON
AND PAROLE SYSTEM 469 (1964).
394. Seepage 1235 infra.
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his property, whether it be personalty or a vested pension, can serve no
legitimate purpose. Nor is the public interest served by prohibiting the
convict from suing in court. Likewise, the practice of barring certain
convicts from testifying in court cannot bejustified in the public interest.
Standard cross-examination and impeachment techniques are adequate
safeguards. Moreover, as the Uniform Rules of Evidence recognize, a
witness's prior criminal record should not be admissable for
impeachment purposes unless his past offenses connote a lack of
veracity.1 5 To deny absolutely the legal effect of a convict's word can
work hardship on innocent parties, the vindication of whose rights
depend on the convict's testimony.
The conclusion that the disabilities just discussed can no longer be
justified on any rational basis gains support from the fact that a number
of states have deleted them from their statutes. Six states, for example,
have repealed civil death statutes since 1959. 311 There remain, however, a
number of civil disabilities that are unmistakably related to the public
interest. Undoubtedly, there are instances when convicted criminals
should be barred from voting, jury service, holding offices of public and
private trust, and engaging in public ahd licensed employment.
Similarly, conviction of certain crimes will justify forfeiture of domestic
rights. Clearly, these restrictions must be available to protect the public
in appropriate situations. The problem is to determine when the
imposition of disabilities is justified in individual cases.
B. Reasonable Application of Necessary Restrictions
As already observed, most civil disability laws are unnecessarily
broad. Many of these provisions automatically deprive the convicted
criminal of rights and privileges with no consideration of his past
history, the nature and circumstances surrounding his offenses, and his
record of rehabilitation. What is needed is a rational and equitable
procedure for imposing civil disabilities that will prevent injustice to
convicted criminals but provide adequate protection for the interests of
society that may be endangered by the criminal behavior of convicts.
This will require development of more realistic standards for
395. UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 21.
396. Alabama: § I, [1965] Ala. Acts 1st Ex. Sess. 381, repealing ALA. CODE tit. 61, § 3
(1958); Kansas: ch. 180, § 21-4701, [1969] Kan. Laws, repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-118
(1964); Maine: ch. 276, [1959] Me. Pub. Laws, repealing ME. REV. STAT. ch. 154, § 20 (1954);
Minnesota: ch. 753, art. Ii, § 17, [1963] Minn. Laws, repealing MINN. STAT. § 610.34 (1961); New
Hampshire: ch. 289, § 2, [1967] N.H. Laws, repealing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:8 (1955);
Vermont: No. 83, [1963] Vt. Acts, repealing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7005 (1958).
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determining when restrictions are justified and efficient procedures for
applying these standards to individual convicts.
1. The Direct Relationship Test.-Since the only justification for
imposing disabilities is the need to protect the public, the sole question
for determination should be whether an individual's criminal past clearly
demonstrates his unfitness to exercise the rights and privileges of normal
citizens. A disability, therefore, should be imposed only when a convict's
offenses bear a direct relationship to the functions and responsibilities of
the right or privilege. For reasons already discussed, the direct
relationship test is not recommended for divorce, adoption, and
dependency statutes. The test should be incorporated, however, in all
other constitutional and statutory provisions that call for the denial or
suspension of rights or privileges upon conviction of a crime. This can be
accomplished either by expressly limiting disqualification to specific,
directly related crimes or simply establishing the direct relationship
requirement in general terms. Either approach avoids the overly broad
classifications that are currently found in most disability provisions.
Under the direct relationship standard, a person convicted of voting
fraud, for example, would be denied the right to vote because his crime is
directly related to this function. Similarly, a physician convicted of
illegally performing an abortion would be prohibited from practicing
medicine. The person convicted of involuntary manslaughter, however,
would not be deprived of the right to vote as the result of this conviction,
since his crime does not demonstrate unfitness to perform the function of
voting. Moreover, an implication of general untrustworthiness, which
may arise because of a criminal conviction, should not normally satisfy
the direct relationship standard.
2. Applying the Direct Relationship Test.-Under existing
procedures, many civil disabilities are automatically imposed upon
conviction without notice to the offender. Thus, a convict may not learn
of a deprivation until he tries to exercise the right or privilege, which may
be many years following his conviction. More importantly, this
arbitrary imposition of disabilities precludes consideration of convicted
criminals on an individual basis. For these reasons, it is essential that
states establish procedures requiring application of the direct
relationship test to individual offenders before rights or privileges are
denied. The propriety of imposing most disabilities is an appropriate
subject for judicial determination. When the determination is more
properly the function of an administrative agency, such as the refusal or
revocation of occupational licenses, the direct relationship standard can
1970] 1235
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
be incorporated in the agency's regulations. Moreover, agency
adherence to the direct relationship test can be ensured by an expanded
scope ofjudicial review.
(a) Judicial determination.-The appropriate forum for
determining whether a convicted criminal should forfeit rights and
privileges is the sentencing court. With the exception of exclusion from
licensed occupations, all disabilities essential to public protection can be
properly considered and decided as a matter of law by the sentencing
judge. The appropriateness of determining these matters at the
sentencing stage was recognized by the draftsmen of the proposed New
Federal Criminal Code in their recommendation that disqualification
from federal office or employment upon conviction of a crime be
discretionary with the sentencing judge . 97 Similarly, the American Bar
Association Advisory Committee on Sentencing and Review recently
recommended that the sentencing court be empowered to determine the
collateral disabilities imposed upon probated offenders both during and
after the term of probation.3 8 By a determination at the sentencing stage
of which civil rights and privileges are lost, the rehabilitation of the
offender will be aided because he will become aware of his legal status
and can more intelligently and accurately plan for his future. In
addition, the sentencing judge can most efficiently apply the direct
relationship test because he will be familiar both with the offender and
the circumstances of his crime.
The court should follow a two-step procedure in determining
whether the imposition of disabilities is justified. First, the court should
decide which civil rights and privileges are directly related to the
offender's crime. Secondly, the court, after considering the offender's
history and any other relevant information, should use its discretion to
decide whether the public interest requires the suspension of these
directly related rights or privileges. Under this procedure, no person
convicted of a crime in the state will lose any civil rights or privileges
unless there is a direct relationship between his crime and the
particular right or privilege. Moreover, it is not mandatory that the
sentencing court deprive an offender of directly related civil rights or
privileges. The facts and circumstances of the case may indicate that
societal protection does not require the imposition of disabilities even
though the sentencing court finds that several civil rights and privileges
397. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 3501-02 (1970).




are directly related to the offender's crime. A deprivation of rights or
privileges should terminate if the offender's conviction is reversed on
rehearing or appeal. Moreover, a sentencing court's imposition of
disabilities should be appealable independently of the conviction.
The discussion thus far has concerned in-state convictions. Also to
be considered is the state's policy toward residents who have been
convicted in other jurisdictions. Under current practices, a person
convicted in the courts of other states, the federal system, or a foreign
country may be deprived automatically of certain rights and privileges in
a state where he later establishes residence. 3" In all probability the
foreign offender will be unaware of this deprivation until he attempts to
exercise a right or privilege in the state of new residence. Additional
measures are required, therefore, to provide a judicial determination of
rights and privileges for the individual convicted in a foreign jurisdiction
prior to becoming a resident of the disability-imposing state. Such a
procedure need not be complicated. The judicial determination could
follow the filing of a petition for the declaration of civil rights and
privileges in a court of general criminal jurisdiction. The petition could
be filed by either the foreign offender, upon establishing residency in the
state, or a government agency that intends to prohibit him from
exercising a right or privilege. A simple form capable of completion by
an average citizen without assistance of an attorney would be sufficient.
The hearing could be a nonadversary proceeding in chambers, unless a
party or witness requests representation by counsel. Unless and until the
court imposes a disability, a foreign offender should not normally be
barred from exercising rights or privileges. Should there appear to be
substantial likelihood of public harm if the offender exercises a directly
related right or privilege, however, the court could issue a temporary
restraining order during the pendency of the petition. In hearing a
petition, the court should follow the procedures suggested for
determinations by sentencing courts of disabilities imposed for
convictions within the state. Special emphasis should be placed on the
foreign offender's prison and post-release records. The court's ruling on
the petition also should be subject to appeal.
Both the sentencing court in cases of state convictions and the court
hearing a petition for a declaration of rights and privileges of a foreign
offender should transmit to the offender an official certificate stating
which, if any, civil rights and privileges are lost, the duration of the
deprivation, and the reasons for the court's determination. The offender
399. See notes 142-61 on pages 960-64 supra and accompanying text.
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also should be informed of procedures for restoration of deprived rights
and privileges as well as his right to appeal the court's determination.
The issuance of this certificate will serve the additional purpose of
informing the public of the extent of the offender's civil disabilities. If an
offender is questioned later about the exercise of a civil right or privilege,
he may offer the certificate to show that he was not deprived of that
particular right or privilege. The written statement of the court's reasons
also will provide the offender with information helpful in deciding if the
court's determination should be appealed. Moreover, the appellate court
can use this statement in deciding the legality of the lower court's
decision.
(b) Administrative determination.-Although a sentencing court
or a court hearing a petition for declaration of rights and privileges can
readily determine whether exclusion from public employment is justified,
the denial of occupational licenses and other types of permits is an
appropriate subject for administrative determination. The numerous
abuses inherent in current licensing practice, as well as suggested
measures for general reform, are detailed elsewhere.10 It suffices here to
point out that the incorporation of the direct relationship test in licensing
legislation would place a reasonable limitation on the agency's discre-
tion that has often been misused to the detriment of convicted criminals.
It is recognized that licensing agencies have certain interests that they
should protect, such as the integrity of the profession and the compe-
tence of its members. These interests, however, can be adequately
protected without unreasonable discrimination against convicted crimi-
nals whose crimes are not directly related to the regulated activity.
Under the direct relationship test, the licensing agency would be
required first to determine whether an individual's criminal offense
demonstrates unfitness to participate in the licensed occupation or
activity. Secondly, the agency would determine whether substantial risk
of harm to the community will result unless the license is denied,
suspended, or revoked. In reaching its decision the licensing authority
should be required to consider such additional factors as the individual's
preconviction record, the nature and circumstances of his crime, his in-
prison vocational training and conduct, and his post-release record. The
agency should be required to provide the convict with a detailed
explanation of the reasons for its decision. This requirement will both
force the licensing agency to give careful attention to the criteria
mentioned above and provide the applicant with information to judge
400. See notes 43-66 on pages 1162-68 supra and accompanying text.
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the advisability of an appeal. The licensing agency also should furnish
the convict with a description of the appropriate appellate and
restoration procedures.
A trial de novo should be available to an individual suffering an
adverse decision from a licensing agency. This new trial will permit an
objective determination by a person not bound by the inbred,
discriminatory bihses of many licensing agencies that are too profession-
oriented to give a fair and impartial hearing. Moreover, an expanded
scope of judicial review will likely prompt licensing agencies to apply the
direct relationship test justly so that convicted criminal will be denied
occupational licenses only in those few cases where protection of the
public clearly requires it.
C. Restoration of Rights and Privileges
As already observed, one of the most objectionable aspects of
present civil disability laws is their failure to provide for restoration of
deprived rights and privileges. Only a few states have established
effective restoration procedures.40' Under the disability laws of some
jurisdictions, the convicted criminal is faced with lifetime deprivations
of many rights and privileges. Although conviction of certain crimes
may require imposition of directly related disabilities, it is clear that at
some point the offender's subsequent rehabilitation may justify
restoration of these rights and privileges. When it is recognized that
many disabilities actually impede the convict's rehabilitation, it is
readily apparent that deprived rights and privileges must be restored at
the earliest practical time. It is recommended, therefore, that
constitutional and statutory provisions be amended to provide for the
automatic restoration of all rights and privileges five years after the
convict's release into the community °2 This recommendation presumes
that a convicted criminal is sufficiently rehabilitated and thereby entitled
to be a normal citizen, free of all civil disabilities, if he has lived a crime-
free life in the community for five years. By automatically restoring the
401. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:5(l) (Supp. 1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 137.250(1)
(1969); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (1957), as amended, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 57.078 (Supp. 1969).
402. A legislatively fixed time maximum of 5 years is recommended by the ABA Advisory
Committee on Sentencing and Review for the supervision and revocation of convicted felons
released on probation. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROBATION 21 (Tent.
Draft, Feb. 1970). The proposed revisions to the Federal Criminal Code also include the automatic
termination of collateral disqualifications or disabilities 5 years after the offender has completed his
sentence. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §§ 3501.04 (1970). Although arbitrary, the 5 year period seems to
be a logical time beyond which the suspension of rights and privileges does not benefit society.
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forfeited rights and privileges at the conclusion of this five-year period,
all statutory consequences of a criminal conviction are terminated.
Although licenses refused or revoked because of a criminal conviction
would not be issued automatically at the end of five years, the ex-convict
would no longer be ineligible for licensing solely because of his criminal
record. The five-year period should begin to run as soon as the person is
released into the community, irrespective of whether the release is by
unconditional discharge from prison, parole, or by court-ordered
probation.
It is not suggested that an ex-convict should always have to await
the passage of five years before resuming the role of an ordinary citizen.
Automatic restoration at this time is proposed merely to set a maximum
limit on the period in which rights and privileges may be deprived. Under
the recommended procedures for imposing disabilities, however, courts
would have wide discretion in determining the duration of disabilities.
Considering the crucial role of immediate post-release experiences in the
ex-convict's rehabilitation, it is believed that courts will seldom conclude
it necessary to impose the maximum term for disabilities. Similarly, a
realistic view of released convicts' economic needs should persuade
reviewing courts to limit exclusion from licensed occupations to
situations where it is absolutely necessary to protect the public.
Recognizing that some convicted criminals may be sufficiently
rehabilitated before the expiration of disabilities imposed by the
sentencing, it is recommended that convicts under disabilities be
permitted to petition the court periodically for restoration of deprived
rights and privileges. Just prior to release from prison, for example, a
convict should be authorized to petition the court to consider whether
any of the disabilities imposed at the sentencing stage could be removed
on the basis of his in-prison record of rehabilitation. At regular intervals
thereafter, the convict should be allowed to petition for restoration of
deprived rights and privileges based upon evidence of rehabilitation in
the comillunity. Similarly, licensing agencies should be required to
review periodically license denials and revocations based upon criminal
convictions in order that the convict who has been denied a license can be
afforded an early opportunity to demonstrate his rehabilitation.
Licensing authorities must be required to recognize an ex-convict's
rehabilitation, both while in prison and after his release. There is much
to commend the practice followed in one state where an occupational
license may not be denied on the basis of past criminality if the applicant
has satisfactorily completed prison vocational training for the
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occupation.1 3 No matter what procedures are employed, however, it is
imperative that the ex-convict's progress toward complete rehabilitation
not be retarded by restrictions on his rights and privileges that have long
since served their purpose. The availability of progressive and efficient
restoration procedures will contribute significantly to this end.
D. Conclusion
The foregoing recommendations do not purport to be the only or
necessarily the preferable solutions to the civil problems facing convicted
criminals. Undoubtedly, a more concrete and detailed analysis of
various alternatives will be required. Nor is it suggested that the
premises underlying these proposals are free from doubt. The obvious
benefits of empirical research are notably absent from both the survey
and the evaluation. It is believed, however, that the recommendations
realistically reflect both the urgency of the problem and the scope of
remedial action required. Beyond this, the recommendations mark
certain guideposts for further consideration of this critical subject by
scholars, jurists, and legislators. The need for immediate and thoughtful
action is abundantly clear.04 Until the harsh injustices presently em-
bodied in civil disability laws are eliminated, ex-convicts will continue







403. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23.8 (West Supp. 1970).
404. As this issue was going to press, the New Jersey statute disfranchising citizens convicted
of specified offenses was declared unconstitutional by a 3-judge federal court. The court, applying
a strict equal protection standard of review, based its decision on the "remarkable contrasts in
treatment" produced by the statute. The court noted, for example, that embezzlers were eligible
to vote under the statute, but those convicted of larceny were ineligible. The court found no
explanation as to "[h]ow the purity of the electoral process is enhanced by the totally irrational
and inconsistent classifications." Recent voting rights cases, the court found, have emasculated
early cases ostensibly approving disfranchisement for conviction. The court was not persuaded by
the state's argument that § 2 of the fourteenth amendment grants states the power to disfranchise
convicted citizens. The court held that § 2 does not constitute a restriction on the equal protection
clause in § I of the fourteenth amendment. Stephens v. Yeomans, Civ. No. 1005-70 (D.N.J. Oct.
30, 1970).
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